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
ROUGET DE L'ISLE SINGING THE MARSEILLAISE.

PHOTOGRAVURE AFTER THE PICTURE
BY PILS IN THE LOUVRE.

THE Marseillaise hymn was composed at Strasburg on the night of April 24th, 1792, by Claude Joseph Rouget de L'Isle, then a captain of engineers. On April 25th it was sung at the house of the mayor (Dietrich), copied and arranged for a military band, by which it was performed publicly for the first time at a review of the National guard on Sunday, April 29th. Grove says, in his "Dictionary of Music," that it was sung at a Civic banquet in Marseilles, on June 25th, with such effect that copies of it were printed and distributed to the volunteers then on the eve of starting to Paris. They entered Paris, July 30th, singing it, and they sang it again as they marched to the attack on the Tuileries on August 10th of the same year. The picture by Pils shows the scene of the first rendition by the composer himself, in the mayor's house on April 25th.

Text Matter

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SPECIAL INTRODUCTIONS BY

RT. HON. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, K.C.
SIR GILBERT PARKER, K.T., D.C.L.

International University Society

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THE ORATORY OF ANGLO-SAXON COUNTRIES

By EDWARD A. ALLEN.

(Professor of Anglo-Saxon and English Literature in the University of Missouri).

ENGLISH-SPEAKING people have always been the freest people, the greatest lovers of liberty, the world has ever seen. Long before English history properly begins, the pen of Tacitus reveals to us our forefathers in their old home-land in the North beating back the Roman legions under Varus, and staying the progress of Rome's triumphant car whose mighty wheels had crushed Hannibal, Jugurtha, Vercingetorix, and countless thousands in every land. The Northern ancestors of the English nation were the only people who did not bend the neck to these lords of all the world besides. In the year 9, when the founder of Christianity was playing about his humble home at Nazareth, or watching his father at work in his workshop, our forefathers dealt Rome a blow from which she never recovered. As Freeman, late professor of history at Oxford, said in one of his lectures: "In the blow by the Teutoburg wood was the germ of the Declaration of Independence, the germ of the surrender of Yorktown." Arminius was our first Washington, "*haud dubie liberator*," as Tacitus calls him, the saviour of his country.

When the time came for expansion, and our forefathers in the fifth century began the conquest and settlement of the island that was to become their New England, they pushed out the Celts, the native inhabitants of the island, just as their descendants, about twelve hundred years later, were to push out the indigenous people of America, to make way for a higher civilization, a larger destiny. No Englishman ever saw an armed Roman in England, and though traces of the Roman conquest may be seen everywhere in this country to-day, it is sometimes forgotten that it was the Britain of the Celts, not the England of the English, which was held for so many centuries as a province of Rome.

The same love of freedom that resisted the Roman invasion in the first home of the English was no less strong in their second home, when Alfred with his brave yeomen withstood the invading Danes at Ashdown and Edington, and saved England from becoming a Danish province.

It is true that the Normans, by one decisive battle, placed a French king on the throne of England, but the English spirit of freedom was never subdued ; it rose superior to the conquerors of Hastings, and in the end English speech and English freedom gained the mastery.

The sacred flame of freedom has burned in the hearts of the Anglo-Saxon race through all the centuries of our history, and this spirit of freedom is reflected in our language and in our oratory. There never have been wanting English orators when English liberty seemed to be imperilled, indeed, it may be said that the highest oratory has always been coincident with the deepest aspirations of freedom.

It is said of Pitt,—the younger, I believe,—that he was fired to oratory by reading the speeches in Milton's 'Paradise Lost.' These speeches—especially of Satan, the most human of the characters in this noble epic—when analyzed and traced to their source, are neither Hebrew nor Greek, but English to the core. They are imbued with the English spirit of Cromwell, with the spirit that beat down oppression at Marston Moor, and ushered in a freer England at Naseby. In the earlier Milton of a thousand years before, whether the work of Cædmon or of some other English muse, the same spirit is reflected in Anglo-Saxon words. Milton's Rebel is more polished and classical, but the spirit is essentially one with that of the ruder poet ; and this spirit, I maintain, is English.

The dry annals of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles are occasionally lighted up with a gleam of true eloquence, as in the description of the battle of Brunanburh, which breaks forth into a pæan of victory. Under the year 991, there is mention of a battle at Maldon, between the English and the Danes, in which great heroism must have been displayed, for it inspired at the time one of the most patriotic outbursts of song to be found in the whole range of English literature. During an enforced truce, because of a swollen stream that separated the two armies a messenger is sent from the Danes to Byrhtnoth, leader of the English forces, with a proposition to purchase peace with English gold. Byrhtnoth, angry and resolute, gave him this answer :—

“Hearest thou, pirate, what this folk sayeth ? They will give you spears for tribute, weapons that will avail you nought in battle. Messenger of the vikings, get thee back. Take to thy people a sterner message, that there stands a fearless earl, who with his band will defend this land, the home of Æthelred, my prince, folk and fold. Too base it seems to me that ye go without battle to your ships with our money, now that ye have come thus far into our country. Ye shall not so easily obtain treasure. Spear and sword, grim battle-play, shall decide between us ere we pay tribute.”

Though the battle was lost and Byrhtnoth slain, the spirit of the man is an English inheritance. It is the same spirit that refused ship-money to Charles I., and tea-money to George III.

The encroachments of tyranny and the stealthier step of royal prerogative have shrunk before this spirit which through the centuries has inspired the noblest oratory of England and America. It not only inspired the great orators of the mother country, it served at the same time as a bond of sympathy with the American Colonies in their struggle for freedom. Burke, throughout his great speech on Conciliation, never lost sight of this idea :—

“ This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English colonies probably than in any other people of the earth. The people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. England, sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored her freedom. The colonists emigrated from you when this first part of your character was most predominant ; and they took this basis and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas and our English principles. . . . The temper and character which prevail in our colonies are, I am afraid, unalterable by any human art. We cannot, I fear, falsify the pedigree of this fierce people, and persuade them that they are not sprung from a nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates. The language in which they would hear you tell them this tale would detect the imposition ; your speech would betray you. . . . In order to prove that Americans have no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavouring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate the value of freedom itself ; and we never gain a paltry advantage over them in debate without attacking some of those principles, or deriding some of those feelings, for which our ancestors have shed their blood. . . . As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom they will turn their faces towards you. The more ardently they love liberty the more perfect will be their obedience. Slavery they can have anywhere—it is a weed that grows in every soil. They can have it from Spain ; they may have it from Prussia. But until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity, freedom they can have from none but you.”

So, too, in the speeches of Chatham, the great Commoner, whose eloquence has never been surpassed, an intense spirit of liberty, the

animating principle of his life, shines out above all things else. Though opposed to the independence of the colonies, he could not restrain his admiration for the spirit they manifested :—

“ The Americans contending for their rights against arbitrary exactions I love and admire. It is the struggle of free and virtuous patriots. . . My Lords, you cannot conquer America. You may swell every expense and every effort still more extravagantly ; pile and accumulate every assistance you can buy or borrow ; traffic and barter with every pitiful little German prince that sells and sends his subjects to the shambles of a foreign prince ; your efforts are forever vain and impotent. If I were an American as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country I would never lay down my arms—never—never—never ! ”

Wherever the principle of Anglo-Saxon freedom and the rights of man have been at stake, the all-animating voice of the orator has kept alive the sacred flame. In the Witenagemot of the earlier kings, in the Parliament of the later kings, in the Massachusetts town-meeting and in the Virginia House of Burgesses, in the Legislature of every State, and in the Congress of the United States, wherever in Anglo-Saxon countries the torch of liberty seemed to burn low, the breath of the orator has fanned it into flame. It fired the eloquence of Sheridan pleading against Warren Hastings for the down-trodden natives of India in words that have not lost their magnetic charm :—

“ My Lords, do you, the judges of this land and the expounders of its rightful laws, do you approve of this mockery and call that the character of justice which takes the form of right to execute wrong ? No, my Lords, justice is not this halt and miserable object ; it is not the ineffective bauble of an Indian pagoda ; it is not the portentous phantom of despair ; it is not like any fabled monster, formed in the eclipse of reason and found in some unhallowed grove of superstitious darkness and political dismay. No, my Lords ! In the happy reverse of all this I turn from the disgusting caricature to the real image. Justice I have now before me, august and pure, the abstract ideal that would be perfect in the spirits and aspirings of men—where the mind rises ; where the heart expands ; where the countenance is ever placid and benign, where the favourite attitude is to stoop to the unfortunate, to hear their cry, and help them ; to rescue and relieve, to succour and save ; majestic from its mercy, venerable from its utility, uplifted without pride, firm without obduracy, beneficent in each preference, lovely though in her frown.”

This same spirit fired the enthusiasm of Samuel Adams and James Otis to such a pitch of eloquence that “ every man who heard them went away ready to take up arms.” It inspired Patrick Henry to hurl his

defiant alternative of "liberty or death" in the face of unyielding despotism. It inspired that great-hearted patriot and orator, Henry Clay, in the first quarter of this century, to plead, single-handed and alone, in the Congress of the United States, session after session before the final victory was won, for the recognition of the provinces of South America in their struggle for independence.

"I may be accused of an imprudent utterance of my feelings on this occasion. I care not : when the independence, the happiness, the liberty of a whole people is at stake, and that people our neighbours, our brethren, occupying a portion of the same continent, imitating our example, and participating in the same sympathies with ourselves, I will boldly avow my feelings and my wishes on their behalf, even at the hazard of such an imputation. I maintain that an oppressed people are authorized, whenever they can, to rise and break their fetters. This was the great principle of the English revolution. It was the great principle of our own. America-Spanish has been doomed for centuries to the practical effects of an odious tyranny. If we were justified, she is more than justified. I am no propagandist. I would not seek to force upon other nations our principles and our liberty if they do not want them. But if an abused and oppressed people will their freedom ; if they seek to establish it ; if, in truth, they have established it, we have a right, as a sovereign power, to notice the fact, and to act as circumstances and our interest require. I will say in the language of the venerated father of my country, 'born in a land of liberty, my anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes, are irresistibly excited, whensoever, in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom.'"

This same spirit loosed the tongue of Wendell Phillips to plead the cause of the enslaved African in words that burned into the hearts of his countrymen. It emboldened George William Curtis to assert the right to break the shackles of party politics and follow the dictates of conscience :—

"I know,—no man better,—how hard it is for earnest men to separate their country from their party, or their religion from their sect. But nevertheless, the welfare of the country is dearer than the mere victory of party, as truth is more precious than the interest of any sect. You will hear this patriotism scorned as an impracticable theory, as the dream of a cloister, as the whim of a fool. But such was the folly of the Spartan Leonidas, staying with his three hundred the Persian horde, and teaching Greece the self-reliance that saved her. Such was the folly of the Swiss Arnold von Winkelried, gathering into his own breast the points of Austrian spears, making his dead body the bridge of victory for his

countrymen. Such was the folly of the American Nathan Hale, gladly risking the seeming disgrace of his name, and grieving that he had but one life to give for his country. Such are the beacon-lights of a pure patriotism that burn forever in men's memories and answer each other through the illuminated ages."

So long as there are wrongs to be redressed, so long as the strong oppress the weak, so long as injustice sits in high places, the voice of the orator will be needed to plead for the rights of man. He may not be called upon to sound a battle cry to arms, but there are bloodless victories to be won as essential to the stability of a great nation and the uplifting of its millions of people as the victories of the battlefield.

When the greatest of modern political philosophers, the author of the Declaration of Independence, urged that, if men were left free to declare the truth, the effect of its great positive forces would overcome the negative forces of error, he seems to have hit the central fact of civilization. Without freedom of thought and absolute freedom to speak out the truth as one sees it, there can be no advancement, no high civilization. To the orator who has heard the call of humanity, what nobler aspiration than to enlarge and extend the freedom we have inherited from our Anglo-Saxon forefathers, and to defend the hope of the world?

Edward A. Allen

HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH

(*For Biographical Note, see Section i.*)

TO THE FRENCH NATION

(Delivered in London, April 10th, 1916).

THE relations between Great Britain and France have been established happily upon unshakable foundations, and during the testing experiences of this war those relations have become marked by intimacy and affection. We welcome these visits as tending to draw still closer the bonds that unite us, the bonds of the common purpose which we share.

During the last few days the Imperial Chancellor has been appealing once more to the sympathy of the neutral world for the hard case of Germany. Germany has been misunderstood. Her peace-loving purpose has been misconstrued.

The Chancellor declares that on December 9th he had expressed his readiness to enter into peace negotiations, but that then, as now, the enemy declined to consider such a thing. It is worth while to cite the actual language which he used on the occasion referred to. "If I am to speak of peace proposals I must first see the peace proposals of our enemies. If our enemies come to me with peace proposals proper to the dignity and assuring the safety of Germany, then we are always ready to discuss them."

What, therefore, the Chancellor means by a readiness on his part to enter into negotiations is that the initiative should come from us, and the decision rest with him. In other words, we are to assume the attitude of a defeated to a victorious adversary. But we are not defeated; we are not going to be defeated; and the Allies are bound by a solemn pact not to seek or accept a separate peace.

The terms upon which we are prepared to conclude peace are the accomplishment of the purposes for which we took up arms. Those purposes were declared by me as far back as November, 1914, and have been known to the world for more than sixteen months. I said, among other things, that we should not sheath the sword until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.

The Chancellor first misquotes my language, and then proceeds to distort its obvious meaning and intention. Great Britain, and France

also, entered the war not to strangle Germany, not to wipe her off the map of Europe, not to destroy or mutilate her national life, certainly not to interfere with (to use the Chancellor's language) "the free exercise of her peaceful endeavours." We were driven, both here and in France, to take up arms in order to prevent Germany (which for this purpose means Prussia) from establishing a position of military menace and dominance over her neighbours.

On several occasions in the last ten years Germany had given evidence of her intention to dictate to Europe under threat of war, and in violating the neutrality of Belgium she proved that she meant to establish her ascendancy even at the price of a universal war and of tearing up the basis of the European polity as established by Treaty. The purpose of the Allies in the war is to defeat that attempt, and thereby pave the way for an international system which will secure the principle of equal rights for all civilized States.

As a result of the war we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples, and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the over-mastering dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia—nothing more, but nothing less.

There is another aspect of the war to which we have from the beginning attached capital importance. The war began, as I have just said, in the unprovoked invasion and desolation of Belgium. From its first moment, the future fate of the smaller nationalities was seen to be in jeopardy, and the apprehensions which were then aroused have been more than justified by what has happened to Serbia and Montenegro.

We are in this struggle the champions not only of Treaty rights, but of the independent status and free development of the weaker countries. In these circumstances cynicism could hardly go farther than in the Chancellor's claim that it is for Germany (of all Powers) to insist when peace comes upon "giving the various races the chance of free evolution, along the lines of their mother tongue, and of national individuality." Apparently this principle is to be applied—I suppose on the approved Prussian lines—both to Poland and to Belgium.

In regard to the first of these two countries, the Poles have already had some illuminating experiences as to what is meant in Berlin by "free evolution along the lines of the mother tongue." The attempt to Germanise Prussian Poland has been for the last twenty years at once the strenuous purpose and the colossal failure of Prussian domestic policy. No one knows this better than the Chancellor, for he has been in his time one of its principal instruments, as, for example when he tried

to colonize Posen with German-speaking farmers. The use of the Polish language in schools, need I remind you, was restricted until it was only allowed for religious instruction, and finally even this concession was withdrawn, and the little Polish children had to learn to say their prayers in German. The wholesale strike of the children, the barbarous floggings that were inflicted on them, the arrests and imprisonment of their mothers, form a black chapter even in the annals of Prussian culture.

And, coming to Belgium, it is with this record that the Chancellor sheds tears over the fate of what he calls "the long-suppressed Flemish race," and declares it to be the future mission of Germany to secure for them "a sound evolution based on their mother tongue." What, I wonder, do the Flemish race themselves think of the prospect which is so opened out to them?

The Chancellor goes on to say that after the war there must be a *new* Belgium which is not to be a Franco-English vassal, but between whose people and the Germans—who have burnt their churches and pillaged their towns and laid waste their fields and trampled on their liberties—there is to be in the future the "collaboration of neighbours." A new development, indeed, of the theory of the rights and duties of a neighbourhood!

My answer is a very simple one. We, the Allies, desire and are determined to see once again the old Belgium. She must not be allowed to suffer permanently from the wanton and wicked invasion of her freedom, and that which has been broken down must be repaired and restored.

I will not waste many words upon the Chancellor's lame and half-hearted attempt to justify the wholesale use of the submarine for the destruction of lives and property. He speaks of it as a legitimate measure of self-defence against our policy of using our command of the sea to put economic pressure upon our enemies.

The Allies are, of course, in adopting and pursuing that policy, exercising a belligerent right expressly sanctioned by the two greatest German Chancellors, Bismarck and Caprivi, recognised by every fighting Power in the Old World and the New, and they have endeavoured and are endeavouring to mitigate as far as possible the resulting inconvenience to neutral trade. They are prepared to justify the legality of all the measures they have taken as covered by the principles and spirit of international law applied to the developments of modern war. They have been carried out with the strictest regard to humanity, and we are not aware of a single instance of a neutral life lost by reason of the Allies' blockade.

The German submarine blockade of Great Britain was in fact commenced and developed long before our Order in Council of March, 1915. Among other instances the Dutch vessel *Maria* and the American vessel *W. P. Frye*, both carrying food to these islands, were sunk respectively in September, 1914, and January, 1915.

On February 4th, 1915, the German Government declared their intention of instituting a general submarine blockade of the United Kingdom with the avowed purpose of cutting off all our overseas supplies. It was not till March 11th that we announced those measures against German trade which the Chancellor now suggests were the cause of the German submarine policy. I need not dwell upon the flagrant violation which has attended its execution of the elementary rules and practices of international law and of the common dictates and obligations of humanity. Up to this moment it is being ruthlessly carried out, as well against neutrals as belligerents.

It is of the highest importance that we should at once reply to the Imperial Chancellor. It is necessary that we should lose no time in answering these travesties of the facts. We, with our Allies—France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, Japan—have been fighting side by side with clean hands and with clear consciences, and side by side as we have the will, so we are confident that we have the power, to vindicate the liberties of Europe.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

(Delivered at Edinburgh, September 18th, 1914).

A FORTNIGHT ago to-day, in the Guildhall of the City of London, I endeavoured to present to the nation and to the world the reasons which have compelled us, the people of all others who have the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, to engage in the hazards and the horrors of war. I do not wish to repeat to-night in any detail what I then said.

The war has arisen immediately and ostensibly, as every one knows, out of a dispute between Austria and Serbia, in which we in this country had no direct concern. The diplomatic history of those critical weeks—the last fortnight in July and the first few days of August—is now accessible to all the world. It has been supplemented during the last few days by the admirable and exhaustive dispatch of our late Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, a dispatch which I trust everybody will read, and no one who reads it can doubt that largely through the

efforts of my right hon. friend and colleague, Sir Edward Grey, the conditions of a peaceful settlement of the actual controversy were already within sight when on July 31st Germany, by her own deliberate act, made war a certainty.

The facts are incontrovertible. They are not sought to be controverted, except, indeed, by the invention and circulation of such wanton falsehoods as that France was contemplating and even commencing the violation of Belgian territory as a first step on her road to Germany. The result is that we are at war, and we are at war—as I have already shown elsewhere, and as I repeat here to-night—for three reasons. In the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obligations and of what is properly called the public law of Europe ; in the second place to assert and to enforce the independence of free States, relatively small and weak, against the encroachments and the violence of the stronger ; and in the third place, to withstand, as we believe in the best interests not only of our own Empire, but of civilization at large, the arrogant claim of a single Power to dominate the development of the destinies of Europe.

Since I last spoke some faint attempts have been made in Germany to dispute the accuracy and the sincerity of this statement of our attitude and aim. It has been suggested, for instance, that our professed zeal for treaty rights and for the interests of small States is a newborn and simulated passion. What, we are asked, has Great Britain cared in the past for treaties or for the smaller nationalities except when she had some ulterior and selfish purpose of her own to serve ? I am quite ready to meet that challenge, and to meet it in the only way in which it could be met, by reference to history ; and out of many illustrations which I might take I will content myself with two, widely removed in point of time, but both, as it happens, very apposite to the present case. I will go back first to the war carried on at first against the revolutionary Government of France and then against Napoleon, which broke out in 1793 and which lasted for more than twenty years. We had then at the head of the Government in this country one of the most peace-loving Ministers who has ever presided over our fortunes, Mr. Pitt. For three years, from 1789 to 1792, he resolutely refused to interfere in any way with the revolutionary proceedings in France or in the wars that sprang out of them, and as late, I think, as February in 1793, in a memorable speech in the House of Commons, which shows amongst other things the shortness of human foresight, he declared that there never was a time when we in this country could more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace. And what was it that, within a few months of that declaration, led this pacific Minister to War ? It was the invasion of

the treaty rights, guaranteed by ourselves, of a small European State—the then States General of Holland.

For nearly two hundred years the Great Powers of Europe had guaranteed to Holland the exclusive navigation of the river Scheldt. The French revolutionary Government invaded what is now Belgium, and as a first act of hostility to Holland declared the navigation of the Scheldt to be open. Our interest in that matter then, as now, was relatively small and insignificant. But what was Mr. Pitt's reply? I quote you the exact words he used in the House of Commons; they are so applicable to the circumstances of the present moment. This is in 1793:

“England will never consent that another country should arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political system of Europe established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of the Powers.”

He went on to say that

“This House—the House of Commons—means substantial good faith to its engagements. If it retains a just sense of the solemn faith of treaties it must show a determination to support them,” and it was in consequence of that stubborn and unyielding determination to maintain treaties, to defend small States, to resist the aggressive domination of a single Power that we were involved in a war which we had done everything to avoid and which was carried on upon a scale both as to area and as to duration up to then unexampled in the history of mankind.

That is one precedent. Let me give you one more. I come down to 1870, when this very treaty to which we are parties no less than Germany, and which guarantees the integrity and independence of Belgium, was threatened. Mr. Gladstone was then Prime Minister of this country, and he was, if possible, a stronger and more ardent advocate of peace even than Mr. Pitt himself. Mr. Gladstone, pacific as he was, felt so strongly the sanctity of our obligations that—though here again we had no direct interest of any kind at stake—he made agreements with France and Prussia to co-operate with either of the belligerents if the other violated Belgian territory. I should like to read a passage from a speech ten years later, delivered in 1880 by Mr. Gladstone himself in this city of Edinburgh, in which he reviewed that transaction and explained his reasons for it.

After narrating the facts which I have summarized, he said this: “If we had gone to war”—which he was prepared to do—“we should have gone to war for freedom. We should have gone to war for public

right, we should have gone to war to save human happiness from being invaded by a tyrannous and lawless Power. That," Mr. Gladstone said, "is what I call a good cause, gentlemen, though I detest war, and there are no epithets too strong if you will supply me with them that I will not endeavour to heap upon its head."

So much for our own action in the past in regard to treaties and small States. But, faint as is this denial of this part of our case, it becomes fainter still, it dissolves into the thinnest of thin air, when it has to deal with our own contention that we and our Allies are withstanding a Power whose aim is nothing less than the domination of Europe. It is, indeed, the avowed belief of the leaders of German thought, I will not say of the German people, of those who for many years past have controlled German policy, that such a domination, carrying with it the supremacy of what they call German culture and the German spirit, is the best thing that could happen to the world.

Let me, then, ask for a moment what is this German culture? What is this German spirit of which the Emperor's armies are at present the missionaries in Belgium and in France? Mankind owes much to Germany, a very great debt for the contributions she has made to philosophy, to science, and to the arts; but that which is specifically German in the movement of the world in the last thirty years has been, on the intellectual side, the development of the doctrine of the supreme and ultimate prerogative in human affairs of material forces, and on the practical side the taking of the foremost place in the fabrication and the multiplication of the machinery of destruction. To the men who have adopted this gospel, who believe that power is the "be all and end all" of the State, naturally a treaty is nothing more than a piece of parchment, and all the old-world talk about the rights of the weak and the obligations of the strong is only so much threadbare and nauseating cant.

One very remarkable feature of this new school of doctrine, whatever be its intellectual or its ethical merits, is that it has turned out, as an actual code for life, to be a very purblind philosophy.

The German culture, the German spirit, did not save the Emperor and his people from delusions and miscalculations as dangerous as they were absurd in regard to the British Empire. We were believed by these cultivated observers to be the decadent descendants of a people who, by a combination of luck and of fraud, had managed to obtain dominion over a vast quantity of the surface and the populations of the globe. This fortuitous aggregation which goes by the name of the British Empire was supposed to be so insecurely founded, and so loosely knit together that, at the first touch of serious menace from without, it would fall to pieces and tumble to the ground. Our great Dominions were

getting heartily tired of the Imperial connexion. India, it was notorious to every German traveller, was on the verge of open revolt, and here at home we, the people of this United Kingdom, were riven by dissension so deep and so fierce that our energies, whether for resistance or for attack, would be completely paralysed. What a fantastic dream! And what a rude awakening! And in this vast and grotesque, and yet tragic, miscalculation is to be found one of the roots, perhaps the main root of the present war.

But let us go one step more. It has been said, "By their fruits ye shall know them," and history will record that, when the die was cast and the struggle began, it was the disciples of that same creed who revived methods of warfare which have for centuries past been condemned by the common sense, as well as by the humanity, of the great mass of the civilized world.

Louvain, Malines, Termonde. These are names which will henceforward be branded on the brow of German culture. The ruthless sacking of the ancient and famous towns of Belgium is fitly supplemented by the story that reaches us only to-day from our own headquarters, in France, of the proclamation issued less than a week ago by the German authorities, who were for a moment, and happily, for little more than a moment, in occupation of the venerable city of Rheims. Let me read, for it should be put on record, the concluding paragraph of the proclamation:

"With a view to securing adequately the safety of the troops, and to instil calm into the population of Rheims, the persons named below (81 in number, and including all the leading citizens of the town) have been seized as hostages by the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. These hostages will be hanged at the slightest attempt at disorder. Also the town will be totally or partially burned and the inhabitants will be hanged for any infraction of the above.

"By order of the German authorities."

Do not let it be forgotten that it is from a Power whose intellectual leaders are imbued with the idea that I have described, and whose generals in the field sanction and even direct those practices—it is from that Power the claim proceeds to impose its culture, its spirit—which means its domination—upon the rest of Europe. That is a claim, I say to you, to all my fellow countrymen, to every citizen and subject of the British Empire whose ears and eyes my words can reach—that is a claim that everything that is great in our past and everything that promises hope or progress in our future summons us to resist to the end.

The task—do not let us deceive ourselves—the task will not be a light one. Its full accomplishment—and nothing short of full accomplishment is worthy of our traditions or will satisfy our resolve—will certainly take months, it may even take years. I have come here to-night, not to ask you to count the cost, for no price can be too high to pay when honour and freedom are at stake, but to put before you, as I have tried to do, the magnitude of the issue and the supreme necessity that lies upon us as a nation, nay, as a brotherhood and family of nations, to rise to its height and acquit ourselves of our duty.

Our supremacy at sea has not been seriously questioned. Full supplies of food and of raw materials are making their way to our shores from every quarter of the globe. Our industries, with one or two exceptions, maintain their activities. Unemployment is, so far, not seriously in excess of the average. The monetary situation has improved, and every effort that the zeal and the skill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the co-operation and expert advice of the bankers and business men of the country can devise—every effort is being made to achieve what is most essential—the complete re-establishment of the foreign exchanges. Meanwhile, the merchant shipping of the enemy has been hunted from the seas, and our seamen are still, patiently or impatiently, waiting a chance to try conclusions with the opposing Fleet. Great and incalculable is the debt which we have owed during these weeks—and which in increasing measure we shall continue to owe, to our Navy. The Navy needs no help, and as the months roll on—thanks to a far-sighted policy in the past—its proportionate strength will grow.

If we turn to our Army we can say, with equal justice and pride, that during these weeks it has revived the most glorious records of the past. Sir John French and his gallant officers and men live in our hearts as they will live in the memories of those who come afterwards. But splendid achievements such as these—equally splendid in retirement and in advance—cannot be won without a heavy expenditure of life and limb, of equipment and supplies. Even now, at this very early stage, I suppose there is hardly a person here who is not suffering from anxiety and suspense. Some of us are plunged in sorrow for the loss of those we love, cut off, some of them, in the springtime of their young lives. We will not mourn for them overmuch.

“ One crowded hour of glorious life
Is worth an age without a name.”

These gaps have to be filled. The wastage of modern war is relentless and almost inconceivable. We have—I mean His Majesty's Government

have—since the war began dispatched to the front already considerably over 200,000 men, and the amplest provision has been made for keeping them supplied with all that is necessary in food, in stores, and in equipment. They will very soon be reinforced by regular troops from India, from Egypt, and the Mediterranean, and in due time by the contingents which our Dominions are furnishing with such magnificent patriotism and liberality. We have with us here our own gallant Territorials, becoming every day a fitter and a finer force, eager and anxious to respond to any call, either at home or abroad, that may be made upon them.

But that is not enough. We must do still more. Already in little more than a month, we have half a million recruits for the four new Armies which, as Lord Kitchener told the country yesterday, he means to have ready to bring into the field. Enlisting as we were last week, in a single day as many men as we have been accustomed to enlist in the course of a whole year, it is not, I think, surprising that the machinery has been overstrained, and there have been many cases of temporary inconvenience and hardship and discomfort. With time and patience and good organization these things will be set right, and the new scale of allowances which was announced in Parliament yesterday will do much to mitigate the lot of wives and children and dependents who are left behind. We want more men, and perhaps most of all, help for training them. Every one in the whole of this kingdom who has in days gone by, as officer or as non-commissioned officer, served his country never had a greater or a more fruitful opportunity of service than is presented to him to-day.

We appeal to the manhood of the three kingdoms. To such an appeal I know well, coming from your senior representative in the House of Commons, that Scotland will not turn a deaf ear. Scotland is doing well, and, indeed, more than well, and no part of Scotland, I believe, in proportion better than Edinburgh. I cannot say with what pleasure I heard the figures given out by the Lord Provost, and those which have been supplied to me by the gallant gentleman who has the Scottish Command, which show, indeed, as we expected, that Scotland is more than holding her own.

In that connexion let me repeat what I said two weeks ago in London. We think it of the highest importance that, as far as possible, and subject to the accidents of war, people belonging to the same place, breathing the same atmosphere, having the same associations, should be kept together.

I have only one word more to say. What is it that we can offer to our recruits? They come to us spontaneously, under no kind of compulsion, of their own free will, to meet a national and an Imperial need ;

we present to them no material inducement in the shape either of bounty or bribe, and they have to face the prospect of a spell of hard training from which most of the comforts and all the luxuries that any of them have been accustomed to are rigorously banished. But then, when they are fully equipped for their patriotic task, they will have the opportunity of striking a blow, it may be even of laying down their lives, not to serve the cause of ambition or aggression, but to maintain the honour and the good faith of our country, to shield the independence of free States, to protect against brute force the principles of civilization and the liberties of Europe.

STANLEY BALDWIN

(1867-).

STANLEY BALDWIN was educated at Harrow and Trinity College Cambridge. As the Conservative candidate he contested Kidderminster unsuccessfully in the election of 1906 when the Liberal Party gained an overwhelming victory. Two years later, however, he was elected for the Bewdley division of Worcestershire, and has continued to represent that division to the present day.

He was for a time a director of the G.W.R. He acted as private secretary to Mr. Bonar Law, before he joined the ministry in 1917, becoming Financial Secretary to the Treasury. From 1921 to 1922 he was President of the Board of Trade, and from November of the latter year to August, 1923, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

On the ill health and consequent resignation of Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Baldwin agreed to form an administration and in May, 1923, was chosen leader of the Conservative party. In the election of December his new policy of tariffs was rejected by the country and his parliamentary majority turned into a minority. He remained Premier until the meeting of Parliament in January, 1924, when the Labour amendment to the Address brought about the defeat of the Conservatives and placed the Labour party in office. But with the defeat of Mr. Macdonald's administration in the following October, the Conservatives were returned with a clear majority after Mr. Baldwin had disavowed his intention of introducing Protection. He resumed the Premiership in November, 1924.

PEACE AND GOODWILL IN INDUSTRY

Delivered in the House of Commons, March 6th, 1925).

IN some ways this is a very difficult speech for me to make. The matter of the Bill itself digs right into one of the most difficult and fundamental questions in the country to-day, and it touches at various points questions which have interested me during the whole of my working life. I have thought so much about them, and I feel

that I have so much to say about them, that my difficulty will be in choosing the little that I can possibly say to-day and finding words to express clearly to the House what is in my mind.

I often wonder if all the people in this country realise the inevitable changes that are coming over the industrial system in England. People are apt either to get their knowledge of the industrial system from textbooks, which must be half a generation behind, or from some circumstances familiar to them at a fixed and static point in their lives, whereas, as a matter of fact, ever since the industrial system began in this country, it has been not only in a state of evolution, but in a state of evolution that, I think, historians in the centuries to come, when they write its history, will acknowledge to be an evolution that has developed at a far more rapid rate than was visible to the people who lived in these times.

I hope the House will bear with me and forgive me if I draw for a few minutes on my own experience, because it so happens that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of my own life, I have seen a great deal of this evolution taking place before my own eyes.

I worked for many years in an industrial business, and I had under me a large number, or what was then a large number, of men. And it so happened, as this was an old family business, with an old and, I venture to say, very good tradition, that when I was first in business I was probably working under a system that was already passing. I doubt if its like could have been found in any of the big, modern industrial towns of this country, even at that time.

It was a place where I knew, and had known from childhood, every man on the ground; a place where I was able to talk with the men not only about the troubles in the works but troubles at home and their wives. It was a place where strikes and lock-outs were unknown. It was a place where the fathers and grandfathers of the men then working there had worked, and where their sons went automatically, into the business. It was also a place where nobody ever "got the sack," and where we had a natural sympathy for those who were less concerned in efficiency than is this generation, and where a large number of old gentlemen used to spend their days sitting on the handles of wheelbarrows, smoking their pipes.

Oddly enough, it was not an inefficient community. It was the last survival of that type of works which ultimately became swallowed up in one of those great combinations towards which the industries of to-day are tending.

I remember very well the impact of the outside world that came on us, that showed how industry was changing in this country. Nothing

had interrupted the even tenor of our ways for many years, until one day there came a great strike in the coalfields ; it was one of the earlier strikes, and it became a national strike.

We tried to carry on as long as we could, but, of course, it became more and more difficult to carry on, and gradually furnace after furnace was damped down and the chimneys ceased to smoke, and about 1,000 men, who had no interest in the dispute that was going on, were thrown out of work, through no fault of their own, at a time when there was no unemployment benefit.

I confess that that event set me thinking very hard.

It seemed to me at that time a monstrous injustice to these men, because I looked upon them as my own family, and it hit me very hard—I would not have mentioned this only it got into the Press two or three years ago—and I made an allowance to them, not a large one, but something, for six weeks to carry them along, because I felt they were being so unfairly treated.

But there was more in it really than that. There was no conscious unfair treatment of these men by the masters. It simply was that we were gradually passing into a new state of industry when the small firms and the small industries were being squeezed out, and business was all tending towards great amalgamations, on the one side of employers, and on the other side of the men, and when we came in any form between these two forces, God help those who stood outside !

That has been the tendency of industry. There is nothing that could change it, because it comes largely, if not principally, from that driving force of necessity in the world that makes people combine together for competition and for the protection they need against that competition.

Those two forces with which we have to reckon are enormously strong, and they are the two forces in this country to which now to a great extent, and it will be a greater extent in the future, we are committed. We have to see what wise statesmanship can do to steer the country through this time of evolution until we can get to the next stage of our industrial civilisation.

It is obvious from what I have said that the organisations of both masters and men—or, if you like the more modern phrase invented by economists, who always invent beastly words, employers and employees—these organisations throw an immense responsibility on the organisations themselves and on those who elect them, and, although big men have been thrown up on both sides, there are a great many on both sides who have not got the requisite qualities of head and heart for business.

There are many men with good heads and no hearts, and many men with good hearts and no heads.

What the country wants to-day from the men who sit on this side of the House and on that is to exercise the same care as the men who have to conduct those great organisations from inside.

I should like to try to clear our minds of cant on this subject, and recognise that the growth of these associations is not necessarily a bad thing in itself, but that, whatever associations may call themselves, it is the same human nature in both, and exactly the same problems have to be met, although we hear a good deal more of some of those problems than of others.

Now, if you look at an employers' organisation for a moment—and we will assume that it has come into being to protect the industry in the world market—we cannot lose sight of the fact that in that organisation, just as much as in the men's organisation, the mere fact of organising involves a certain amount of sacrifice of personal liberty. That cannot be helped. Everybody knows that perfectly well, both employers and employees.

To a certain extent both these organisations must on one side be uneconomic.

A trade union is uneconomic in one sense of the word when it restricts output and when it levels down the work to a lower level. It is an association for the protection of the weaker men which has often proved uneconomic.

Exactly the same thing happens in the employers' organisation.

Primarily, it is protective, but in effect it is very often uneconomic, because it keeps in existence works which, if left to the process of competition, would be squeezed out, and whose prolonged existence is really only a weakness to the country.

Also it has another very curious effect, not at all dissimilar from that of the trade union reaction which shows that both those organisations are instinct with English traditions. The workmen's organisation is formed to see that under the conditions a workman cannot get his living in a particular trade unless he belongs to that union. An employers' organisation is formed in that particular trade for the protection of the trade, and it has the result of effectively preventing any new man starting in that trade.

In this great problem which is facing the country in years to come, it may be from one side or the other that disaster may come, but surely it shows that the only progress that can be obtained in this country is

by those two bodies of men—so similar in their strength and so similar in their weaknesses—learning to understand each other and not to fight each other.

It is perfectly true that trade unionism has its weak spots. We are primarily discussing trade unions, and that is why I shall content myself to speak about trade unions only. It is perfectly true that my hon. and learned friends (Mr. Macquisten and Mr. Greaves-Lord, who moved and seconded the Second Reading of the Bill) have laid their finger on three points which trade unionists themselves know are their weak spots. That can be seen by the interruptions that came from the Labour Benches.

Those three points are, the question whether in all cases the subject of the levy is treated fairly, the question of the ballot, and the question of book-keeping. To my mind it is impossible to dissociate one of these questions from the other, and they really all hang together.

The whole tradition of our country has been to let Englishmen develop their own associations in their own way, and with that I agree. But there are limits to that. I spoke some time ago—and I spoke with a purpose—about the recognition of the change in the industrial situation in those works with which I was connected, when for the first time what was done in the way of organising the coal strike suddenly came and hit thousands of men who had nothing to do with it and had no direct interest in it.

As these associations come along and become more powerful, on whichever side they are, there may come a time when not only may they injure their own members—about which probably there would be a good deal of argument—but when they may directly injure the State. It is at that moment that any Government should say that, whatever freedom and latitude in that field may be left to any kind of association in this free country, nothing shall be done that shall injure the State, which is the concern of all of us and far greater than all of us or of our interests.

I have not very much more to say. I have just tried to put, as clearly as I can in a few words, my conviction that we are moving forward rapidly from an old state of industry into a newer, and the question is: What is that newer state going to be?

No man, of course, can say what form evolution is taking. Of this, however, I am quite sure, that whatever form we may see, possibly within this generation, or at any rate in the time of the next generation, it has got to be a form of close partnership, however that is going to be

arrived at ; and it will not be a partnership the terms of which will be laid down, at any rate not yet, in Acts of Parliament, or from this Party or that.

It has got to be a partnership of men who understand their own work, and it is little help that they can get really either from politicians or from intellectuals.

There are few men fitted to judge of and to settle and to arrange the problem that distracts the country to-day between employers and employed.

There are few men qualified to intervene who have not themselves been right through the mill.

I always want to see, at the head of these organisations on both sides, men who have been right through the mill, and who themselves know exactly where the shoe pinches, who know exactly what can be conceded and what cannot, and who can make their reasons plain ; and I hope that we shall always find such men trying to steer their respective ships side by side, instead of making for head-on collisions.

Having said what I have said about that, what am I to say about the attitude of the Party of which I have the honour to be the head ?

I do not know whether the House will forgive me if I speak for a minute or two on a rather personal note.

For two years past, in the face of great difficulties, perhaps greater than many were aware of, I have striven to consolidate, and to breathe a living force into my great Party. Friends of mine who have done me the honour to read my speeches during that time have seen clearly, however ill they may have been expressed, the ideals at which I have been aiming.

I spoke on that subject again last night at Birmingham, and I shall continue to speak on it as long as I am where I am.

We find ourselves, after these two years, in power, in possession of perhaps the greatest majority our Party has ever had, and with the general assent of the country. Now how did we get there ? It was not by promising to bring this Bill in ; it was because, rightly or wrongly, we succeeded in creating an impression throughout the country that we stood for stable Government and for peace in the country between all classes of the community.

Those were the principles for which we fought ; those were the principles on which we won ; and our victory was not won entirely by the votes of our own Party, splendidly as they fought. I should think that the number of Liberals who voted for us at the last Election ran into six figures, and I should think that we probably polled more Labour votes than were polled on the other side.

That being so, what should our course be at the beginning of a new Parliament? I have not myself the slightest doubt. Last year the Leader of the Labour Party (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald), when he was Prime Minister, suspended what had been settled by the previous Government, and that was further progress for the time being on the scheme of Singapore. He did it on the ground that it was a gesture for peace, and he hoped that it would be taken as such by all the countries in the world. He hoped that a gesture of that kind might play its part in leading to what we all want to see, that is, a reduction in the world's armaments.

I want my Party to-day to make a gesture to the country of a similar nature, and to say to them: "We have our majority; we believe in the justice of this Bill which has been brought in to-day, but we are going to withdraw our hand, and we are not going to push our political advantage home at a moment like this. Suspicion which has prevented stability in Europe is the one poison that is preventing stability at home, and we offer the country to-day this: We, at any rate, are not going to fire the first shot. We stand for peace. We stand for the removal of suspicion in the country. We want to create an atmosphere, a new atmosphere in a new Parliament for a new age, in which the people can come together. We abandon what we have laid our hands to. We know we may be called cowards for doing it. We know we may be told that we have gone back on our principles. But we believe we know what at this moment the country wants, and we believe it is for us in our strength to do what no other party can do at this moment, and to say that we at any rate stand for peace."

I know, I am as confident as I can be of anything, that that will be the feeling of all those who sit behind me, and that they will accept the Amendment which I have put down in the spirit in which I have moved it. And I have equal confidence in my fellow-countrymen throughout the whole of Great Britain.

Although I know that there are those who work for different ends from most of us in this House, yet there are many in all ranks and all parties who will re-echo my prayer:

"Give peace in our time, O Lord."

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

(1848-).

A VERY learned and philanthropic British lady, who represents the Twentieth Century fully enough to have become an LL.D., was recently asked to mention her "principal recreations" for publication. Her answer on record is: "Philanthropic work with especial reference to the young."

Perhaps without prejudice to the dignity of the Rt. Honourable Arthur James Balfour as one of the most forcible leaders in the public life of his generation, this may be sought out hereafter as the only single sentence at all likely to suggest his versatility. Reckoned up without regard to chronological order, since his busy life began in Scotland (July 25th, 1848), as the eldest son of the late James Maitland Balfour, of Whittingehame, Haddingtonshire, such items as these are only a beginning of the results of intellectual activities so incessant that they compare with those of Macaulay among his predecessors in British intellectual leadership. For him, as for Macaulay, the question, "What has he done?" might be answered most easily by change to "What is there that he did not do?" Whether or not it is considered in part as "recreation with a special reference to the training of the young," it has all been done to the "top of the Balfour bent." As a bachelor who found time for versatility and found abundant recreation in it, Macaulay may be used still further to explain Balfour, at least by contrast; for, beginning as a Commoner, Macaulay in the expression of his political liberality during its last stages in the Peerage may have been as conservative at times as Balfour, the Commoner, ever was at all in leading the vanguard of the Lords in advance, or commanding the rear guard in stubborn retreat.

Education at Trinity College, Cambridge, developed the characteristic talents of the Scotch lairds of Balfour and it developed afterwards through many changes of talent. The Scotch birthright of metaphysical talent might naturally develop into his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," published in 1879, and appear somewhat changed in his "Foundations of Belief," with its sub-title of "Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology," published in 1895, and republished to answer

continued demand in 1901. If such success gave its author more occasion for secret pride than he felt on becoming Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1902, he may have found "recreation" in what for others might have seemed the hardest work of both literature and politics.

The results of talents developed by education of this kind change with increasing education. Mr. Balfour's literary successes are too various for mention, and there is no sameness in them. There has been no change except through increase in the results of the political education which began for Mr. Balfour in his service as private secretary to the Marquis of Salisbury (1878-80) and in his association with the work of Lord Beaconsfield in Berlin (1878).

In all his versatility there is no sign of change from what such a beginning represents in "Conservative education," up to the highest. It appeared throughout his service in Parliament, beginning in 1874. It was shown whether he was acting as Leader of the House or Leader of the Opposition. As Chief Secretary for Ireland (1887-91), Leader of the House of Commons and First Lord of the Treasury, Prime Minister (1902-05), and also as the Opposition Leader in the Commons, he showed always the same Balfour-Salisbury-Beaconsfield conservatism he illustrated so signally in the debates at the crisis of 1909-10. In rear-action, the Lords could have had no better defender. If in leading advance there has seemed at times to be a weakness in his Conservatism, it has been such as he might have learned from Lord Beaconsfield, who thought it the part of great generalship to capture the enemy's most dangerous guns and turn them on their retreat towards new position.

Beyond this slight suggestion, Mr. Balfour's history belongs to volumes. His expressions of the ideas he represented in 1909-10, as he met one of the most powerful attacks to which British hereditary privilege had been subjected in his generation, will be long read as history, and he will be long remembered as a factor in making history. He resigned the leadership of the Conservative party in 1911, but on the formation of the Coalition Government in May, 1915, he occupied a place in the Cabinet.

The Order of Merit was bestowed upon him June, 1916. In 1919 he was elected Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, and in 1922 was made a K.G. and Earl of Balfour.

GERMAN WAR AIMS

Contrasted 1914—1917

(Delivered at the Guildhall, July 13th, 1917).

YOU will easily believe that it is with no light emotion that I have heard read the address which you, my Lord Mayor, have been good enough to present to me. From such a centre as the city of London, and on such an occasion as this, it would in any case move the recipient deeply and profoundly ; but when I remember how long has been my connexion with the City, how kindly disposed towards me they have shown themselves since the very first days in which I was introduced to them as their candidate, that which would, under any circumstances, have been of immense value to me receives a double worth.

The address describes in terms far too favourable the labours which my friends and I, who constituted the mission from this country to the United States have been able to perform. We did our best—and we received the best. Never was a mission so kindly treated by those to whom it was sent. Never was hospitality offered more graciously or with a freer hand. Never was a reception given to the representatives of one country by the great people of another more cordial in its character. I hope, I believe, nay, I am well assured, that the results of that mission were good. They were good, not because the members of our mission were specially endowed with this or that diplomatic gift, but because the great people of the United States realized that the mission, apart from its business character and its executive side, was itself symbolical of a great new departure in the history of the world. They knew it instinctively, and they showed their knowledge in a manner which none who witnessed it is ever likely to forget.

If something was done by us, how much was done to us by those whom we met on the other side of the Atlantic ? We came to interchange ideas, feelings, hopes, aspirations. We had the advantage, or disadvantage, of coming from what I may call the war zone of Europe. We went to America, being ourselves personally and individually in touch with all the greatness of the horror of war. We crossed the Atlantic, and we found a great people who, from the very circumstances of their geographical position, could only look at these colossal events from afar off, who could not know as we know, directly and by almost immediate experience, what war meant, but who nevertheless were able imaginatively to grasp what it all meant, not merely for the present, but for the future of the world, who saw with an impartiality perhaps impossible

to us at that time what German militarism really meant, not only for those who are actually fighting it at the moment, but for every free community, wherever it might be situated, and in whatever part of the world it might look forward to develop itself upon its own lines. They saw that with a clear vision, and they entered into the war obviously and patently with no selfish object. Even German calumny has not been able to suggest that the United States of America desired territory or entered the war for the purpose of adding to their vast dominions.

The moral assistance thus given by the United States cannot be exaggerated. I do not propose to-day to dwell upon all that the United States have done, are doing, are going to do, from what I may describe as the more material aspect of warlike operations. I dwell for the moment upon the moral strength which their adhesion has given to the Allies, and that, in my opinion, cannot be exaggerated. It is interesting, to the cynic almost amusing, to observe how German aims have changed with the changing fortunes of war. They now through an obedient Press and a patient propaganda are trying to persuade the world that they are engaged in nothing more than defensive warfare. The world, it seems, came to the conclusion from the narrowest, the most selfish, and the most sordid motives in July, 1914, that it was time that Germany should be crushed, and the embattled hosts now ranged against Germany and her Allies are represented as so many hordes of hungry plunderers who attacked this innocent, peace-loving, cultured nation for purposes of selfish aggrandisement. That is the legend now being spread abroad to some extent in Germany, where it is difficult to believe that it receives any credence, and through neutral countries, where Germany at least hopes against hope that it may find some faithful believers.

A more preposterous and ludicrous doctrine to those who remember what took place in 1914 and later can hardly be conceived. If anybody wants really to know what the spirit was which animated the German people before the war and during the first months of the war, do not let him look at what the German newspapers say now ; let him look at what the German newspapers said then. Let him study the German leading article writer. Let him, above all, study the German preacher. Then he will see what were the real aims, disguised indeed in language which was almost always bombastic and not seldom blasphemous, which animated that people.

In those days they were to fulfil the ideal nakedly stated by Bernhardt that Germany must be everything or nothing, and what they preached was that Germany was to be everything, not indeed for sordid or selfish reasons, but because German culture was so incomparably superior to the petty civilizations of rival States that no greater benefit could be

done to mankind than by some great effort, half military, half missionary, to bring all these States under the domination, physical, moral, and intellectual, of this single power, and so contrived that true progress, true culture on the German model, should flourish even in those States to which that model was absolutely abhorrent. That was the motive put forward to the German people by the theoretical idealists. There was a more prosaic side, which explained that German commerce would better flourish if Austria, the Balkans, the Turkish Empire, and the East far beyond the Turkish Empire were under German control. It looked forward to finding what they called a place for Germany under the sun, which meant, translated into the prose of real life, the appropriation by Germany of other people's colonies.

I do not think that anybody who remembers or will revive his memory in that earlier literature can doubt that I have not exaggerated the facts of the case. But there are some people who always like chapter and verse, something which they can quote, something to which they can specifically point to bear out some broad and general proposition such as that which I have laid before you. May I, then, remind you of something which happened just before the war, in those last critical hours at the end of July, 1914, before the horrors of a universal war burst upon the world? In those days it began to dawn upon German statesmanship that Great Britain was not likely to stand selfishly aside and allow its friends to be crushed before its eyes. It therefore tried to enter into a transaction with the then Foreign Secretary, my friend Sir Edward Grey, and see on what terms Great Britain could be bought off. What were the terms they offered? The suggestion they had the impudence to make was that if Germany was allowed a free hand in the war she would guarantee that the then French territory in Europe should not be diminished. The natural question then was asked: What exactly do you mean by this suggestion? Are you going to guarantee the French colonies? No, said the Germans, we do not propose to guarantee the French colonies. Even a child could see what this meant. It meant that a victorious Germany might impose upon a subject France what indemnity it liked, what terms of commercial treaties it liked. It might bind France hand and foot helpless before its aggressive power; and in addition to all that, in addition to making France poor, impotent, subservient in Europe, all the French colonies were to be at the disposal of Germany.

That is on record. These gentlemen who never look towards territorial aggrandisement, these gentlemen who are now engaged against aggressive enemies circling round them, and desirous of destroying them, these gentlemen before war broke out practically announced in so many words what their ambitions as regards Western Europe really were.

Lord Grey replied as it befitted him to reply. Speaking of the German Chancellor's proposal, he said :—"What he asks us is in effect to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. It would be a disgrace to us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."

I remind you of this half-forgotten episode in diplomatic history not for the purpose of discussing the lines taken by this country in the matter, but in order to show you by documentary evidence that before a shot was fired, before a soldier had crossed any frontier, the Germans, with every motive to conciliate us and anxious to give everything they were prepared to give to keep us out of the war, deliberately intended not only to make France subservient in Europe, but to add to the German colonial empire. Let us hear no more of Germany having gone into the war for no other purpose than the purpose of self-defence.

The war thus begun was continued with the same spirit, and what has been the result? The result has been that the civilized world, even those most remote from immediate German designs, even those who three years ago would never have thought it possible that they would be dragged into a European quarrel, have begun to feel—I am not referring now to the United States—these other nations have been gradually forced into a conviction that unless German militarism be crushed their own stability and security will always be imperilled. Farther and farther the frontier of war extends. More and more are diplomatic relations broken off between the Central Powers and this or that Republic in South America or in the Far East. It is the inevitable result of German methods of warfare. Germany will never be able in our lifetime to shake off the load of hatred and of disgust which not merely her aims, but her methods have excited.

I am not going to survey the whole area of international politics. Indeed, it is not necessary. The broad outlines of it are known to all of you; they are writ large in the news which reaches us from day to day. In that news we see that one free country after another throws in its lot with us. The first among the smaller States was our ancient Ally, Portugal, and at this moment Portuguese troops are fighting with brilliant gallantry and not for the first time, beside British soldiers. Greece, under a constitutional King and a popular Minister, is throwing in her lot with the lovers of freedom and haters of military autocracy. So it goes on, and I think the end, which may be near or far, is clear and inevitable. The world has declared itself resolute not to bow its knee and worship that ideal of German culture combined with German domination which I described

to you earlier in my speech as being the note characteristic of every German utterance when the tide of battle seemed to be flowing in Germany's favour. Those days have passed, and German demands are more modest. Universality of German culture is forgotten, and nothing is now talked of openly but German self-defence.

I rejoice to think that in the inevitable complications and difficulties which a world settlement necessarily presents, and always must present, we have with us such a country as the United States—and such a statesman as President Wilson.

They are as far removed from pinning their trust to undefined and in some cases unmeaning formulæ as they are removed from anything which could be described as love of aggression or love of putting one population reluctantly under the domination of another. They cherish ideals to which we can cordially subscribe, because they are our own ideals. As little as we have, they entered the war with anything which any human being can describe as a selfish motive. Indeed, they have an advantage over us in the fact that, while we in the inevitable course of events have become conquerors of German territory, they have no desire to have any share in any operations except those which are taking place in the very centre and heart of this great storm.

We members of the Mission, on whose behalf I am speaking to-day as well as on my own, rejoice to think that a part, however small, should have fallen to us in bringing in with our great European and Asiatic Allies the incalculable moral and material strength of the United States. For myself I would say that, while such a gain to the world is incalculable, the results of it, to which I look forward, extend far beyond the possible duration of this war, and reach forward, as I hope, to times generations in advance of those in which we now live. This is the greatest step ever taken—I leave now the immediate area of war considerations, and travel to the wider aspects of the question—this is the greatest step ever taken in a direction with which I know the City of London has always sympathized—close mutual co-operation and understanding between two great nations who have sometimes misunderstood each other, though of all nations they are most fitted for mutual comprehension.

I remember, my Lord Mayor, in the time of one of your predecessors, attending a banquet at the Mansion House to bid farewell and God-speed to a great Ambassador, a great American, a great friend of this country, and, if I may add a personal note, a kind friend of my own—the late Mr. Choate. He has been taken from us, taken from his friends, from his country, and from the country which next to his own was nearest to his heart, at the very moment when this new and happy spirit has brooded over our common destinies. I saw him within a few hours of his death,

and in the very height of that wonderful reception given to the British Mission by the City of New York. None of us could hope to die with our dearest aspirations more fully fulfilled than his were at the moment that death happened to him—an enviable end. It is not, however, to speak of Mr. Choate as a man that I refer to that banquet at the Mansion House, but it is to make a quotation from him with which I will end a speech which has already, I fear, extended too long. It is a short quotation, but it is an eloquent one, and it is one which absolutely expresses the truest convictions, the firmest beliefs, and the most unalterable hopes that I have ever entertained. These are the words he spoke in taking, as it were, leave of the British nation :—

“ I have endeavoured to make the English people better acquainted with my own country, its history, its institutions, its great names, for the purpose of showing them that really the difference between the English and the American is only skin deep, and ” (and this is the point) “ that under different historical forms we pursue with equal success the same great objects of liberty, of justice, of the public welfare, and that our interests are so inextricably interwoven that we would not if we could, and we could not if we would, escape the necessity of an abiding and a perpetual friendship.”

LORD BEACONSFIELD

(BENJAMIN DISRAELI)

(*For Biographical Note, see Section i.*)

DENMARK AND GERMANY

(Delivered in the House of Commons, July 4th, 1864).

NOW, I must observe that what is called the Polish question occupies a different position in France from that which it occupies in England. I will not admit that, in deep sympathy with the Poles, the French are superior to the English people. I believe I am only stating accurately the feelings of this country when I say, that among men of all classes there is no modern event which is looked back to with more regret than the partition of Poland. It is universally acknowledged by them to be one of the darkest pages of the history of the eighteenth century. But in France the Polish question is not a question which merely interests the sentiments of the millions. It is a political question, and a political question of the very highest importance—a question which interests Ministers, and Cabinets, and princes. Well, the ruler of France, a sagacious prince and a lover of peace, as the Secretary of State has just informed us, was of course perfectly alive to the grave issues involved in what is called the Polish question. But the Emperor knew perfectly well that England had already had opportunities of considering it in the completest manner, and had arrived at a settled conclusion with regard to it. Therefore, with characteristic caution, he exercised great reserve, and held out little encouragement to the representatives of the Polish people. He knew well that in 1855 he himself, our ally—and with us a conquering ally—had urged this question on the English Government, and that, under the most favourable circumstances for the restoration of Poland, we had adhered to our traditional policy, neither to go to war nor to interfere. Therefore, the French Government exhibited a wise reserve on the subject.

But after a short time, what must have been the astonishment of the Emperor of the French when he found the English Government embracing the cause of Poland with extraordinary ardour! The noble lord the Secretary of State and the noble lord the First Minister, but

especially the former, announced the policy as if it were a policy new to the consideration of statesmen, and likely to lead to immense results. He absolutely served a notice to quit on the Emperor of Russia. He sent a copy of this dispatch to all the Courts of Europe which were signatories to the Treaty of Vienna, and invited them to follow his example. From the King of Portugal down to the King of Sweden there was not a signatory of that treaty who was not, as it were, clattering at the palace gates of St. Petersburg, and calling the Czar to account respecting the affairs of Poland. For three months Europe generally believed that there was to be a war on a great scale, of which the restoration of Poland was to be one of the main objects. Is it at all remarkable that the French Government and the French people, cautious as they were before, should have responded to such invitations and such stimulating proposals? We know how the noble lord fooled them to the top of their bent. The House recollects the six propositions to which the attention of the Emperor of Russia was called in the most peremptory manner. The House recollects the closing scene, when it was arranged that the ambassadors of France, Austria, and England, should on the very same day appear at the hotel of the Minister of Russia, and present notes ending with three identical paragraphs, to show the agreement of the Powers. An impression pervaded Europe that there was to be a general war, and that England, France, and Austria were united to restore Poland.

The House remembers the end of all this—it remembers the reply of the Russian Minister, couched in a tone of haughty sarcasm and of indignation that deigned to be ironical. There was then but one step to take, according to the views of the French Government, and that was action. They appealed to that England which had itself thus set the example of agitation on the subject; and England, wisely as I think, recurred to her traditionary policy, the Government confessing that it was a momentary indiscretion which had animated her councils for three or four months; that they never meant anything more than words; and a month afterwards, I believe, they sent to St. Petersburg an obscure dispatch, which may be described as an apology. But this did not alter the position of the French Government and the French Emperor. The Emperor had been induced by us to hold out promises which he could not fulfil. He was placed in a false position both to the people of Poland and the people of France; and therefore, Sir, I am not surprised that when the noble lord the Secretary of State, a little alarmed by the progress of affairs in Germany, thought it discreet to reconnoitre his position on September 17th, he should have been received at Paris with coldness, and, ultimately, that his dispatch should have been answered in this manner.

I fear that I may weary the House with my narrative, but I will not abuse the privilege of reading extracts, which is generally very foreign to my desire. Yet, on a question of this kind it is better to have the documents, and not lay oneself open to the charge of garbling. Mr. Grey, writing to Lord Russell on September 18th, 1863, says :

The second mode of proceeding suggested by your lordship, namely, 'to remind Austria, Russia, and the German Diet, that any acts on their part tending to weaken the integrity and independence of Denmark would be at variance with the treaty of May 8, 1852,' would be in a great measure analogous to the course pursued by Great Britain and France in the Polish question. He had no inclination (and he frankly avowed that he should so speak to the Emperor) to place France in the same position with reference to Germany as she had been placed in with regard to Russia. The formal notes addressed by the three Powers to Russia had received an answer which literally meant nothing, and the position in which those three great Powers were now placed was anything but dignified ; and if England and France were to address such a reminder as that proposed to Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation, they must be prepared to go further, and to adopt their course of action more in accordance with the dignity of two great Powers than they were now doing in the Polish question. . . . Unless Her Majesty's Government was prepared to go further, if necessary, than the mere presentation of a note, and the receipt of an evasive reply, he was sure the Emperor would not consent to adopt your lordship's suggestion. (No. 2, 131).

Well, Sir, that was an intimation to the noble lord with respect to the change in the relations between England and France that was significant ; I think it was one that the noble lord should have duly weighed—and when he remembered the position which this country occupied with regard to Denmark—that it was a position under the treaty which did not bind us to interfere more than France itself—conscious, at the same time, that any co-operation from Russia in the same cause could hardly be counted upon—I should have said that a prudent Government would have well considered that position, and that they would not have taken any course which committed them too strongly to any decided line of action. But so far as I can judge from the correspondence before us, that was not the tone taken by Her Majesty's Government ; because here we have extracts from the correspondence of the Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister, to the Diet at Frankfort, and a most important dispatch to Lord Bloomfield : all in the fortnight that elapsed after the receipt of the dispatch of Mr. Grey that

notified the change in the feeling of the French Government. It is highly instructive that we should know what effect that produced in the system and policy of Her Majesty's Government. Immediately—almost the day after the receipt of that dispatch—the Secretary of State wrote to the Swedish Minister :

Her Majesty's Government set the highest value on the independence and integrity of Denmark. . . . Her Majesty's Government will be ready to remind Austria and Prussia of their treaty obligations to respect the integrity and independence of Denmark. (No. 2, 137-8).

Then on September 29th—that is, only nine or ten days after the receipt of the French dispatch—we have this most important dispatch, which I shall read at some little length. It is at p. 136, and is really addressed to the Diet. The Secretary of State says :

Her Majesty's Government, by the Treaty of London of May 8th, 1852, is bound to respect the integrity and independence of Denmark. The Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia have taken the same engagement. Her Majesty could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which is only to cease on terms injuriously affecting the constitution of the whole Danish monarchy. Her Majesty's Government could not recognize this military occupation as a legitimate exercise of the powers of the Confederation, or admit that it could properly be called a federal execution. Her Majesty's Government could not be indifferent to the bearing of such an act upon Denmark and European interest. Her Majesty's Government therefore earnestly entreats the German Diet to pause and to submit the questions in dispute between Germany and Denmark to the mediation of other Powers unconcerned in the controversy, but deeply concerned in the maintenance of the peace of Europe and the independence of Denmark. (No. 2, 145).

My object in reading this dispatch is to show that, after the indication of the change of feeling on the part of France, the policy—the sincere policy—of the Government was not modified. The Secretary of State writes thus on September 30th to Lord Bloomfield at Vienna :

Her Majesty's Government trusts that no act of federal execution to which Austria may be a party, and no act of war against Denmark on the ground of the affairs of Schleswig, will be allowed to clash with this primary and essential treaty obligation. Her Majesty's Government, indeed, entertain a full confidence that the Government of Austria is as deeply impressed as Her Majesty's Government with the conviction that the independence and integrity of Denmark form an essential element in the balance of power in Europe. (No. 3, 147).

Now, this takes us to the end of September ; and I think the House up to this time tolerably clearly understands the course of the correspondence. Nothing of any importance happened in October that requires me to pause and consider it. We arrive, then, at the month of November, and now approach very important and critical affairs. The month of November was remarkable for the occurrence of two great events which completely changed the character and immensely affected the aspect of the whole relations between Denmark and Germany ; and which produced consequences which none of us may see the end of. Early in November the Emperor of the French proposed a European Congress. His position was such—as he himself has described it, there can be no indelicacy in saying so—his position had become painful from various causes, but mainly from the manner in which he had misapprehended the conduct of the English Government with regard to Poland. He saw great troubles about to occur in Europe ; he wished to anticipate their settlement ; he felt himself in a false position with respect to his own subjects, because he had experienced a great diplomatic discomfiture ; but he was desirous—and there is no doubt of the sincerity of the declaration—he was desirous of still taking a course which should restore and retain the cordial understanding with this country. He proposed, then, a general Congress.

Well, when Parliament met on February 4th, I had to make certain observations on the general condition of affairs, and I gave my opinion as to the propriety of Her Majesty's Government refusing to be a party to that Congress. Generally speaking, I think that a Congress should not precede action. If you wish any happy and permanent result from a Congress, it should rather follow the great efforts of nations ; and when they are somewhat exhausted, give them the opportunity of an honourable settlement. Sir, I did not think it my duty to conceal my opinion, Her Majesty's Government having admitted that they had felt it their duty to refuse a proposition of that character. I should have felt that I was wanting in that ingenuousness and fair play in politics which I hope, whoever sits on that bench or this, we shall always pursue, if, when the true interests of the country are concerned, agreeing as I did with the Government, I did not express frankly that opinion. But, Sir, I am bound to say that had I been aware of what has been communicated to us by the papers on the table—had I been aware, when I spoke on February 4th, that only a week before Parliament met, that only a week before we were assured by a Speech from the Throne that Her Majesty was continuing to carry on negotiations in the interest of peace—that Her Majesty's Government had made a proposition to France

which must inevitably have produced, if accepted, a great European war, I should have given my approbation in terms much more qualified.

But, Sir, whatever difference of opinion there might be as to the propriety or impropriety of Her Majesty's Government acceding to the Congress, I think there were not then—I am sure there are not now—two opinions as to the mode and manner in which that refusal was conveyed. Sir, when the noble lord vindicated that curt and, as I conceive, most offensive reply, he dilated the other night on the straightforwardness of British Ministers, and said that, by whatever else their language might be characterized, it was distinguished by candour and clearness, and that even where it might be charged with being coarse, it at least conveyed a determinate meaning. Well, Sir, I wish that if our diplomatic language is characterized by clearness and straightforwardness, some of that spirit had distinguished the dispatches and declarations addressed by the noble lord to the Court of Denmark. It is a great pity that we did not have a little of that rude frankness when the fortunes of that ancient kingdom were at stake.

But, Sir, another event of which I must now remind the House happened about that time. In November the King of Denmark died. The death of the King of Denmark entirely changed the character of the question between Germany and Denmark. The question was a federal question before, as the noble lord, from the dispatches I have read, was perfectly aware; but by the death of the King of Denmark it became an international question, because the controversy of the King of Denmark was with the Diet of Germany, which had not recognized the change in the *lex regia*, or the changes in the succession to the various dominions of the King. It was, therefore, an international question of magnitude and of a menacing character. Under these circumstances, when the question became European, when the difficulties were immensely magnified and multiplied—the offer of a Congress having been made on November 5th, and not refused until the 27th, the King of Denmark having died on the 16th—it was, I say, with the complete knowledge of the increased risk and of the increased dimensions of the interests at stake, that the noble lord sent that answer to the invitation of the Emperor of the French. I say, Sir, that at this moment it became the Government of England seriously to consider their position. With the offer of the Congress and with the death of the King of Denmark—with these two remarkable events before the noble lord's eyes, it is my duty to remind the House of the manner in which the noble lord the Secretary of State addressed the European Powers. Neither of these great events seems to have induced the noble

lord to modify his tone. On November 19th, the King having just died, the Secretary of State writes to Sir Alexander Malet, our Minister to the Diet, to remind him that all the Powers of Europe had agreed to the treaty of 1852. On the 20th he writes a letter of menace to the German Powers, saying that Her Majesty's Government expect, as a matter of course, that all the Powers will recognize the succession of the King of Denmark as heir of all the states which, according to the Treaty of London, were united under the sceptre of the late King. And on the 23rd, four days before he refused the invitation to the Congress, he writes to Lord Bloomfield :

Her Majesty's Government would have no right to interfere on behalf of Denmark if the troops of the Confederation should enter Holstein on federal grounds. But if execution were enforced on international grounds, the Powers who signed the treaty of 1852 would have a right to interfere. (No. 3, 230).

To Sir Augustus Paget, our Minister at Copenhagen, on November 30th—the House will recollect that this was after he had refused the Congress, after the King had died, and after the question had become an international one—he writes announcing his refusal of the Congress and proposing the sole mediation of England. Then he writes to Sir Alexander Malet in the same month, that Her Majesty's Government can only leave to Germany the sole responsibility of raising a war in Europe, which the Diet seemed bent on making.

This is the tone which the Government adopted, after the consideration, as we are bound to believe, which the question demanded, after having incurred the responsibility of refusing the Congress offered by the Emperor of the French, after the death of the King of Denmark, after the question had been changed from a federal to an international one—such, I repeat, is the tone they took up, and in which they sent their menacing messages to every court in Germany. I say that at the death of the King of Denmark it behoved Her Majesty's Ministers, instead of adopting such a course, maturely to consider their position in relation to the events which had occurred. There were two courses open to Her Majesty's Government, both intelligible, both honourable. It was open to them, after the death of the King of Denmark, to have acted as France had resolved under the same circumstances to act—France, who occupies, we are told, a position in reference to these matters so dignified and satisfactory that it has received the compliments even of a baffled Minister. That course was frankly announced shortly afterwards to the English Minister by the Minister of France in Denmark. On November 19th General Fleury said to Lord Wodehouse at Copenhagen :

That his own instructions from the Emperor were, not to take part in any negotiations here, but to tell the Danish Government explicitly that if Denmark became involved in a war with Germany, France would not come to her assistance.

If England had adopted that course it would have been intelligible and honourable. We were not bound by the treaty of 1852 to go to the assistance of Denmark if she became involved in a war with Germany. No one pretends that we were. As a matter of high policy, much as we may regret any disturbance in the territorial limits of Europe, being a country the policy of which is a policy of tranquillity and peace, there were no adequate considerations which could have justified England in entering into an extensive European War, without allies, to prevent a war between Denmark and Germany. That was, I say, an honourable and intelligible course.

There was another course equally intelligible and equally honourable. Though I am bound to say that the course which I should have recommended the country to take would have been to adopt the same position as that of France, yet, if the Government really entertained the views with respect to the balance of power which have been expressed occasionally in the House by the noble lord, and in a literary form by the Secretary of State—from which I may say I disagree, because they appear to me to be founded on the obsolete tradition of an antiquated system, and because I think that the elements from which we ought to form an opinion as to the distribution of the power of the world must be collected from a much more extensive area, and must be formed of larger and more varied elements : but let that pass : yet, I say, if Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the balance of power were endangered by a quarrel between Germany and Denmark, they were justified in giving their advice to Denmark, in threatening Germany, and in taking the general management of the affairs of Denmark ; but they were bound, if a war did take place between Germany and Denmark, to support Denmark. Instead of that, they invented a process of conduct which I hope is not easily exemplified in the history of this country, and which I can only describe in one sentence—it consisted of menaces never accomplished and promises never fulfilled.

With all these difficulties they never hesitate in their tone. At least, let us do them this justice—there never were, in semblance, more determined Ministers. They seemed at least to rejoice in the phantom of a proud courage. But what do they do? They send a special envoy to Denmark, who was to enforce their policy and arrange everything. Formally, the special envoy was sent to congratulate the King

on his accession to the throne of Denmark, and all the other Powers did the same ; but in reality the mission of Lord Wodehouse was for greater objects than that, and his instructions are before us in full. Without wearying the House by reading the whole of those instructions, I will read one paragraph, which is the last, and which is, as it were, a summary of the whole. They were written at the end of December. Recollect, this is the policy of the Government after refusing the Congress, and after the death of the King of Denmark, which had therefore incurred a still deeper responsibility, and which, we must suppose, had deeply considered all the issues involved. This is the cream of the instructions given by the Government to Lord Wodehouse :

The result to be arrived at is the fulfilment of the treaty of May 8th, 1852, and of the engagements entered into by Prussia and Austria and Denmark in 1851-2. (No. 3, 353).

Lord Wodehouse could not possibly be at fault as to what he was to do when he arrived at his destination. His was, no doubt, a significant appointment. He was a statesman of some experience ; he had held a subordinate but important position in the administration of our foreign affairs ; he had been a Minister at a Northern Court ; he had recently distinguished himself in Parliament by a speech on the question of Germany and Denmark, in which he took a decidedly dangerous view. Lord Wodehouse received clear instructions as to what he was to do. But, at the same time, what was the conduct of the Secretary of State ? While Lord Wodehouse was repairing to his post, did the Secretary of State in the least falter in his tone ? It was about this time that the great diplomatic reprimand was sent to Sir Alexander Malet for having talked of the ' protocol ' of 1852 instead of the ' treaty.' This was the time that instructions were sent out that if anybody had the hardihood to mention the ' protocol ' of 1852 he was immediately to be stopped. However elevated his position might be, even if it were M. Bismarck himself, he was to be pulled up directly, in the full flow of his eloquence ; note was to be taken of this great diplomatic *lapsus*, and the Minister was to telegraph instantly home to his Government how he had carried out his instructions in this respect. On December 17th, the noble lord wrote to Sir Andrew Buchanan, our ambassador at Berlin :

Let it suffice at present for Her Majesty's Government to declare that they would consider any departure from the treaty of succession of 1852, by Powers who signed or acceded to that treaty, as entirely inconsistent with good faith. (No. 3, 383).

Similar dispatches were sent to Wurtemberg, Hanover, and Saxony. On December 23rd the noble earl wrote to Sir Andrew Buchanan :

If the overthrow of the dynasty now reigning in Denmark is sought by Germany, the most serious consequences may ensue. (No. 3, 411).

I want to know what honourable members mean by cheering the words I have just quoted. If you wish to convey even to a little Power that if it does a certain thing you will go to war with it, you take care not to announce your intention in an offensive manner ; because, were you to do so, probably, even the smallest Power in Europe would not yield. And certainly if you wish to tell a great Power in Europe what may be eventually the consequences if it should adopt a different line from that which you desire, you would not abruptly declare that if it declined to accede to your wish you would declare war. Why, there are no dispatches on record in the world—there is no record in any Foreign Office of language of this kind. The question is, what interpretation can be put on these threats. The Secretary of State writes again on December 25th to Sir Andrew Buchanan, stating that :

Any precipitate action on the part of the German Confederation may lead to consequences fatal to the peace of Europe, and may involve Germany, in particular, in difficulties of the most serious nature. (No. 4, 414).

On December 26th the Secretary of State writes to Sir Alexander Malet, and sends him a copy of the treaty of 1852, in order that he might communicate it to the Diet. Now, that is the state of affairs after the King of Denmark's death ; after he had been perfectly acquainted with the policy of France ; after he had been frankly told that the French Emperor had explicitly informed Denmark that if she got involved in war with Germany, France would not come to her assistance. Now the words 'if she went to war' might have been interpreted in two ways ; because she might get into war without any fault of her own, and Germany might be the aggressor : but there could be no mistake in regards to the words 'if she became involved in war.' Neither Denmark nor England could make any mistake in regard to the policy of France, which the Secretary of State now says was a magnanimous policy.

Notwithstanding these threats, notwithstanding these repeated menaces, and notwithstanding every effort made by Her Majesty's Government to prevent it, federal execution took place, as it was intended to take place. One day after the most menacing epistle which I have ever read—the day after the copy of the treaty of 1852 had been solemnly

placed before the Diet by Sir Alexander Malet—on December 27th, federal execution took place. At any rate, I do not think that is evidence of the just influence of England in the councils of Germany.

What was the course of Her Majesty's Government at this critical conjuncture? Why, Sir, they went again to France. After all that had happened their only expedient was to go and supplicate France. I will read the letter. Mr. Layard seems to triumph in the recollection of mistakes and disappointments. I will give him the date, but I should think it must really be seared upon his conscience. December 27th is the date of federal execution: and Her Majesty's Government must have been in a state of complete panic, because on the 28th they made application to France, which is answered in a few hours by Lord Cowley: 'I said Her Majesty's Government were most sincerely anxious to——' I wish really to be candid, not to misrepresent anything, and to put the case before the House without garbling any of the dispatches.—'I said that Her Majesty's Government were most sincerely anxious to act with the Imperial Government in this question.' No doubt they were. I am vindicating your conduct. I believe in your sincerity throughout. It is only your intense incapacity that I denounce. The passage in the dispatch is Shakespearian; it is one of those dramatic descriptions which only a masterly pen could accomplish. Lord Cowley went on:

Her Majesty's Government felt that if the two Powers could agree, war might be avoided; otherwise the danger of war was imminent. M. Drouyn de Lhuys said he partook this opinion; but as his Excellency made no further observation, I remarked it would be a grievous thing if the difference of opinion which had arisen upon the merits of a general Congress were to produce an estrangement which would leave each Government to pursue its own course. I hoped that this would not be the case. Her Majesty's Government would do all in their power to avoid it. I presumed I might give them the assurance that the Imperial Government were not decided to reject the notion of a Conference. (No. 4, 444).

Well, Sir, this received a curt and unsatisfactory reply. Nothing could be obtained from the plaintive appeal of Lord Cowley. Well, what did Her Majesty's Government do? Having received information that the threat of federal execution had been fulfilled, having appealed to France, and been treated in the manner I have described, what did the Government do? Why, the Secretary of State, within twenty-four hours afterwards, penned the fiercest dispatch he had ever yet written. It is dated December 31st, 1863, and it is addressed to Sir Andrew Buchanan:

Her Majesty's Government do not hold that war would relieve Prussia from the obligations of the treaty of 1852. The King of Denmark would by that treaty be entitled still to be acknowledged as the sovereign of all the dominions of the late King of Denmark. He has been so entitled from the time of the death of the late King. A war of conquest undertaken by Germany avowedly for the purpose of adding some parts of the Danish dominions to the territory of the German Confederation might, if successful, alter the state of succession contemplated by the Treaty of London, and give to Germany a title by conquest to parts of the dominions of the King of Denmark. The prospect of such an accession may no doubt be a temptation to those who think it can be accomplished ; but Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that Prussia will depart from the straight line of good faith in order to assist in carrying such a project into effect. (No. 4, 445).

You cheer as if it were a surprising thing that the Secretary of State should have written a single sentence of common sense. These are important state documents, and I hope Her Majesty's Government are not so fallen that there is not a Minister among them who is able to write a dispatch—I do not say a bad dispatch, but a very important one. I wish to call attention to its importance :

If German nationality in Holstein, and particularly in Schleswig were made the ground of the dismemberment of Denmark, Polish nationality in the Duchy of Posen would be a ground equally strong for the dismemberment of Prussia. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the safest course for Prussia to pursue is to act with good faith and honour and to stand by and fulfil her treaty engagements. By such a course she will command the sympathy of Europe ; by a contrary course she will draw down upon herself the universal condemnation of all disinterested men. By this course alone war in Europe can be with certainty prevented. (No. 4, 445).

Well, Sir, that I think was a bold dispatch to write after the rejection, for the second or third time, of our overtures to France. That brings us up to the last day of the year.

But before I proceed to more recent transactions, it is necessary to call the attention of the House to the remarkable contrast between the menaces lavished on Germany and the expectations—to use the mildest term—that were held out to Denmark. The great object of Her Majesty's Government when the difficulties began to be very serious, was to induce Denmark to revoke the patent of Holstein—that is, to terminate the constitution. The constitution of Holstein had been

granted very recently before the death of the King, with a violent desire on the part of the monarch to fulfil his promises. It was a wise and excellent constitution by which Holstein became virtually independent. It enjoyed the fullness of self-government, and was held only by sovereign ties to Denmark, as Norway is held to Sweden. The Danish Government were not at all willing to revoke the constitution in Holstein. It was one that did them credit, and was naturally popular in Holstein. Still, the Diet was very anxious that the patent should be revoked, because if Holstein continued satisfied it was impossible to trade on the intimate connexion between Schleswig and Holstein, the lever by which the kingdom of Denmark was to be destroyed. The Diet, therefore, insisted that the patent should be revoked. Her Majesty's Government, I believe, approved the patent of Holstein as the Danish Government had done, but, as a means of obtaining peace and saving Denmark, they made use of all the means in their power to induce Denmark to revoke that constitution. Sir Augustus Paget, writing to the Foreign Secretary on October 14, and describing an interview with M. Hall, the Prime Minister of Denmark, says :

After much further conversation, in which I made use of every argument to induce his Excellency to adopt a conciliatory course, and in which I warned him of the danger of rejecting the friendly counsels now offered by Her Majesty's Government—(No. 3, 162)—

M. Hall promises to withdraw the patent. What interpretation could M. Hall place on that interview? He was called upon to do what he knew to be distasteful, and believed to be impolitic. He is warned of the danger of rejecting those friendly counsels, and in consequence of that warning he gives way and surrenders his opinion. I would candidly ask what is the interpretation which in private life would be put on such language as I have quoted, and which had been acted upon by those to whom it was addressed?

Well, we now come to the federal execution in Holstein. Speaking literally, the federal execution was a legal act, and Denmark could not resist it. But from the manner in which it was about to be carried into effect, and in consequence of the pretensions connected with it, the Danes were of opinion that it would have been better at once to resist the execution, which aimed a fatal blow at the independence of Schleswig, and upon this point they felt strongly. Well, Her Majesty's Government—and I give them full credit for being actuated by the best motives—thought otherwise, and wished the Danish Government to submit

to this execution. And what was the sort of language used by them in order to bring about that result? Sir Augustus Paget replied in this way to the objections of the Danish Minister :

I replied that Denmark would at all events have a better chance of securing the assistance of the Powers if the execution were not resisted.

I ask any candid man to put his own interpretation upon this language. And on the 12th of the same month Lord Russell himself tells M. Bille, the Danish Minister in London, that there is no connexion between the engagements of Denmark to Germany, and the engagements of the German Powers under the treaty of 1852. After such a declaration from the English Minister in the metropolis a declaration which must have had the greatest effect upon the policy of the Danish Government—of course they submitted to the execution. But having revoked the patent and submitted to the execution, as neither the one nor the other was the real object of the German Powers, a new demand was made which was one of the greatest consequence.

Now, listen to this. The new demand was to repeal the old constitution. I want to put clearly before the House the position of the Danish Government with respect to this much-talked-of constitution. There had been in the preceding year a Parliamentary Reform Bill carried in Denmark. The King died before having given his assent to it, though he was most willing to have done so. The instant the new King succeeded, the Parliamentary Reform Bill was brought to him. Of course great excitement prevailed in Denmark, just as it did in England at the time of the Reform Bill under similar circumstances, and the King was placed in a most difficult position. Now, observe this: England, who was so obtrusive and pragmatical in the councils which she gave, who was always offering advice and suggestions, hung back when the question arose whether the new King should give his assent to the Reform Bill or not. England was selfishly silent, and would incur no responsibility. The excitement in Copenhagen was great, and the King gave his assent to the Bill. But mark! at that moment it was not at all impossible that if Her Majesty's Government had written a dispatch to Copenhagen asking the King not to give his assent to the Bill for the space of six weeks in order to assist England in the negotiations she was carrying on in behalf of Denmark; and if the King had convened his council and laid before them the express wish of an ally who was then looked upon by Denmark with confidence and hope, especially from the time that France had declared she would not assist her, I cannot doubt that the King would have complied with a request that was so important to his fortunes. But the instant the King had sanctioned the new

constitution, the English Government began writing dispatches calling upon him to revoke it. Aye, but what was his position then? How could he revoke it? The King was a constitutional King; he could have put an end to this constitution only by a *coup d'état*; and he was not in a position, nor I believe if he were had he the inclination, to do such an act. The only constitutional course open to him was to call the new Parliament together with the view of revoking the constitution.

But see what would have been the position of affairs then. In England the Reform Act was passed in 1832, new elections took place under it, and the House assembled under Lord Althorp, as the leader of the Government. Now, suppose Lord Althorp had come down to that House with a King's speech recommending them to revoke the reform Act, and have asked leave to introduce another Bill for the purpose of reforming the constitution, would it not have been asking an utter impossibility? But how did Her Majesty's Government act towards Denmark in similar circumstances? First of all, the noble lord at the head of the Foreign Office wrote to Lord Wodehouse on December 20th, giving formal advice to the Danish Government to repeal the constitution, and Lord Wodehouse, who had been sent upon this painful and, I must say, impossible office to the Danish Minister, thus speaks of the way in which he had performed this task:

I pointed out to M. Hall also that if, on the one hand, Her Majesty's Government would never counsel the Danish Government to yield anything inconsistent with the honour and independence of the Danish Crown, and the integrity of the King's dominions; so, on the other hand, we had a right to expect that the Danish Government would not, by putting forward extreme pretensions, drive matters to extremities.

And Sir Augustus Paget who appears to have performed his duty with great temper and talent, writing on December 22nd, says:

I asked M. Hall to reflect what would be the position of Denmark if the advice of the Powers were refused, and what it would be if accepted, and to draw his own conclusions. (No. 4, 420).

Now, I ask, what are the conclusions which any gentleman—I do not care on what side of the House he may sit—would have drawn from such language as that? But before that, a special interview took place between Lord Wodehouse and the Danish Minister, of which Lord Wodehouse writes:

It was my duty to declare to M. Hall that if the Danish Government rejected our advice, Her Majesty's Government must leave Denmark to encounter Germany on her own responsibility.

Well, Sir, I ask again whether there are two interpretations to be put upon such observations as these? And what happened? It was impossible for M. Hall, who was the author of the constitution, to put an end to it; so he resigned—a new Government is formed, and under the new constitution Parliament is absolutely called together to pass an Act to terminate its own existence. And in January Sir Augustus Paget tells the Danish Government with some *naïveté*:

If they would summon the Rigsraad, and propose a repeal of the constitution, they would act wisely, in accordance with the advice of their friends, and the responsibility of the war would not be laid at their door.

Well, then, these were three great subjects on which the representation of England induced Denmark to adopt a course against her will, and as the Danes believed, against their policy. The plot begins to thicken. Notwithstanding the revocation of the patent, the federal execution, and the repeal of the constitution, one thing more is wanted, and Schleswig is about to be invaded. Affairs now become most critical. No sooner is this known than a very haughty menace is sent to Austria. From a dispatch of Lord Bloomfield, dated December 31st, it will be seen that Austria was threatened, if Schleswig was invaded, that

The consequences would be serious. The question would cease to be a purely German one, and would become one of European importance.

On January 4th, Earl Russell writes to Mr. Murray, at the Court of Saxony:

The most serious consequences are to be apprehended if the Germans invade Schleswig. (No. 4, 481).

On the 9th, again he writes to Dresden:

The line taken by Saxony destroys confidence in diplomatic relations with that State. (No. 4, 502).

On January 18th he writes to Lord Bloomfield:

You are instructed to represent in the strongest terms to Count Rechberg, and if you shall have an opportunity of doing so, to the Emperor, the extreme injustice and danger of the principle and practice of taking possession of the territory of a State as what is called a material guarantee for the obtainment of certain international demands, instead of pressing those demands by the usual method of negotiation. Such a

practice is fatal to peace, and destructive of the independence of States. It is destructive of peace because it is an act of war, and if resistance takes place it is the beginning of war. But war so begun may not be confined within the narrow limits of its early commencement, as was proved in 1853, when the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Russia as a material guarantee proved the direct cause of the Crimean War. (No. 4, 564).

It is only because I do not wish to weary the House that I do not read it all, but it is extremely well written. Well, then, the dispatch goes on to say :

Such a practice is most injurious to the independence and integrity of the State to which it is applied, because a territory so occupied can scarcely be left by the occupying force in the same state in which it was when the occupation took place. But, moreover, such a practice may recoil upon those who adopt it, and, in the ever-varying course of events, it may be most inconveniently applied to those who, having set the example, had flattered themselves it never could be applied to them. (No. 4, 564).

Well, the invasion of Schleswig is impending, and then an identic note is sent to Vienna and Berlin in these terms :

Her Majesty's Government having been informed that the Governments of Austria and Prussia have addressed a threatening summons to Denmark, the undersigned has been instructed to ask for a formal declaration on the part of those Governments that they adhere to the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. (No. 4, 565).

And again, writing to Lord Bloomfield, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs speaks of the invasion as 'a breach of faith which may entail upon Europe widespread calamities.' But all these remonstrances were in vain. Notwithstanding these solemn warnings, notwithstanding this evidence that in the German Courts the just influence of England was lowered, the invasion of Schleswig takes place. And what is the conduct of the Government? They hurry again to Paris. They propose a joint declaration of the non-German Powers. Earl Russell writes to Lord Cowley in the middle of January. An answer was sent, I believe, the next day, the 14th, and this is Lord Cowley's statement in reference to the opinion of the French Government :

As to the four Powers impressing upon the Diet the heavy responsibility that it would incur if, by any precipitate measures, it were to break the peace of Europe before the conference which had been proposed

by the British Government for considering the means of settling the question between Germany and Denmark, and thereby maintaining that peace, can be assembled, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he had not forgotten that when Russia had been warned by France, Great Britain, and Austria of the responsibility which she was incurring by her conduct towards Poland, Prince Gortschakoff had replied, 'that Russia was ready to assume that responsibility before God and man.' He, for one, did not wish to provoke another answer of the same sort to be received with the same indifference. (No. 4, 536).

The drama now becomes deeply interesting. The events are quick. That is the answer of the French Government; and on the next day Lord Russell writes to Lord Cowley to propose concert and co-operation with France to maintain the treaty—that is, to prevent the occupation of Schleswig. Lord Cowley writes the next day to Lord Russell that the French Government want to know what 'concert and co-operation' mean. Lord Russell at last, on January 24th, writes to say that concert and co-operation mean 'if necessary, material assistance to Denmark.' That must have been about the same time when the Cabinet was sitting to draw up Her Majesty's speech, assuring Parliament that negotiations continued to be carried on in the interest of peace. Now, Sir, what was the answer of the French Government when, at last, England invited her to go to war to settle the question between Germany and Denmark? I will read the reply:

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after recapitulating the substance of my dispatch of January 24th to your Excellency, explains very clearly the views of the French Government upon the subject. The Emperor recognizes the value of the London treaty as tending to preserve the balance of power and maintain the peace of Europe. But the Government of France, while paying a just tribute to the purport and objects of the treaty of 1852, is ready to admit that circumstances may require its modification. The Emperor has always been disposed to pay great regard to the feelings and aspirations of nationalities. It is not to be denied that the national feelings and aspirations of Germany tend to a closer connexion with the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig. The Emperor would feel repugnance to any course which should bind him to oppose in arms the wishes of Germany. It may be comparatively easy for England to carry on a war which can never go beyond the maritime operations of blockade and capture of ships. Schleswig and England are far apart from each other. But the soil of Germany touches the soil of France, and a war between France and Germany would be one of the most burdensome and one of the most hazardous in which the French Empire could engage.

Besides these considerations the Emperor cannot fail to recollect that he has been made an object of mistrust and suspicion in Europe on account of his supposed projects of aggrandizement on the Rhine. A war commenced on the frontiers of Germany would not fail to give strength to these unfounded and unwarrantable imputations. For these reasons, the Government of the Emperor will not take at present any engagement on the subject of Denmark. If, hereafter, the balance of power should be seriously threatened, the Emperor may be inclined to take new measures in the interest of France and of Europe. But for the present the Emperor reserves to his Government entire liberty. (No. 4, 620).

Well, Sir, I should think that, after the reception of that dispatch, though it might have been very hard to convince the Foreign Secretary of the fact, any other person might easily have suspected that the just influence of England was lowered in another quarter of Europe.

Sir, I have now brought events to the period when Parliament met, trespassing, I fear, too much on the indulgence of the House; but honourable members will remember that, in order to give this narrative to-day, it was necessary for me to peruse 1,500 printed folio pages, and I trust I have done no more than advert to those passages to which it was requisite to direct attention in order that the House might form a complete and candid opinion of the case. I will not dwell, or only for the slightest possible time, on what occurred upon the meeting of Parliament. Sir, when we met there were no papers; and I remember that when I asked for papers there was not, I will frankly say, on both sides of the House, a sufficient sense of the very great importance of the occasion, and the singular circumstance that the papers were not presented to us. It turned out afterwards from what fell from the Secretary of State in another place, that it was never intended that the papers should be presented at the meeting of Parliament. The noble lord at the head of the Government treated the enquiry for papers in a jaunty way, and said, 'Oh! you shall have papers and I wish you joy of them.' That was the tone of the First Minister in reference to the most important diplomatic correspondence ever laid before Parliament since the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens: but we are all now aware of the importance of these transactions. It was weeks—months almost—before we became masters of the case, but during the interval the most disastrous circumstances occurred, showing the increased peril and danger of Denmark, and the successes of the invaders of her territory. We all remember their entrance into Jutland. We all remember the inquiries which were made on the subject, and the assurances

which were given. But it was impossible for the House to pronounce any opinion, because the papers were not before it, and the moment we had the papers, a Conference was announced.

One word with respect to the Conference. I never was of opinion that the Conference would arrive at any advantageous result. I could not persuade myself, after reading the papers, that, whatever might be the cause, anyone seriously wished for a settlement, except, of course, Her Majesty's Ministers, and they had a reason for it. The Conference lasted six weeks. It wasted six weeks. It lasted as long as a carnival, and, like a carnival, it was an affair of masks and mystification. Our Ministers went to it as men in distressed circumstances go to a place of amusement—to while away the time, with a consciousness of impending failure. However, the summary of the Conference is this, that Her Majesty's Government made two considerable proposals. They proposed, first, the dismemberment of Denmark. So much for its integrity. They proposed, in the second place, that the remainder of Denmark should be placed under the joint guarantee of the Great Powers. They would have created another Turkey in Europe, in the same geographical relation, the scene of the same intrigues, and the same source of constant misconceptions and wars. So much for the independence of Denmark. These two propositions having been made, the one disastrous to the integrity and the other to the independence of Denmark, the Conference, even with these sacrifices offered, was a barren failure.

And now I wish to ask—after having, I hope, with some clearness and in a manner tolerably comprehensive, placed the case before honourable members—what is their opinion of the management of these affairs by Her Majesty's Government? I showed you that the beginning of this interference was a treaty by which England entered into obligations as regards Denmark not different from those of France. I have shown you, on the evidence of the Secretary of State, that the present position of France with respect to Denmark is one quite magnanimous, free from all difficulties and disgrace. I have shown you, I think, what every man indeed feels, that the position of England under this treaty, on the contrary, is most embarrassing, surrounded with difficulties and full of humiliation. I have stated my opinion that the difference between the position of England and that of France arose from the mismanagement of our affairs. That appeared to me to be the natural inference and logical deduction. I have given you a narrative of the manner in which our affairs have been conducted and now I ask you what is your opinion? Do you see in the management of those affairs that capacity, and especially that kind of capacity that is

adequate to the occasion? Do you find in it that sagacity, prudence, that dexterity, that quickness of perception, and those conciliatory moods which we are always taught to believe necessary in the transaction of our foreign affairs? Is there to be seen that knowledge of human nature, and especially that peculiar kind of science, most necessary in these affairs—an acquaintance with the character of foreign countries and of the chief actors in the scene?

Sir, for my part I find all these qualities wanting; and in consequence of the want of these qualities, I see that three results have occurred. The first is that the avowed policy of Her Majesty's Government has failed. The second is, that our just influence in the councils of Europe has been lowered. Thirdly, in consequence of our just influence in the councils of Europe being lowered, the securities for peace are diminished. These are three results which have followed in consequence of the want of the qualities to which I have alluded, and in consequence of the management of these affairs by the Government. Sir, I need not, I think, trouble the House with demonstrating that the Government have failed in their avowed policy of upholding the independence and integrity of Denmark. The first result may be thrown aside. I come therefore to the second. By the just influence of England in the councils of Europe I mean an influence contra-distinguished from that which is obtained by intrigue and secret understanding; I mean an influence that results from the conviction of foreign Powers that our resources are great and that our policy is moderate and steadfast. Since the settlement that followed the great revolutionary war, England, who obtained at that time—as she deserved to do, for she bore the brunt of the struggle—who obtained at that time all the fair objects of her ambition, has on the whole followed a Conservative foreign policy. I do not mean by Conservative foreign policy a foreign policy that would disapprove—still less oppose the natural development of nations. I mean a foreign policy interested in the tranquillity and prosperity of the world, the normal condition of which is peace and which does not ally itself with the revolutionary party of Europe. Other countries have their political systems and public objects, as England had, though they may not have attained them. She is not to look upon them with unreasonable jealousy. The position of England in the councils of Europe is essentially that of a moderating and mediatorial Power. Her interest and her policy are, when changes are inevitable and necessary, to assist so that these changes, if possible, may be accomplished without war, or, if war occurs, that its duration and asperity may be lessened. This is what I mean by the just influence of England in the councils of Europe. It appears to me that the just influence of England in the councils of Europe has been

lowered. Within twelve months we have been twice repulsed at St. Petersburg. Twice have we supplicated in vain at Paris. We have menaced Austria, and Austria has allowed our menaces to pass like an idle wind. We have threatened Prussia, and Prussia has defied us. Our objurgations have rattled over the head of the German Diet, and the German Diet has treated them with contempt.

Again, Sir, during the last few months there is scarcely a form of diplomatic interference which has not been suggested or adopted by the English Government—except a Congress. Conferences at Vienna, at Paris, at London, all have been proposed; protocols, joint declarations, sole mediation, joint mediation, identic notes, sole notes, united notes—everything has been tried. Couriers from the Queen have been scouring Europe with the exuberant fertility of abortive projects. After the termination of the most important Conference held in the capital of the Queen, over which the chief Minister of Her Majesty's foreign relations presided and which was attended with all the pomp and ceremony requisite for so great an occasion, we find that its sittings have been perfectly barren; and the chief Ministers of the Cabinet closed the proceedings by quitting the scene of their exertions and appearing in the two Houses of Parliament to tell the country that they have no allies, and that, as they have no allies, they can do nothing. Pardon me, I must not omit to do justice to the exulting boast of the Secretary of State, who, in the midst of discomfiture, finds solace in the sympathy and politeness of the neutral Powers. I do not grudge Lord Russell the sighs of Russia or the smiles of France; but I regret that with characteristic discretion he should have quitted the battle of the Conference only to take his seat in the House of Lords to denounce the perfidy of Prussia, and to mourn over Austrian fickleness. There wanted but one touch to complete the picture and it was supplied by the noble lord, the First Minister.

Sir, I listened with astonishment—I listened with astonishment as the noble lord condemned the vices of his victim and inveighed at the last moment against the obstinacy of unhappy Denmark. Denmark would not submit to arbitration. But on what conditions did the German Powers accept it? And what security had Denmark? That if in the Conference she could not obtain an assurance that the neutral Powers would support her by force on the line of the Schlei—what security, I say, had she that any other line would be maintained—an unknown line by an unknown arbiter? Sir, it does appear to me impossible to deny, under these circumstances, that the just influence of England in the councils of Europe is lowered. And now, I ask, what are the consequences of the just influence of England in the councils of Europe being

lowered? The consequences are—to use a familiar phrase in the dispatches—‘most serious,’ because in exact proportion as that influence is lowered the securities for peace are diminished. I lay this down as a great principle, which cannot be controverted, in the management of our foreign affairs. If England is resolved upon a particular policy, war is not probable. If there is, under these circumstances, a cordial alliance between England and France, war is most difficult; but if there is a thorough understanding between England, France, and Russia, war is impossible.

These were the happy considerations under which Her Majesty’s Ministers entered office, and which they enjoyed when they began to move in the question of Denmark. Two years ago, and even less, there was a cordial understanding between England, France, and Russia upon this question or any question which might arise between Germany and Denmark. What cards to play! What advantages in the management of affairs! It seemed, indeed, that they might reasonably look forward to a future which would justify the confidence of Parliament; when they might point with pride to what they had accomplished, and appeal to public opinion to support them. But what has happened? They have alienated Russia, they have estranged France, and then they call Parliament together to declare war against Germany. Why, such a thing never happened before in the history of this country. Nay, more, I do not think it can ever happen again. It is one of those portentous results which occur now and then to humiliate and depress the pride of nations, and to lower our confidence in human intellect. Well, Sir, as the difficulties increase, as the obstacles are multiplied, as the consequences of the perpetual errors and constant mistakes are gradually becoming more apparent, you always find Her Majesty’s Government nearer war. As in private life we know it is the weak who are always violent, so it is with Her Majesty’s Ministers. As long as they are confident in their allies, as long as they possess the cordial sympathy of the Great Powers, they speak with moderation, they counsel with dignity: but, like all incompetent men, when they are in extreme difficulty, they can see but one resource, and that is force. When affairs cannot be arranged in peace you see them turning first to St. Petersburg—that was a bold dispatch which was sent to St. Petersburg in January last, to ask Russia to declare war against Germany—and twice to Paris, entreating that violence may be used to extricate them from the consequences of their own mistakes. It is only by giving the Government credit as I have been doing throughout, for the complete sincerity of their expressions and conduct, that their behaviour is explicable. Assume that their policy was a war policy, and it is quite intelligible. Whenever

difficulties arise, their resolution is instantly to have recourse to violence. Every word they utter, every dispatch they write, seems always to look to a scene of collision. What is the state of Europe at this moment? What is the state of Europe produced by this management of our affairs? I know not what other honourable gentlemen may think, but it appears to me most serious. I find the great German Powers openly avowing that it is not in their capacity to fulfil their engagements. I find Europe impotent to vindicate public law because all the great alliances are broken down; and I find a proud and generous nation like England shrinking with the reserve of magnanimity from the responsibility of commencing war, yet sensitively smarting under the impression that her honour is stained—stained by pledges which ought not to have been given, and expectations which I maintain ought never to have been held out by wise and competent statesmen.

Sir, this is anarchy. It therefore appears to me obvious that Her Majesty's Government have failed in their avowed policy of maintaining the independence and integrity of Denmark. It appears to me undeniable that the just influence of England is lowered in the councils of Europe. It appears to me too painfully clear that to lower our influence is to diminish the securities of peace. And what defence have we? If ever a criticism is made on his ambiguous conduct the noble lord asks me, 'What is your policy?' My answer might be—my policy is the honour of England and the peace of Europe, and the noble lord has betrayed both.

THE BERLIN TREATY

(Delivered in the House of Lords, July 18th, 1878).

MY LORDS, in laying on the Table of your Lordships' House, as I am about to do, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, I have thought I should only be doing my duty to your Lordships' House, to Parliament generally, and to the country, if I made some remarks on the policy which was supported by the Representatives of Her Majesty at the Congress, and which is embodied in the Treaty of Berlin and in the Convention which was placed on your Lordships' Table during my absence.

My Lords, you are aware that the Treaty of San Stefano was looked on with much distrust and alarm by Her Majesty's Government—that they believed it was calculated to bring about a state of affairs

dangerous to European independence, and injurious to the interests of the British Empire. Our impeachment of that policy is before your Lordships and the country, and is contained in the Circular of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in April last. Our present contention is that we can show that, by the changes and modifications which have been made in the Treaty of San Stefano by the Congress of Berlin and by the Convention of Constantinople, the menace of European independence has been removed, and the threatened injury to the British Empire has been averted. Your Lordships will recollect that by the Treaty of San Stefano about one-half of Turkey in Europe was formed into a State called Bulgaria—a State consisting of upwards of 50,000 geographical square miles, and containing a population of 4,000,000, with harbours on either sea—both on the shores of the Euxine and of the Archipelago. That disposition of territory severed Constantinople and the limited district which was still spared to the possessors of that city—severed it from the Provinces of Macedonia and Thrace by Bulgaria descending to the very shores of the Aegean; and, altogether, a State was formed, which, both from its natural resources and its peculiarly favourable geographical position, must necessarily have exercised a predominant influence over the political and commercial interests of that part of the world. The remaining portion of Turkey in Europe was reduced also to a considerable degree by affording what was called compensation to previous rebellious tributary Principalities, which have now become independent States—so that the general result of the Treaty of San Stefano was, that while it spared the authority of the Sultan so far as his capital and its immediate vicinity, it reduced him to a state of subjection to the Great Power which had defeated his armies, and which was present at the gates of his capital. Accordingly, though it might be said that he still seemed to be invested with one of the highest functions of public duty—the protection and custody of the Straits—it was apparent that his authority in that respect could be exercised by him only in deference to the superior Power which had vanquished him, and to whom the proposed arrangements would have kept him in subjection. My Lords, in these matters the Congress of Berlin have made great changes. They have restored to the Sultan two-thirds of the territory which was to have formed the great Bulgarian State. They have restored to him upwards of 30,000 geographical square miles, and 2,500,000 of population—that territory being the richest in the Balkans, where most of the land is rich, and the population one of the wealthiest, most ingenious, and most loyal of his subjects. The frontiers of his State have been pushed forward from the mere environs of Salonica and Adrianople to the lines of the Balkans and Trajan's Pass; the new

Principality, which was to exercise such an influence, and produce a revolution in the disposition of the territory and policy of that part of the globe is now merely a State in the Valley of the Danube, and both in its extent and its population is reduced to one-third of what was contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano. My Lords, it has been said that while the Congress of Berlin decided upon a policy so bold as that of declaring the range of the Balkans as the frontier of what may now be called New Turkey, they have, in fact, furnished it with a frontier which, instead of being impregnable, is in some parts undefended, and is altogether one of an inadequate character. My Lords, it is very difficult to decide, so far as nature is concerned, whether any combination of circumstances can ever be brought about which would furnish what is called an impregnable frontier. Whether it be river, desert, or mountainous range, it will be found, in the long run, that the impregnability of a frontier must be supplied by the vital spirit of man ; and that it is by the courage, discipline, patriotism, and devotion of a population that impregnable frontiers can alone be formed. And, my Lords, when I remember what race of men it was that created and defended Plevna, I must confess my confidence that, if the cause be a good one, they will not easily find that the frontier of the Balkans is indefensible. But it is said that although the Congress has furnished—and it pretended to furnish nothing more—a competent military frontier to Turkey, the disposition was so ill managed that, at the same time, it failed to secure an effective barrier—that in devising the frontier, it so arranged matters that this very line of the Balkans may be turned. The Congress has been charged with having committed one of the greatest blunders that could possibly have been accomplished by leaving Sofia in the possession of a Power really independent of Turkey, and one which, in the course of time, might become hostile to Turkey. My Lords, this is, in my opinion, an error on the part of those who furnish information of an authentic character to the different populations of Europe, who naturally desire to have correct information on such matters. It is said that the position of Sofia is of a commanding character, and that of its value the Congress were not aware, and that it was yielded to an imperious demand on the part of one of the Powers represented at the Congress. My Lords, I can assure your Lordships that there is not a shadow of truth in the statement. I shall show that when the Congress resolved to establish the line of the Balkans as the frontier of Turkey, they felt that there would have been no difficulty, as a matter of course, in Turkey retaining the possession of Sofia. What happened was this. The highest military authority of the Turks—so I think I may describe him—was one of the Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of the Porte—I allude to Mehemet Ali Pasha.

Well, the moment the line of the Balkans was spoken of, he brought under the notice of his colleagues at the Conference—and especially, I may say, of the Plenipotentiaries of England—his views on the subject ; and, speaking as he did not only with military authority, but also with consummate acquaintance with all these localities, he said nothing could be more erroneous than the idea that Sofia was a strong strategical position, and that those who possessed it would immediately turn the Balkans and march on Constantinople. He said that as a strategical position it was worthless, but that there was a position in the Sandjak of Sofia which, if properly defended, might be regarded as impregnable, and that was the Pass of Ichtiman. He thought it of vital importance to the Sultan that that position should be secured to Turkey, as then His Majesty would have an efficient defence to his capital.

That position was secured. It is a pass which, if properly defended, will prevent any host, however powerful, from taking Constantinople by turning the Balkans. But, in consequence of that arrangement, it became the duty of the Plenipotentiaries to see what would be the best arrangement in regard to Sofia and its immediate districts. The population of Sofia and its district are, I believe, without exception Bulgarian, and it was thought wise, they being Bulgarians, that, if possible, it should be included in Bulgaria. That was accomplished by exchanging it for a district in which the population, if not exclusively, are numerically Mohammedan, and which, so far as the fertility of the land is concerned, is an exchange highly to the advantage of the Porte. That, my Lords, is a short account of an arrangement which I know has for a month past given rise in Europe, and especially in this country, to a belief that it was in deference to Russia that Sofia was not retained, and that by its not having been retained, Turkey had lost the means of defending herself, in the event of her being again plunged into war.

My Lords, it has also been said, with regard to the line of the Balkans, that it was not merely in respect of the possession of Sofia that an error was committed, but that the Congress made a great mistake in not retaining Varna. My Lords, I know that there are in this Assembly many Members who have recollections—glorious recollections—of that locality. They will know at once that if the line of the Balkans were established as the frontier, it would be impossible to include Varna, which is to the North of the Balkans. Varna itself is not a place of importance, and only became so in connexion with a system of fortifications which are now to be razed. No doubt, in connexion with a line of strongholds, Varna formed a part of a system of defence ; but of itself Varna is not a place of importance. Of itself it is only a roadstead, and those who dwell upon the importance of Varna and consider that it was a great

error on the part of the Congress not to have secured it for Turkey, quite forget that between the Bosphorus and Varna, upon the coast of the Black Sea, the Congress has allotted to Turkey a much more important point on the Black Sea—the harbour of Burgos. My Lords, I think I have shown that the charges made against the Congress on these three grounds—the frontiers of the Balkans, the non-retention of Sofia, and the giving up of Varna—have no foundation whatever.

Well, my Lords, having established the Balkans as the frontier of Turkey in Europe, the Congress resolved that South of the Balkans, to a certain extent, the country should be formed into a Province to which should be given the name of Eastern Roumelia. At one time it was proposed by some to call it South Bulgaria ; but it was manifest that such a name between it and North Bulgaria there would be constant intriguing to bring about a union between the two Provinces. We, therefore, thought that the Province of East Roumelia should be formed, and that there should be established in it a Government somewhat different from that of contiguous provinces where the authority of the Sultan might be more unlimited. I am not myself of opinion that, as a general rule, it is wise to interfere with a military Power which you acknowledge ; but, though it might have been erroneous, as a political principle, to limit the military authority of the Sultan, yet there are in this world other things besides political principles—there are such things as historical facts, and he would not be a prudent statesman who did not take into consideration historical facts as well as political principles. The province which we have formed into Eastern Roumelia had been the scene of many excesses, by parties on both sides, to which human nature looks with deep regret ; and it was thought advisable, in making these arrangements for the Peace of Europe, that we should take steps to prevent the probable recurrence of such events. Yet to do this, and not give the Sultan a direct military authority in the province, would have been, in our opinion, a grievous error. We have, therefore, decided that the Sultan should have the power to defend the barrier of the Balkans with all his available force. He has power to defend his frontiers by land and by sea, both by the passes of the mountains and the ports and strongholds of the Black Sea. No limit has been placed on the amount of force he may bring to bear with that object. No one can dictate to him what the amount of that force shall be ; but, in respect to the interior and the internal government of the province, we thought the time had arrived when we should endeavour to carry into effect some of those important proposals intended for the better administration of the States of the Sultan, which were discussed and projected at the Conference of Constantinople.

My Lords, I will not enter into any minute details on these questions. They might weary you at this moment, and I have several other matters on which I must yet touch ; but, generally speaking, I imagine there are three great points which we shall have before us in any attempt to improve the administration of Turkish dominion. First of all, it is most important—and we have so established it in Eastern Roumelia—that the office of Governor shall be for a specific period, and that, as in India, it should not be for less than five years. If that system generally obtained in the dominions of the Sultan, I believe it would be of incalculable benefit. Secondly, we thought it desirable that there should be instituted public assemblies, in which the popular element should be adequately represented, and that the business of those assemblies should be to levy and administer the local finances of the province. And, thirdly, we thought it equally important that order should be maintained in this province, either by a *gendarmerie* of adequate force or by a local militia, in both cases the officers holding their commissions from the Sultan. But the whole subject of the administration of Eastern Roumelia has been referred to an Imperial Commission at Constantinople, and this Commission, after making its investigations, will submit recommendations to the Sultan, who will issue Firmans to carry those recommendations into effect. I may mention here—as it may save time—that in all the arrangements which have been made to improve the condition of the subject-races of Turkey in Europe, inquiry by local commissions in all cases where investigation may be necessary is contemplated. Those commissions are to report their results to the Chief Commission ; and, after the Firman of the Sultan has been issued, the changes will take place. It is supposed that in the course of three months from the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, the principal arrangements may be effected.

My Lords, I may now state what has been effected by the Congress in respect of Bosnia—that being a point on which I think considerable error prevails. One of the most difficult matters we had to encounter in attempting what was the object of the Congress of Berlin—namely, to re-establish the Sultan as a real and substantial authority—was the condition of some of his distant provinces, and especially of Bosnia. The state of Bosnia, and of those provinces and principalities contiguous to it, was one of chronic anarchy. There is no language which can describe adequately the condition of that large portion of the Balkan peninsula occupied by Roumania, Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and other provinces. Political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit, and of the pursuit of objects which patriotic minds would wish to accomplish, the hatred of races, the animosities

of rival religions, and, above all, the absence of any controlling power that could keep these large districts in anything like order—such were the sad truths, which no one who has investigated the subject could resist for a moment. Hitherto—at least until within the last two years—Turkey had some semblance of authority which, though it was rarely adequate, and when adequate, was unwisely exercised, still was an authority to which the injured could appeal, and which sometimes might control violence. But the Turkey of the present time was in no condition to exercise that authority. I inquired into the matter of those most competent to give an opinion, and the result of my investigation was a conviction that nothing short of an army of 50,000 men of the best troops of Turkey would produce anything like order in those parts, and that, were the attempt to be made, it would be contested and resisted, and might finally be defeated. But what was to be said at a time when all the statesmen of Europe were attempting to concentrate and condense the resources of the Porte with the view of strengthening them—what would have been the position of the Porte if it had to commence its new career—a career, it is to be hoped, of amelioration and tranquillity—by dispatching a large army to Bosnia to deal with those elements of difficulty and danger? It is quite clear, my Lords, that such an effort at this moment by Turkey might bring about its absolute ruin. Then what was to be done? There have been before, in the history of diplomacy, not unfrequent instances in which, even in civilized parts of the globe, States having fallen into decrepitude have afforded no assistance to keep order and tranquillity, and have become, as these districts have become, a source of danger to their neighbours. Under such circumstances, the Powers of Europe have generally looked to see whether there was any neighbouring Power of a character entirely different from those disturbed and desolated regions, but deeply interested in their welfare and prosperity, who would undertake the task of attempting to restore their tranquillity and prosperity. In the present case, you will see that the position of Austria is one that clearly indicates her as fitted to undertake such an office. It is not the first time that Austria has occupied provinces at the request of Europe to ensure that order and tranquillity, which are European interests, might prevail in them. Not once, twice, or thrice has Austria undertaken such an office. There may be differences of opinion as to the policy on which Austria has acted, or as to the principles of government which she has maintained; but that has nothing to do with the fact that, under circumstances similar to those which I have described as existing in Bosnia and the provinces contiguous to it, Austria has been invited and has interfered in the manner I have described, and has brought about order and tranquillity. Austria, in the present case, was deeply in-

terested that some arrangement should be made. Austria, for now nearly three years, has had upwards of 150,000 refugees from Bosnia, which have been supported by her resources, and whose demands notoriously have been of a vexatious and exhausting character. It was, therefore, thought expedient by the Congress that Austria should be invited to occupy Bosnia, and not to leave it until she had deeply laid the foundations of tranquillity and order. My Lords, I am the last man who would wish, when objections are made to our proceedings, to veil them under the decision of the Congress; it was a decision which the Plenipotentiaries of England highly approved. It was a proposal which, as your Lordships will see when you refer to the Protocols which I shall lay on the table to-night, was made by my noble friend the Secretary of State, that Austria should accept this trust and fulfil this duty; and I earnestly supported him on that occasion. My Lords, in consequence of that arrangement, cries have been raised against our 'partition of Turkey.' My Lords, our object has been directly the reverse—our object has been to prevent partition. The question of partition is one upon which, it appears to me, very erroneous ideas are in circulation. Some two years ago—before, I think, the War had commenced, but when the disquietude and dangers of the situation were very generally felt—there was a school of statesmen who were highly in favour of what they believed to be the only remedy—what they called the partition of Turkey. Those who did not agree with them were those who thought we should, on the whole, attempt the restoration of Turkey. Her Majesty's Government at all times have resisted the partition of Turkey. They have done so, because, exclusive of the high moral considerations that are mixed up with the subject, they believed an attempt, on a great scale, to accomplish the partition of Turkey would inevitably lead to a long, a sanguinary, and often recurring struggle, and that Europe and Asia would both be involved in a series of troubles and sources of disaster and danger of which no adequate idea could be formed.

These professors of partition—quite secure, no doubt, in their own views—have freely spoken to us on this subject. We have been taken up to a high mountain and shown all the kingdoms of the earth, and they have said—'All these shall be yours if you will worship Partition.' But we have declined to do so for the reasons I have shortly given. And it is a remarkable circumstance that after the great war, and after the prolonged diplomatic negotiations, which lasted during nearly a period of three years, on this matter, the whole Powers of Europe, including Russia, have strictly, and as completely as ever, come to the unanimous conclusion that the best chance for the tranquillity and order of the world is to retain the Sultan as part of the acknowledged political system of

Europe. My Lords, unquestionably after a great war—and I call the late war a great war, because the greatness of a war now must not be calculated by its duration, but by the amount of forces brought into the field, and where a million of men have struggled for supremacy, as has been the case recently, I call that a great war—but, I say, after a great war like this, it is utterly impossible that you can have a settlement of any permanent character without a re-distribution of territory and considerable changes. But that is not partition. My Lords, a country may have lost provinces, but that is not partition. We know that not very long ago a great country—one of the foremost countries of the world—lost provinces; yet, is not France one of the Great Powers of the world, and with a future—a commanding future. Austria herself has lost provinces—more provinces even than Turkey, perhaps; even England has lost provinces—the most precious possessions—the loss of which every Englishman must deplore to this moment. We lost them from bad government. Had the principles which now obtain between the metropolis and her dependencies prevailed then, we should not, perhaps, have lost those provinces, and the power of this Empire would have been proportionally increased. It is perfectly true that the Sultan of Turkey has lost provinces; it is true that his armies have been defeated; it is true that his enemy is even now at his gates; but all that has happened to other Powers. But a sovereign who has not yet forfeited his capital, whose capital has not been occupied by his enemy—and that capital one of the strongest in the world—who has armies and fleets at his disposal and who still rules over 20,000,000 inhabitants, cannot be described as a Power whose Dominions have been partitioned. My Lords, it has been said that no limit has been fixed to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria. Well, I think that was a very wise step. The moment you limit an occupation you deprive it of half its virtue. All those opposed to the principles which occupation was devised to foster and strengthen feel that they have only to hold their breath and wait a certain time, and the opportunity for their interference would again present itself. Therefore, I cannot agree with the objection which is made to the arrangement with regard to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria on the question of its duration.

My Lords, there is a point on which I feel it now my duty to trouble your Lordships, and that is the question of Greece. A severe charge has been made against the Congress, and particularly against the English Plenipotentiaries, for not having sufficiently attended to the interests and claims of Greece. My Lords, I think you will find, on reflection, that that charge is utterly unfounded. The English Government

were the first that expressed the desire that Greece should be heard at the Congress. But, while they expressed that desire, they communicated confidentially to Greece that it must on no account associate that desire on the part of the Government with any engagement for the re-distribution of territory. That was repeated, and not merely once repeated. The Greek inhabitants, apart from the kingdom of Greece, are a considerable element in the Turkish Empire, and it is of the greatest importance that their interests should be sedulously attended to. One of the many evils of that large Slav State—the Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty—was, that it would have absorbed, and made utterly to disappear from the earth, a considerable Greek population. At the Congress the Greeks were heard, and they were heard by representatives of considerable eloquence and ability ; but it was quite clear, the moment they put their case before the Congress, that they had totally misapprehended the reason why the Congress had met together, and what were its objects and character. The Greek representatives, evidently, had not in any way relinquished what they call their great idea—and your Lordships well know that it is one that has no limit which does not reach as far as Constantinople. But they did mention at the Congress, as a practical people, and feeling that they had no chance of obtaining at that moment all they desired—that they were willing to accept as an instalment the two large provinces of Epirus and Thessaly, and the Island of Crete. It was quite evident to the Congress, that the representatives of Greece utterly misunderstood the objects of our labours—that we were not there to partition Turkey, and give them their share of Turkey, but for a very contrary purpose—as far as we could to re-establish the dominion of the Sultan on a rational basis, to condense and concentrate his authority, and to take the opportunity—of which we have largely availed ourselves—of improving the condition of his subjects. I trust, therefore, when I have pointed out to your Lordships this cardinal error in the views of Greece, that your Lordships will feel that the charge made against the Congress has no substantial foundation. But the interests of Greece were not neglected, and least of all by Her Majesty's Government. Before the Congress of Berlin, believing that there was an opportunity of which considerable advantage might be made for Greece without deviating into partition, we applied to the Porte to consider the long-vexed question of the boundaries of the two States. The boundaries of Greece have always been inadequate and inconvenient ; they are so formed as to offer a premium to brigandage—which is the curse of both countries, and has led to misunderstanding and violent intercourse between the inhabitants of both. Now, when some re-distribution—and a considerable re-distribution—of

territories was about to take place—now, we thought, was the opportunity for Greece to urge her claim, and that claim we were ready to support, and to reconcile the Porte to viewing it in a large and liberal manner. And I am bound to say that the manner in which our overtures were received by the Porte was encouraging, and more than encouraging. For a long period Her Majesty's Government have urged upon both countries, and especially upon Greece, the advantage of a good understanding between them. We urged that it was only by union between Turks and Greeks that any reaction could be obtained against that overpowering Slav interest which was then exercising such power in the Peninsula, and which had led to this fatal and disastrous war. More than this, on more than one occasion—I may say, on many occasions—we have been the means of preventing serious misunderstandings between Turkey and Greece, and on every occasion we have received from both States an acknowledgment of our good offices. We were, therefore, in a position to assist Greece in this matter. But, of course, to give satisfaction to a State which coveted Constantinople for its capital, and which talked of accepting large provinces and a powerful island as only an instalment of its claims for the moment, was difficult. It was difficult to get the views of that Government accepted by Turkey, however inclined it might be to consider a reconstruction of frontiers on a large and liberal scale. My noble friend the Secretary of State did use all his influence, and the result was that, in my opinion, Greece has obtained a considerable accession of resources and strength. But we did not find, on the part of the representatives of Greece, that response or that sympathy which we should have desired. Their minds were in another quarter. But though the Congress could not meet such extravagant and inconsistent views as those urged by Greece—views which were not in any way within the scope of the Congress or the area of its duty—we have still, as will be found in the Treaty, or certainly in the Protocol, indicated what we believe to be a rectification of frontier, which would add considerably to the strength and resources of Greece. Therefore, I think, under all the circumstances, it will be acknowledged that Greece has not been neglected. Greece is a country so interesting that it enlists the sympathies of all educated men. Greece has a future, and I would say, if I might be permitted, to Greece, what I would say to an individual who has a future—'Learn to be patient.'

Now, my Lords, I have touched upon most of the points connected with Turkey in Europe. My summary is that at this moment—of course, no longer counting Servia or Roumania, once tributary principalities, as part of Turkey; not counting even the new Bulgaria, though it is a

tributary principality, as part of Turkey ; and that I may not be taunted with taking an element which I am hardly entitled to place in the calculation, omitting even Bosnia—European Turkey still remains a Dominion of 60,000 geographical square miles, with a population of 6,000,000, and that population in a very great degree concentrated and condensed in the provinces contiguous to the capital. My Lords, it was said, when the line of the Balkans was carried—and it was not carried until after long and agitating discussions—it was said by that illustrious statesman who presided over our labours, that ‘ Turkey in Europe once more exists.’ My Lords, I do not think that, so far as European Turkey is concerned, this country has any right to complain of the decisions of the Congress, or, I would hope, of the labours of the Plenipotentiaries. You cannot look at the map of Turkey as it had been left by the Treaty of San Stefano, and it has been re-arranged by the Treaty of Berlin, without seeing that great results have accrued. If these results had been the consequences of a long war—if they had been the results of a struggle like that we underwent in the Crimea—I do not think they would have been even then un^{der}substantial or unsatisfactory. My Lords, I hope that you and the country will not forget that these results have been obtained without shedding the blood of a single Englishman ; and if there has been some expenditure, it has been an expenditure which, at least, has shown the resources and determination of this country. Had you entered into that war—for which you were prepared—and well prepared—probably in a month you would have exceeded the whole expenditure you have now incurred.

My Lords, I now ask you for a short time to quit Europe and to visit Asia, and consider the labours of the Congress in another quarter of the world. My Lords, you well know that the Russian arms met with great success in Asia, and that in the Treaty of San Stefano considerable territories were yielded by Turkey to Russia. In point of population, they may not appear to be of that importance that they are generally considered, because it is a fact which should be borne in mind that the population which was yielded to Russia by Turkey amounted to only about 250,000 souls and, therefore, if you look to the question of population, and to the increase of strength to a state which depends on population you would hardly believe that the acquisition of 250,000 new subjects is a sufficient return for the terrible military losses which inevitably must accrue from campaigns in that country. But although the amount of population was not considerable, the strength which the Russians acquired was of very different character. They obtained Kars by conquest—they obtained Ardahan—another stronghold—they obtained Bayazid—and the Valley of Alashkerd with the adjoining territory, which contain the

great commercial routes in that part of the world. They also obtained the port of Batoum. Now, my Lords, the Congress of Berlin have so far sanctioned the Treaty of San Stefano that, with the exception of Bayazid and the Valley which I have mentioned—no doubt very important exceptions, and which were yielded by Russia to the views of the Congress—they have consented to the yielding of the places I have named to Russia. The Congress have so far approved the Treaty of San Stefano that they sanctioned the retention by Russia of Kars and Batoum. Now the question arises—the Congress having come to that determination—was it a wise step on the part of the Plenipotentiaries of Her Majesty to agree to that decision? That is a question which may legitimately be asked. We might have broken up the Congress, and said, ‘We will not consent to the retention of these places by Russia, and we will use our force to oblige her to yield them up.’ Now, my Lords, I wish fairly to consider what was our position in this state of affairs. It is often argued as if Russia and England had been at war and peace was negotiating between the two Powers. That was not the case. The rest of Europe were critics over a Treaty which was a real Treaty that existed between Russia and Turkey. Turkey had given up Batoum, she had given up Kars and Ardahan, she had given up Bayazid. In an examination of the question, then, we must remember that Russia at this moment, so far as Europe is concerned, has acquired in Europe nothing but a very small portion of territory, occupied by 130,000 inhabitants. Well, she naturally expected to find some reward in her conquests in Armenia for the sacrifices which she had made. Well, my Lords, consider what those conquests are. There was the strong fort of Kars. We might have gone to war with Russia in order to prevent her acquiring Kars and Batoum, and other places of less importance. The war would not have been, probably, a very short war. It would have been a very expensive war—and, like most wars, it would probably have ended in some compromise and we should have got only half what we had struggled for. Let us look these two considerable points fairly in the face. Let us first of all take the great stronghold of Kars. Three times has Russia captured Kars. Three times, either by our influences, or by other influences, it has been restored to Turkey. Were we to go to war for Kars and restore it to Turkey, and then to wait till the next misunderstanding between Russia and Turkey, when Kars should have been taken again? Was that an occasion of a *casus belli*? I do not think your Lordships would ever sanction a war carried on for such an object and under such circumstances.

Then, my Lords, look at the case of Batoum, of which your Lordships have heard so much. I should have been very glad if Batoum

had remained in the possession of the Turks, on the general principle that the less we had reduced its territory in that particular portion of the globe, the better it would be as regards the prestige on which the influence of the Ottoman Porte much depends there. But let us see what is this Batoum of which you have heard so much. It is generally spoken of in society and in the world as if it were a sort of Portsmouth—whereas, in reality, it should rather be compared with Cowes. It will hold three considerable ships, and if it were packed like the London Docks, it might hold six ; but in that case the danger, if the wind blew from the north, would be immense. You cannot increase the port seaward ; for though the water touching the shore is not absolutely fathomless, it is extremely deep, and you cannot make any artificial harbour or breakwater. Unquestionably, in the interior the port might be increased, but it can only be increased by first-rate engineers, and by the expenditure of millions of capital ; and if we were to calculate the completion of the port by the precedents which exist in many countries (and certainly in the Black Sea), it would not be completed under half a century. Now is that a question for which England would be justified in going to war with Russia ? My Lords, we have, therefore, thought it advisable not to grudge Russia those conquests that have been made—especially after obtaining the restoration of the town of Bayazid and its important district.

But it seemed to us the time had come when we ought to consider whether certain efforts should not be made to put an end to these perpetually recurring wars between the Porte and Russia, ending, it may be, sometimes apparently in comparatively insignificant results ; but always terminating with one fatal consequence—namely, shaking to the centre the influence and the prestige of the Porte in Asia and diminishing its means of profitably and advantageously governing that country. My Lords, it seemed to us that as we had now taken, and as Europe generally had taken, so avowedly deep an interest in the welfare of the subjects of the Porte in Europe, the time had come when we ought to consider whether we could not do something which would improve the general condition of the dominions of the Sultan in Asia ; and, instead of these most favoured portions of the globe every year being in a more forlorn and disadvantageous position, whether it would not be possible to take some steps which would secure at least tranquillity and order ; and, when tranquillity and order were secured, whether some opportunity might not be given to Europe to develop the resources of a country which Nature has made so rich and teeming. My Lords, we occupy with respect to this part of the world a peculiar position, which is shared by no other Power. Our Indian Empire is on every occasion on which

these discussions occur, or these troubles occur, or these settlements occur—our Indian Empire is to England a source of grave anxiety, and the time appeared to have arrived when, if possible, we should terminate that anxiety. In all the questions connected with European Turkey we had the assistance and sympathy sometimes of all, and often of many, of the European Powers—because they were interested in the question who should possess Constantinople, and who should have the command of the Danube and the freedom of the Mediterranean. But when we came to considerations connected with our Oriental Empire itself, they naturally are not so generally interested as they are in those which relate to the European portion of the Dominions of the Porte, and we have to look to our own resources alone. There has been no want, on our part, of invitations to neutral Powers to join with us in preventing or in arresting war. Besides the great Treaty of Paris there was the Tripartite Treaty, which, if acted upon, would have prevented war. But that Treaty could not be acted upon, from the unwillingness of the parties to it to act; and therefore we must clearly perceive that if anything could be effectually arranged, as far as our Oriental Empire is concerned, the arrangements must be made by ourselves. Now, this was the origin of that Convention at Constantinople which is on your Lordships' table, and in that Convention our object was not merely a military or chiefly a military object. Our object was to place this country certainly in a position in which its advice, and in which its conduct might at least have the advantage of being connected with a military power and with that force which it is necessary to possess often in great transactions, though you may not fortunately feel that it is necessary to have recourse to that force. Our object in entering into that arrangement with Turkey was, as I said before, to produce tranquillity and order. When tranquillity and order were produced, we believed that the time would come when the energy and enterprise of Europe might be invited to what really is another Continent, as far as the experience of man is concerned, and that its development will add greatly not merely to the wealth and the prosperity of the inhabitants, but to the wealth and prosperity of Europe. My Lords, I am surprised to hear—for though I have not heard it myself from any authority, it is so generally in men's mouths that I am bound to notice it—that the step we have taken should be represented as one that is calculated to excite the suspicion or enmity of any of our Allies, or of any State. My Lords, I am convinced that when a little time has elapsed, and when the people are better acquainted with this subject than they are at present, no one will accuse England of having acted in this matter but with frankness and consideration for other Powers. And if there be

a Power in existence to which we have endeavoured to show most consideration from particular circumstances in this matter it is France. There is no step of this kind that I would take without considering the effect it might have upon the feelings of France—a nation to whom we are bound by almost every tie that can unite a people, and with whom our intimacy is daily increasing. If there could be any step which of all others was least calculated to excite the suspicion of France it would appear to be this—because we avoided Egypt, knowing how susceptible France is with regard to Egypt; we avoided Syria, knowing how susceptible France is on the subject of Syria, and we avoided availing ourselves of any part of the *terra firma*, because we would not hurt the feelings or excite the suspicions of France. France knows that for the last two or three years we have listened to no appeal which involved anything like an acquisition of territory, because the territory which might have come to us would have been the territory which France would see in our hands with suspicion and dislike. But I must make this observation to your Lordships. We have a substantial interest in the East; it is a commanding interest, and its behest must be obeyed. But the interest of France in Egypt and her interest in Syria are, as she acknowledges, sentimental and traditionary interests; and, although I respect them, I wish to see in the Lebanon and in Egypt the influence of France fairly and justly maintained, and although her officers and ours in that part of the world—and especially in Egypt—are acting together with confidence and trust, we must remember that our connexion with the East is not merely an affair of sentiment and tradition, but that we have urgent and substantial and enormous interests which we must guard and keep. Therefore, when we find that the progress of Russia is a progress which, whatever may be the intentions of Russia, necessarily in that part of the world produces such a state of disorganization and want of confidence in the Porte, it comes to this—that if we do not interfere in the vindication of our own interests, that part of Asia must become the victim of anarchy, and ultimately become part of the possessions of Russia.

Now, my Lords, I have ventured to review the chief points connected with the subject on which I wished to address you—namely, what was the policy pursued by us, both at the Congress of Berlin and in the Convention of Constantinople. I am told, indeed, that we have incurred an awful responsibility by the Convention into which we have entered. My Lords, a prudent Minister certainly would not recklessly enter into any responsibility; but a Minister who is afraid to enter into responsibility is, to my mind, not a prudent Minister. We do not, my Lords, wish to enter into any unnecessary responsibility, but there

is one responsibility from which we certainly shrink ; we shrink from the responsibility of handing to our successors a diminished or a weakened Empire. Our opinion is that the course we have taken will arrest the great evils which are destroying Asia Minor and the equally rich countries beyond. We see in the present state of affairs the Porte losing its influence over its subjects ; we see a certainty, in our opinion, of increasing anarchy, of the dissolution of all those ties which, though feeble, yet still exist and which have kept society together in those countries. We see the inevitable result of such a state of things, and we cannot blame Russia for availing herself of it. But, yielding to Russia what she has obtained, we say to her—‘ Thus far, and no farther.’ Asia is large enough for both of us. There is no reason for these constant wars, or fears of wars, between Russia and England. Before the circumstances which led to the recent disastrous war, when none of those events which we have seen agitating the world had occurred, and when we were speaking in ‘ another place ’ of the conduct of Russia in Central Asia, I vindicated that conduct, which I thought was unjustly attacked, and I said then, what I repeat now—there is room enough for Russia and England in Asia. But the room that we require we must secure. We have, therefore, entered into an alliance—a defensive alliance—with Turkey, to guard her against any further attack from Russia. We believe that the result of this Convention will be order and tranquillity. And then it will be for Europe—for we ask no exclusive privileges or commercial advantages—it will then be for Europe to assist England in availing ourselves of the wealth which has been so long neglected and undeveloped in regions once so fertile and so favoured. We are told, as I have said before, that we are undertaking great responsibilities. From those responsibilities we do not shrink. We think that, with prudence and discretion, we shall bring about a state of affairs as advantageous for Europe as for ourselves ; and in that conviction we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the act which we have recommended is one that leads to trouble and to warfare. No, my Lords. I am sure there will be no jealousy between England and France upon this subject.

In taking Cyprus the movement is not *Mediterranean* ; it is *Indian*. We have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire and for its preservation in peace. If that be our first consideration, our next is the development of the country. And upon that subject I am told that it was expected to-night that I should in detail lay before the House the minute system by which all those results, which years may bring about, are instantly to be acquired. I, my Lords, am prepared to do nothing of the kind. We must act with considerable

caution. We are acting with a Power, let me remind the House, which is an independent Power—the Sultan—and we can decide nothing but with his consent and sanction. We have been in communication with that prince—who, I may be allowed to remind the House, has other things to think about, even than Asia Minor; for no man was ever tried, from his accession to the throne till this moment, so severely as the Sultan has been; but he has invariably during his reign expressed his desire to act with England and to act with Europe, and especially in the better administration and the management of his affairs. The time will come—and I hope it is not distant—when my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may be able to communicate to the House details of these matters, which will be most interesting. But we must protest against being forced into statements on matters of importance which are necessarily still immature. And we must remember that, formally speaking, even the Treaty of Berlin has not been ratified, and there are many things which cannot even be commenced until the ratification of that Treaty has occurred.

My Lords, I have now laid before you the general outline of the policy that we have pursued, both in the Congress of Berlin and at Constantinople. They are intimately connected with each other, and they must be considered together. I only hope that the House will not misunderstand our motives in occupying Cyprus, and in encouraging those intimate relations between ourselves and the Government and the population of Turkey. They are not movements of war; they are operations of peace and civilization. We have no reason to fear war. Her Majesty has fleets and armies which are second to none. England must have seen with pride the Mediterranean covered with her ships; she must have seen with pride the discipline and devotion which have been shown to her and her Government by all her troops, drawn from every part of her Empire. I leave it to the illustrious duke, in whose presence I speak, to bear witness to the spirit of imperial patriotism which has been exhibited by the troops from India, which he recently reviewed at Malta. But it is not on our fleets and armies, however necessary they may be for the maintenance of our imperial strength, that I alone or mainly depend in that enterprise on which this country is about to enter. It is on what I most highly value—the consciousness that in the Eastern nations there is confidence in this country, and that, while they know we can enforce our policy, at the same time they know that our Empire is an Empire of liberty, of truth, and of justice.

EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

(1872-).

THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD takes his title from the town where in 1872 he was born. He proceeded with a classical scholarship from the local school to Wadham College, Oxford. He was President of the Union in 1893. He gained a first class in jurisprudence in 1895 ; was Vinerian Law Scholar in 1896 ; was elected a Fellow of Merton ; and in the next few years was a lecturer at Merton and Oriel and extension lecturer in modern history for Oxford and for Victoria University. After successful legal practice at Liverpool, he was returned as a Tariff Reformer for the Walton division at the election of 1906 ; he retained this seat until elevated to the Lord Chancellorship in 1919. He inaugurated his parliamentary career with a brilliant speech ; but the subsequent notice he attracted to himself was as much due to the violence of his denunciation of ministers as to the qualities of his speeches.

By 1912 he had become the leader of the " Diehard " party in the House. At the time of the Home Rule Bill of 1912 he actively supported the cause of Ulster and associated himself with Sir Edward Carson in organizing resistance in Ulster against the proposed bill. During the war he became first head of the Press Bureau but shortly after went to France on active service.

With the formation of the first Coalition Ministry in May, 1915, he was appointed Solicitor-General, and knighted. In November he succeeded Sir E. Carson as Attorney-General till 1919.

In the autumn of 1918 he visited the United States on propaganda work. After the general election of December, 1918, he was made a peer and appointed Lord Chancellor in the reconstructed Ministry of Mr. Lloyd George. The appointment aroused keen criticism on account of his violent partisanship before the war. As Lord Chancellor he did however conduct his duties with characteristic and commendable vigour, and was responsible for many important and far-reaching legal reforms, the principal of these being the unification and identification of the land system of this country by the passing of the Law of Property Act, 1925 ; this Act came into operation on the first day of January, 1925, and in effect it assimilated the law of real and personal property, it amended the law of copyholds, it completely altered the law of intestacy as regards

both real and personal property and gave daughters an equal interest with sons in the estates of their parents, and it also made drastic alterations in the transfer of freehold property.

He was created an earl in 1922; and since the end of 1924 has been Secretary of State for India. He is the author of several books and has contributed liberally to newspapers.

His chief publications are: "International Law"; "Toryism until 1832"; "Speeches 1906-9"; "My American Visit" 1918; and "America Revisited," 1924.

IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

(Delivered at Glasgow University, November, 1923).

IDEALISM may be defined, as well as in another way, by calling it the spirit which impels an individual or group of individuals to a loftier standard of conduct than that which ordinarily prevails around him or them. This definition does not, of course, impinge upon the philosophical concept of idealism that in external conceptions the objects immediately known are ideas; that, in other words, all reality is in its nature psychical. With such abstractions (though they are of great interest) we are not practically at this moment concerned.

Idealism in the international field is the spirit which would carry into the relations of States the kind of ethical progress generally indicated above.

Now it is evident that every sane and normal citizen must desire improvement in the standards of purity and morality. Nor is it less evident that every reasonable statesman must desire that the relationship between States shall be increasingly regulated in accordance with the highest attainable standards of conscientious conduct. Conflict, therefore, is very unlikely to arise so long as attention is confined to the larger generalizations which the term suggests. The subject, however, of this observation is naturally neither an attempt to examine nor appraise the value either in national or international affairs of a loftier standpoint; or of a more austere ethical outlook. Such abstract discussion would be one-sided; nor would it lend itself to any fruitful disputation.

It is when attention is directed to the sharply contrasted views of those who are distinguished in political matters as "Idealists" or "Realists," that the subject-matter of the present examination becomes apparent. The use of these discordant terms makes it plain that the

word "Idealism" is employed in current phraseology to indicate a point of view in relation to life which may be challenged without either absurdity or cynicism. No one, for instance, imagines that the school of political thought which is conveniently described as Realistic would impeach the conception or definition of Idealism with which this address began. The term, therefore, is used in a narrower or more specialized sense, which must be somewhat more carefully analysed.

In current language an idealist in this sense is one who places before himself in private or public affairs as attainable, a goal which other citizens, perhaps equally moral, do not believe to be so attainable. Provided that the idealist be a sound judge of moral valuations nothing but good can proceed from his admonitions. If he wrenches, in his individual exertions, even a tiny fragment from the area of a grosser world, he will not perish without the glory of achievement.

It has, of course, naturally happened that the greatest of idealists have been teachers or preachers. And of all such, Jesus Christ was evidently the most pre-eminent. But it would be unreasonable to suppose that when He admonished him who was assaulted to turn the other cheek to the smiter, or him who was rich to sell all his possessions, and give them to the poor, He was laying down standards of conduct which He either expected or desired to see generally adopted. He was, on the contrary, diffusing through the medium of metaphor a sweet and beautiful moral atmosphere for the purification of imperfect manhood. Were an autocrat to issue a ukase within his own dominions ordering all rich men to divest themselves of their possessions in favour of the poor, he would be, assuming morality of purpose, an idealist in the narrower sense, but he would also be an idealist in that more aggressive and dangerous connotation, with which we are principally concerned.

An analysis of the subject derives some guidance from the use of the term in private, as opposed to public, policy. For such an examination makes it plain how small has been the conquest of Idealist thought, even over the comparatively easy domain of individual conduct. The school of Idealism is the very antithesis of the school of self-interest. And yet nothing is more apparent than that politically, economically, and philosophically the motive of self-interest not only is, but must be, and ought to be, the mainspring of human conduct. Bentham long since pointed out in his "Theory of Legislation," how inconvenient and even mischievous the consequences would be if every individual were to regulate his conduct, not in relation to his own interests, which he is likely to understand, but in relation to the interests of others, in relation to which he is very likely to be imperfectly informed.

Economically the matter is not less plain. Mankind subsists precariously upon this globe on the terms of constant and contributory toil. The experience of thousands, perhaps of hundreds of thousands of years, has shown that the desire of self-advancement is the only adequate incentive for that standard of labour and achievement which each individual must be encouraged in the common scheme to afford. The only legitimate sphere, therefore, of the idealist within the field of private morality is to elevate, if he can, the standards by reference to which conduct is, in the existing scheme of things, adjusted, without attempting to impair motives which are fundamental in human nature, and vital to social economy.

If we turn to the relationship of States we shall find it necessary to draw similar distinctions even more clearly ; for many causes combine in this field to contract the area with which altruism is likely to win adherence. The man who cries, " My country, right or wrong," may or may not be a patriot ; but he is certainly not an idealist. The latter in this connexion must again be conceived of not merely as one who desires to see the substitution in international practice of Law for War : the complete purification of international morality ; and perhaps

—" The Parliament of man, the Federation of the world."

For in this vague sentiment of benevolence many admirable citizens of many countries would concur. But the Idealist in the sense which concerns us is he who believes that these things are in fact attainable ; that we ought to take steps and make exertions, and even sacrifices, in order to attain them. And he would indeed, in most cases, actually shape the policy of his country, and even compromise its interests, because he believes in the prospects which he indicates ; and in the sanctity and infallibility of international compacts.

Twenty-four years ago a Tsar of Russia issued to the world a very sonorous and idealist message. It announced the hope that War might be for ever ended. It made specific proposals in that sense. And thus there came into existence a Hague Conference, with the history of which most of us are familiar. It would be foolish to deny that this Conference did some useful work in its secondary tasks—namely, the consideration of international disputes ; and the alleviation of avoidable cruelty in the prosecution of war, which is itself in its very essence cruel. But it has achieved absolutely nothing in the direction of its major and more imposing purpose. In a book upon the subject of international law which I wrote immediately after the appearance of the Tsar's communication I made the following observation :

“No sensible person with the slightest knowledge of history will believe that human nature has so profoundly altered as to afford the most remote prospect that this dream will ever be realized.”

This conclusion was much assailed at the time by our sentimentalists. But a few years later that same Russia was hurling men in millions in the attempt to destroy Japan. And continuously thereafter the junta of evil and ambitious men, of whom the Kaiser was alike the mouthpiece and the figurehead, was projecting the stupendous tragedy which has almost, in its reactions, destroyed the civilization of Europe. Untaught by previous experience; undeterred by the shattering refutation of their beliefs which the Great War brought with it; the Idealists immediately had the originality to exploit its outbreak for their own controversial purposes. It was indeed unfortunate, they admitted, that the War should have occurred at all; and especially war so savagely conducted and flung over so enormous an area of the world's surface. But, after all, it had its bright side. For it was to be a war to end war. This time, at least, when once the ploughshare, according to the correct tradition, had ousted the weapons of war, there was to be no further declension into primeval savagery. And so we were to have a League of Nations consisting in time of all the nations, great and small, in the world; equipped with military and naval force, and therefore able to make good its decisions against a recalcitrant member.

While I thought, and think, that there was, and still is, a modest area within which the League of Nations may make useful contribution to the harmony of the world; the larger claims made on its behalf always seemed to me to be frankly fantastic. Its framers forgot human nature as absurdly as they neglected history. What in the history of the world has ever happened which afforded foothold for expectations so megalomaniac? Divide the history of the world into two broad epochs, with the birth of Jesus Christ as the dividing line. An examination in terms, however general, of these two periods equips a scientific observer with some material for the formation of true decision. Of the earlier period first.

I do not pause to deal here with the countless minor struggles which everywhere marked the infancy of the world. I mention, only to note it, the evidence collected by Darwin and his followers showing at work in every department of life the survival of the fittest. But I must bestow a moment upon the lessons to be derived from the Old Testament. According to Holy Writ the chosen people were set in motion in order that they might violently possess themselves of a land flowing with milk and honey. They were “utterly to destroy their

enemies." And thereafter we find them over a long period of time, protracted no doubt by their own peccadilloes, engaged in violent and bloody strife with various antagonists. It may, of course, be said, in view of their desperate struggles with the Philistines, that the latter were very wicked men. Unfortunately, however, there always have existed in the world very wicked men.

Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary to import the qualification that all wars are to cease, except against very wicked men. But even here a difficulty presents itself. For every war that I know of has recurrently presented the same phenomenon that each protagonist believed, or pretended to believe, in the moral vileness of the other. In 1914, for instance, the French affirmed the Germans to be wicked aggressors; whereas the German people as a whole loudly proclaimed the criminal initiative of Russia.

It must, therefore, I think, be admitted that the history of the chosen people, and indeed the Old Testament, taken as a whole, afford little ground for optimism in this regard.

A similar, but more extended observation falls to be made about all the great Eastern Empires of the ancient world. Indeed, in this connexion, sombre images throng the mind. Egyptians, Medes, Persians, Assyrians—all these achieved Empire at the point of the sword. Of how many dead Empires does the silent and immobile East contain the record? In what graves repose the millions of their unprotesting slain?

A happier and more humane experience might have been looked for from that exquisite intellectual efflorescence which we associate with the greatest of Greek States. Yet, historically, their records tell of almost continuous strife. So bitterly indeed, and amid such jealousies, did they wage war with one another, that they could not combine even against the fierce Macedonian, and so one more rare and beautiful civilization perished utterly from the earth.

To Greece succeeded Rome, teaching the entire world through the whole of its stern, dominating, and Imperial sway, that might was right; and that a sharp sword in the hand of a disciplined soldier was the most persuasive argument in world diplomacy.

And there came, too, in correction, the message of Jesus Christ, tender in its simplicity, superhuman in its humanity. The creed of Him who was crucified was to spread with incredible swiftness over a large part of the world's surface. Mighty powers and great princes have rendered homage to the message of mercy and peace which came from those Divine and persuasive lips.

And yet, while we take note of the spread of the Christian religion, we must none the less analyse the value of its reaction upon international conduct. What was its influence over the recent world convulsion? What was its spiritual and intellectual contribution to that poignant problem? Why did an omnipotent Deity suddenly doom so many innocent victims to bestial destruction? Did the greatest priest in the world, enthroned in his Roman Palace, ever pronounce a clear and intelligible conclusion upon the moral responsibility for the outbreak of war; or upon the methods by which that war was conducted? Was he influenced by the fact that his flock diverged beneath different standards? If so, he ceased to be the divinely appointed mouthpiece of the higher morality, and declined to a place, such as it was, among the politicians.

After a digression, apparently, rather than actually irrelevant, we may resume a hurried historical summary.

After Rome, the Barbarians; after the Barbarians countless decades of anarchial chaos. And then throughout the centuries a long succession of almost uninterrupted wars—wars dynastic; wars territorial; wars on points of honour; and wars of naked aggression. England and France; England and Spain; England and Holland; England and France again; France and Germany; and thereafter the violent emergence of the Hohenzollern dynasty; more cynically based on blood and iron; more determined *debellare superbos*, than any Power since mighty Rome.

Are we really to learn nothing from all that has happened over this immense period of time? Does any warrant exist for the belief that human nature has altered its whole character? And, if so, what is the warrant? And when did that alteration take place? And, more particularly, what evidence of this great Reformation do we find in what has happened in Europe since the Armistice? There have been wars and rumours of wars. I do not myself know of a moment in the last four years in which there has appeared to be less prospect of permanent peace in Europe than at the present moment.

Nor is it an answer to say, as some do, that the infirmities of the Treaty of Versailles were responsible for the unrest and the violence which distract Europe to-day. If there were infirmities in that Treaty these again were infirmities in human nature which cannot be corrected. For the statesmen who put their names to that Treaty—to the territorial readjustments of that Treaty—were themselves the mouthpieces of imperious and conquering democracies, and the views under discussion here are largely founded upon the expectation that the human

nature of democracies will not undergo much modification. And if it does not they will obtain statesmen malleable to their purposes.

Summing up this branch of the matter, we are bound to conclude that from the very dawn of the world man has been a combative animal. To begin with, he fought violently for his own elemental needs ; later, perhaps in tribal or communal quarrel ; later still, with the growth of greater communities, upon a larger and more sophisticated scale. And it is to be specially noted that there have nevertheless almost always existed men who sincerely but very foolishly believed ; firstly, that no war would arise in their own day ; and, secondly (when that war did arise), that for some reason or other it would be the last. At this point the idealist degenerates into the pacifist ; and it is at this point consequently that he becomes a danger to the community of which he is a citizen. Athens, in her decline, had no lack of such advisers ; and, unhappily for the City of the Violet Crown, she preferred their sloppy folly to the ardent eloquence of Demosthenes. In the days of Napoleon (who had a very just contempt of these " ideologues ") Charles Fox harnessed his eloquence to the chariot of sentimentalism. But he switched rather abruptly as soon as he became Foreign Minister. And in our own day we have been afforded convincing evidence of the real peril to national security which arises when idealists grow too strong in the conduct of public affairs. Perhaps this happened in 1906. Every sensible person now realizes that even in that year the German scheme was being nebulously conceived ; and its deadly menace increased with every year which passed. I myself, in a book called " Unionist Policy," published in 1910, devoted a long article, of which I shall presume to say that it was closely and clearly reasoned, to demonstrating the soundness of Lord Roberts' warnings. But the immense increase in the German Army, the construction of strategic railways upon the Belgian boundary, the creation of a mighty fleet, which had no enemy but ours, left our idealists unconvinced.

And accordingly, every year the annual meeting of a great federation, with pathetic faith and sincerity, passed resolutions in favour of reducing our military and naval expenditure ; and a member of Parliament, in private life an admirable citizen and a sagacious chemist, produced the immortal saying that he would rather trust to the doctrines of international law than to the protection of the British Fleet. Even the robust patriotism of my friend Mr. Winston Churchill succumbed for a fugitive moment to the miasma ; though the lapse in his case was to be nobly retrieved by the demoniac energy elicited by actual contact with the Admiralty. It was, indeed, in these years that Idealism became rampant with those in power. Notorious and almost vital facts were

everywhere ignored. German editors were entertained by English editors in London ; and dilated with fluent eloquence upon the pacific intentions of the Fatherland. English editors in their turn visited Berlin to enjoy, in that martial capital, the same agreeable reassurances. And all the time the armies grew. All the time a mighty instrument was being fashioned in the German fleet. All the time Heligoland frowned more impregnably upon the North Sea. All the time those great military railways, unneeded for peaceful traffic, were debouching upon the defenceless Belgian frontier. In the welter of sentimentality, amid which Great Britain might easily have mouldered into ruin, my valued colleague, Lord Haldane, presented a figure alike interesting, individual, and arresting. In speech fluent and even infinite, he yielded to no living idealist in the easy coinage of sentimental phraseology. Here, indeed, he was a match for those who distributed the chloroform of Berlin. Do we not remember, for instance, that Germany was his spiritual home ? But he none the less prepared himself, and the Empire, to talk when the time came with his spiritual friends in language not in the least spiritual. He devised the Territorial Army, which was capable of becoming the easy nucleus of national conscription ; and which unquestionably ought to have been used for that purpose at the outbreak of war. He created the Imperial General Staff. He founded the Officers' Training Corps.

And two other names require special and honourable mention in an age of incredible self-deceit. Lord Roberts devoted the evening of an illustrious life to warnings of marvellous prescience which passed almost unheeded. General Baden-Powell used the laurels which he had gained at Mafeking to inspire and sustain the noblest and most promising movement which has taken place in our lifetime. The foundation of the Boy Scouts established for this gifted and imaginative soldier a monument more lasting than bronze.

It has been thought worth while to retrace the events of these fateful years with some particularity in order to show that Idealism in national affairs is not merely impracticable, but that it may easily degenerate into a deadly source of national peril.

Still a further illustration may be drawn from recent events. The signing of the Armistice immediately released all the sentimentalists. Not only was the Great War ended, but there was never to be another. The League of Nations was to be equipped with functions and resources which would in effect enthrone it in super-sovereignty over the contributory nations. But herein the statesman who of all others should most completely have understood the American people demonstrated that in fact he understood them least of all. That people is the most

generous people in the world in the field of international charity. The United States have lavished countless millions of dollars upon the starving population of Russia. They were first in the field with bountiful relief to stricken Japan. But they draw—and rightly draw—a sharp and logical distinction between Idealism in their capacity as private citizens for private charities ; and Idealism in their corporate or national character. And accordingly they exercised their undoubted right in repudiating at the first opportunity an idealist conception which they believed to be at once impracticable, strange to their traditions, and incompatible with their interests.

A broader consideration must now in its turn be examined. We are told that the object aimed at is the abolition of war. Everybody recognizes that war is both cruel and hateful. But is it even conceivable that it can ever be abolished ? Is the ownership of the world to be stereotyped by perpetual tenure in the hands of those who possess its different territories to-day ? If it is, very strange and undesirable consequences will one day follow. For nations wax and wane, so that a Power competent in one age to govern an empire, perhaps remote, in the general interest of the world, will in another abuse a dominion for which it no longer possesses the necessary degree of vigour. The history of Spain supplies a familiar illustration.

Her chivalry was second to none in Europe. Her high standard of gallant conduct was disfigured only by the cruelties of the Inquisition. Her stately galleons brought a quiver of apprehension even to the stout bosom of Queen Elizabeth ; and were never discredited until the rout of the superb Armada. And in exuberant colonial enterprise she was the mistress and pioneer of Europe. In the last-named enterprise, indeed, she flung her civilization and her language into the remote parts of the world, deriving incredible titles from successive Papal Bulls. And coincidentally, or almost so, with her immense maritime enterprise, she flung the martial Moor in rout from Spain. But her decline was as rapid as her ascension. She proved no adequate custodian of her over-sea possessions. Had a League of Nations existed when she began to lose them, would it have sustained Spain, or the insurgents of Spain, or in another case, the despoilers of Spain ?

And the general extrusion of savage races from regions, for instance the American continent and certain of the South Sea Islands, to which they had some considerable legal right, shows that, rightly or wrongly, nations of stronger fibre, confronted by indigenous weaklings, have always asserted the right of forcible expropriation. No one (to make the argument short) who has studied the history of the world has ever

defended the view that the supreme interest of evolutionary humanity can support a definitive delimitation for all time of the surface of the world.

But if such a final distribution is impracticable and even undesirable, by what agency are modifications to be made? Voluntary cessions of territory have not been frequent in the past; and there seems little reason to suppose that they will become more fashionable in the future. For many thousands of years the emergence of new and martial nations has been gradually marked by violent readjustments of national boundaries. It may, of course, be the case that human nature has so completely altered that some new method is discoverable. I confess, however, that none has up to the present occurred to my own mind.

It may, perhaps, be charged against those who sincerely hold the views which I have attempted to make plain, that we carry in our veins the virus which coloured the sombre and unmoral genius of Treitschke, and which found popular expression in the mosquito propaganda of von Bernhardi. But such a charge, if made, would be patently unjust. We neither hold nor have we preached these doctrines. We diagnose certain diseases. We did not create them. A distinction must surely be drawn between him who calls attention to the risk of conflagration and that other who puts his torch to inflammable material.

The purpose and moral of these general observations may be summarized in a few concluding observations. For as long a time as the records of history have been preserved human societies passed through a ceaseless process of evolution and adjustment. This process has been sometimes pacific; but more often it has resulted from warlike disturbance. The strength of different nations, measured in terms of arms, varies from century to century. The world continues to offer glittering prizes to those who have stout hearts and sharp swords; it is therefore extremely improbable that the experience of future ages will differ in any material respect from that which has happened since the twilight of the human race. It is for us, therefore, who in our history have proved ourselves a martial, rather than a military, people to abstain, as has been our habit, from provocation; but to maintain in our own hand the adequate means for our own protection; and, so equipped, to march with heads erect and bright eyes along the road of our Imperial destiny.

PRINCE BISMARCK

(1815-1898).

IN delivering his great speech on the Army Bill (February 1888) which, in the opinion of his enemies, was the most powerful reactionary utterance of the second half of the century, Bismarck showed himself a consummate master of that art which conceals itself so thoroughly that it requires a laborious collection of evidence to demonstrate its existence. He did not care at all to be considered an orator. His whole mind was centred on carrying his point. In this he succeeded so well on that occasion, and on almost every other, that though he probably made more public speeches and carried more points than any other man in Germany during his day, he is seldom thought of as an eloquent man or as an orator and is rarely classed among the great speakers of his country. In delivering his speech on the Army Bill, he talked to the German Reichstag in what was apparently a bluff, off-handed, jovial style, very much as if he were talking to half a dozen companions around a table over beer and pipes. Now, he stopped to jest with the opposition, now he grew confidential as if he were revealing State secrets to truest friends, now he appealed as a German to Germans in behalf of the Fatherland, now he spoke for the sacred interests of peace and philanthropy—always with the easy, assured assumption that everyone must agree with him as a matter of course without the necessity for anything more than this conversational style of putting things among friends.

His mastery of German is phenomenal. Though his language is simplicity itself, his sentences grow on him until no one of less mental power could have emerged from their labyrinths. He does emerge, however, and that so easily and naturally that their involved nature only becomes remarkable when the attempt is made to transfer his thought to another language.

Bismarck (Otto Edward Leopold, Prince von Bismarck-Schönhausen), was born April 1st, 1815, and died July 30th, 1898. He was the greatest "Conservative" of his age and one of the greatest of any age. Among the public men with whom he was matched in Europe only Gladstone equalled him in intellect and, lacking his intense force of prejudice, Gladstone himself was never anything like his equal in effectiveness. To Bismarck more than to any other one man, probably more than to

any other ten men, was due the gradual but sure growth of the feeling which at his death had turned Europe into an "armed camp." When he first entered politics, as a representative of the extreme royalists of the German land-holding nobility in their opposition to the parliamentary movement of 1848-49, he showed the same tendencies which appear in his speech on the Army Bill of 1888. He was disturbed by the evident tendency of the world to grow into cities, which he regarded as hotbeds of treason and disorder. To check this he believed "blood and iron" were necessary in both domestic and foreign politics. This and his intense devotion to the royal family of Prussia are the mainsprings of his politics. He opposed the "United Germany," proposed by the Frankfort Parliament of 1849, because he thought it gave too much recognition to the people at the expense of the Crown. He fought for royal prerogative at every point in the history of Germany until the empire was established at Versailles after France had submitted on terms he had dictated. In 1884 he achieved his greatest triumph against the "Socialists" of Germany by committing the empire to the Imperial policy, which it has since pursued with that antagonism to England which ended in the catastrophe of 1914. Bismarck was for forty years one of the master forces in European diplomacy.

VINDICATION OF BLOOD AND IRON

(Delivered in the Reichstag, February 6th, 1888).

IF I rise to speak to-day it is not to urge on your acceptance the measure the President has mentioned (the Army Appropriation). I do not feel anxious about its adoption, and I do not believe that I can do anything to increase the majority by which it will be adopted—by which it is all-important at home and abroad that it should be adopted. Gentlemen of all parties have made up their minds how they will vote and I have the fullest confidence in the German Reichstag that it will restore our armament to the height from which we reduced it in the period between 1867 and 1882; and this is not with respect to the conditions of the moment, not with regard to the apprehensions which may excite the stock exchanges and the mind of the public; but with a considerate regard for the general condition of Europe. In speaking, I shall have more to say of this than of the immediate question.

I do not speak willingly, for under existing conditions a word unfortunately spoken may be ruinous, and the multiplication of words can do little to explain the situation, either to our own people or to foreigners. I speak unwillingly, but I fear that if I kept silent there would be an increase rather than a diminution of the expectations which have attached themselves to this debate, of unrest in the public mind, of the disposition to nervousness at home and abroad. The public might believe the question to be so difficult and critical that a minister for foreign affairs would not dare to touch upon it. I speak, therefore, but I can say truly that I speak with reluctance. I might limit myself to recalling expressions to which I gave utterance from this same place a year and a day ago. Little change has taken place in the situation since then. I chanced to-day on a clipping from the *Liberal Gazette*, a paper which I believe stands nearer to my friend, Representative Richter, than it does to me. It pictures one difficult situation to elucidate another, but I can take only general notice of the main points there touched on, with the explanation that if the situation has since altered, it is for the better rather than for the worse.

We had then our chief apprehension because of a war which might come to us from France. Since then, one peace-loving President has retired from administration in France, and another peace-loving President has succeeded him. It is certainly a favourable symptom that in choosing its new chief executive France has not put its hand into Pandora's box, but that we have assurance of a continuation under President Carnot of the peaceful policy represented by President Grevy. We have, moreover, other changes in the French administration whose peaceful significance is even stronger than that of the change in the presidency—an event which involved other causes. Such members of the ministry as were disposed to subordinate the peace of France and of Europe to their personal interests have been pushed out, and others, of whom we have not this to fear, have taken their places. I think I can state, also—and I do it with pleasure, because I do not wish to excite but to calm the public mind—that our relations with France are more peaceful, much less explosive than a year ago.

The fears which have been excited during the year have been occasioned more by Russia than by France, or I may say that the occasion was rather the exchange of mutual threats, excitement, reproaches and provocations which have taken place during the summer between the Russian and French press. But I do not believe that the situation in Russia is materially different now from what it was a year ago. The *Liberal Gazette* has printed in display type what I said then:—"Our friendship with Russia sustained no interruption during our war and it

is elevated above all doubt to-day. We expect neither assault nor attack nor unfriendliness from Russia." Perhaps this was printed in large letters to make it easier to attack it. Perhaps also with the hope that I had reached a different conclusion in the meantime and had become convinced that my confidence in the Russian policy of last year was erroneous. This is not the case. The grounds which gave occasion for it lie partly in the Russian press and partly in the mobilization of Russian troops. I cannot attach decided importance to the attitude of the press. They say that it means more in Russia than it does in France. I am of contrary opinion. In France the press is a power which influences the conclusions of the administration. It is not such a power in Russia, nor can it be ; but in both cases the press is only spots of printer's ink on paper against which we have no war to wage. There can be no ground of provocation for us in it. Behind each article is only one man—the man who has guided the pen to send the article into the world. Even in a Russian paper, we may say in an independent Russian paper secretly supported by French subsidies, the case is not altered. The pen which has written in such a paper an article hostile to Germany has no one behind it but the man whose hand held the pen, the man who in his cabinet produced the lucubration and the protector which every Russian newspaper is wont to have—that is to say the official more or less important in Russian party politics who gives such a paper his protection. But both of them do not weigh a feather against the authority of his Majesty, the Czar of Russia . . .

Since the great war of 1870 was concluded, has there been any year, I ask you, without its alarm of war ? Just as we were returning, at the beginning of the seventies, they said : When will we have the next war ? When will the Revanche be fought ? In five years at latest. They said to us then : " The question of whether we will have war and of the success with which we shall have it (it was a representative of the Centre who upbraided me with it in the Reichstag) depends to-day only on Russia. Russia alone has the decision in her hands."

Perhaps I will return to this question later. In the meantime, I will continue the pictures of these forty years and recall that in 1876 a war cloud gathered in the South ; that in 1877, the Balkan War was only prevented by the Berlin Congress from putting the whole of Europe in a blaze, and that quite suddenly after the Congress a new vision of danger was disclosed to us in the East because Russia was offended by our action at the conference. Perhaps, later on, I will recur to this also if my strength will permit.

Then followed a certain reaction in the intimate relations of the three emperors which allowed us to look for some time into the future with

more assurance ; yet on the first signs of uncertainty in their relations, or because of the lapsing of the agreements they had made with each other, our public opinion showed the same nervous and, I think, exaggerated excitement with which we had to contend last year—which, at the present time, I hold to be specially uncalled for. But because I think this nervousness uncalled for now, I am far from concluding that we do not need an increase of our war footing. On the contrary ! Therefore, I have unrolled before you this tableau of forty years—perhaps not to your amusement ! If not, I beg your pardon, but had I omitted a year which you yourselves had experienced with shuddering, the impression might have been lost that the state of anxiety before wars, before continually extending complication, the entanglements of which no one can anticipate,—that this condition is permanent with us ; that we must reckon upon it as a permanency ; and that independently of the circumstances of the moment, with the self-confidence of a great nation which is strong enough under any circumstances to take its fate into its own hands against any coalition ; with the confidence in itself and in God which its own power and the righteousness of its cause, a righteousness which the *car* of the Government will always keep with Germany that we shall be able to foresee every possibility and doing so to look forward to peace.

The long and the short of it is that in these days we must be as strong as we can ; and if we will we can be stronger than any other country of equal resources in the world. I will return to that. And it would be a crime not to use our resources. If we do not need an army prepared for war we do not need to call for it. It depends merely on the not very important question of the cost—and it is not very important, though I mention it incidentally. I have no mind to go into figures, financial or military, but France during the last few years has spent in improving her forces three thousand millions, while we have spent hardly fifteen hundred millions including that we are now asking for. But I leave the Ministers of War and of Finance to deal with that. When I say that we must strive continually to be ready for all emergencies, I advance the proposition that, on account of our geographical position, we must make greater efforts than any other powers would be obliged to make in view of the same ends. We lie in the middle of Europe. We have at least three fronts on which we can be attacked. France has only an eastern boundary ; Russia only its western, exposed to assault. We are, moreover, more exposed than any other people to the danger of hostile coalition because of our geographical position, and because, perhaps, of the feeble power of cohesion which, until now, the German people has exhibited when compared with

others. At any rate, God has placed us in a position where our neighbours will prevent us from falling into a condition of sloth—of wallowing in the mire of mere existence. On one side of us He has set the French, a most warlike and restless nation ; and He has allowed to become exaggerated in the Russians fighting tendencies which had not become apparent in them during the earlier part of the century. So we are spurred forward on both sides to endeavours which perhaps we would not make otherwise. The pikes in the European carp-pond will not allow us to become carp, because they make us feel their stings in both our sides. They force us to an effort which, perhaps, we would not make otherwise, and they force us also to a cohesion among ourselves as Germans which is opposed to our innermost nature ; otherwise we would prefer to struggle with each other. But when we are enfiladed by the press of France and Russia, it compels us to stand together, and through such compression it will so increase our fitness for cohesion that we may finally come into the same condition of indivisibility which is natural to other people—which thus far we have lacked. We must respond to this dispensation of Providence, however, by making ourselves so strong that the pike can do nothing more than encourage us to exert ourselves. We had, years ago, in the times of the Holy Alliance (I recall an old American song which I learned from my dead friend, Motley :—

In good old colonial times
When we lived under a King !)

We had then patriarchal times and with them a multitude of balustrades on which we could support ourselves, and a multitude of dykes to protect us from the wild European floods. That was the German confederation, and the true beginning, and continuance, and conclusion on the German confederation was the Holy Alliance, for whose service it was made. We depended on Russia and Austria, and, above everything, we relied on our own modesty, which did not allow us to speak before the rest of the company had spoken. We have lost all that, and we must help ourselves. The Holy Alliance was shipwrecked in the Crimean War—through no fault of ours ! The German confederation has been destroyed by us because our existence under it was neither tolerable for us nor for the German people. Both have ceased to exist. After the dissolution of the German confederation, after the war of 1866, we should have been obliged to reckon on isolation for Prussia or North Germany, had we been obliged to stop at reckoning with the fact that on no side would they forgive us the new and great successes which we had obtained. Never do other powers look with pleasure on the triumphs of a neighbour.

Our connection with Russia was not disturbed, however, by the events of 1866. In 1866 the memory of the politics of Count von Buol and of Austrian politics during the Crimean War was too fresh in Russia to allow them to think of supporting the Austrian against the Prussian monarchy or of renewing the campaign which Czar Nicholas had conducted for Austria in 1849. For us, therefore, there remained a natural inclination towards Russia, which, foreseen in the last century, had in this its recognized origin in the politics of Czar Alexander I. To him Prussia owes thanks indeed. In 1813 he could easily have turned on the Polish frontiers and concluded peace. Later he could have brought about the fall of Prussia. We have then, as a fact, to thank, for the restoration of the old footing, the good will of Czar Alexander I. ; or if you are inclined to be sceptical, say to the need felt in Russian politics for Prussia. This feeling of gratitude has controlled the administration of Frederick William the Third.

The balance which Russia had on its account with Prussia was used up through the friendship, I may say through the serviceability of Prussia during the entire reign of Czar Nicholas and, I may add, settled at Olmutz. At Olmutz, Czar Nicholas did not take the part of Prussia, did not shield us from adverse experience, did not guard us against humiliation ; for, on the whole, he leaned towards Austria more than towards Prussia. The idea that during his administration we owed thanks to Russia results from a historical legend. But while Czar Nicholas lived, we, on our side, did not violate the tradition with Russia. During the Crimean War, as I have already told you, we stood by Russia in spite of threats and of some hazard. His Majesty, the late King, had no desire to play a decided part in the war with a strong army, as I think he could easily have done. We had concluded treaties by which we were bound to put a hundred thousand men in the field by a set time. I advised his Majesty that we should put not a hundred thousand but two hundred thousand in the field and to put them there *à cheval* so that we could use them right and left ; so that his Majesty would have been the final arbiter of the fortunes of the Crimean War. But his late Majesty was not inclined to warlike undertakings, and the people ought to be grateful to him for it. I was younger and less experienced then than I am now. We bore no malice for Olmutz, however, during the Crimean War. We came out of the Crimean War as a friend of Russia, and while I was ambassador to Russia I enjoyed the fruit of this friendship in a very favourable reception at court and in Russian society. Our attitude towards Austria in the Italian War was not to the taste of the Russian cabinet but it had no unfavourable consequences. Our Austrian War of 1866 was looked upon with a certain satisfaction. No one in Russia then grudged Austria

what she got. In the year 1870 we had, in taking our stand and making our defence, the satisfaction of co-incidentally rendering a service to our Russian friends in the Black Sea. The opening of the Black Sea by the contracting powers would never have been probable if the Germans had not been victorious in the neighbourhood of Paris. Had we been defeated, for example, I think the conclusion of the London agreement would not have been so easily in Russia's favour. So the war of 1870 left no ill humour between us and Russia. . . .

The bill will bring us an increase of troops capable of bearing arms—a possible increase, which if we do not need it, we need not call out, but can leave the men at home. But we shall have it ready for service if we have arms for it. And that is a matter of primary importance. I remember the carbine which was furnished by England to our Landwehr in 1813, and with which I had some practice as a huntsman—that was no weapon for a soldier! We can get arms suddenly for an emergency, but if we have them ready for it, then this bill will count for a strengthening of our peace forces and a reinforcement of the peace league as great as if a fourth great power had joined the alliance with an army of seven hundred thousand men—the greatest yet put in the field.

I, think, too, that this powerful reinforcement of the army will have a quieting effect on our own people, and will in some measure relieve the nervousness of our exchanges, of our press, and of our public opinion. I hope they all will be comforted if they make it clear to themselves that after this reinforcement and from the moment of the signature and publication of the bill, the soldiers are there! But arms are necessary, and we must provide better ones if we wish to have an army of triarians—of the best manhood that we have among our people; of fathers of family over thirty years old! And we must give them the best arms that can be had! We must not send them into battle with what we have not thought good enough for our young troops of the line. But our steadfast men, our fathers of family, our Samsons, such as we remember seeing hold the Bridge at Versailles, must have the best arms on their shoulders, and the best clothing to protect them against the weather, which can be had from anywhere. We must not be niggardly in this. And I hope it will reassure our countrymen if they think now it will be the case—as I do not believe—that we are likely to be attacked on both sides at once. There is a possibility of it, for, as I have explained to you in the history of the Thirty Years' War, all manner of coalitions may occur. But if it should occur we could hold the defensive on our borders with a million good soldiers. At the same time, we could hold in reserve a half million or more, almost a million, indeed; and send them forward as they were needed. Some one has said to me: "The only result of that will be

that the others will increase their forces also." But they cannot. They have long ago reached the maximum. We lowered it in 1867 because we thought that having the North-German confederation, we could make ourselves easier and exempt men over thirty-two. In consequence our neighbours have adopted a longer term of service—many of them a twenty-year term. They have a maximum as high as ours, but they cannot touch us in quality. Courage is equal in all civilized nations. The Russians or the French acquit themselves as bravely as the Germans. But our people, our seven hundred thousand men, are veterans trained in service, tried soldiers who have not yet forgotten their training. And no people in the world can touch us in this, that we have the material for officers and under-officers to command this army. That is what they cannot imitate. The whole tendency of popular education leads to that in Germany as it does in no other country. The measure of education necessary to fit an officer or under-officer to meet the demands which the soldier makes on him, exists with us to a much greater extent than with any other people. We have more material for officers and under-officers than any other country, and we have a corps of officers that no other country can approach. In this and in the excellence of our troops of under-officers, who are really the pupils of our officers' corps, lies our superiority. The course of education which fits an officer to meet the strong demands made on his position for self-denial, for the duty of comradeship, and for fulfilling the extraordinarily difficult social duties whose fulfilment is made necessary among us by the comradeship which, thank God, exists in the highest degree among officers and men without the least detriment to discipline—they cannot imitate us in that—that relationship between officers and men which, with a few unfortunate exceptions, exists in the German army. But the exceptions confirm the rule, and so we can say that no German officer leaves his soldiers under fire, but brings them out even at the risk of his own life ; while, on the other hand, no German soldier, as we know by experience, forsakes his officer.

If other armies intend to supply with officers and sub-officers as many troops as we intend to have at once, then they must educate the officers, for no untaught fool is fit to command a company, and much less is he fit to fulfil the difficult duties which an officer owes to his men, if he is to keep their love and respect. The measure of education which is demanded for that, and the qualities which, among us especially, are expressed in comradeship and sympathy by the officer, that no rule and no regulation in the world can impress on the officers of other countries. In that we are superior to all, and in that they cannot imitate us ! On that point I have no fear.

But there is still another advantage to be derived from the adoption of this bill : The very strength for which we strive shows our peaceful disposition. That sounds paradoxical, but still it is true.

No man would attack us when we have such a powerful war-machine as we wish to make the German army. If I were to come before you to-day and say to you—supposing me to be convinced that the conditions are different from what they are—if I were to say to you : “ We are strongly threatened by France and Russia ; it is evident that we will be attacked ; my conviction as a diplomat, considering the military necessities of the case, is that it is expedient for us to take the defensive by striking the first blow, as we are now in a position to do ; an aggressive war is to our advantage, and I beg the Reichstag for a milliard or half a milliard to begin it at once against both our neighbours ”—indeed gentlemen, I do not know that you would have sufficient confidence in me to consent ! I hope you would not.

But if you were to do it, it would not satisfy me. If we in Germany should wish to wage war with the full exertion of our national strength, it must be a war with which all who engage in it, all who offer themselves as sacrifices in it—in short, the whole nation takes part as one man ; it must be a peoples’ war ; it must be a war carried on with the enthusiasm of 1870, when we were ruthlessly attacked. I well remember the ear-splitting joyful shouts at the Cologne railway station ; it was the same from Berlin to Cologne ; and it was the same here in Berlin. The waves of public feeling in favour of war swept us into it whether we wished or not. It must always be so if the power of a people such as ours is to be exerted to the full. It will be very difficult, however, to make it clear to the provinces and states of the confederation and to their peoples, that war is now unavoidably necessary. They would ask : “ Are you sure of that ? Who knows ? ” In short, when we came to actual hostilities, the weight of such imponderable considerations would be much heavier against us than the material opposition we would meet from our enemies. “ Holy Russia ” would be irritated ; France would bristle with bayonets as far as the Pyrenees. It would be the same everywhere. A war which was not decreed by the popular will could be carried on if once the constituted authorities had finally decided on it as a necessity ; it would be carried on vigorously, and perhaps successfully, after the first fire and the sight of blood. But it would not be a finish fight in its spirit with such fire and *élan* behind it as we should have in a war in which we were attacked. Then all Germany from Memel to Lake Constance would flame out like a powder mine ; the country would bristle with arms, and no enemy would be rash enough to join issue with the *furor Teutonicus* (Berserker madness) thus roused by attack.

We must not lose sight of such considerations, even if we are now superior to our future opponents, as many military critics besides our own consider us to be. All our own critics are convinced of our superiority. Naturally every soldier believes it. He would come very near to being a failure as a soldier if he did not wish for war and feel full assurance of victory. If our rivals sometimes suspect that it is fear of the result which makes us peaceful, they are grievously in error. We believe as thoroughly in the certainty of our victory in a righteous cause as any lieutenant in a foreign garrison can believe in his third glass of champagne—and perhaps we have more ground for our assurance! It is not fear which makes us peaceable, but the consciousness of our strength—the consciousness that if we were attacked at the most unfavourable time, we are strong enough for defence and for keeping in view the possibility of leaving it to the providence of God to remove in the meantime the necessity for war.

I am never for an offensive war, and if war can come only through our initiative, it will not begin. Fire must be kindled by someone before it can burn, and we will not kindle it. Neither the consciousness of our strength, as I have just represented it, nor the trust in our alliances will prevent us from continuing with our accustomed zeal our accustomed efforts to keep the peace. We will not allow ourselves to be led by bad temper; we will not yield to prejudice. It is undoubtedly true that the threats, the insults, the provocations which have been directed against us, have aroused great and natural animosities on our side. And it is hard to rouse such feelings in the Germans, for they are less sensitive to the dislike of others towards them than any other nation. We are taking pains, however, to soften these animosities, and in the future as in the past we will strive to keep the peace with our neighbours—especially with Russia. When I say “especially with Russia,” I mean that France offers us no security for the success of our efforts, though I will not say that it does not help. We will never seek occasion to quarrel. We will never attack France. In the many small occasions for trouble which the disposition of our neighbours to spy and to bribe has given us, we have made pleasant and amicable settlements. I would hold it grossly criminal to allow such trifles either to occasion a great national war or to make it probable. There are occasions when it is true that the “more reasonable gives way.” I name Russia especially, and I have the same confidence in the result I had a year ago when my expression gave this “Liberal” paper here occasion for black type. But I have it without running after—or, as a German paper expressed it, “grovelling before Russia.” That time has gone by. We no longer sue for favour either in France or in Russia. The Russian press and Russian public opinion have

shown the door to an old, powerful, and attached friend as we were. We will not force ourselves upon them. We have sought to regain the old confidential relationship, but we will run after no one. But that does not prevent us from observing—it rather spurs us on to observe these treaty rights with redoubled care—the treaty rights of Russia. Among these treaty rights are some which are not conceded by all our friends: I mean the rights which at the Berlin Congress Russia won in the matter of Bulgaria. . . .

In consequence of the resolution of the Congress, Russia, up to 1885, chose as prince a near relative of the Czar concerning whom no one asserted or could assert that he was anything else than a Russian dependent. It appointed the Minister of War and the greater part of the officials. In short, it governed Bulgaria. There is no possible doubt of it. The Bulgarians, or a part of them, or their prince—I do not know which—were not satisfied. There was a *coup d'état* and there has been a defection from Russia. This has created a situation which we have no call to change by force of arms—though its existence does not change theoretically the rights which Russia gained from the conference. But if Russia should seek to establish its rights forcibly I do not know what difficulties might arise and it does not concern us to know. We will not support forcible measures and will not advise them. I do not believe there is any disposition towards them. I am sure no such inclination exists. But if through diplomatic means, through the intervention of the Sultan as the suzerain of Bulgaria, Russia seeks its rights, then I assume that it is the province of loyal German statesmanship to give an unmistakable support to the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, and to stand by the interpretation which without exception we gave it—an interpretation on which the voice of the Bulgarians cannot make me err. Bulgaria, the Statelet between the Danube and the Balkans, is certainly not of sufficient importance to justify plunging Europe into war from Moscow to the Pyrenees, from the North Sea to Palermo—a war the issue of which no one could foresee, at the end of which no one could tell what the fighting had been about.

So I can say openly that the position of the Russian press, the unfriendliness we have experienced from Russian public opinion, will not prevent us from supporting in Russia a diplomatic attempt to establish its rights as soon as it makes up its mind to assert them in Bulgaria. I say deliberately—"As soon as Russia expresses the wish." We have put ourselves to some trouble heretofore to meet the views of Russia on the strength of reliable hints, but we have lived to see the Russian press attacking, as hostile to Russia, the very things in German politics which were prompted by a desire to anticipate Russia's wishes. We did that

at the Congress, but it will not happen again. If Russia officially asks us to support measures for the restoration in Bulgaria of the situation approved by the Congress with the Sultan as suzerain, I would not hesitate to advise his Majesty, the Emperor, that it should be done. This is the demand which the treaties make on our loyalty to a neighbour, with whom, be the mood what it will, we have to maintain neighbourly relations and defend great common interests of monarchy, such as the interests of order against its antagonists in all Europe, with a neighbour, I say, whose sovereign has a perfect understanding in this regard with the allied sovereigns. I do not doubt that when the Czar of Russia finds that the interests of his great empire of a hundred million people require war, he will make war. But his interests cannot possibly prompt him to make war against us. I do not think it at all probable that such a question of interest is likely to present itself. I do not believe that a disturbance of the peace is imminent—if I may recapitulate—and I beg that you will consider the pending measure without regard to that thought or that apprehension, looking on it rather as a full restoration of the mighty power which God has created in the German people—a power to be used if we need it! If we do not need it, we will not use it and we will seek to avoid the necessity for its use. This attempt is made somewhat more difficult by threatening articles in foreign newspapers and I may give special admonition to the outside world against the continuance of such articles. They lead to nothing. The threats made against us, not by the government but in the newspapers, are incredibly stupid, when it is remembered that they assume that a great and proud power such as the German Empire is capable of being intimidated by an array of black spots made by a printer on paper, a mere marshalling of words. If they would give up that idea, we could reach a better understanding with both our neighbours. Every country is finally answerable for the wanton mischief done by its newspapers, and the reckoning is liable to be presented some day in the shape of a final decision from some other country. We can be bribed very easily—perhaps too easily—with love and good will. But with threats, never!

We Germans fear God, and nothing else in the world!

It is the fear of God which makes us love peace and keep it. He who breaks it against us ruthlessly will learn the meaning of the war-like love of the Fatherland which in 1813 rallied to the standard the entire population of the then small and weak kingdom of Prussia; he will learn, too, that this patriotism is now the common property of the entire German nation, so that whoever attacks Germany will find it unified in arms, every warrior having in his heart the steadfast faith that God will be with us.

SIR ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN

(For Biographical Note, see Section i.)

OVERSEA DOMINIONS AND THE WAR

(SIR ROBERT BORDEN and Lieutenant-General SMUTS were the chief guests at a luncheon at the House of Commons, given on April 2nd, 1917, by the Empire Parliamentary Association to the Oversea Ministers attending the Imperial War Conference).

LITTLE more than twenty months have elapsed since I last addressed you. We had some realization, but hardly an adequate conception even then, of the tremendous task which still lay before us in this war. In these islands you have risen splendidly to the need ; we of the Dominions have striven also to do our part. I then reminded you that 350,000 men had joined the Colours in the oversea nations. To-day I can tell you that not fewer than one million men in those dominions have taken up arms for the Empire. The Canadian Expeditionary Force in Europe then numbered 75,000 ; to-day I am proud to tell you that Canada has sent forth to aid the Allied cause more than 325,000 men. Our total enlistments exceed 400,000, and in the Canadian Expeditionary Force alone more than 300,000 men have left the shores of our Dominion. Their achievement under the sternest test has been splendidly worthy of the traditions which are their heritage.

There is not time nor is this the occasion to dwell upon the phases of the war since my last visit to England. The most recent had its inception on the first day of February last in the attempt to starve into submission the people of these islands by the ruthless sinking of all ships entering a wide ocean area round the United Kingdom. I am wholly confident that this attempt will fail, but I am equally confident that to ensure such failure the people of the Empire, and especially the people of these islands, must realize that the peril is a substantial one. It must be met with a spirit which will not shrink from timely self-denial in order to avoid future need, which will command the whole-hearted and united service of the nation to preserve its existence, which will consecrate the energy of a united Empire to one supreme purpose. Waste in time of peace is a sin ; in this time of national stress and danger it is a crime. I speak of waste in the broadest sense—waste of food, waste of time, waste of opportunity, waste of labour. A government can do much,

but it cannot do everything. The highest national achievement depends upon the self-denial, the devotion, the resolution, and the strong purpose of the people.

I speak in no despondent mood, but as one disposed to face realities. The enemy are staking everything upon this last throw of the dice. All their energies are being concentrated upon this year's campaign, whether on land or on sea. Any flagging of our spirit, any lack of effort—disastrous at any time—would be fatal now. Consider any sacrifice or self-denial, however stern, which the need may impose upon those at home, how do these compare with the privation, the danger, the suffering, and too often, the supreme sacrifice of those who hold the lines in France or elsewhere in the great theatres of war. If any of us should chance to be despondent let him go for confidence to the men in the trenches. If for a moment he lacks heart, let him go to the wounded in the hospitals for courage. If we seek a standard for the nation's spirit, let us remember the discipline and heroism of the men who lined up on the deck of the *Tyndarus* when she was sinking.

The German people are fighting with desperation under the belief engendered and fostered by their military autocracy, that we seek to crush Germany and to terminate her national existence. No such purpose ever was or could be in the mind of the British people. It is impossible to crush in that sense a nation of seventy millions. Beyond comparison Germany was at the beginning of the war the most powerful military State in the world's history. Any idea of successful aggression against her was unthinkable. Confident in that strength, the German nation, following blindly the behests of militarism, entered upon this war for world-domination. For the health of Germany's soul her people must be taught before it ends that military aggression is neither a legitimate nor a profitable business enterprise; that world domination is impossible; that treaties are sacred; that the public conscience of the world will not permit the rape of small, weak nations; will not tolerate the horrible methods of barbarity which have characterized the passage of the German armies and their occupancy of conquered territory; and finally, that there is a world-conscience which commands and can arouse a force sufficient to subdue any nation that runs amok. The lesson must be thoroughly learned by the German people, or the Allied nations will have taken up arms in vain. Let Germany so set her house in order that a change of ideal and of purpose can be relied on; let her make reparation for the evil she has wrought; let her give adequate guarantees for the future. Thus, but not otherwise, can she have peace. For this, but not to crush her, the Allied nations are fighting.

We have gathered together here from the ends of the earth to take counsel with you of the Mother Land upon the needs of the situation, so as better to co-ordinate our common effort and consummate our common purpose. When first I spoke to you, in 1912, I took leave to put forward certain views respecting future constitutional relations. Two years ago I emphasized the same considerations without dwelling upon them. The purpose which I then had at heart still remains steadfast. It may be that in the shadow of the war we do not clearly realize the measure of recent constitutional development. I shall not attempt to anticipate any conclusion which may be reached by the Imperial War Conference now sitting in London, a conference embracing India, now for the first time taking her place at the national council of Empire, as well as all the great Dominions except Australia, whose absence is deeply regretted. Except with regard to India, the summoning of that Conference does not mark a new stage of constitutional development. Its present duty is to consider and, where necessary, to determine general questions of common concern which in some cases have an intimate relation to the war and to the conditions which will arise upon its conclusion.

Without further reference to the Imperial War Conference I address myself to the constitutional position which has arisen from the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet. The British Constitution is the most flexible instrument of government ever devised. It is surrounded by certain statutory limitations, but they are not of a character to prevent the remarkable development to which I shall allude. The office of Prime Minister, thoroughly recognized by the gradually developed conventions of the Constitution, although entirely unknown to the formal enactments of the law, is invested with a power and authority which under new conditions, demanding progress and development, are of inestimable advantage. The recent exercise of that great authority has brought about an advance which may contain the germ and define the method of constitutional development in the immediate future. It is only within the past few days that the full measure of that advance has been consummated.

For the first time in the Empire's history there are sitting in London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and both exercising well-defined powers. Over each of them the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom presides. One of them is designated as the 'War Cabinet,' which chiefly devotes itself to such questions touching the prosecution of the war as primarily concern the United Kingdom. The other is designated as the 'Imperial War Cabinet,' which has a wider purpose, jurisdiction, and personnel. To its deliberations have been

summoned representatives of all the Empire's self-governing Dominions. We meet there on terms of equality under the presidency of the First Minister of the United Kingdom ; we meet there as equals, although Great Britain presides, *primus inter pares*. Ministers from six nations sit around the council board, all of them responsible to their respective Parliaments and to the people of the countries which they represent. Each nation has its voice upon questions of common concern and highest importance as the deliberations proceed ; each preserves unimpaired its perfect autonomy, its self-government, and the responsibility of its Ministers to their own electorate. For many years the thought of statesmen and students in every part of the Empire has centred around the question of future constitutional relations ; it may be that now, as in the past, the necessity imposed by great events has given the answer.

JACQUES BÉNIGNE BOSSUET

(1627-1704).

AMONG the funeral orations of Bossuet, who is sometimes ranked with Mirabeau at the head of the list of French orators, two are most admired—that over the great Prince of Condé, and that which he delivered on the death of Henrietta of England. “As the orator advances,” says one of his critics, speaking of the former oration, “he gathers strength by the force of his movements; his thoughts bound and leap like the quick, impetuous sallies of the warrior whom he describes; his language glows and sparkles, rushes and rejoices like a free and bounding river, sweeping in beauty through the open champagne, gathering volume and strength from tributary streams, glancing through green meadows and dark woodlands, rushing through forests and mountains, and finally plunging with resistless force and majesty into the open sea.”

It does not seem that oratory worthy to inspire so magnificent a eulogy as this could have higher merits than those just marshalled and brought to climax. But the compliment, high as it is, fails to do justice to that which is greatest in Bossuet—to that which can follow him into every language into which he is translated, and so make him a model for the writers as well as for the speakers of every country. This supreme merit is his delicacy. “All great art is delicate art,” writes John Ruskin, and Bossuet illustrates the meaning of this profound law of effectiveness in saying of the Prince of Condé: “When a favour was asked of him, it was he that appeared obliged.” It is easy enough for one who has mastered the first secrets of language to imitate the Ciceronian array of clauses in which one phalanx of words after another moves forward to complete an already assured conquest. It is not wholly impossible even for one who is not great to attain something of the style by virtue of which Taine commands words with the same perfect mastery of rank on rank, corps on corps, which Napoleon showed in the handling of men. And this is art. But it is not the greatest art. We may be awed by the storm into fear and contempt of self; but after the hurricane is stilled, after the clouds have passed, after the night has grown silent—it is then that the sublimity of the stars can appeal to us to recognize in ourselves our kinship with all that is best and highest in the universe. And it is to this highest quality in us that Bossuet appeals with the

wonderful delicacy of genius in saying of Condé : " When a favour was asked of him, it was *he* that appeared obliged." We feel at once that if this had not been true, it could not have been imagined as possible, and that it could have been possible only in a life of the highest order.

It is remarkable that France should have had as contemporaries three such orators as Bossuet, Fénelon, and Bourdaloue. It has been said in comparing them that Bourdaloue spoke to the understanding, Bossuet to the imagination, and Fénelon to the heart. If this were true, it would give the palm of highest effectiveness to Fénelon who, indeed, is still known to thousands of actual readers where Bossuet is known to hundreds. But to Bossuet the palm of art would remain, for it was only Bossuet who could have said of such a man as Condé, so as to make us think it of Condé himself and yet recognize the propriety of not having so sublime a compliment paid directly to any man, that his glory followed him everywhere, and that when all alone, he appeared as great and as worthy of respect as when he gave the word of command to vast armies.

Bossuet was born at Dijon, September 27th, 1627, of a respectable family of bourgeois rank. He was educated from his earliest years for the Church. He learned the art of expression from its greatest master, Homer, for whose poems and those of Virgil he developed a fondness in youth which he never lost. His love for Homer was exceeded only by that which made him so great a student of the Bible that Lamartine says he had it " transfused into him." A man of many books, it was to these three that he reverted always, and they made him great as they have made so many others. It is strange that men as diverse as Bossuet and Samuel Houston, the one speaking in full canonicals to French nobles and court beauties ; the other, in his hunting shirt, haranguing American frontiersmen, should have been governed by the same taste in literature, and should have been formed so largely on the same models.

Bossuet began to be celebrated as soon as he began to preach. In his thirty-fifth year he appeared before Louis XIV., who immediately after the close of the sermon sent a messenger to congratulate the elder Bossuet " on having such a son." He became tutor to the Dauphin, and wrote for his use the ' Discourse on Universal History ' and several other works of minor importance. His ' Exposition of Catholic Doctrine ' was published about 1671, and his ' Defence of the Doctrine of the Clergy of France ' was written some ten years later, though not published until 1735. His celebrated controversy with Fénelon is thought by some even of his admirers to have added less to his credit than to that of his great rival. He died at Paris, April 12th, 1704.

W.V.B.

FUNERAL ORATION OVER THE PRINCE OF CONDÉ

(Delivered before Louis XIV.).

AT the moment that I open my lips to celebrate the undying glory of Louis Bourbon, Prince of Condé, I find myself equally overwhelmed by the greatness of the subject, and, if permitted to avow it, by the uselessness of the task. What part of the habitable world has not heard of the victories of the Prince of Condé, and the wonders of his life? Everywhere they are rehearsed. The Frenchman, in extolling them, can give no information to the stranger. And although I may remind you of them to-day, yet, always anticipated by your thoughts, I shall have to suffer your secret reproach for falling so far below them. We feeble orators can add nothing to the glory of extraordinary souls. Well has the sage remarked that their actions alone praise them; all other praise languishes by the side of their great names. The simplicity of a faithful narrative alone can sustain the glory of the Prince of Condé. But expecting that history, which owes such a narrative to future ages, will make this appear, we must satisfy, as we can, the gratitude of the public, and the commands of the greatest of kings. What does the empire not owe to a prince who has honoured the house of France, the whole French name, and, so to speak, mankind at large! Louis the Great himself has entered into these sentiments. After having mourned that great man, and given by his tears, in the presence of his whole court, the most glorious eulogy which he could receive, he gathers together in this illustrious temple whatever is most august in his kingdom, to render public acknowledgments to the memory of the Prince; and he desires that my feeble voice should animate all these mournful signs—all this funeral array. Let us then subdue our grief and make the effort.

But here a greater object, and one more worthy of the pulpit, presents itself to my thoughts. God it is who makes warriors and conquerors. "Thou," said David, "hast taught my hands to war, and my fingers to fight." If he inspires courage he gives no less other great qualities natural and supernatural, both of the mind and heart. Everything comes from his powerful hand, from heaven he sends all generous sentiments, wise counsels, and good thoughts. But he would have us to distinguish between the gifts which he abandons to his enemies and those which he reserves for his servants. What distinguishes his friends from all others is piety; until that gift of heaven is received, all others are not only useless, but aid the ruin of those whom they adorn. Without this

inestimable gift of piety, what was the Prince of Condé, with all his great heart and lofty genius? No, my brethren, if piety had not consecrated his other virtues, neither these princes would have found any solace for their grief, nor that venerable prelate any confidence in his prayers, nor myself any support for the praises which are due to so great a man. Under the influence of such an example, let us lose sight of all human glory! Destroy the idol of the ambitious! Let it fall prostrate before these altars! On this occasion, group together—for we can do it with propriety—the highest qualities of an excellent nature, and to the glory of truth exhibit in a prince universally admired whatever constitutes the hero and carries the glory of the world to the loftiest eminence, valour, magnanimity, and natural goodness—qualities of the heart; vivacity and penetration, grandeur of thought, and sublimity of genius—qualities of the intellect; all would be nothing but an illusion, if piety were not added—piety, which indeed is the whole of man! This it is which you see in the life, eternally memorable, of the high and illustrious Prince Louis Bourbon, Prince of Condé, Prince of the blood!

God has revealed to us that he alone makes conquerors, that he alone causes them to subserve his designs. Who made Cyrus but God, who, in the prophecies of Isaiah, named him two hundred years before his birth? “Thou hast not known me,” said He to him, “but I have even called thee by thy name, and surnamed thee. I will go before thee and make the crooked places straight; I will break in pieces the gates of brass, and cut in sunder the bars of iron. I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me. I form the light and create darkness”; as if he had said, “I the Lord do everything, and from eternity know everything that I do.” Who could have formed an Alexander but the same God who made him visible from afar to the prophet Daniel, and revealed by such vivid images his unconquerable ardour? “See,” said he, “that conqueror, with what rapidity he advances from the west, as it were by bounds and without touching the earth.” Resembling, in his bold movements and rapid march, certain vigorous and bounding animals, he advances, only by quick and impetuous attacks, and is arrested neither by mountains nor precipices. Already the King of Persia falls into his power. At sight of him, he is “moved with anger—rushes upon him, stamps him under his feet; none can defend him from his attacks, or deliver him out of his hand.” Listening only to these words of Daniel, whom do you expect to see under that image—Alexander or the Prince of Condé? God had given him that indomitable valour for the salvation of France during the minority of a king of four years. But let that king, cherished of heaven, advance in life, everything will yield to his exploits. Equally superior to his friends and his enemies, he will

hasten now to employ, now to surpass his most distinguished generals ; and under the hand of God, who will ever befriend him, he will be acknowledged the firm bulwark of his kingdom. But God had chosen the Duke d'Enghien to defend him in his childhood. Thus, during the first years of his reign, the duke conceived a design which the most experienced veterans could not achieve ; but victory justified it before Rocroy ! True, the hostile army is the stronger. It is composed of those old bands of Valonnaise, Italians, and Spaniards, which never till then were broken. But how much could be counted on the courage which inspired our troops, the pressing necessity of the State, past advantages, and a prince of the blood who carried victory in his eyes ! Don Francisco de Mellos steadily waits his approach ; and, without the possibility of retreating, the two generals and their armies had chosen to shut themselves in by woods and marshes, in order to decide their quarrels like two warriors, in close combat. Then, what was seen ? The young prince appeared another man ! Moved by so great an object, his mighty soul revealed itself entire ; his courage increased with his peril, his sagacity with his ardour. During the night, which must be spent in presence of the enemy, like a vigilant general, he was the last to retire ; yet never did he repose more peacefully. In the prospect of so great a day, and his first battle, he is tranquil ; so much is he in his element ; for well is it known that on the morrow, at the appointed time, he must awake from his profound slumber—another Alexander ! See him, as he flies, either to victory or to death. As soon as he has conveyed from rank to rank the ardour which animates himself, he is seen, almost at the same time, attacking the right wing of the enemy ; sustaining ours about to give way ; now rallying the half-subdued Frenchmen, now putting to flight the victorious Spaniard ; carrying terror everywhere, and confounding with his lightning glance those who had escaped his blows. But that formidable infantry of the Spanish army, whose heavy and wedged battalions, resembling so many towers,—towers which had succeeded in repairing their breaches,—remained immovable in the midst of all others in disorder, and from all sides kept up a steady fire. Thrice the young conqueror attempted to break these intrepid warriors ; thrice was he repulsed by the valorous Count de Fontaine, who was borne in his carriage, and, notwithstanding his infirmities, proved that the warrior spirit is master of the body which it animates. In vain does Bek, with his fresh cavalry, endeavour to rush through the wood to fall on our exhausted soldiers ; the Prince has prevented him ; the routed battalions demand quarter ; but victory is more disastrous to the Duke d'Enghien than conflict itself. As he advances with an assured air to receive the parole of those brave men, they, ever on their guard, are seized with the fear of being surprised

by a new attack ; their terrible discharge renders our army furious ; nothing is seen but carnage ; blood maddens the soldier ; until that great Prince, who could not slaughter those lions like timid sheep, calmed their excited courage, and joined to the pleasure of conquering that of pardoning his enemies. What then was the astonishment of those veteran troops and their brave officers when they saw that there was no safety but in the arms of the conqueror ! With what wonder did they look upon that young Prince, whose victory had enhanced his lofty bearing, and whose clemency added to it a new charm ! Ah, how willingly would he have saved the brave Duke de Fontaine ! But he was found prostrate among thousands of the dead, of whom Spain yet feels the loss. She knew not that the Prince who had destroyed so many of her veteran regiments on the field of Rocroy would complete their subjugation on the plains of Lens. Thus the first victory was the pledge of many more. The Prince bends the knee, and on the battlefield renders back to the God of armies the glory which he had conferred. There they celebrated Rocroy delivered, the threatenings of a formidable army turned to shame, the regency established, France in repose, and a reign, destined to such prosperity, begun by an omen so happy. The army commenced the thanksgiving : all France followed. The first achievement of the Duke d'Enghien was extolled to the skies. Such an event was enough to render illustrious any other life ; but in his case, it was but the first step in his career.

From that first campaign, after the taking of Thionville, noble fruit of the victory at Rocroy, he passed for a general equally invincible in sieges and battles. But observe in this young Prince what is not less beautiful than victory. The court, which had prepared for him the applause which he merited, was astonished at the manner in which he received it. The queen-regent testified to him that the king was satisfied with his services. In the mouth of the sovereign, that was a recompense worthy of his toils. But if others ventured to praise him, he rejected their praises as offensive. Intractable to flattery, he dreaded its very appearance. Such was the delicacy, or rather such was the good sense of the Prince. His maxim was—and you will please to notice it, for it is the maxim which makes great men—that in great actions our only care ought to be to perform well our part, and let glory follow virtue. This he inspired in others, this he *followed* himself, so that he was never tempted by false glory ; everything in him tended to the true and the great. Whence it followed that he placed his glory in the service of the king and the prosperity of the State. This was the fundamental principle of his life—this engrossed his last and most cherished feelings. The court

could scarcely hold him, though he was the object of its admiration. He must show himself everywhere, to Germany as to Flanders, the intrepid defender given us by God. Here direct your special attention. A contest awaits the Prince more formidable than Rocroy : to prove his virtue, war is about to exhaust all its inventions, all its efforts. What object presents itself to my eyes ? Not only men to combat, but inaccessible mountains, ravines, and precipices on one side ; on the other an impenetrable wood, the bottom of which is a marsh ; behind, streams and prodigious intrenchments ; everywhere lofty forts and levelled forests traversed by frightful roads ; in the midst *Merci* with his brave Bavarians flushed with such distinguished success and the taking of *Fribourg* ; —*Merci*, whom the Prince of Condé and the vigilant *Turenne* had never surprised in an irregular movement, and to whom they rendered the distinguished testimony that he never lost a favourable opportunity, and never failed to foresee their plans, as if he had assisted at their councils. Here, during eight days, and in four different attacks, was seen all that could be endured and undertaken in war. Our troops seemed disheartened as much by the resistance of the enemy as by the frightful disposition of the ground ; and the Prince at times saw himself almost abandoned. But like another *Maccabeus*, “ his own arm never failed him ” ; and his courage, excited by so many perils, “ brought him succour.” No sooner was he seen the first to force those inaccessible heights, than this ardour drew all others after him. *Merci* sees his destruction certain : his best regiments are defeated ; the night saves the remains of his army. But what excessive rains also come to the enemy’s aid, so that we have at once not only courage and art, but all nature to contend with ; what advantage of this is taken by a bold and dexterous enemy, and in what frightful mountain does he anew intrench himself ! But, beaten on all sides, he must leave, as booty to the Duke d’*Enghien*, not only his cannon and baggage, but also all the regions bordering on the Rhine. See how the whole gives way. In ten days *Philipsbourg* is reduced, notwithstanding the approach of winter, *Philipsbourg*, which so long held the Rhine captive under our laws, and whose loss the most illustrious of kings has so gloriously repaired. *Worms*, *Spire*, *Mayence*, *Landau*, and twenty other places of note open their gates. *Merci* cannot defend them, and no longer appears before his conqueror. But this is not enough ; he must fall at his feet, a victim worthy of his valour : *Nordlingen* shall see his fall ;—then shall it be decided that their enemies cannot stand before the French, either in Germany or Flanders ; and there shall it be seen that to the Prince all these advantages are due. God, the Protector of France and of a king, whom he has destined for his mighty works, ordains it thus.

By such arrangements, everything appeared safe under the conduct of the Duke d'Enghien ; and without wishing to spend the day in recounting his other exploits, you know that among so many places attacked not one escaped his hands ; and thus the glory of the Prince continued to rise. Europe, which admired the noble ardour by which he was animated in his battles, was astonished to perceive that he had perfect self-control ; and that at the age of twenty-six years, he was as capable of managing his troops as of urging them into perils ; of yielding to fortune as of causing it to subserve his designs. In all situations he appears to us one of those extraordinary men who force all obstacles. The promptitude of his action leaves no time for its contravention. Such is the character of conquerors. When David, himself a great warrior, deplored the death of two captains, he gave them this eulogy : " They were swifter than eagles, they were stronger than lions." Such is the very image of the Prince whom we deplore. Like lightning, he appeared at the same time in different and distant places. He was seen in all attacks, in all quarters. When occupied on one side, he sends to reconnoitre the other ; the active officer who conveys his orders is anticipated, and finds all reanimated by the presence of the Prince. He seems to multiply himself in action ; neither fire nor steel arrests his progress. No need has he to arm his head exposed to so many perils ; God is his assured armour ; blows lose their force as they reach him, and leave behind only the tokens of his courage and of the protection of heaven. Tell him not that the life of the first prince of the blood, so necessary to the State, ought to be spared ; he answers that such a prince, more interested by his birth in the glory of the king and crown, ought, in the extremity of the State, more readily than all others to devote himself to its recovery. After having made his enemies, during so many years, feel the invincible power of the king, were it asked, What did he do to sustain it at home ? I would answer, in a word, he made the regent respected. And since it is proper for me once for all to speak of those things respecting which I desire to be forever silent, it may be stated that up to the time of that unfortunate imprisonment, he had never dreamed that it was possible for him to attempt anything against the State ; and to his honour be it said, if he desired to secure a recompense, he desired still more to merit it. It was this which caused him to say—and here I can confidently repeat his words, which I received from his own lips, and which so strikingly indicate his true disposition—that he had entered that prison the most innocent of men, and that he had issued from it the most culpable. " Alas ! " said he, " I lived only for the service of the king, and the honour of the State." Words which indicate a sincere regret for having been carried so far by his misfortunes.

But without excusing what he himself so strongly condemned, let us say, so that it may never again be mentioned, that as in celestial glory the faults of holy penitents, covered by what they have done to repair them, and the infinite compassion of God, never more appear, so in the faults so sincerely acknowledged, and in the end so gloriously repaired by faithful services, nothing ought to be remembered but the penitence of the Prince, and the clemency of his sovereign who has forgotten them.

However much he was involved in those unfortunate wars, he has at least this glory, never to have permitted the grandeur of his house to be tarnished among strangers. Notwithstanding the majesty of the empire, the pride of Austria, and the hereditary crowns attached to that house, particularly in the branch which reigns in Germany, even when a refugee at Namur, and sustained only by his courage and reputation, he urged the claims of a Prince of France and of the first family in the world so far that all that could be obtained from him was his consent to treat upon equality with the archduke, through a brother of the emperor, and the descendant of so many emperors, on condition that the prince in the third degree should wear the honours of the "Low Countries." The same treatment was secured to the Duke d'Enghien; and the house of France maintained its rank over that of Austria even in Brussels. But mark what constitutes true courage. While the Prince bore himself so loftily with the archduke who governed, he rendered to the King of England and the Duke of York, now so great a monarch, but then unfortunate, all the honours which were their due; and finally he taught Spain, too disdainful, what that majesty was which misfortune could not tear from princes. The rest of his conduct was not less distinguished. Amid the difficulties which his interests introduced into the treaty of the Pyrenees, hear what were his orders, and see whether any one ever acted so nobly, with reference to his own interests. He wrote to his agents in the conference, that it was not right that the peace of Christendom should be postponed for his sake; that they might take care of his friends, but must leave him to his fate. Ah, what a noble victim thus sacrificed himself for the public good! But when things changed, and Spain was willing to give him either Cambray and its environs, or Luxembourg in full sovereignty, he declared that to these advantages, and all others, however great, which they could give him, he preferred—what? His duty and the good-will of the king! This formed the ruling passion of his heart. This he was incessantly repeating to the Duke d'Enghien, his son. Thus did he appear himself! France beheld him, in these last traits, returning to her bosom with a character ennobled by suffering, and more than ever devoted to his king and country. But in those first wars he had but one life to offer; now he has another which is dearer to him

than his own. After having, under his father's example, nobly finished his studies, the Duke d'Enghien is ready to follow him to the battlefield. Not content with teaching him the art of war by his instructions, he conducts him to living lessons and actual practice. Leave we the passage of the Rhine, the wonder of our age, and the life of Louis the Great. In the field of Senef, although he commanded, as he had already done in other campaigns, he learned war by the side of his father, in the most terrible conflicts. In the midst of so many perils, he sees the Prince thrown down in a trench, under a horse covered with blood. While offering him his own and raising him from the trench, he is wounded in the arms of his affectionate father, but without discontinuing his kind offices, delighted with the opportunity of satisfying at once his filial piety and love of glory. How could the Prince fail to think that nothing was wanting to that noble son but opportunities, to achieve the greatest things. Moreover his tenderness increased with his esteem.

But not only for his son and his family did he cherish such tender sentiments. I have seen him (and do not imagine that I exaggerate here) deeply moved with the perils of his friends ; I have seen him, simple and natural, change colour at the recital of their misfortunes, entering into their minutest as well as most important affairs, reconciling contending parties, and calming angry spirits with a patience and gentleness which could never have been expected from a temper so sensitive, and a rank so high. Far from us be heroes without humanity ! As in the case of all extraordinary things, they might force our respect and seduce our admiration, but they could never win our love. When God formed the heart of man he planted goodness there, as the proper characteristic of the Divine nature, and the mark of that beneficent hand from which we sprang. Goodness, then, ought to be the principal element of our character, and the great means of attracting the affection of others. Greatness, which supervenes upon this, so far from diminishing goodness, ought only to enable it, like a public fountain, to diffuse itself more extensively. This is the price of hearts ! For the great whose goodness is not diffusive, as a just punishment of their haughty indifference, remain forever deprived of the greatest good of life, the fellowship of kindred souls. Never did man enjoy this more than the Prince of whom we are speaking. Never did one less fear that familiarity would diminish respect. Is this the man that stormed cities and gained battles ? Have I forgotten the high rank he knew so well to defend ? Let us acknowledge the hero, who, always equal to himself, without rising to appear great, or descending to be civil and kind, naturally appeared everything that he ought to be toward all men, like a majestic and beneficent river, which peacefully conveys from city to city the abundance which it has spread through the

countries it waters ; which flows for the benefit of all, and rises and swells only when some violent opposition is made to the gentle current which bears it on its tranquil course. Such was the gentleness and such the energy of the Prince of Condé. Have you an important secret ? Confide it freely to that noble heart ; your affair becomes his by that confidence. Nothing was more inviolable to that Prince than the rights of friendship. When a favour was asked of him, it was he that appeared obliged ; and never was his joy so natural or lively as when he conferred pleasure upon others. The first money which, by the permission of the king, he received from Spain, notwithstanding the necessities of his exhausted house, was given to his friends, although he had nothing to hope from their friendship after the peace. Four hundred thousand crowns, distributed by his orders—rare instance of generosity—showed that gratitude was as powerful in the Prince of Condé as selfishness is in most men. With him virtue was ever its own reward. He praised it even in his enemies. Whenever he had occasion to speak of his actions, and even in the communications which he sent to the court he extolled the wise counsels of one and the courage of another, the merits of none were overlooked ; and in his anxiety to do others justice he never seemed to find a place for what he had done himself. Without envy, without disguise or pretension ; equally great in action and in repose, he appeared at Chantilly as he did at the head of his troops. Whether he embellished that magnificent and charming home, whether he planted his camp, or fortified a place in the midst of the hostile country—whether he marched with an army amid perils, or conducted his friends through superb valleys to the noise of falling fountains silent neither by day nor night, he was always the same man ; his glory followed him everywhere. How delightful, after the contest and tumult of arms, to be able to relish those peaceful virtues and that tranquil glory which none can share with the soldier more than with fortune ; where one can pursue the great end of life without being stunned with noise of trumpets, the roar of cannon, or the cries of the wounded, and when all alone, man appears as great, and as worthy of respect as when he gives the word of command, and whole armies do his bidding.

Let us now look at the qualities of his intellect ; and since, alas ! that which is most fatal to human life, namely the military art, admits of the greatest genius and talent, let us in the first place consider the great genius of the Prince with reference to that department. And in the first place what general ever displayed such far-reaching foresight ? One of his maxims was, that we ought to fear enemies at a distance, in order not to fear them near at hand—nay more, to rejoice in their approach. See, as he considers all the advantages which he can give or take, with

what rapidity he comprehends times, places, persons and not only their interests and talents, but even their humours and caprices ! See how he estimates the cavalry and infantry of his enemies, by the nature of the country, or the resources of the confederated princes ! Nothing escapes his penetration. With what prodigious comprehension of the entire details and general plan of the war, he is ever awake to the occurrence of the slightest incident ; drawing from a deserter, a prisoner, a passer-by, what he wishes him to say or to conceal, what he knows, and, so to speak, what he does not know, so certain is he in his conclusions. His patrols repeat to him the slightest things ; he is ever on the watch, for he holds it as a maxim, that an able general may be vanquished, but ought never to suffer himself to be surprised. And it is due to him to say that this never occurred in his case. At whatever, or from whatever quarter his enemies come, they find him on his guard always ready to fall upon them and take advantage of their position ; like an eagle, which, whether soaring in mid-air or perched upon the summit of some lofty rock sweeps the landscape with his piercing eyes and falls so surely upon his prey that it can neither escape his talons nor his lightning glance, so keen his perception, so quick and impetuous his attack, so strong and irresistible the hands of the Prince of Condé. In his camp vain terrors, which fatigue and discourage more than real ones, are unknown. All strength remains entire for true perils ; all is ready at the first signal, and, as saith the prophet, " All arrows are sharpened, all bows bent." While waiting, he enjoys as sound repose as he would under his own roof. Repose, did I say ? At Pieton, in the presence of that formidable army which three united powers had assembled, our troops indulged in constant amusements, the whole army was rejoicing, and never for a moment felt that it was weaker than the enemy. The Prince, by the disposition of his army had put in safety not only our whole frontier and all our stations, but also our soldiers ; he watches—that is enough ! At last the enemy moves off—precisely what the Prince expected. At their first movements he starts ; the army of Holland, with its proud standards, is already in his power—blood flows everywhere—the whole becomes his prey. But God knows how to limit the best formed plans. The enemy is everywhere scattered. Oudenarde is delivered out of their hands ; but they themselves are saved out of those of the prince by a dense cloud, which covers the heavens ; terror and desertion enter the troops ; none can tell what has become of that formidable army. Then it was that Louis, after having accomplished the rude siege of Besançon, and once more reduced Franche Comté, with unparalleled rapidity, returned, irradiated with glory, to profit by the action of his armies in Flanders and Germany, and commanded the

army which performed such prodigies in Alsace ; thus appearing the greatest of heroes, as much by his personal exploits as by those of his generals.

While a happy disposition imparted such noble traits to our Prince, he never ceased to enrich it by reflection. The campaigns of Cæsar formed the subject of his study. Well do I recollect how much he interested us by indicating, with all the precision of a catalogue, the place where that celebrated general by the advantageous nature of his positions compelled five Roman legions and two experienced leaders to lay down their arms without a struggle. He himself had explored the rivers and mountains, which aided in the accomplishment of that grand result ; and never before had so accomplished a teacher explained the ' Commentaries ' of Cæsar. The generals of a future age will render him the same homage. They will be seen studying in the places where it took place, what history will relate of the encampment of Pieton, and the wonders that followed. They will notice, in that of Chatenoy, the eminence occupied by that great Captain, and the stream where he covered himself from the cannon of the intrenchments of Selestad. Then will they see him putting Germany to shame—now pursuing his enemies, though stronger ; now counteracting their schemes, and now causing them to raise the siege of Saverne, as he had that of Haguenau a little while before. It was by strokes like these, of which his life is full, that he carried his fame to such a height that, in the present day, it is one of the highest honours to have served in the army of the Prince of Condé, and even a title to command to have seen him perform that duty.

But if ever he appeared great, and by his wondrous self-possession superior to all exigencies, it was in these critical moments upon which victory turns, and in the deepest ardour of battle. In all other circumstances he deliberates—docile, he lends an ear to the counsels of all ; but here everything is presented to him at once ; the multiplicity of objects confounds him not ; in an instant his part is taken ; he commands, he acts together ; everything is made to subserve his purpose. Shall I add (for why fear the reputation of so great a man should be diminished by the acknowledgment ?) that he was distinguished not only by his quick sallies which he knew so promptly and agreeably to repair, but that he sometimes appeared, in ordinary occasions, as if he had in him another nature to which his great soul abandoned minor details, in which he himself deigned not to mingle. In the fire, the shock, the confusion of battle, all at once sprang up in him—I know not what firmness and clearness, what ardour and grace—so attractive to his friends, so terrible to his enemies—a combination of qualities and contrasts, at once singular

and striking. In that terrible engagement, when before the gates of the city, and in the sight of the citizens, heaven seemed to decide the fate of the Prince ; when he had against him choice troops and a powerful general—when more than once he saw himself exposed to the caprices of fortune—when, in a word, he was attacked on every side, those who were fighting near him have told us that if they had an affair of importance to transact with him, they would have chosen for it that very moment when the fires of battle were raging around him ; so much did his spirit appear elevated above them, and, as it were, inspired in such terrible encounter ; like those lofty mountains, whose summits, rising above clouds and storms, find their serenity in their elevation, and lose not a single ray of the light by which they are enveloped. Thus on the plains of Lens, name agreeable to France ! the Archduke, drawn contrary to his design from an advantageous position, through the influence of a false success, is forced, by a sudden movement of the Prince, who opposes fresh troops to those already exhausted, to take flight. His veteran troops perish ; his cannon which he relied on fall into our hands, and Bek, who had flattered himself with certain victory, taken and wounded in the battle, renders, by his dying despair, a mournful homage to his conqueror. Is it necessary to relieve or besiege a city ? The Prince knows how to profit by every opportunity. Thus being suddenly informed of an important siege, he passes, at once, by a rapid march, to the place, and discovers a safe passage through which to give relief at a spot not sufficiently fortified by the enemy. Does he lay siege to a place ? Each day he invents some new means of advancing its conquest. Some have thought that he exposed his troops ; but he protected them by abridging the time of peril through the vigour of his attacks. Amid so many surprising blows the most courageous governors cannot make good their promises to their generals. Dunkirk is taken in thirteen days amid the rains of autumn ; and those ships, so renowned among our allies, all at once appear upon the ocean with our flags.

But what a wise general ought especially to know, is his soldiers and officers. For thence comes that perfect concert which enables armies to act as one body, or to use the language of Scripture, “ as one man.” But how as one man ? Because under one chief, that knows both soldiers and officers, as if they were his arms and hands, all is equally moved. This it is which secures victory, for I have heard our great Prince say that, in the battle of Nordlingen, what gained success was his knowledge of M. de Turenne, whose consummate genius needed no order to perform whatever was necessary. The latter, on his side, declared that he acted without anxiety, because he knew the Prince, and his directions, which were always safe. Thus they imparted to each other a mutual

confidence which enabled them to apply themselves wholly to their respective parts ; and thus happily ended the most hazardous and keenly contested battle that was ever fought.

That was a noble spectacle in our day to behold, at the same time, and in the same campaign, these two men, whom the common voice of all Europe equalled to the greatest generals of past ages—now at the head of separate troops, now united, yet more by the concurrence of the same thoughts, than by the orders which the inferior received from the other ; now opposed front to front, and redoubling the one in the other activity and vigilance ;—as if the Deity, whose wisdom, according to the Scriptures, disports itself in the universe, would show us under what perfect forms, and with what excellent qualities he can endow men. What encampments and what marches ! what hazards and precautions ! what perils and resources ! Were ever in two men seen the same virtues with such diverse, not to say contrary characteristics ! The one seemed to act from profound reflection ; the other from sudden illumination ; the latter consequently was more ardent, though by no means precipitate, while the former, with an appearance of greater coolness, never exhibited anything like languor—ever more ready to act than to speak, resolute and determined within, even when he seemed hesitating and cautious without. The one, as soon as he appeared in the army, gave a high idea of his valour, and caused an expectation of something extraordinary, nevertheless he advanced systematically, and by degrees reached the prodigies which crowned his life ; the other, like a man inspired, from his first battle equalled the most consummate masters. The one by his rapid and constant efforts won the admiration of the world, and silenced all envy ; the other, at the very first, reflected such a vivid light that none dared to attack him. The one, in fine, by the depth of his genius and the incredible resources of his courage, rose superior to the greatest dangers, and profited even by the infelicities of fortune ; the other, at once by the advantages of his elevated birth, and the lofty thoughts by which he was inspired from heaven, and especially by an admirable instinct of which men know not the secret, seemed born to draw fortune into his plans, and to force destiny itself. And as in their life, those great men were seen distinguished by diverse characteristics, so the one, cut down by a sudden blow, like a Judas Maccabeus, dies for his country ; the army mourns him as a father ; the court and country are covered with tears ; his piety is praised with his courage, and his memory fades not with time ; the other, raised, like a David, by his arms to the summit of glory, like him also dies in his bed, celebrating the praises of God and giving instructions to his family, and thus leaves all hearts filled as much with the splendour of his life as the serenity of his death. What a privilege

to see and to study these great men and learn from each the esteem which the other merits. This has been the spectacle of our age ; but what is greater still, we have seen a king making use of these great generals and enjoying the succour of heaven ; and being deprived of the one by death, and of the other by his maladies, conceiving the greatest plans, and performing the noblest deeds, rising above himself, surpassing the hopes of his friends and the expectations of the world ; so lofty is his courage, so vast his intelligence, so glorious his destiny.

Such are the spectacles which God gives to the world, and the men whom He sends into it, to illustrate, now in one nation, now in another, according to His eternal counsels, His power and His wisdom. For, do His divine attributes discover themselves more clearly in the heavens which His fingers have formed, than in the rare talents which He has distributed, as it pleases Him, to extraordinary men ? What star shines more brilliantly in the firmament than the Prince of Condé has done in Europe ? Not war alone gave him renown ; but his resplendent genius which embraced everything, ancient as well as modern history, philosophy, theology the most sublime, the arts and the sciences. None possessed a book which he had not read ; no man of excellence existed, with whom he had not, in some speculation or in some work, conversed ; all left him instructed by his penetrating questions or judicious reflections. His conversation, too, had a charm, because he knew how to speak to every one according to his talents ; not merely to warriors on their enterprises, to courtiers on their interests, to politicians on their negotiations, but even to curious travellers on their discoveries in nature, government, or commerce ; to the artisan of his inventions, and in fine to the learned of all sorts, and their productions. That gifts like these come from God, who can doubt ? That they are worthy of admiration, who does not see ? But to confound the human spirit which prides itself upon these gifts, God hesitates not to confer them upon his enemies. St. Augustine considers among the heathen, so many sages, so many conquerors, so many grave legislators, so many excellent citizens—a Socrates, a Marcus Aurelius, a Scipio, a Cæsar and an Alexander, all deprived of the knowledge of God and excluded from his eternal kingdom. Is it not God then who has made them ? Who else could do so but He who made everything in heaven and in the earth ? But why has He done so ? What in this case are the particular designs of that infinite wisdom which makes nothing in vain ? Hear the response of St. Augustine. “ He has made them ” says he, “ that they might adorn the present world.” He has made the rare qualities of those great men as He made the sun. Who admires not that splendid luminary ; who is not ravished with his midday radiance, and the gorgeous beauty of his rising or decline ?

But as God has made it to shine upon the evil and upon the good, such an object, beautiful as it is, cannot render us happy ; God has made it to embellish and illumine this great theatre of the universe. So, also, when He has made in His enemies as well as in His servants those beautiful lights of the mind, those rays of His intelligence, those images of His goodness ; it is not that these alone can secure our happiness. They are but a decoration of the universe, an ornament of the age. See, moreover, the melancholy destiny of those men who are chosen to be the ornaments of their age. What do such rare men desire but the praise and the glory which men can give ? God, perhaps to confound them, will refuse that glory to their vain desires ! No :—He confounds them rather by giving it to them, and even beyond their expectation.

That Alexander, who desired only to make a noise in the world, has made it even more than he dared to hope. Thus he must find himself in all our panegyrics, and by the species of glorious fatality, so to speak, partake of all the praises conferred upon every prince. If the great actions of the Romans required a recompense, God knows how to bestow one correspondent to their merits as well as their desires. For a recompense He gives them the empire of the world, as a thing of no value. O kings ! humble yourselves in your greatness : conquerors, boast not your victories ! He gives them, for recompense, the glory of men ; a recompense which never reaches them, a recompense which we endeavour to attach to—what ? To their medals or their statues disinterred from the dust, the refuse of years and barbarian violence ; to the ruins of their monuments and works, which contend with time, or rather to their idea, their shadow, or what they call their name. Such is the glorious prize of all their labours ; such, in the very attainment of their wishes, is the conviction of their error. Come, satisfy yourselves, ye great men of earth ! Grasp, if you can, that phantom of glory, after the example of the great men whom ye admire. God who punishes their pride in regions of despair, envies them not, as St. Augustine says, that glory so much desired ; “ vain, they have received a recompense as vain as their desires.”

But not thus shall it be with our illustrious Prince. The hour of God is come ; hour anticipated, hour desired, hour of mercy and of grace. Without being alarmed by disease, or pressed by time, he executes what he designed. A judicious ecclesiastic, whom he had expressly called, performs for him the offices of religion ; he listens, humble Christian, to his instructions ; indeed, no one ever doubted his good faith. From that time he is seen seriously occupied with the care of vanquishing himself ; rising superior to his insupportable pains, making, by his submission, a constant sacrifice. God, whom he invoked by faith, gave

him a relish for the Scriptures ; and in that Divine Book he found the substantial nurture of piety. His counsels were more and more regulated by justice ; he solaced the widow and orphan, the poor approached him with confidence. A serious as well as an affectionate father, in the pleasant intercourse which he enjoyed with his children, he never ceased to inspire them with sentiments of true virtue ; and that young prince, his grandchild, will forever feel himself indebted to his training. His entire household profited by his example. . . . These simple things—governing his family, edifying his domestics, doing justice and mercy, accomplishing the good which God enjoins, and suffering the evils which he sends—these are the common practices of the Christian life which Jesus Christ will applaud before his Father and the holy angels. But histories will be destroyed with empires ; no more will they speak of the splendid deeds with which they are filled. While he passed his life in such occupations, and carried beyond that of his most famous actions the glory of a retreat so good and pious, the news of the illness of the Duchess de Bourbon reached Chantilly like a clap of thunder. Who was not afraid to see that rising light extinguished ? It was apprehended that her condition was worse than it proved. What, then, were the feelings of the Prince of Condé, when he saw himself threatened with the loss of that new tie of his family to the person of the king ? Was it on such an occasion that the hero must die ? Must he who had passed through so many sieges and battles perish through his tenderness ? Overwhelmed by anxieties produced by so frightful a calamity, his heart, which so long sustained itself alone, yields to the blow ; his strength is exhausted. If he forgets all his feebleness at the sight of the king approaching the sick princess ; if transported by his zeal, he runs, without assistance, to avert the perils which that great king does not fear, by preventing his approach, he falls exhausted before he has taken four steps—a new and affecting way of exposing his life for the king. Although the Duchess d’Enghien, a princess, whose virtues never feared to perform her duty to her family and friends, had obtained leave to remain with him, to solace him, she did not succeed in assuaging his anxieties ; and after the young princess was beyond danger, the malady of the king caused new troubles to the Prince. . . . The Prince of Condé grew weaker, but death concealed his approach. When he seemed to be somewhat restored, and the Duke d’Enghien, ever occupied between his duties as a son and his duties as a subject, had returned by his order to the king, in an instant all was changed, and his approaching death was announced to the Prince. Christians, give attention, and here learn to die, or rather learn not to wait for the last hour, to begin to live well. What ! expect to commence a new life when,

seized by the freezing grasp of death, ye know not whether ye are among the living or the dead? Ah! prevent, by penitence, that hour of trouble and darkness! Thus, without being surprised at that final sentence communicated to him, the Prince remains for a moment in silence, and then all at once exclaims: "Thou dost will it, O my God; Thy will be done! Give me grace to die well!" What more could you desire? In that brief prayer you see submission to the will of God, reliance on His Providence, trust in His grace, and all devotion.

JOHN BRIGHT

(1811-1889).

JOHN BRIGHT has been called the most eloquent of the Liberal orators of his day, and he was certainly the most strenuous, the most forcible, as he was no doubt the most effective of them all.

To appreciate his relations to the England of his time, to the British Empire, and so to the movement of the world in general, it is necessary to keep in view the fact that he stood for the largest possible measure of free intercourse and uncoerced co-operation among all men in all countries, and conversely for the minimum of forcible interference of nation with nation, class with class, individual with individual.

This idea[†] gave him his strength in politics, and it also fixed his limitations. The England of his day was engaging more and more actively in "world-politics," while he preached non-intervention. His opposition to the Crimean War defeated him for Parliament in 1857 when he sought re-election before a Manchester constituency. Vindicated by election for Birmingham, he remained in Parliament for more than thirty years. In 1882, when a member of the Gladstone cabinet, he had presented to him the question of the coercive extension of "spheres of influence," as it was involved in the bombardment of Alexandria. However easily other Liberals might find reasons reconciling such aggressive acts to their party principles and to their ideas of public policy, the habits and tendencies of his lifetime governed him and compelled his resignation from the Cabinet.

If honesty, strength of purpose, and courage to hold a predetermined course regardless of the opinions of others, constitute the chief grounds for respecting the character of a public man, then John Bright, regardless of the nature of his opinions, is one of the most respectable public men of his century. Perhaps it is true that a party under his leadership would have been reduced to a mere balance of power, but it is probable that the force he stands for would make such a balance of power the controlling factor in every real crisis. Mr. Gladstone was an organizer, because with many of the same qualities which made Bright admirable, and illustrating the same tendencies almost to the point of parallelism, he was more capable of looking into the immediate future

and seeing all that in looking to the long run Bright was likely to pass over as immaterial or even as contemptible. It would not be just or historical to call Gladstone an opportunist, but he was a party leader, a great organizer, a man who, while he was directed throughout his life by principle, had that desire for immediate practical results which increases political effectiveness in a given case, but often works to prevent the most effective operation of principle in shaping the course of events in that higher domain of politics where the forces which govern are too manifold and involved to be comprehended by any mind, however great. It is in this domain that men like Bright are most effective. It was not the fault of Bright, that a strong conservative reaction overtook the English world at the close of the nineteenth century. He asked no quarter, and on questions of principle conceded nothing ; yet few men have been really more conservative in method than he. It is not necessary to assume him correct in his methods of applying his theories, but if we look into his general plan of work in public affairs we cannot fail to see that he is, above everything, the advocate of quiet and peaceful growth,—of development through natural processes of education and evolution. He most ardently desired that the world should grow better, and, being an optimist by nature, he was fully convinced that, if given an opportunity to do so in peace, it would develop to the extent of the removal of those oppressive restrictions which check its progress.

Bright was the son of a Quaker cotton spinner of Lancashire, and the influence of his heredity affected him deeply, showing itself constantly in his work for the peaceful extension of industrial helpfulness and co-operation throughout the world, regardless of national boundaries. Born near Rochdale, in 1811, he grew up at a time when the condition of manufacturing operatives was often miserable in the extreme. From his entrance into public life, in 1843, when he took his seat in Parliament, until within a short time of his death, he was at the front in every fight for reform. He worked with Cobden against the corn laws, and was himself the moving spirit in the agitation against the game laws, under which a man's liberty, or even his life, had often been accounted less important than the security of a rabbit warren. In all questions which concerned the United States, his principles almost inevitably carried him to the defence of American institutions. He dissented from Gladstone on Irish Home Rule,—for the same reason, no doubt, which led him to sympathize with the side of the Union in the American Civil War. He died March 27th, 1889.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES.

(Delivered in the House of Commons, 1865).

I HOPE the debate on the defence of Canada will be useful, though I am obliged to say, while I admit the importance of the question brought before the House, that I think it is one of some delicacy. Its importance is great, because it refers to the possibility of a war with the United States, and its delicacy arises from this, that it is difficult to discuss the question without saying things which tend rather in the direction of war than of peace. The difficulty now before us is that there is an extensive colony or dependency of this country adjacent to the United States, and if there be a war party in the United States,—a party hostile to this country,—that circumstance affords it a very strong temptation to enter without much hesitation into a war with England, because it feels that through Canada it can inflict a great humiliation on this country. At the same time, it is perfectly well known to all intelligent men, and especially to all statesmen and public men of the United States,—it is as well known to them as it is to us,—that there is no power whatever in this United Kingdom to defend successfully the territory of Canada against the United States. We ought to know that in order to put ourselves right upon the question and that we may not be called upon to talk folly and to act folly. The noble lord at the head of the government—or his government at least—is responsible for having compelled this discussion; because if a vote is to be asked from the House of Commons—and it will only be the beginning of votes—it is clearly the duty of the House to bring the matter under discussion. That is perfectly clear for many reasons, but especially since we have heard from the Governor-General of Canada that in the North American provinces they are about to call into existence a new nationality; and I, for one, should certainly object to the taxation of this country being expended needlessly on behalf of any nationality but our own. What I should like to ask the House first of all is this: Will Canada attack the States? Certainly not. Next, will the States attack Canada, keeping England out of view altogether? Certainly not. There is not a man in the United States, probably, whose voice or opinion would have the smallest influence who would recommend or desire that attack should be made by the United States on Canada with a view to its forcible annexation to the Union. There have been dangers, as we know, on the frontier lately. The Canadian people

have been no wiser than some Members of this House, or a great many men among the richer classes in this country. When the refugees from the South,—I am not speaking of the respectable, honourable men from the South, many of whom have left that country during their troubles, for whom I feel the greatest commiseration, but I mean the ruffians from the South, who in large numbers have entered Canada, and who have employed themselves there in a course of policy likely to embroil us with the United States,—when they entered Canada the Canadians treated them with far too much consideration. They expressed very openly opinions hostile to the United States, whose power lay close to them. I will not go into details with which we are all acquainted : the seizing of the American ships on the lakes, the raid into the State of Vermont, the robbery of a bank, the killing of a man in his own shop, the stealing of horses in open day, nor the transaction, of which there is strong proof, that men of this class conspired to set fire to the greatest cities of the Union. All these things have taken place, and the Canadian government made scarcely any sign. I believe an application was made to the noble lord at the head of the foreign office a year ago to stimulate the Canadian government to take some steps to avoid the dangers which have since arisen ; but with that sort of negligence which has been seen so much here, nothing was done until the American government, roused by these transactions, showed that they were no longer going to put up with them. Then the Canadian government and people took a little notice. I have heard a good many people complain of Lord Monck's appointment that he was a follower of the noble lord who had lost his election, and therefore must be sent out to govern a province ; but I will say of him that from all I have heard from Canada he has conducted himself there in a manner very serviceable to the colony, and with the greatest possible propriety as representing the sovereign. He was all along favourable to the United States ; his cabinet, I believe, has always been favourable, and I know that at least the most important newspaper there has always been favourable to the North. But still nothing was done until these troubles began, and everything was done. Volunteers were sent to the frontier, the trial of the raiders was proceeded with, and probably they may be surrendered ; and the Canadian Chancellor of the Exchequer has proposed a vote in the new Parliament to restore to the persons at St. Alban's who were robbed, the fifty thousand dollars which were taken from them. What is the state of things now ? There is the greatest possible calm on the frontier. The United States have not a syllable to say against Canada. The Canadian people found they were wrong ; they have now returned to their right minds, and there is not a man in Canada at this moment, I believe, who has

any kind of idea that the United States government has the smallest notion of attacking them, now or at any future time, on account of anything which has transpired between Canada and the United States. If there comes a war in which Canada may be made a victim, it will be a war got up between the government in Washington and the government in London, and it becomes us to inquire whether that is at all probable. Is there anybody in the House in favour of such a war? I notice with the greatest delight a change which I said would some day come—and I was not a false prophet—in the line taken here with regard to the American question. Even the noble lord, the member for Stamford, spoke to-night without anger, and without any of that ill feeling which, I am sorry to say, on previous occasions he has manifested in discussing this question. I hope there is no man out of Bedlam, or, at least, who ought to be out,—nay, I suspect there are few men in Bedlam, who are in favour of our going to war with the United States.

In taking this view I am not arguing that we regard the vast naval and military power and the apparently boundless resources of that country. I ~~will~~ assume that you, my countrymen, have come to the conclusion that it is better for us not to make war with the United States, not because they are strong, but on the higher ground that we are against wars. Our history for the last two hundred years and more has recorded sufficient calamitous and, for the most part, unnecessary wars. We have had enough of whatever a nation can gain from military success and glory. I will not speak of the disasters which might follow to our commerce and the widespread ruin that might be caused by a war. We are a wiser and better people than we were in this respect, and we should regard a war with the United States as even a greater crime, if needlessly entered into, than a war with almost any other nation in the world. Well, then, as to our government, with a great many blunders, one or two of which I will comment on by-and-by, they have preserved neutrality during this great struggle. We have had it stated in the House, and there has been in the House a motion, that the blockade was ineffectual and ought to be broken. Bad men of various classes, and, perhaps, agents of the Richmond conspiracy, and persons, it is said, of influence from France,—all these are stated to have brought pressure to bear on the noble lord and his colleagues with a view of inducing them to take part in this quarrel, but all this has failed to break our neutrality. Therefore, I say, we may very fairly come to the conclusion that England is not for war. If anything arises on any act of aggression out of which Canada might suffer, I believe the fault is not with this country. That is a matter which gives me great satisfaction; and I believe the House will agree with me that I am not mis-stating the case.

But, let me ask, are the United States for war? because, after all, I know the noble lord, the member for Stamford, has a lurking idea that there is some danger from that quarter, and I am afraid the same feeling prevails in minds not so acute as that which the noble lord possesses. Now, if we could have at the bar of the House Earl Russell, as representing Her Majesty's government, and Mr. Adams, as representing the government of President Lincoln, and ask them their opinions, I think they would tell us what the Secretary for the Colonies has told us to-night: that the relations between those governments are peaceable; and I know, from the communications between the Minister of the United States and our Minister for Foreign Affairs, that our relations with the United States are perfectly amicable and have been growing more and more amicable for many months past. And I will take the liberty of expressing this opinion, that there has never been an administration in the United States since the time of the Revolutionary War up to this hour more entirely favourable to peace with all foreign countries, and more especially favourable to peace with this country, than the government of which President Lincoln is the head. I will undertake to say that the most exact investigator of what has taken place will be unable to point to a single word he, President Lincoln, has said, or a single line he has written, or a single act he has done, since his first accession to power, that betrays that anger or passion or ill feeling towards this country which some people here imagine influences the breasts of his cabinet. If, then, Canada is not for war, if England is not for war, if the United States are not for war, whence is the war to come? I should like to ask—I wish the noble lord, the member for Stamford, had been a little more frank—whence comes that anxiety which to some extent prevails?

It may even be assumed that the government is not free from it, though it has shown it in the ridiculous form of proposing a vote of fifty thousand pounds. It is said that the newspapers have got into a sort of panic. Well, they can do that every night between twelve and six, when they write these articles; they can be very courageous or very panic-stricken. It is said that "the city,"—we know what "the city" means, the right honourable gentleman alluded to it to-night; they are persons who deal in shares, though that does not describe the whole of them,—it is said that what they call the "money interests" are alarmed. Well, I never knew the City to be right. Men who are deep in great monetary transactions, and steeped to the lips sometimes in perilous speculations, they are not able to take a broad, dispassionate view of questions of this nature; and as to the newspapers, I agree with my honourable friend, the Member for Bradford, who, referring

to one of them in particular, said the course it took indicated its wishes to cover its own confusion. Surely after four years of uninterrupted publication of lies with regard to America, it has done much to destroy its influence in foreign questions forever. I must now mention a much higher authority, the authority of the Peers. I don't know why we should be so much restricted here with regard to the House of Lords. I think this House must have observed that the other House is not always so squeamish in what they say about us. It appeared to me that in this debate the right honourable gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) felt it necessary to get up and endeavour to excuse his chief.

Now, if I were to give advice to the honourable gentlemen opposite, it would be this,—for while stating that during the last four years many noble lords in the other House have said foolish things, I think I should be uncandid if I did not say that you also have said foolish things,—learn from the example set you by the right honourable gentleman. He, with a thoughtfulness and statesmanship which you do not all acknowledge, did not say a word from that bench likely to create difficulty with the United States. I think his chief and his followers might learn something from his example. Not long ago, I think, a panic was raised by what was said in another place about France; and now an attempt is made there to create a panic on this question. In the Reform Club there is fixed to the wall a paper giving a telegraphic account of what is done in this House every night, and also of what is done in the other House; and I find that the only words required to describe what is done in the other House are the words, "Lords adjourned." The noble lord at the head of the government is responsible for that. He has brought this House to very nearly the same condition; because we do very little, and they absolutely nothing. All of us, no doubt in our young days were taught a verse intended to inculcate virtue and industry, a couplet of which runs thus:—

" For Satan still some mischief finds
For idle hands to do."

I don't believe that many here are afflicted with any disease arising from a course of continued idleness; but I should like to ask the House in a more serious mood, what is the reason that any man in this country has now any more anxiety with regard to the preservation of peace with the United States than he had five years ago? Is there not a consciousness in your heart of hearts that you have not behaved generously towards your neighbour? Do we not feel in some way or other a reproving of conscience? And in ourselves are we

not sensible of this, that conscience tends to make us cowards at this particular juncture? Well, I shall not revive past transactions with anger, but with a feeling of sorrow, for I maintain, and I think history will bear out what I say, that there is no generous and high-minded Englishman who can look back on the transactions of the last four years without a feeling of sorrow at the course that we have pursued in some particulars; and as I am anxious to speak with the view to a better state of feeling both in this country and the United States, I shall take the liberty, if the House will allow me, for a few minutes, to refer to two or three of those transactions, regarding which, though not in the main greatly wrong, in some circumstances we were so unfortunate as to create the irritation that at this moment we wish did not exist. The honourable Member for Horsham referred to the course taken by the government with regard to acknowledging the belligerent rights of the South. Now, I have never been one to condemn the government for acknowledging the South as belligerents then, except on this ground I think it might be logically contended that it might possibly become necessary to take that step, but I think the time and the manner of the act were most unfortunate, and could not but have produced very evil effects. Why, going back four years ago, we recollect what occurred when the news arrived here of the first shot fired at Fort Sumter. I think that was about the fourth of April, and immediately after it was announced that a new minister was coming from the United States to this country. Mr. Dallas had represented that, as he did not represent the new government, nor the new President, he would rather not undertake anything of importance. It was announced that his successor had left New York on a certain day; and we know that when we have the date of a departure from New York for this country we can calculate the time of arrival here to within twelve hours. Mr. Adams arrived in London on the thirteenth of May, and when he opened his newspaper the next morning he found it contained the proclamation of neutrality and the acknowledgment of the belligerent rights of the South. In my opinion the proper course would have been to have waited until Mr. Adams arrived, and to have discussed the matter with him in a friendly manner, when an explanation might have been given of the grounds upon which the English government felt themselves bound to issue it. But everything was done in an unfriendly manner, and the effect was to afford great comfort at Richmond, and generally to grieve those people of America who were most anxious for the continuance of the friendly and amicable relations between that country and England. To illustrate the point, allow me to suppose that a great revolt having taken place in Ireland that we within a fortnight after the

outbreak sent over a new minister to the United States, and that on the morning of his arrival he found that government had, without consulting him, taken such a hasty step as to acknowledge the belligerent rights of the Irish. I ask whether, under such circumstances, a feeling of irritation would not have been expressed by every man in Great Britain? I will not argue this question further, as to do so would be simply to depreciate the intellect of the honourable gentlemen listening to me. But seven or eight months after that event another transaction, of a very different and of a very unfortunate nature, took place, namely, that which arose out of the seizure of the two Southern envoys on board an English ship called the Trent.

I recollect at that time making a speech at Rochdale entirely in favour of the United States government and people, but I did not then, nor do I now, attempt to defend the seizure of those persons. I said that, although precedents for such an action might possibly be found to have occurred in what I may call the evil days of our history, they were totally opposed to the maxims of the United States government, and that it was most undoubtedly a bad act. I do not complain of the demand that the men should be given up. I only complain of the manner in which the demand was made and the menaces by which it was accompanied. I think it was absurd and wrong, and was not statesman-like, when there was not the least foundation for supposing the United States government was aware of the act, or had in the slightest degree sanctioned it, immediately to get ships ready, and to make other offensive preparations, and to allow the Press, which is always ready to inflame the passions of the people to frenzy, to prepare their minds for war. That was not the whole of the transactions, however, for the United States, before they heard a word from this country on the subject, sent a dispatch to Mr. Adams, which was shown to our government, stating that the act had not been done by their orders,—that it was a pure accident, and that they should regard the matter with the most friendly disposition towards this country. How came it that this dispatch was never published for the information of the people of this country? How came it that the flame of war was fanned by the newspapers supposed to be devoted to the government, and that one of them, said to be peculiarly devoted to the prime minister, had the audacity—I know not whence it obtained its instructions—flatly and emphatically to deny that such a dispatch has ever been received? How is it possible to maintain amicable relations with any great country, or even with any small one, unless the government will manage these transactions in what I may call a more courteous and a more honourable manner? I received a letter from a most eminent gentleman resident in the United States

dated only two days before the Southern envoys were given up, in which he stated that the real difficulty encountered by the President in the matter was that the menaces of the English government had made it almost impossible for him to concede the point and he asked whether the English government was intending to seek a cause of quarrel or not. I am sure that the noble lord at the head of the government would himself feel more disposed to yield and would find it more easy to grant a demand of the kind if made in a courteous and friendly manner than if accompanied by manners such as this government had offered to that of the United States. The House will observe that I am not condemning the government of this country on the main point but that I am complaining merely because they did not do what they had to do in that manner which was most likely to remove difficulties and to preserve a friendly feeling between the two nations. The last point to which I shall direct your attention is with respect to the ships which have been sent out to prey upon the commerce of the United States and in doing so I shall confine myself to the Alabama. This vessel was built in this country, all her munitions of war were obtained from this country, and almost every man on board was a subject of the Queen. She sailed from one of our chief ports, and she was built by a firm in which a Member of this House was, and I presume is still, interested. I don't complain now, neither did I two years ago, when the matter was brought before the House by the honourable Member for Bradford, that the Member for Birkenhead struck up a friendship with Captain Semmes, who, perhaps, in the words applied to another person under somewhat similar circumstances, "was the mildest mannered man that ever scuttled ship." I don't complain, and I have never done so, that the Member for Birkenhead looks admiringly upon what has been called the greatest example that man has ever seen of the greatest crime that man has ever committed. And I should not complain even had he entered into the gigantic traffic in flesh and blood which no subject of this realm can enter into without being deemed a felon in the eyes of our law and punished as such; but what I do complain of is that a magistrate of a county, a deputy-lieutenant, whatever that may be, and the representative of a constituency of the country, having sat in this ancient and honourable assembly, did, as I believe he did with regard to this ship, break the laws of this country, drive us into an infraction of international law, and treat with undeserved disrespect the proclamation of neutrality of the Queen. But I have another cause of complaint, though not against the honourable gentleman this time, for he having, on a previous occasion, declared that he would rather be the builder of a dozen Alabamas than do something which nobody else

had done, his language was received with repeated cheers from the other side of the House.

I think that that was a very unfortunate circumstance, and I beg to tell honourable gentlemen that at the end of last session, when there was a great debate on the Denmark question, there were many men on this side of the House who had no objection whatever to see the present government turned out of office,—for they had many grounds of complaint against them,—but they felt it impossible to take upon themselves the responsibility of bringing into office and power a party who can cheer such sentiments. But turning from the honourable Member for Birkenhead to the noble lord at the head of the Foreign Office, he, who in the case of the acknowledgment of belligerent rights had proceeded with such remarkable celerity, amply compensated for it by the slowness which he displayed in the case of the Alabama. And another curious thing, which even the noble lord's colleagues have never been able to explain, is that, although he sent after the Alabama to Cork to stop her, notwithstanding she had gone out of our jurisdiction, still she was permitted subsequently to go into a dozen or a score of ports belonging to this country in various parts of the world. Now, it seems to me that this is rather a special instance of that feebleness of purpose on the part of the noble lord which has done much to mar what would otherwise have been a great political career. Well, then, the honourable Member for Birkenhead, or his firm, or his family, or whoever it is that does these things, after having seen the peril into which the country was drifting on account of the Alabama, proceeded at once to build the two rams, and it was only at the very last moment, when we were on the eve of a war with the United States, that the government had the courage to seize these vessels. There are shipowners here, and I ask them what would be the feelings of the people of this country if they had suffered as the shipowners of America have suffered? As a rule, all their ships have been driven from the ocean. Mr. Lowe, an influential shipowner of New York, has had three very large ships destroyed by the Alabama. The George Griswold, a ship of two thousand tons that came to this country with a heavy cargo of provisions of various kinds for the suffering people of Lancashire, that very ship was destroyed on her return passage, and the ship that destroyed her may have been, and I believe was, built by these patriotic shipbuilders of Birkenhead. Well, Sir, these are things to rankle in the breast of the country that is subjected to these losses and indignities. To-day you may see by the papers that one vessel has destroyed twelve or thirteen ships, between the Cape of Good Hope and Australia. If I had, as some honourable Members have done, thought it necessary to bring American

questions before this House three or four times during the session, I should have asked questions about these ships ; but no ! You who were in favour of the disruption of the States do not ask questions of this kind, but refer to other points that may embarrass the government or make their difficulties greater with the United States. But the members of the government itself have not been very wise, and I shall not be thought unnecessarily critical if I say that governments generally are not very wise. Two years ago, in that very debate, the noble lord at the head of the government and the Attorney-General addressed the House. I besought the noble lord—and I do not ask favours from him very often,—only to speak for five minutes words of generosity and sympathy for the government and people of the United States. He did not do it, and perhaps it was foolish to expect it. The Attorney-General made a most able speech, but it was the only time I ever listened to him with pain, for I thought his speech full of bad morals and bad law ; and I am quite certain that he gave an account of the facts which was not so ingenuous or fair as the House had a right to expect at his hands.

Next session the noble lord and the Attorney-General turned right round and had a different story to tell, and as the aspect of things changed on the other side they gradually returned to good sense and fairness. They were not the only Members of the government who have spoken on this subject. The noble lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have also made speeches. Every one will feel that I would not willingly say a word against either of them, because I do not know among the official statesmen of this country two men for whom I feel greater sympathy or more respect, but I have to complain of them that they should both go to Newcastle, a town in which I feel great interest, and there give forth their words of offence and unwisdom. The noble lord, we all know very well, can say very good and very smart things, but I regret to say that what he said was not true, and I, for one, have not much respect for things that are smart but not true. The Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared from the papers to have spoken in a tone of exultation and to have made a speech which I undertake to say he wishes he had never made. But the House must bear in mind that these gentlemen are set on a hill. They are not obscure men, making speeches in a public-house or in some mechanics' institute, but they are men whose voices are heard wherever the English language is known ; and, knowing what effect their eloquence produced in Lancashire,—how they affected prices, and the profits and losses of every one, and changed the course of business,—I can form an idea of the irritation that these speeches caused in the United States. Then I must refer to the unwise abuse of the learned gentleman,

the Member for Sheffield, and, I may add to that, the unsleeping ill-will of the noble lord the Member for Stamford. I am not sure that either of them is converted, for I thought I heard something from the honourable and learned Member that shows he retains his sentiments.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

(Delivered at Birmingham, October 29th, 1858).

WE all know and deplore that at the present moment a larger number of the grown men of Europe are employed, and a larger portion of the industry of Europe is absorbed, to provide for and maintain the enormous armaments which are now on foot in every considerable continental State. Assuming, then, that Europe is not much better in consequence of the sacrifices we have made, let us inquire what has been the result in England, because, after all, that is the question which it becomes us most to consider. I believe that I understate the sum when I say that, in pursuit of this will-o'-the-wisp (the liberties of Europe and the balance of power), there has been extracted from the industry of the people of this small island no less an amount than £2,000,000,000. I cannot imagine how much £2,000,000,000 is, and therefore I shall not attempt to make you comprehend it.

I presume it is something like those vast and incomprehensible astronomical distances with which we have been lately made familiar ; but however familiar we feel that we do not know one bit more about them than we did before. When I try to think of that sum of £2,000,000,000 there is a sort of vision passes before my mind's eye. I see your peasant labourer delve and plough, sow and reap, sweat beneath the summer's sun, or grow prematurely old before the winter's blast. I see your noble mechanic with his manly countenance and his matchless skill, toiling at his bench or his forge. I see one of the workers in our factories in the North, a woman,—a girl it may be, gentle and good, as many of them are, as your sisters and daughters are,—I see her intent upon the spindle whose revolutions are so rapid that the eye fails altogether to detect them, or to watch the alternating flight of the unresting shuttle. I turn again to another portion of your population, which, “plunged in mines, forgets a sun was made,” and I see the man who brings up from the

secret chambers of the earth the elements of the riches and the greatness of his country. When I see all this I have before me a mass of produce and of wealth which I am no more able to comprehend than I am that £2,000,000,000 of which I have spoken, but I behold in its full proportions the hideous error of your governments, whose fatal policy consumes in some cases a half, never less than a third, of all the results of that industry which God intended should fertilize and bless every home in England, but the fruits of which are squandered in every part of the surface of the globe, without producing the smallest good to the people of England.

We have, it is true, some visible results that are of a more positive character. We have that which some people call a great advantage,—the national debt,—a debt which is now so large that the most prudent, the most economical and the most honest have given up all hope, not of its being paid off, but of its being diminished in amount.

We have, too, taxes which have been during many years so onerous that there have been times when the patient beasts of burden threatened to revolt,—so onerous that it has been utterly impossible to levy them with any kind of honest quality, according to the means of the people to pay them. We have that, moreover, which is a standing wonder to all foreigners who consider our condition,—an amount of apparently immovable pauperism which to strangers is wholly irreconcilable with the fact that we, as a nation, produce more of what should make us all comfortable than is produced by any other nation of similar numbers on the face of the globe. Let us likewise remember that during the period of those great and so-called glorious contests on the continent of Europe, every description of home reform was not only delayed, but actually crushed out of the minds of the great bulk of the people. There can be no doubt whatever that in 1793 England was about to realize political changes and reforms, such as did not appear again until 1830, and during the period of that war, which now almost all men agree to have been wholly unnecessary, we were passing through a period which may be described as the dark age of English politics; when there was no more freedom to write or speak, or politically to act, than there is now in the most despotic country of Europe.

But it may be asked, did nobody gain? If Europe is no better and the people of England have been so much worse who has benefited by the new system of foreign policy? What has been the fate of those who were enthroned at the Revolution and whose supremacy has

been for so long a period undisputed among us? Mr. Kinglake, the author of an interesting book on Eastern travel describing the habits of some acquaintances that he made in the Syrian deserts, says that the jackals of the desert follow their prey in families, like the place hunters of Europe. I will reverse, if you like, the comparison, and say that the great territorial families of England, which were enthroned at the Revolution, have followed their prey like the jackals of the desert. Do you not observe at a glance that, from the time of William III, by reason of the foreign policy which I denounce, wars have been multiplied, taxes increased, loans made, and the sums of money which every year the government has to expend augmented, and that so the patronage at the disposal of ministers must have increased also, and the families who were enthroned and made powerful in the legislation and administration of the country must have had the first pull at, and the largest profit out of, that patronage? There is no actuary in existence who can calculate how much of the wealth, of the strength, of the supremacy of the territorial families of England has been derived from an unholy participation in the fruits of the industry of the people, which have been wrested from them by every device of taxation and squandered in every conceivable crime of which a government could possibly be guilty.

The more you examine this matter, the more you will come to the conclusion which I have arrived at, that this foreign policy, this regard for the "liberties of Europe," this care at one time for "the Protestant interests," this excessive love for "the balance of power," is neither more nor less than a gigantic system of outdoor relief for the aristocracy of Great Britain. I observe that you receive that declaration as if it were some new and important discovery. In 1815, when the great war with France was ended, every Liberal in England whose politics, whose hopes and whose faith had not been crushed out of him by tyranny of the time of that war, was fully aware of this, and openly admitted it; and up to 1832, and for some years afterward, it was the fixed and undoubted creed of the great Liberal party. But somehow all is changed. We who stand upon the old landmarks, who walk in the old paths, who would conserve what is wise and prudent, are hustled and shoved about as if we were come to turn the world upside down. The change which has taken place seems to confirm the opinion of a lamented friend of mine, who, not having succeeded in all his hopes, thought that men made no progress whatever, but went round and round like a squirrel in a cage. The idea is now so general that it is our duty to meddle everywhere, that it really seems as if we had pushed the Tories from the field, expelling them by our competition.

It is for you to decide whether our greatness shall be only temporary, or whether it shall be enduring. When I am told that the greatness of our country is shown by the £100,000,000 of revenue produced, may I not also ask how it is that we have 1,100,000 paupers in this kingdom and why it is that £7,000,000 should be taken from the industry chiefly of the labouring classes to support a small nation, as it were, of paupers? Since your legislation upon the corn laws, you have not only had nearly £20,000,000 of food brought into the country annually, but such an extraordinary increase of trade that your exports are about doubled, and yet I understand that in the year 1856, for I have no later return, there were no less than 1,100,000 paupers in the United Kingdom, and the sum raised in poor-rates was not less than £7,200,000. And that cost of pauperism is not the full amount, for there is a vast amount of temporary, casual, and vagrant pauperism that does not come in to swell that sum.

Then do not you well know—I know it, because I live among the population of Lancashire, and I doubt not the same may be said of the population of this city and county—that just above the level of the 1,100,000 there is at least an equal number who are ever oscillating between independence and pauperism, who, with a heroism which is not the less heroic because it is secret and unrecorded, are doing their very utmost to maintain an honourable and independent position before their fellow-men?

While Irish labour, notwithstanding the improvement which has taken place in Ireland, is only paid at the rate of about one shilling a day; while in the straths and glens of Scotland there are hundreds of shepherd families whose whole food almost consists of oatmeal porridge from day to day, and from week to week; while these things continue, I say that we have no reason to be self-satisfied and contented with our position, but that we who are in Parliament and are more directly responsible for affairs, and you who are also responsible, though in a lesser degree, are bound by the sacred duty which we owe our country to examine why it is that with all this trade, all this industry, and all this personal freedom, there is still so much that is unsound at the base of our social fabric?

I have been already told by a very eminent newspaper publisher in Calcutta, who, commenting on a speech I made at the close of the session with regard to the condition of India and our future policy in that country, said that the policy I recommended was intended to strike at the root of the advancement of the British empire, and that its advancement did not necessarily involve the calamities which I pointed out as likely to occur.

My Calcutta critic assured me that Rome pursued a similar policy for a period of eight centuries, and that for those eight centuries she remained great. Now, I do not think that examples taken from pagan, sanguinary Rome proper models for the imitation of a Christian country, nor would I limit my hopes of the greatness of England even to the long duration of eight hundred years.

But what is Rome now? The great city is dead. A poet has described her as "the lone mother of dead empires." Her language even is dead. Her very tombs are empty; the ashes of her most illustrious citizens are dispersed.

"The Scipios' tomb contains no ashes now." Yet I am asked, I, who am one of the legislators of a Christian country, to measure my policy by the policy of ancient and pagan Rome!

I believe there is no permanent greatness to a nation except it be based upon morality. I do not care for military greatness or military renown. I care for the condition of the people among whom I live. There is no man in England who is less likely to speak irreverently of the crown and monarchy of England than I am; but crowns, coronets, mitres, military display, the pomp of war, wide colonies, and a huge empire are, in my view, all trifles, light as air, and not worth considering, unless with them you can have a fair share of comfort, contentment, and happiness among the great body of the people. Palaces, baronial castles, great halls, stately mansions, do not make a nation. The nation in every country dwells in the cottage; and unless the light of your constitution can shine there, unless the beauty of your legislation and the excellence of your statesmanship are impressed there on the feelings and condition of the people, rely upon it you have yet to learn the duties of government.

I have not, as you have observed, pleaded that this country should remain without adequate and scientific means of defence. I acknowledge it to be the duty of your statesmen, acting upon the known opinions and principles of ninety-nine out of every hundred persons in the country, at all times, with all possible moderation, but with all possible efficiency, to take steps which shall preserve order within and on the confines of your kingdom. But I shall repudiate and denounce the expenditure of every shilling, the engagement of every man, the employment of every ship, which has no object but intermeddling in the affairs of other countries, and endeavouring to extend the boundaries of an empire which is already large enough to satisfy the greatest ambition, and I fear is much too large for the highest statesmanship to which any man has yet attained.

The most ancient of profane historians has told us that the Scythians of his time were a very warlike people, and that they elevated an old cimex upon a platform as a symbol of Mars,—for to Mars alone, I believe, they built altars and offered sacrifices. To this cimex they offered sacrifices of horses and cattle, the main wealth of the country, and more costly sacrifices than to all the rest of their gods. I often ask myself whether we are at all advanced in one respect beyond those Scythians. What are our contributions to charity, to education, to morality, to religion, to justice, and to civil government, when compared with the wealth we expend in sacrifices to the old cimex? Two nights ago I addressed in this hall a vast assembly composed to a great extent of your countrymen who have no political power, who are at work from the dawn of the day to the evening, and who have therefore limited means of informing themselves on these great subjects. Now I am privileged to speak to a somewhat different audience. You represent those of your great community who have a more complete education, who have on some points greater intelligence, and in whose hands reside the power and influence of the district. I am speaking, too, within the hearing of those whose gentle nature, whose finer instincts, whose purer minds, have not suffered as some of us have suffered in the turmoil and strife of life. You can mould opinion, you can create political power;—you cannot think a good thought on this subject and communicate it to your neighbours, you cannot make these points topics of discussion in your social circles and more general meetings, without affecting sensibly and speedily the course which the government of your country will pursue.

May I ask you, then, to believe, as I do most devoutly believe, that the moral law was not written for men alone in their individual character, but that it was written as well for nations and for nations great as this of which we are citizens? If nations reject and deride that moral law, there is a penalty which will inevitably follow. It may not come at once, it may not come in our lifetime; but rely upon it, the great Italian is not a poet only, but a prophet, when he says:—

“The sword of heaven is not in haste to smite,
Nor yet doth linger.”

We have experience, we have beacons, we have landmarks enough. We know what the past has cost us, we know how much and how far we have wandered, but we are not left without a guide. It is true we have not, as an ancient people had, Urim and Thummim,—those

oraculous gems on Aaron's breast,—from which we take council, but we have the unchangeable and eternal principles of the moral law to guide us, and only so far as we walk by that guidance can we be permanently a great nation, or our people a happy people.

CRIMEAN WAR

(Delivered in the House of Commons, on February 23rd, 1855).

I AM one of those forming the majority of the House, I suspect, who are disposed to look upon our present position as one of more than ordinary gravity. I am one, also, of those, not probably constituting so great a majority of the House, who regret exceedingly the circumstances which have obliged the right honourable gentlemen who are now upon this bench to secede from the government of the noble Lord, the Member for Tiverton. I do not take upon me for a moment to condemn them, because I think, if there be anything in which a man must judge for himself, it is whether he should take office if it be offered to him, whether he should secede from office, whether he should serve under a particular leader, or engage in the service of the Crown, or retain office in a particular emergency. In such cases I think that the decision must be left to his own conscience, and his own judgment; and I should be the last person to condemn anyone for the decision to which he might come. I think, however, that the speech of the right honourable gentleman is one which the House cannot have listened to without being convinced that he and his retiring colleagues have been moved to the course which they have taken by a deliberate judgment upon this question, which, whether it be right or wrong, is fully explained, and is honest to the House and to the country. Now, sir, I said that I regretted their secession, because I am one of those who do not wish to see the government of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton overthrown. The House knows well, and nobody knows better than the noble Lord, that I have never been one of his ardent and enthusiastic supporters. I have disapproved much of his policy at home and abroad; but I hope I do not bear to him, as I can honestly say that I do not bear to any man in this House—for from all I have received unnumbered courtesies—any feeling that takes even a tinge of a personal animosity, and, even if I did, at a moment so grave as this, no feeling of a personal character whatever should prevent me from doing that which I think now, of all times, we are called upon to do—that which we honestly and conscientiously believe

to be for the permanent interests of the country. We are in this position, that for a month past, at least, there has been a chaos in the regions of the Administration. Nothing can be more embarrassing—I had almost said, nothing can be more humiliating—than the position which we offer to the country; and I am afraid that the knowledge of our position is not confined to the limits of these islands. It will be admitted that we want a government, that if the country is to be saved from the breakers which now surround it, there must be a government, and it devolves upon the House of Commons to rise to the gravity of the occasion, and to support any man who is conscious of his responsibility and who is honestly offering and endeavouring to deliver the country from the embarrassment in which we now find it. We are at war, and I shall not say one single sentence with regard to the policy of the war or its origin, and I know not that I shall say a single sentence with regard to the conduct of it; but the fact is we are at war with the greatest military Power, probably, of the world, and that we are carrying on our operations at a distance of 3,000 miles from home, and in the neighbourhood of the strongest fortifications of that great military empire. I will not stop to criticise—though it really invites me—the fact that some who have told us we were in danger from the aggressions of that empire, at the same time told us that that empire was powerless for aggression, and also that it was impregnable to attack. By some means however, the public have been alarmed as if that aggressive power were unbounded, and they have been induced to undertake an expedition, as if the invasion of an impregnable country were a matter of holiday-making rather than of war. But we are now in a peculiar position with regard to that war, for, if I am not mistaken—and I think I gathered as much from the language of the right honourable gentleman—at this very moment terms have been agreed upon—agreed upon by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen, consented to by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton when he was in that Cabinet; and ratified and confirmed by him upon the formation of his own government—and that these terms are now specifically known and understood; and that they have been offered to the government with which this country is at war, and in conjunction with France and Austria—one, certainly, and the other supposed to be, an ally of this country. Now, those terms consist of four propositions, which I shall neither describe nor discuss, because they are known to the House; but three of them are not matters of dispute, and, with regard to the other, I think that the noble Lord the Member for the City of London stated, upon a recent occasion, that it was involved in these terms that the preponderant power of Russia in the Black Sea should cease, and that Russia had accepted it with that

interpretation. Therefore, whatever difference arises is merely as to the mode in which that "preponderant power" shall be understood or made to cease. Now, there are some gentlemen not far from me—there are men who write in the public press—there are thousands of persons in the United Kingdom at present—and I learn with astonishment and dismay, that there are persons even in that grave assembly which we are not allowed to specify by a name in this House—who have entertained dreams—impracticable theories—expectations of vast European and Asiatic changes, of revived nationalities, and of a new map of Europe, if not of the world, as a result or an object of this war. And it is from those gentlemen that we hear continually, addressed to the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, terms which I cannot well understand. They call upon him to act, to carry on the war with vigour, and to prosecute enterprises which neither his government, nor any other government has ever seriously entertained; but I would appeal to those gentlemen whether it does not become us—regarding the true interests and the true honour of the country—if our government have offered terms of peace to Russia, not to draw back from those terms, not to cause any unnecessary delay, not to adopt any subterfuge to prevent those terms being accepted, nor to attempt shuffles of any kind, not to endeavour to insist upon harder terms, and thus make the approach of peace even still more distant than it is at present? Whatever may be said about the honour of the country in any other relation in regard to this affair, this, at least, I expect every man who hears me to admit—that if terms of peace have been offered, they have been offered in good faith, and shall be in honour and good faith adhered to; so that if, unfortunately for Europe and humanity, there should be any failure at Vienna, no man should point to the English government and to the authorities and rulers of this Christian country, and say that we have prolonged the war and the infinite calamities of which it is the cause. Well, now, I said that I was anxious that the government of the noble Lord should not be overthrown. Will the House allow me to say why I am so? The noble Lord at the head of the government has long been a great authority with many persons in this country upon foreign policy. His late colleague, and present envoy to Vienna, has long been a great authority with a large portion of the people of this country upon almost all political questions. With the exception of that unhappy selection of an ambassador at Constantinople, I hold that there are no men in this country more truly responsible for our present position in this war than the noble Lord who now fills the highest office in the State, and the noble Lord who is now, I trust, rapidly approaching the scene of his labours in Vienna. I do not say this now to throw blame upon those

noble Lords, because their policy, which I hold to be wrong, they, without doubt, as firmly believe to be right ; but I am only stating facts. It has been their policy that they have entered into war for certain objects, and I am sure that neither the noble Lord at the head of the government nor his late colleague the noble Lord the Member for London will shrink from the responsibility which attaches to them. Well, sir, now we have those noble Lords in a position, which is, in my humble opinion, favourable to the termination of the troubles which exist. I think that the noble Lord at the head of the government himself would have more influence in stilling whatever may exist of clamour in this country than any other member in this House. I think, also, that the noble Lord the Member for London would not have undertaken the mission to Vienna if he had not entertained some strong belief, that, by so doing, he might bring the war to an end. Nobody gains reputation by a failure in negotiation, and as that noble Lord is well acquainted with the whole question from beginning to end, I entertain a hope—I will not say a sanguine hope—that the result of that mission to Vienna will be to bring about a peace, to extricate this country from some of those difficulties inseparable from a state of war. There is one subject upon which I should like to put a question to the noble Lord at the head of the government. I shall not say one word here about the state of the army in the Crimea, or one word about its numbers, or its condition. Every member of this House, every inhabitant of this country, has been sufficiently harrowed with details regarding it. To my solemn belief, thousands—nay, scores of thousands of persons—have retired to rest, night after night, whose slumbers have been disturbed, or whose dreams have been based upon the sufferings and agonies of our soldiers in the Crimea. I should like to ask the noble Lord at the head of the government—although I am not sure if he will feel that he can or ought to answer the question—whether the noble Lord, the Member for London, has power, after discussions have commenced, and as soon as there shall be established good grounds for believing that the negotiations for peace will prove successful, to enter into any armistice? I know not, Sir, who it is that says “No, no,” but I should like to see any man get up and say that the destruction of 200,000 human lives lost on all sides during the course of this unhappy conflict is not a sufficient sacrifice. You are not pretending to conquer territory—you are not pretending to hold fortified or unfortified towns ; you have offered terms of peace, which, as I understand them, I do not say are not moderate ; and breathes there a man in this House or in this country whose appetite for blood is so insatiable that, even when terms of peace have been offered and accepted, he pines for that assault in which of Russian, Turk, French, and English, as sure as one man dies,

20,000 corpses will strew the streets of Sebastopol? I say I should like to ask the noble Lord—and I am sure that he will feel, and that this House will feel, that I am speaking in no unfriendly manner towards the government of which he is at the head—I should like to know, and I venture to hope that it is so, if the noble Lord the Member for London has power, at the earliest stage of these proceedings at Vienna, at which it can properly be done, and I should think that it might properly be done at a very early stage—to adopt a course by which all further waste of human life may be put an end to, and further animosity between three great nations be, as far as possible, prevented? I appeal to the noble Lord at the head of the government and to this House; I am not now complaining of the war—I am not now complaining of the terms of peace, nor indeed, of anything that had been done—but I wish to suggest to this House what, I believe, thousands and tens of thousands of the most educated and of the most Christian portion of the people of this country are feeling upon this subject, although indeed, in the midst of a certain clamour in the country, they do not give public expression to their feelings. Your country is not in an advantageous state at this moment; from one end of the Kingdom to the other there is a general collapse of industry. Those members of this House, not intimately acquainted with the trade and commerce of the country, do not fully comprehend our position as to the diminution of employment and the lessening of wages. An increase in the cost of living is finding its way to the homes and hearts of a vast number of the labouring population. At the same time there is growing up—and, notwithstanding what some honourable members of this House may think of me, no man regrets it more than I do—a bitter and angry feeling against that class which has for a long period conducted the public affairs of this country. I like political changes, when such changes are made as the result, not of passion, but of deliberation and reason. Changes so made are safe, but changes made under the influence of violent exaggeration, or of the violent passions of public meetings, are not changes usually approved by this House or advantageous to the country. I cannot but notice, in speaking to gentlemen who sit on either side of this House, or in speaking to anyone I meet between this House and any of those localities we frequent when the House is up—I cannot, I say, but notice that an uneasy feeling exists as to the news that may arrive by the very next mail from the East. I do not suppose that your troops are to be beaten in actual conflict with the foe, or that they will be driven into the sea; but I am certain that many homes in England in which there now exists a fond hope that the distant one may return—many such homes may be rendered desolate when the next mail shall arrive. The angel of death

has been abroad throughout the land ; you may almost hear the beating of his wings. There is no one, as when the first-born were slain of old, to sprinkle with blood the lintel and the two side posts of our doors, that he may spare and pass on ; he takes his victims from the castle of the noble, from the mansions of the wealthy, and the cottage of the poor and the lowly, and it is on behalf of all these classes that I make this solemn appeal. I tell the noble Lord, that if he be ready honestly and frankly to endeavour, by the negotiations to be opened at Vienna, to put an end to this war, no word of mine, no vote of mine, will be given to shake his power for one single moment, or to change his position in this House. I am sure that the noble Lord is not inaccessible to appeals made to him from honest motives and with no unfriendly feeling. The noble Lord has been for more than forty years a member of this House. Before I was born he sat upon the Treasury Bench, and he has devoted his life in the service of his country. He is no longer young, and his life has extended almost to the term allotted to man. I would ask, I would entreat, the noble Lord to take a course which, when he looks back upon his whole political career—whatever he may find therein to be pleased with, whatever to regret—cannot but be a source of gratification to him. By adopting that course he would have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having obtained the object of his laudable ambition—having become the foremost subject of the Crown, the director of, it may be, the destinies of his country and the presiding genius in her councils—he had achieved a still higher and nobler ambition ; that he had returned the sword to the scabbard—that at his word torrents of blood had ceased to flow—that he had restored tranquillity to Europe, and saved this country from the indescribable calamities of war.

CAMILLO BENSO COUNT DI CAVOUR

(1810-1861).

THE unification and redemption of Italy may well be considered a more wonderful achievement than the unification of Germany ; and it is far more distinctly the achievement of Cavour than the existing German empire is the work of Bismarck. The latter had behind him the greatest military power in Europe and a mighty people to whom foreign domination has long been merely an ugly dream of the past. Cavour had only the feeble kingdom of Sardinia as a rallying point for heart-broken Italians, inhabiting provinces, which had known for centuries nothing but alien domination, cruel oppression, and savagely suppressed outbreaks. A long record of martyred aspirations for freedom and self-government naturally drove Italian patriotism into an extreme distrust with every monarchic power ; into fierce outbreaks for a democracy which contiguous Europe would not tolerate, and into diverse conspiracies, and organizations of Carbonari. How Cavour, in private life, learned to mould all these elements to the uses of national unification ; how he mastered the politics and the cabinet secrets of Europe, and with what sagacity and success, from his entrance into the Sardinian Parliament in 1848 until his death in 1861, he controlled the Sardinian King and his people, played the European powers against each other, and from the chaos of Italian revolutionary movements drew forth the Italy of to-day, united under a free representative government, " a free Church in a free State,"—all this is told in books and will be discussed in others without number.

Yet this greatest and noblest political feat of the century was accomplished in a brief public life of twelve years—and by a man whose speeches were said to be " not what is called eloquent," though, judged by their effect, they were the most moving orations men ever heard.

Count Cavour was born in Turin, August 10th, 1810. His family descended from a Saxon ancestor of the time of Frederick Barbarossa, were known as the Bensì, and had a marquisate and an estate near Cavour, from which the title came. Camillo's father held a position at the court of Turin, and the babe was presented at the baptismal font by the beautiful Pauline Bonaparte, the Princess Borghese. When made a page at court, Camillo scorned the uniform and menial service,

and spoke his mind so freely that he was sent away to learn prudence. His tongue, again in 1831, made his position in the army untenable, and he retired to the family estate, which he successfully managed till his entrance into public life in 1848.

In the meantime he had been an active promoter of agriculture and public improvements, and withal, a close student, and observer of politics, keeping himself aloof from conspiracies and revolutionary organizations, but more or less under suspicion of sympathizing with their aims. Entering the Sardinian Parliament in the exciting times of 1848, he became a member of the Cabinet in 1850 and Prime Minister in 1852, a post he held till he resigned in 1859, disgusted with the terms of peace his ally, Louis Napoleon, had conceded to Austria at Villa Franca. But he soon resumed his position, seeing in the Garibaldian movement a means of completing his work, which was practically done when he died—June 6th, 1861. During most of his premiership he was really a dictator, his will being a law alike to king, parliament, and people.

ROME AND ITALY

(A Speech on the Necessity of Having Rome for the Capital of United Italy).

ROME should be the capital of Italy. There can be no solution of the Roman question without the acceptance of this premise by Italy and by all Europe. If any one could conceive of a united Italy with any degree of stability, and without Rome for its capital, I would declare the Roman question difficult, if not impossible of solution. And why have we the right, the duty of insisting that Rome shall be united to Italy? Because without Rome as the capital of Italy, Italy cannot exist.

This truth being felt instinctively by all Italians, being asserted abroad by all who judge Italian affairs impartially, needs no demonstration, but is upheld by the judgment of the nation.

And yet, gentlemen, this truth is susceptible of a very simple proof. Italy has still much to do before it will rest upon a stable basis; much to do in solving the grave problems raised by her unification; much to do in overcoming all the obstacles which time-honoured traditions oppose to this great undertaking. And if this end must be compassed, it is essential that there be no cause of dissidence, of failure. Until the question of the capital of Italy is determined there will be endless discords among the different provinces.

It is easy to understand how persons of good faith, cultured and talented, are now suggesting, some on historical, some on artistic grounds, and also for many other reasons the advisability of establishing the capital in some other city of Italy. Such a discussion is quite comprehensible now, but if Italy already had her capital in Rome do you think this question would be even possible? Assuredly not. Even those who are now opposed to transferring the capital to Rome, if it were once established they would not dream of removing it. Therefore it is only by proclaiming Rome the capital of Italy that we can put an end to those dissensions among ourselves.

I am grieved that men of eminence, men of genius, men who have rendered glorious service to the cause of Italian unity, should drag this question into the field of debate, and there discuss it with (dare I say it) puerile arguments. The question of the capital, gentlemen, is not determined by climate, by topography, nor even by strategical considerations. If these things effected the selection I think I may safely say that London would not be the capital of England, nor perhaps Paris the capital of France. The selection of the capital is determined by great moral reasons. It is the will of the people that decides this question touching them so closely.

In Rome, gentlemen, are united all the circumstances, whether historic, intellectual, or moral, that should determine the site of the capital of a great State. Rome is the only city with traditions not purely local. The entire history of Rome from the time of Cæsar to the present day is the history of a city whose importance reaches far beyond her confines; of a city destined to be one of the capitals of the world. Convinced, profoundly convinced of this truth, I feel constrained to declare it solemnly to you and to the nation and I feel bound to appeal in this matter to the patriotism of every citizen of Italy, and to the representatives of her most eminent cities that discussions may cease, and that he who represents the nation before other powers may be able to proclaim that the necessity of having Rome as the capital is recognized by all the nation. I think I am justified in making this appeal even to those who, for reasons which I respect, differ with me on this point. Yet more; I can assume no Spartan indifference in the matter. I say frankly that it will be a deep grief to me to tell my native city that she must renounce resolutely and definitely all hope of being the seat of government.

Yes, gentlemen, as far as I am personally concerned, it is no pleasure to go to Rome. Having little artistic taste, I feel sure that in the midst of the splendid monuments of ancient and modern Rome I will lament the plain and unpoetic streets of my native town. But

one thing I can say with confidence ; knowing the character of my fellow-citizens ; knowing from actual facts how ready they have always been to make the greatest sacrifices for the sacred cause of Italy ; knowing their willingness to make sacrifices when their city was invaded by the enemy and their promptness and energy in its defence ; knowing all this, I have no fear that they will not uphold me when, in their name and as their deputy, I say that Turin is ready to make this great sacrifice in the interests of united Italy.

I am comforted by the hope—I may even say the certainty—that when Italy shall have established the seat of government in the eternal city she will not be ungrateful to this land which was the cradle of liberty ; to this land in which was sown that germ of independence which, maturing rapidly and branching out, has now reached forth its tendrils from Sicily to the Alps.

I have said and I repeat : Rome, and Rome only, should be the capital of Italy.

But here begin the difficulties of the problem. We must go to Rome, but there are two conditions : we must go there in concert with France, otherwise the union of Rome with the rest of Italy will be interpreted by the great mass of Catholics, within Italy and without, as the signal of the slavery of the Church. We must go, therefore, to Rome in such a way that the true independence of the Pontiff will not be diminished. We must go to Rome, but the civil power must not extend to spiritual things. These are the two conditions that must be fulfilled if this united Italy is to exist.

As to the first, it would be folly, in the present condition of affairs in Europe, to think of going to Rome in the face of the opposition of France. Yet more : even if, through events which I believe improbable and impossible, France were reduced to a condition which forbade material interference with our actions, we should none the less avoid uniting Rome to the rest of Italy, if, by so doing, we caused loss to our allies.

We have contracted a great debt towards France. I do not claim that the narrow moral code which affects individual actions should be applied *ad litteram* to international relations. Still there are certain moral principles which even nations may not violate with impunity.

I know that many diplomats profess contrary views. I remember hearing a famous Austrian statesman applauded a few years ago when he laughingly declared that in a short time Austria would astound Europe by her ingratitude to Russia. As a matter of fact, Austria kept her word ; you already know, and if you do not, I can testify to the fact, that at the Congress of Paris no power showed more hostility to Russia

or tried harder, to aggravate the conditions of peace than Austria, whose sword had done nothing toward imposing peace upon her old ally. But gentlemen, the violation of that great moral principle did not go unpunished. After a few years Russia had her revenge, and we should be glad of it, for I do not hesitate to attribute to the unforgotten ingratitude of Austria the facility with which friendly relations were established between Russia and ourselves, relations now unfortunately interrupted, but, I hope, without changing the feelings of Russia for Italy, and without any alteration of the sympathy for us which has always dwelt in the bosom of the Czar.

Gentlemen, we have an even graver motive for co-operating with France. When, in 1859, we invoked French aid when the Emperor consented to descend into Italy at the head of his legions, he made no secret of his pledges to the court of Rome. We accepted his aid without protest against those pledges. Now, after reaping such advantages from that alliance, we can protest against the pledges only to a point. But then, you will object, the solution of the Roman question is impossible !

I answer : if the second of our conditions is fulfilled, the first will offer few obstacles. That is, if we can so act that the reunion of Rome to Italy does not cause alarm to Catholic society. By Catholic society I mean the great mass of people who profess religious belief from conviction and not for political ends, and who are free from vulgar prejudices. If, I say, we can persuade the great mass of Catholics that the uniting of Rome to Italy can be accomplished without sacrificing the liberty of the Church, the problem will, I think, be solved.

We must not deceive ourselves ; there are many who, while not prejudiced against Italy nor against liberal ideas, yet fear that if Rome were united to Italy, the seat of Italian government established there and the King seated in the Quirinal, the Pontiff would lose both dignity and independence ; they fear that the Pope instead of being the head of Catholicism would be reduced to the rank of grand almoner or head chaplain.

If these fears were well founded, if the fall of the temporal power would really have this consequence, I would not hesitate to say that the union of Rome to the Italian State would be fatal not only to Catholicism but to the existence of Italy itself. Yet, further, I can imagine no greater misfortune for a cultured people than to see in the hands of its rulers not only the civil but also the religious power.

The history of centuries proves to us that wherever this union was consummated, civilization immediately ceased to advance and, therefore, necessarily began to retrograde ; the most detestable of

despotisms followed, and this, whether a caste of priests usurped the temporal power or a caliph or sultan seized control of things spiritual. Everywhere this fatal union has produced the same result ; God forbid that it should ever be so here ! . . .

When these doctrines have received the solemn sanction of the national Parliament, when it will be no longer lawful to doubt the feelings of Italians, when it is clear to the world that they are not hostile to the religion of their fathers, but wish to preserve this religion in their country, when it is no longer necessary to show them how to prosper and to develop their resources by combating a power which was an obstacle, not only to the reorganization of Italy but also to the spread of Catholicity, I believe that the greater part of Catholic society will absolve the Italians and will place where it belongs the responsibility of the fatal struggle which the Pope insists upon waging against the country in whose midst he lives.

But God avert this fatal chance ! At the risk of being considered Utopian, I believe that when the proclamation of the principles which I have just declared, and when the endorsement of them that you will give are known and considered at Rome and in the Vatican, I believe, I say, that those Italian fibres which the reactionary party has, as yet, been unable to remove from the heart of Pius IX., will again vibrate, and there will be accomplished the greatest act that any people has yet performed. And so it will be given to the same generation to have restored a nation, and to have done what is yet greater, yet more sublime, an act of which the influence is incalculable, that is, to have reconciled the papacy with the civil power, to have made peace between Church and State, between the spirit of religion and the great principles of liberty. Yes, I hope that it will be given us to compass these two great acts which will most assuredly carry to the most distant posterity the worthiness of the present generation of Italians.

LORD CHATHAM

(WILLIAM, VISCOUNT PITT AND EARL OF CHATHAM)

(1708-1778).

THE words with which the elder Pitt closed his reply to Lord Mansfield in arguing the Wilkes case in the House of Lords are at once the secret of his power as an orator and the explanation of his success as a statesman. "When law ends tyranny begins," he said as the final word of that great plea for the English constitution. It is for this idea that he stands in the history of England and of English-speaking people. "The higher law" to which appeal is made when impatience of wrong will not wait on prescription for reforms, he did not recognize,—or if he recognized it, combated it as a part of the tyranny which begins where prescription ends. What he dreaded most and opposed most strenuously for England was the arbitrary power, which in its own right of assumed superiority undertakes to decide the present without regard to the past without the previously given consent of those who are affected, and with regard to those precedents and rules of procedure, which, whether or not they have been enacted as legislation, have the force of law because they stand for regularity, for order, for "due process," for the sanity, the reasonable consideration which every man in or out of power owes to every other. "We all know what the constitution is," said Chatham in the Wilkes case. "We all know that the first principle of it is that the subject shall not be governed by the *arbitrium* of any one man or body of men less than the whole legislature, but by certain laws to which he has virtually given his consent, which are open to him to examine and are not beyond his ability to understand."

That the weak, the "subject," the defenceless shall "not be governed by the *arbitrium* of any man," but only by the due and orderly processes of the justice which is necessary for their liberties and their defence—to hold that idea as Chatham held it, and to dare as much for it as he dared, would make any man great. Undoubtedly he was one of the greatest men of England. "I have sometimes seen eloquence without wisdom and often wisdom without eloquence," said Franklin in speaking of him, "but in him I have seen them united in the highest

possible degree." No one who reads his speech in the Wilkes case in 1770 and after it the noble protest against the attempt to subjugate America made by him in his speech on the address to the throne in November 1777 is likely to dissent from this verdict. He attacked the arbitrary action of the King, as fearlessly as he had attacked that of Parliament. If the constitution was in danger, he did not stop to consider the rank, the dignity, the power of those who threatened it. He threatened them on his side in the name of that which he recognized as the greatest force in human affairs,—of the law, the love of order, the "due process," the justice and liberty which depend on due process under prescribed constitutional forms. If we wonder sometimes how the makers of the American constitution could have gained so much of that wisdom which comes from the hatred of disorderly power, we have only to read the speeches of Chatham, made in the face of the patriotic sentiment of England, in defiance of the royal prerogative, in contempt of all public opinion which supported arbitrary power, to understand that American love of liberty is an inheritance from the generations whose spirit inspired him, when in the House of Lords he said: "I rejoice that America has resisted. . . . I hope some dreadful calamity will befall this country which will open the eyes of the King."

He was not inconsistent in opposing American independence as he did in his last speech, delivered with what was almost literally his dying breath. He looked on Americans as Englishmen entitled to all their rights under the English constitution, and he was glad to see them fight for them if they could enforce them in no other way. But that as Englishmen they should join with France to free themselves from the constitution and laws he regarded with such reverence; that in doing so they should seek to "dismember the British Empire," seemed to him monstrous. Of the rights of humanity he seems to have no governing conception. The rights of Englishmen were very dear to him, but it does not seem to have occurred to him that there was any compelling reason for respecting the rights of Frenchmen, of Spaniards, of Hindoos, or other foreigners whose interests seemed to antagonize those of the British Empire. It is possible, but by no means certain, that he could have warmed as Burke did to the strongest indignation against British oppression in India, but it is for British liberty under English law, not for human liberty under the laws of Nature or of God, that he stands distinctively. Yet taking him with all his limitations and weaknesses, with the pomposity which sometimes made him seem ridiculous, and the vehemence which often made him unreasonable, he is still one of the noblest figures in the history of modern England.

He was born at Westminster, November 15th, 1708. After studying at Oxford and serving in the army as a cornet of horse, he entered Parliament in 1735, attracting immediate attention and winning the distinguished success of drawing the fire of Walpole, who complimented him by procuring his dismissal from the army because of his attacks on the administration. From this time until he was raised to the peerage in 1766, Pitt increased steadily in popular favour. He was called the "Great Commoner," and was in fact the first great popular parliamentary leader in English history. The most celebrated of his earlier speeches are only reported in fragments, but as a Commoner he could hardly have exceeded the fire of his denunciations of arbitrary power, when in the House of Lords he asserted the spirit of English liberty against the Tory policy towards America. He died May 11th, 1778, at Hayes, where he was removed after his collapse in the House of Lords on April 7th of the same year.



CONCILIATION WITH AMERICA

(On an Address to the Throne, in the House of Lords, November 18th, 1777).

I RISE, my lords, to declare my sentiments on this most solemn and serious subject. It has imposed a load upon my mind, which, I fear, nothing can remove; but which impels me to endeavour its alleviation, by a free and unreserved communication of my sentiments.

In the first part of the address, I have the honour of heartily concurring with the noble earl who moved it. No man feels sincerer joy than I do; none can offer more genuine congratulation on every accession of strength to the Protestant succession. I therefore join in every congratulation on the birth of another princess and the happy recovery of her Majesty. But I must stop here. My courtly complaisance will carry me no further. I will not join in congratulation on misfortune and disgrace. I cannot concur in a blind and servile address which approves and endeavours to sanctify the monstrous measures which have heaped disgrace and misfortune upon us. This, my lords, is a perilous and tremendous moment! It is not a time for adulation. The smoothness of flattery cannot now avail; cannot save us in this rugged and awful crisis. It is now necessary to instruct the throne in the language of truth. We must dispel the delusion and the darkness which envelop it; and display, in its full danger and true colours, the ruin that is brought to our doors.

This, my lords, is our duty. It is the proper function of this noble assemblage, sitting, as we do, upon our honours in this house, the hereditary council of the crown. Who is the minister—where is the minister, that has dared to suggest to the throne the contrary, unconstitutional language this day delivered from it? The accustomed language from the throne has been application to Parliament for advice, and a reliance on its constitutional advice and assistance. As it is the right of Parliament to give, so it is the duty of the crown to ask it. But on this day and in this extreme momentous exigency, no reliance is reposed on our constitutional counsels! no advice is asked from the sober and enlightened care of Parliament! but the crown, from itself and by itself, declares an unalterable determination to pursue measures—and what measures, my lords? The measures that have produced the imminent perils that threaten us; the measures that have brought ruin to our doors.

Can the minister of the day now presume to expect a continuance of support, in this ruinous infatuation? Can Parliament be so dead to its dignity and its duty, as to be thus deluded into the loss of the one and the violation of the other?—To give an unlimited credit and support for the steady perseverance in measures not proposed for our parliamentary advice, but dictated and forced upon us—in measures, I say, my lords, which have reduced this late flourishing empire to ruin and contempt!—"But yesterday, and England might have stood against the world: now none so poor to do her reverence." I use the words of a poet; but, though it be poetry, it is no fiction. It is a shameful truth, that not only the power and strength of this country are wasting away and expiring; but her well-earned glories, her true honour, and substantial dignity are sacrificed. France, my lords, has insulted you; she has encouraged and sustained America; and whether America be wrong or right, the dignity of this country ought to spurn at the officious insult of French interference. The ministers and ambassadors of those who are called rebels and enemies are in Paris; in Paris they transact the reciprocal interests of America and France. Can there be a more mortifying insult? Can even our ministers sustain a more humiliating disgrace? Do they dare to resent it? Do they presume even to hint a vindication of their honour and the dignity of the State by requiring the admission of the plenipotentiaries of America? Such is the degradation to which they have reduced the glories of England! The people whom they affect to call contemptible rebels, but whose growing power has at last obtained the name of enemies; the people with whom they have engaged this country in war, and against whom they now command our implicit support in every measure of desperate hostility: this people, despised as rebels, or acknowledged as enemies,

are abetted against you, supplied with every military store, their interests consulted, and their ambassadors entertained, by your inveterate enemy ! and our ministers dare not interpose with dignity or effect. Is this the honour of a great kingdom ? Is this the indignant spirit of England, who, " but yesterday," gave law to the house of Bourbon ? My lord, the dignity of nations demands a decisive conduct in a situation like this. Even when the greatest prince that perhaps this country ever saw filled our throne, the requisition of a Spanish general on a similar subject was attended to and complied with. For on the spirited remonstrance of the Duke of Alva, Elizabeth found herself obliged to deny the Flemish exiles all countenance, support, or even entrance into her dominions ; and the Count le Marque and his few desperate followers were expelled the kingdom. Happening to arrive at the Brille, and finding it weak in defence, they made themselves masters of the place : and this was the foundation of the United Provinces.

My lords, this ruinous and ignominious situation, where we cannot act with success, nor suffer with honour, calls upon us to remonstrate in the strongest and loudest language of truth, to rescue the ear of majesty from the delusions which surround it. The desperate state of our arms abroad is in part known : no man thinks more highly of them than I do. I love and honour the English troops, I know their virtues and their valour. I know they can achieve anything except impossibilities ; and I know that the conquest of English America is an impossibility. You cannot, I venture to say it, you cannot conquer America. Your armies in the last war effected everything that could be effected and what was it ? It cost a numerous army, under the command of a most able general, now a noble lord in this house, a long laborious campaign to expel five thousand Frenchmen from French America. My lords, you cannot conquer America. What is your present situation there ? We do not know the worst ; but we know that in three campaigns we have done nothing and suffered much. Besides the sufferings, perhaps total loss, of the Northern force, the best appointed army that ever took the field, commanded by Sir William Howe, has retired from the American lines. He was obliged to relinquish his attempt and with great delay and danger to adopt a new and distant plan of operation. We shall soon know, and in any event have reason to lament, what may have happened since. As to conquest, therefore, my lords, I repeat it is impossible. You may swell every expense and every effort still more extravagantly ; pile and accumulate every assistance you can buy or borrow ; traffic and barter with every little pitiful German prince that sells and sends his subjects to the shambles of a foreign prince ;

your efforts are forever vain and impotent : doubly so from this mercenary aid on which you rely. For it irritates to an incurable resentment the minds of your enemies—to overrun them with the mercenary sons of rapine and plunder ; devoting them and their possessions to the rapacity of hired cruelty ! If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country I never would lay down my arms—never—never—never !

Your own army is infected with the contagion of these illiberal allies. The spirit of plunder and of rapine is gone forth among them. I know it, and notwithstanding what the noble earl, who moved the address, has given as his opinion of our American army, I know from authentic information, and the most experienced officers, that our discipline is deeply wounded. Whilst this is notoriously our sinking situation, America grows and flourishes ; whilst our strength and discipline are lowered, hers are rising and improving.

But, my lords, who is the man that in addition to these disgraces and mischiefs of our army has dared to authorize and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping knife of the savage, to call into civilized alliance the wild and inhuman savage of the woods ; to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputed rights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren ? My lords, these enormities cry aloud for redress and punishment. Unless thoroughly done away, it will be a stain on the national character. It is a violation of the constitution. I believe it is against law. It is not the least of our national misfortunes, that the strength and character of our army are thus impaired. Infected with the mercenary spirit of robbery and rapine, familiarized with the horrid scenes of savage cruelty, it can no longer boast of the noble and generous principles which dignify a soldier ; no longer sympathize with the dignity of the royal banner nor feel the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war, “ that make ambition virtue ! ” What makes ambition virtue ?—the sense of honour. But is the sense of honour consistent with a spirit of plunder or the practice of murder ? Can it flow from mercenary motives, or can it prompt to cruel deeds ? Beside these murderers and plunderers, let me ask our ministers, What other allies have they acquired ? What other powers have they associated to their cause ? Have they entered into an alliance with the king of the gypsies ? Nothing, my lords, is too low or too ludicrous to be consistent with their counsels.

The independent views of America have been stated and asserted as the foundation of this address. My lords, no man wishes for the due dependence of America on this country more than I do. To preserve it and not confirm that state of independence into which your measures

hitherto have driven them is the object which we ought to unite in attaining. The Americans contending for their rights against arbitrary exactions I love and admire. It is the struggle of free and virtuous patriots ; but contending for independency and total disconnection from England, as an Englishman, I cannot wish them success. For, in a due constitutional dependency, including the ancient supremacy of this country in regulating their commerce and navigation, consists the mutual happiness and prosperity both of England and America. She derived assistance and protection from us ; and we reaped from her the most important advantages. She was indeed the fountain of our wealth, the nerve of our strength, the nursery and basis of our naval power. It is our duty, therefore, my lords, if we wish to save our country, most seriously to endeavour the recovery of these most beneficial subjects ; and in this perilous crisis, perhaps the present moment may be the only one in which we can hope for success. For in their negotiations with France they have, or think they have, reason to complain : though it be notorious that they have received from that power important supplies and assistance of various kinds, yet it is certain they expected it in a more decisive and immediate degree. America is in ill humour with France on some points that have not entirely answered her expectations. Let us wisely take advantage of every possible moment of reconciliation. Besides, the natural disposition of America herself still leans towards England ; to the old habits of connection and mutual interest that united both countries. This was the established sentiment of all the continent ; and still, my lords, in the great and principal part, the sound part of America, the wise and affectionate disposition prevails ; and there is a very considerable part of America yet sound—the middle and the southern provinces. Some parts may be factious and blind to their true interests ; but if we express a wise and benevolent disposition to communicate with them those immutable rights of nature, and those constitutional liberties to which they are equally entitled with ourselves ; by a conduct so just and humane we shall confirm the favourable and conciliate the adverse. I say, my lords, the rights and liberties to which they are equally entitled with ourselves but no more. I would participate to them every enjoyment and freedom which the colonizing subjects of a free State can possess, or wish to possess, and I do not see why they should not enjoy every fundamental right in their property, and every original substantial liberty, which Devonshire or Surrey, or the county I live in, or any other county in England, can claim ; reserving always, as the sacred right of the mother country, the due constitutional dependency of the colonies. The inherent supremacy of the State in regulating and protecting the navigation and commerce of all her

subjects is necessary for the mutual benefit and preservation of every part, to constitute and preserve the prosperous arrangement of the whole empire.

The sound parts of America, of which I have spoken, must be sensible to these great truths and of their real interests. America is not in that state of desperate and contemptible rebellion which this country has been deluded to believe. It is not a wild and lawless banditti, who, having nothing to lose, might hope to snatch something from public convulsions. Many of their leaders and great men have a great stake in this great contest. The gentleman who conducts their armies, I am told, has an estate of four or five thousand pounds a year, and when I consider these things I cannot but lament the inconsiderate violence of our penal acts, our declarations of treason and rebellion, with all the fatal effects of attainder and confiscation.

As to the disposition of foreign powers, which is asserted to be pacific and friendly, let us judge, my lords, rather by their actions and the nature of things, than by interested assertions. The uniform assistance supplied to America by France suggests a different conclusion. The most important interests of France, in aggrandizing and enriching herself with what she most wants, supplies of every naval store from America, must inspire her with different sentiments. The extraordinary preparations of the house of Bourbon, by land and by sea, from Dunkirk to the Straits, equally ready and willing to overwhelm these defenceless islands, should rouse us to a sense of their real disposition, and our own danger. Not five thousand troops in England!—hardly three thousand in Ireland! What can we oppose to the combined force of our enemies? Scarcely twenty ships of the line fully or sufficiently manned, that any admiral's reputation would permit him to take the command of. The river of Lisbon in the possession of our enemies! The seas swept by American privateers! Our channel trade torn to pieces by them! In this complicated crisis of danger, weakness at home and calamity abroad, terrified and insulted by the neighbouring powers, unable to act in America, or acting only to be destroyed, where is the man with the forehead to promise or hope for success in such a situation or from perseverance in the measures that have driven us to it? Who has the forehead to do so? Where is that man? I should be glad to see his face.

You cannot conciliate America by your present measures. You cannot subdue her by your present, or by any measures. What, then, can you do? You cannot conquer; you cannot gain; but you can address; you can lull the fears and anxieties of the moment into an ignorance of the danger that should produce them. But, my lords, the time demands

the language of truth. We must not now apply the flattering unction of servile compliance or blind complaisance. In a just and necessary war to maintain the rights or honour of my country, I would strip the shirt from my back to support it. But in such a war as this, unjust in its principle, impracticable in its means, and ruinous in its consequences, I would not contribute a single effort, nor a single shilling. I do not call for vengeance on the heads of those who have been guilty ; I only recommend to them to make their retreat. Let them walk off ; and let them make haste, or they may be assured that speedy and condign punishment will overtake them.

My lords, I have submitted to you, with the freedom and truth which I think my duty, my sentiments on your present awful situation. I have laid before you the ruin of your power, the disgrace of your reputation, the pollution of your discipline, the contamination of your morals, the complication of calamities, foreign and domestic, that overwhelm your sinking country. Your dearest interests, your own liberties, the constitution itself, totters to the foundation. All this disgraceful danger, this multitude of misery, is the monstrous offspring of this unnatural war. We have been deceived and deluded too long. Let us now stop short. This is the crisis—the only crisis of time and situation, to give us a possibility of escape from the fatal effects of our delusions. But if, in an obstinate and infatuated perseverance in folly, we slavishly echo the peremptory words this day presented to us, nothing can save this devoted country from complete and final ruin. We madly rush into multiplied miseries and “ confusion worse confounded.”

Is it possible, can it be believed, that ministers are yet blind to this impending destruction ? I did hope that instead of this false and empty vanity, this overweening pride, engendering high conceits and presumptuous imaginations, that ministers would have humbled themselves in their errors, would have confessed and retracted them, and by an active, though a late repentance, have endeavoured to redeem them. But, my lords, since they had neither sagacity to foresee, nor justice nor humanity to shun, these oppressive calamities ; since not even severe experience can make them feel, nor the imminent ruin of their country awaken them from their stupefaction, the guardian care of Parliament must interpose. I shall, therefore, my lords, propose to you an amendment to the address to his Majesty, to be inserted immediately after the first two paragraphs of congratulation on the birth of a princess, to recommend an immediate cessation of hostilities and the commencement of a treaty to restore peace and liberty to America, strength and happiness to England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries. This, my lords, is yet in our power ; and let not the wisdom

and justice of your lordships neglect the happy and perhaps the only opportunity. By the establishment of irrevocable law, founded on mutual rights, and ascertained by treaty, these glorious enjoyments may be firmly perpetuated. And let me repeat to your lordships, that the strong bias of America, at least of the wise and sounder parts of it, naturally inclines to this happy and constitutional reconnection with you. Notwithstanding the temporary intrigues with France, we may still be assured of their ancient and confirmed partiality to us. America and France cannot be congenial. There is something decisive and confirmed in the honest American that will not assimilate to the futility and levity of Frenchmen.

My lords, to encourage and confirm that innate inclination to this country, founded on every principle of affection, as well as a consideration of interest ; to restore that favourable disposition into a permanent and powerful reunion with this country ; to revive the mutual strength of the empire ; again to awe the house of Bourbon, instead of meanly truckling, as our present calamities compel us, to every insult of French caprice and Spanish punctilio ; to re-establish our commerce ; to re-assert our rights and our honour ; to confirm our interests, and renew our glories forever, a consummation most devoutly to be endeavoured ! and which, I trust, may yet arise from reconciliation with America ; I have the honour of submitting to you the following amendment, which I move to be inserted after the first two paragraphs of the address :—

“ And that this house does most humbly advise and supplicate His Majesty, to be pleased to cause the most speedy and effectual measures to be taken, for restoring peace in America : and that no time may be lost in proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities there, in order to the opening of a treaty for the final settlement of the tranquillity of these invaluable provinces, by a removal of the unhappy causes of this ruinous civil war ; and by a just and adequate security against the return of the like calamities in times to come. And this house desires to offer the most dutiful assurances to His Majesty, that it will in due time, cheerfully co-operate with the magnanimity and tender goodness of His Majesty, for the preservation of his people, by such explicit and most solemn declarations, and provisions of fundamental and irrevocable laws, as may be judged necessary for the ascertaining and fixing forever the respective rights of Great Britain and her colonies.”

(Lord Suffolk, having defended the employment of the Indians in war, as “ a means that *God and nature put into our hands !*” Lord Chatham resumed :)—

I am astonished! shocked! to hear such principles confessed—to hear them avowed in this house, or in this country: principles equally unconstitutional, inhuman, and unchristian!

My lords, I did not intend to have encroached again upon your attention; but I cannot repress my indignation. I feel myself impelled by every duty. My lords, we are called upon as members of this house, as men, as Christian men, to protest against such notions standing near the throne, polluting the ear of majesty. “That God and nature put into our hands!” I know not what ideas that lord may entertain of God and nature; but I know that such abominable principles are equally abhorrent to religion and humanity. What! to attribute the sacred sanction of God and nature to the massacres of the Indian scalping knife—to the cannibal savage torturing, murdering, roasting, and eating; literally, my lords, eating the mangled victims of his barbarous battles! Such horrible notions shock every precept of religion, divine or natural, and every generous feeling of humanity. And, my lords, they shock every sentiment of honour; they shock me as a lover of honourable war and a detester of murderous barbarity.

These abominable principles, and this more abominable avowal of them, demand the most decisive indignation. I call upon that right reverend bench, those holy ministers of the Gospel and pious pastors of our church; I conjure them to join in the holy work, and vindicate the religion of their God. I appeal to the wisdom and the law of this learned bench, to defend and support the justice of their country. I call upon the bishops to interpose the unsullied sanctity of their lawn; upon the learned judges to interpose the purity of their ermine, to save us from this pollution. I call upon the honour of your lordships to reverence the dignity of your ancestors and to maintain your own. I call upon the spirit and humanity of my country to vindicate the national character. I invoke the genius of the constitution. From the tapestry that adorns these walls, the immortal ancestor of this noble lord frowns with indignation at the disgrace of his country. In vain he led your victorious fleets against the boasted Armada of Spain; in vain he defended and established the honour, the liberties, the religion, the Protestant religion, of this country, against the arbitrary cruelties of Popery and the Inquisition, if these more than popish cruelties and inquisitorial practices are let loose among us; to turn forth into our settlements, among our ancient connections, friends, and relations, the merciless cannibal, thirsting for the blood of man, woman, and child! to send forth the infidel savage—against whom? against your Protestant brethren; to lay waste their country, to desolate their dwellings, and extirpate their race and name, with these horrible hell-hounds

of savage war !—hell-hounds, I say, of savage war. Spain armed herself with blood-hounds to extirpate the wretched natives of America ; and we improve on the inhuman example even of Spanish cruelty ; we turn these savage hell-hounds against our brethren and countrymen in America, of the same language, laws, liberties, and religion ; endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify humanity.

My lords, this awful subject, so important to our honour, constitution, and our religion, demands the most solemn and effectual inquiry. And I again call upon your lordships, and the united powers of the State, to examine it thoroughly and decisively, and to stamp upon it an indelible stigma of the public abhorrence. And I again implore those holy prelates of our religion to do away with these iniquities from among us. Let them perform a lustration ; let them purify this house and this country from this sin.

My lords, I am old and weak, and at the present unable to say more ; but my feelings and indignation were too strong to have said less. I could not have slept this night in my bed, nor reposed my head on my pillow, without giving this vent to my eternal abhorrence of such preposterous and enormous principles.

THE DEFENCE OF WEAKER STATES

(Delivered in the House of Lords, 1770).

MY Lords, I cannot agree with the noble duke, that nothing less than an immediate attack upon the honour or interest of this nation can authorize us to interpose in defence of weaker states, and in stopping the enterprises of an ambitious neighbour. Whenever that narrow, selfish policy has prevailed in our councils, we have constantly experienced the fatal effects of it. By suffering our natural enemies to oppress the Powers less able than we are to make a resistance, we have permitted them to increase their strength ; we have lost the most favourable opportunities of opposing them with success ; and found ourselves at last obliged to run every hazard, in making that cause our own, in which we were not wise enough to take part while the expense and danger might have been supported by others. With respect to Corsica I shall only say, that France has obtained a more useful and important acquisition in one *pacific* campaign, than in any of her *belligerent* campaigns ; at least while I had the honour of administering the war against her. The word may, perhaps, be thought singular : I mean only

while I was the minister chiefly entrusted with the conduct of the war. I remember, my Lords, the time when Lorraine was united to the Crown of France ; that too was, in some measure, a pacific conquest ; and there were people who talked of it as the noble duke now speaks of Corsica. France was permitted to take and keep possession of a noble province ; and, according to his Grace's ideas, we did right in not opposing it. The effect of these acquisitions is, I confess, not immediate ; but they unite with the main body by degrees, and, in time, make a part of the national strength. I fear, my Lords, it is too much the temper of this country to be insensible of the approach of danger, until it comes with accumulated terror upon us.

My Lords, the condition of His Majesty's affairs in Ireland, and the state of that kingdom within itself, will undoubtedly make a very material part of your Lordships' inquiry. I am not sufficiently informed to enter into the subject so fully as I could wish ; but by what appears to the public, and from my own observation, I confess I cannot give the ministry much credit for the spirit or prudence of their conduct. I see that, even where their measures are well chosen, they are incapable of carrying them through without some unhappy mixture of weakness or imprudence. They are incapable of doing entirely right. My Lords, I do, from my conscience, and from the best weighed principles of my understanding, applaud the augmentation of the army. As a military plan, I believe it has been judiciously arranged. In a political view, I am convinced it was for the welfare, for the safety of the whole empire. But, my Lords, with all these advantages, with all these recommendations, if I had the honour of advising His Majesty, I would never have consented to his accepting the augmentation with that absurd, dishonourable condition which the Ministry have submitted to annex to it. My Lords, I revere the just prerogative of the Crown, and would contend for it as warmly as for the rights of the people. They are linked together, and naturally support each other. I would not touch a feather of the prerogative. The expression, perhaps, is too light ; but, since I have made use of it, let me add, that the entire command and power of directing the local disposition of the army is the royal prerogative, as the master feather in the eagle's wing ; and if I were permitted to carry the allusion a little farther, I would say, they have disarmed the imperial bird, the '*Ministrum fulminis alitem.*' The army is the thunder of the crown. The Ministry have tied up the hand which should direct the bolt.

My Lords, I remember that Minorca was lost for want of four battalions. They could not be spared from hence ; and there was a delicacy about taking them from Ireland. I was one of those who promoted an inquiry into the matter in the other House ; and I was

convinced that we had not regular troops sufficient for the necessary service of our nation. Since the moment the plan of augmentation was first talked of, I have constantly and warmly supported it among my friends: I have recommended it to several members of the Irish House of Commons, and exhorted them to support it with their utmost interest in Parliament. I did not foresee, nor could I conceive it possible, the Ministry would accept of it, with a condition that makes the plan itself ineffectual, and, as far as it operates, defeats every useful purpose of maintaining a standing military force. His Majesty is now so confined, by his promise, that he must leave twelve thousand men locked up in Ireland, let the situation of his affairs abroad, or the approach of danger to this country, be ever so alarming, unless there be an actual rebellion, or invasion, in Great Britain. Even in the two cases excepted by the King's promise, the mischief must have already begun to operate, must have already taken effect before His Majesty can be authorized to send for the assistance of his Irish army. He has not left himself the power of taking any preventive measures, let his intelligence be ever so certain, let his apprehensions of invasion or rebellion be ever so well founded; unless the traitor be actually in arms—unless the enemy be in the heart of your country, he cannot move a single man from Ireland.

CHATHAM'S LAST SPEECH

(From Harsha, after Goodrich).

On the seventh of April, 1778, Lord Chatham made his appearance, for the last time, in the House of Lords. It is a day memorable for the occurrence of one of the most affecting scenes ever witnessed in Parliament—a day when the great master of modern oratory was overwhelmed by the effort of his own powerful eloquence.

Lord Chatham was ignorant of the real state of feeling in America. He imagined that the colonies might be brought back to their former allegiance to the British Government. He did not wish to see the extensive dominion of old England rent in twain and the independence of America recognized. He could not endure these thoughts. He therefore heard "with unspeakable concern" that the Duke of Richmond intended, on the seventh of April, to move an address to the king, advising him to effect a conciliation with America, involving her independence. Such a measure he thought was disastrous and ruinous to the prosperity and happiness of England. He determined to take a bold stand against it, and, accordingly, was carried to the House of Lords, to raise his voice against the dismemberment of the empire. He was led into the House of Peers by his son, the Honourable William Pitt, and his son-in-law, Lord Mahon. He was dressed in a rich suit of black velvet, and covered up to the knees in flannel. Within his large wig, little more of his countenance was seen than his aquiline nose and his penetrating eye, which retained all its native fire. He looked like a dying man, yet never was seen a figure of more dignity. He appeared like a being of a superior species. The lords stood up and made a lane for him to pass to his seat, while, with a gracefulness of deportment for which he was so eminently distinguished, he bowed to them as he proceeded. Having taken his seat, he listened with profound attention to the Duke of Richmond's speech. When Lord Weymouth had finished his reply in behalf of the ministry, Lord Chatham rose with slowness and great difficulty, and delivered the following speech. Supported by his two relations, he lifted his hand from the crutch on which he leaned, raised it up, and, casting his eyes toward heaven, commenced as follows:

I THANK God that I have been enabled to come here to-day to perform my duty, and speak on a subject which is so deeply impressed on my mind. I am old and infirm. I have one foot—more than one foot—in the grave. I have risen from my bed to stand up in the cause of my country—perhaps never again to speak in this house.

“The reverence, the attention, the stillness of the house,” said an eye-witness, “were here most affecting: had any one dropped a handkerchief, the noise would have been heard.”

As he proceeded, Lord Chatham spoke at first in a low tone, with all the weakness of one who is labouring under a severe indisposition. Gradually, however, as he warmed with the subject, his voice became louder and more distinct, his intonations grew more commanding, and his whole manner was solemn and impressive in the highest degree.

“My Lords,” he exclaimed, “I rejoice that the grave has not closed upon me; that I am still alive, to lift up my voice against the dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy! Pressed down as I am by the hand of infirmity, I am little able to assist my country in this most perilous conjuncture; but, my Lords, while I have sense and memory, I will never consent to deprive the offspring of the royal house of Brunswick, the heirs of the Princess Sophia, of the fairest inheritance. Shall we tarnish the lustre of this nation by an ignominious surrender of its rights and fairest possessions? Shall this great nation, that has survived, whole and entire, the Danish depredations, the Scottish inroads, the Norman Conquest—that has stood the threatened invasion of the Spanish Armada, now fall prostrate before the house of Bourbon? Surely my Lords this nation is no longer what it was. Shall a people that seventeen years ago were the terror of the world now stoop so low as to tell their ancient inveterate enemy, Take all we have, only give us peace? It is impossible.

“In God’s name, if it is absolutely necessary to declare either for peace or war, and the former cannot be preserved with honour, why is not the latter commenced without delay? I am not, I confess, well-informed as to the resources of this kingdom, but I trust it has still sufficient to maintain its just rights, though I know them not. But, my Lords, any state is better than despair. Let us at least make one effort, and, if we must fall, let us fall like men!”

When Lord Chatham had taken his seat Lord Temple said to him, “You have forgotten to mention what we have been talking about. Shall I get up?” “No,” replied Lord Chatham, “I will do it by and by.”

After the Duke of Richmond had concluded his speech, Lord Chatham made a strenuous attempt to rise, but after repeated efforts to regain an erect position, he suddenly pressed his hand to his heart and fell down in convulsions. The Duke of Cumberland, Lord Temple, Lord Stanford, and other peers caught him in their arms; and his son, the celebrated William Pitt, then a youth of seventeen, sprang forward to support him. The debate was immediately adjourned. Lord Chatham was conveyed in a state of insensibility from the House to his country residence at Hayes, where he lingered a few weeks, and expired on the eleventh of May, 1778, aged seventy years.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

(1874-).

IN 1910 he went to the Home Office, and was much criticized by the Labour Party for employing troops for strike-breaking during the great strike in 1911-12. Mr. Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1912; shortly after he took several trips in a sea-plane, then considered an unusual and daring feat.

When war broke out in 1914 he was the recipient of the nation's thanks because the Navy was found to be perfectly ready for instant action. His resignation arose over a difference of opinion with Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord. This took place in May, 1915, but, after certain other minor vicissitudes, Mr. Churchill accepted the appointment of Minister of Munitions in July, 1917, in the Lloyd George Coalition government. In 1918 he became Secretary for War and three years later was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies. In 1924 he became Chancellor of the Exchequer.

THE WORK OF THE NAVY

(Delivered in the House of Commons, February 15th, 1915).

AFTER the outbreak of war my noble friend Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, had to create an Army eight or ten times as large as any previously maintained or even contemplated in this country, and the War Office has been engaged in vast processes of expansion, improvisation, and development entirely without parallel in military experience. Thanks, however, to the generous provision made so readily for the last five years by the House of Commons for the Royal Navy no such difficulties or labours have confronted the Admiralty. On the declaration of war we were able to count upon a Fleet of sufficient superiority for all our needs with a good margin for safety in vital matters, fully mobilised, placed in its war stations, supplied and equipped with every requirement down to the smallest detail that could be foreseen, with reserves of ammunition and torpedoes up to, and above, the regular standard, with ample supplies of fuel and oil, with adequate reserves of stores of all kinds, with complete systems of transport and supply, with full numbers of trained officers and men of all ratings, with a large surplus of reserved and trained men, with adequate

establishments for training new men, with an immense programme of new construction rapidly maturing to reinforce the Fleet and replace casualties, and with a prearranged system for accelerating that new construction which has been found to yield satisfactory and even surprising results.

I would draw the attention of the House in illustration to only three particular points. First of all, ammunition. If hon. Members will run their eye along the series of figures for this Vote, in the last five or six years, and particularly during the latter years, they will see an enormous increase in the Vote. In time of peace one gets little credit for such expenditure, but in time of war we thank God it has been made. Then, Sir, oil. Most pessimistic prophecies were made as to the supply of oil, but no difficulty has been found in practice in that regard. The estimates which we had formed of the quantity of oil to be consumed by the Fleet in war proved to be much larger than our actual consumption. On the other hand, there has been no difficulty whatever in buying practically any quantity of oil. No single oil ship has been interfered with on passage to this country. The price of oil to-day is substantially below what it was when I last addressed the House on this topic. Indeed we have found it possible to do what we all along wished to do, but hesitated to decide upon, on account of all the gloomy prophecies and views which were entertained—we have found it possible to convert the *Royal Sovereign* to a completely oil fuel basis, so that this ship equally with the *Queen Elizabeth* will enjoy the great advantages of liquid fuel for war purposes.

Then as to manning. No more widespread delusion existed than that, although we might build ships, we could never find men to man them. In some quarters of this country the idea was fostered that when mobilisation took place ships could not be sent fully manned to sea; but when mobilisation did take place we were able to man, as I told the House we should be able to, every ship in the Navy fit to send to sea. We were able to man a number of old ships which we did not intend to send to sea, but which, after being repaired and refitted, were found to have the possibility of usefulness in them. We were able to man, in addition, powerful new vessels building for foreign nations for which no provision had been made. We were able to man an enormous number—several score—of armed merchantmen which had been taken up and have played an important part in our arrangements for the control of traffic and trade. We were able to provide all the men that were necessary for the Royal Naval Air Service, which never existed three years ago, which is already making a name for itself, and which has become a considerable and formidable body. We were able to

keep our training schools full to the very brim so as to prepare a continual supply of drafts for the new vessels which are coming on in such great numbers, and over and above that we were able, without injury to any of these important interests, to supply the nucleus of instructors and trained men to form the cadres of the battalions of the Royal Naval Division, which have now reached a respectable total, and which have developed an efficiency which enables them to be counted on immediately as a factor in the defence of this country, and very soon as an element in the forces which we can use overseas.

We have never been a military nation, though now we are going to take a hand in that. We have always relied for our safety on naval power, and in that respect it is not true to say we entered on this war unprepared. On the contrary, the German Army was not more ready for an offensive war on a gigantic scale than was the British Fleet for national defence. The credit for this is due to the House, which irrespective of party interests has always by overwhelming and in later years unchallengeable majorities, supported the Government and the Minister in every demand made for naval defence. Indeed, such disputes as we have had from time to time have only been concerned with the margin of superiority, and have turned on comparatively small points respecting them. For instance, we have discussed at enormous length what percentages of "Dreadnought" superiority would be available in particular months in future years, and we have argued whether the "Lord Nelsons" should be counted as "Dreadnoughts" or not. The House of Commons as a whole has a right to claim the Navy as its child, and as the unchanging object of its care and solicitude; and now after six months of war, with new dangers and new difficulties coming into view, we have every right to feel content with the results of our labour.

Since November, when I last had an opportunity of speaking to the House on naval matters, two considerable events have happened—the victory off the Falkland Islands, and the recent successful cruiser action near the Dogger Bank. Both of these events are satisfactory in themselves, but still more are they satisfactory in their consequences and significance, and I shall venture to enlarge upon them and hang the thread of my argument upon them. The victory off the Falklands terminated the first phase of the Naval War by effecting a decisive clearance of the German flag from the oceans of the world. The blocking in of the enemy's merchantmen at the very outset and the consequent frustration of his whole plans for the destruction of our commerce, the reduction of his base at Tsing-tau, the expulsion of his ships from the China Sea by Japan, the hunting down of the *Königsberg* and the *Emden*,

the latter by an Australian cruiser, were steps along the path to the goal finally reached when Admiral von Spee's powerful squadron, having been unsuccessfully though gallantly engaged by Admiral Cradock, off Coronel, was brought to action and destroyed on December 8th by Sir Doveton Sturdee. Only two small German cruisers and two armed merchantmen remain at large of all their formidable preparations for the attack on our trade routes, and these vessels are at present in hiding. During the last three months—that is to say, since Parliament rose—on the average about 8,000 British vessels have been continuously on the sea, passing to and fro on their lawful occasions. There have been 4,465 arrivals at, and 3,600 sailings from, the ports of the United Kingdom. Only nineteen vessels have been sunk by the enemy, and only four of these vessels have been sunk by above-water craft. That is a very remarkable result to have been achieved after only a few months of war. I am sure, if we had been told before the war that such a result would be so soon achieved, and that our losses would be so small, we should not have believed it for a moment. I am quite sure, if the noble Lord whom I see in his place (Lord Charles Beresford)—who has always felt, and quite legitimately, anxiety for the trade routes and the great difficulty of defending them—if he had been offered six months ago such a prospect, he would have said it was too good to be true.

Certainly the great sailors of the past, men of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, would have been astounded. During those two great wars, which began in 1793 and ended, after a brief interval, in 1814, 10,871 British merchant ships were captured or sunk by the enemy. Even after the decisive Battle of Trafalgar, when we had the undisputed command of the sea, so far as it can be tactically and strategically attained, the loss of British ships went on at a rate of over 500 ships a year. In 1806, 519 ships were sunk or captured—that is, the year after Trafalgar; in 1807, 559; in 1808, 469; in 1809, 571; and in 1810, 619. Our total losses on the high seas in the first six months of the war, including all ships other than trawlers engaged in mine-sweeping—including all ships, including losses by mines and vessels scuttled by submarines—our losses in the whole of that period are only 63. Of course, we must always be on the look-out for another attempt by the enemy to harass the trade routes. Although the oceans offer rather a bleak prospect to the German cruisers, and the experience of their consorts is not encouraging, the Admiralty must be fully prepared for that possibility, and we shall be able to meet any new efforts with advantages and resources incomparably superior to those which were at our disposal at the beginning of the war. The truth is that steam and telegraphs have enormously increased, as compared with sailing days, the thoroughness and efficiency

of superior sea-power. Coaling, communications, and supplies are vital and constant needs, and once the upper hand has been lost they become operations of almost insuperable difficulty to the weaker navy. Credit is due to our outlying squadrons and to the Admiralty organisation by which they have been directed. It must never be forgotten that the situation on every sea, even the most remote, is dominated and decided by the influence of Sir John Jellicoe's Fleet—lost to view amid the northern mists, preserved by patience and seamanship in all its strength and efficiency, silent, unsleeping, and, as yet, unchallenged.

The command of the sea which we have thus enjoyed has not only enabled our trade to be carried on practically without interruption of serious disturbance, but we have been able to move freely about the world very large numbers of troops. I am going to give the House a figure which has no military significance because so many uncertain factors are comprised within the total, but which is an absolutely definite figure so far as the work of the Admiralty Transport Department is concerned. We have now moved by sea, at home and abroad, including wounded brought back from the front, including Belgian wounded, including Belgian and French troops, moved here and there as circumstances required, often at the shortest possible notice, with constant changes of plan, across oceans threatened by the enemy's cruisers and across channels haunted by submarines to and fro from India and Egypt, from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China, South Africa, from every fortress and possession under the Crown, approximately 1,000,000 men without, up to the present, any accident or loss of life.

We are at war with the second Naval Power in the world. When complaints are made that we have taken too many transports or armed too many auxiliary cruisers, or made use of too many colliers or supply ships, I must mention that fact. The statement that the Admiralty have on charter, approximately, about one-fifth of the British Mercantile Marine tonnage is correct. With that we discharge two duties, both of importance at the present time; first, the supply, fuelling, and replenishing with ammunition of the Fleets; second, the transport of reinforcements and supplies for the Army in the Field, including the return of wounded. It must be remembered in regard to the Fleet that we have no dockyard or naval port at our backs, and that the bases we are using during the war have no facilities for coaling from the shore. We are not, like the Germans, living on a great naval port at Wilhelmshaven, on which £15,000,000 or £16,000,000 has been spent. Rosyth is not finished, and will not be available for some time. Everything, therefore, required to keep the Fleet in being—supplies, stores, and above all, fuel—has to be not only carried but kept afloat in ships.

What are called the "afloat reserves"—the great mobile reserves of fuel and stores maintained at the various bases used by the Fleet—are those which are fixed by the War Staff and approved by the Board of Admiralty after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. When those amounts have been fixed, the Transport Department have no choice but to supply them. It is necessary that there should be sufficient colliers to enable all the Fleet units at a particular base to coal simultaneously with a maximum rapidity twice over within a short interval, and extensive naval movements at high speed may at any moment necessitate this being put to the test. After two such coalings there must still be sufficient coal available for unforeseen contingencies, including delays in bringing further supplies through storm or foggy weather, or hostile operations leading to the closing of particular areas of water, or through the temporary suspension of coaling in South Wales, through damage to docks, railways, bridges, pits or other local causes.

We cannot possibly run any risk of having the Fleet rendered immobile. We must make assurance doubly sure. The life of the State depends upon it and it follows, having always to be ready for a great emergency, with all the Fleet steaming at once continuously for days together—having always to be ready for that, it follows that during periods of normal Fleet movements the reserves of coal are often and necessarily turned over slowly, and colliers may in consequence remain at the bases for considerable periods. That is our system. The fact, therefore, that particular vessels are noticed by shipowners to be kept waiting about for long periods is no sign of mismanagement or incapacity on the part of the Admiralty, but it is an indispensable precaution and method without which the Fleet could not act in a time of emergency. The position at every home coaling base, and of every ship, is telegraphed to the Admiralty nightly, and a tabulated statement is issued the same night. This statement is issued as the basis for a comprehensive daily criticism, with a view to securing the highest possible economy compatible with, and subject to, the vital exigencies of war. So much for the Fleet and its supply and its coaling.

With regard to the Army, it should be remembered that we are supplying across the sea, in the teeth of the enemy's opposition, an Army almost as large as the Grand Army of Napoleon, only vastly more complex in organisation and equipment. We are also preparing other Armies still larger in number. I do not know on what day or at what hour the Secretary of State for War will ask the Admiralty to move 20,000, or it may be 40,000 men. It may be at a very short notice. He does not know, until we tell him, how we shall move them, by what route or to what ports. Plans are frequently

changed on purpose at the very last moment ; it is imperative for the safety of our soldiers, and the reinforcement of our Armies, and the conduct of the war. We have at the present moment a powerful and flexible machinery which can move whole armies with celerity wherever it is desired in a manner never before contemplated or dreamt of, and I warn the House most solemnly against allowing grounds of commercial advantage or financial economy to place any hampering restriction or impediment upon these most difficult and momentous operations. Careful and prudent administration does not stop at the outbreak of war. Everything in our power will be done to enforce it and avoid extravagance. We shall therefore welcome the advice of business men on points where they can help us. Gradually, as we get more and more control of the situation, higher economy in some respects may be possible, but military and naval requirements must be paramount, rough and ready although their demands often are, and they must be served fully at the cost of all other considerations. I am afraid that I cannot hold out any hope of any immediate reduction in the tonnage required by the Admiralty.

I have said that the strain in the early months of the war has been greatly diminished now by the abatement of distant convoy work, and by the clearance of the enemy's flag from the seas and oceans. There were times when, for instance, the great Australian convoy of sixty ships was crossing the Indian Ocean, or the great Canadian convoy of forty ships, with its protecting squadrons, was crossing the Atlantic, or when the regular flow of large Indian convoys of forty and fifty ships sailing in company was at its height both ways ; when there were half a dozen minor expeditions being carried by the Navy, guarded and landed at different points, and supplied after landing ; where there was a powerful German cruiser squadron still at large in the Pacific or the Atlantic, which had to be watched for and waited for in superior force in six or seven different parts of the world at once, and when, all the time, within a few hours' steam of our shores there was concentrated a hostile fleet which many have argued in former times was little inferior to our own ; and when there was hardly a Regular soldier left at home, and before the Territorial Force and the New Armies had attained their present high efficiency and power—there were times when our naval resources, considerable as they are, were drawn out to their utmost limit, and when we had to use old battleships to give strength to cruiser squadrons, even at the cost of their speed, and when we had to face and to accept risks with which we did not trouble the public, and which no one would willingly seek an opportunity to share. But the victory at the Falkland Islands swept all these difficulties out of existence. It set free a large force of cruisers and battleships for all purposes ; it opened the way to other

operations of great interest ; it enabled a much stricter control and more constant outlook to be maintained in Home waters, and it almost entirely freed the outer seas of danger. That was a memorable event, the relief and advantage of which will only be fully appreciated by those who have full knowledge of all that has taken place, and will only be fully appreciated by those who not only knew, but felt, what was going forward.

Now, I come to the battle cruiser action on the Dogger Bank. That action was not fought out, because the enemy, after abandoning their wounded consort, the *Blücher*, made good their escape into water infested by their submarines and mines. But this combat between the finest ships in both navies is of immense significance and value in the light which it throws upon rival systems of design and armament, and upon relative gunnery efficiency. It is the first test we have ever had, and, without depending too much upon it, I think it is at once important and encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the theories of design, and particularly of big-gun armament, always identified with Lord Fisher. The range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting, smashing power of the heavier British projectile is decidedly greater, and—this is the great thing—our shooting is at least as good as theirs. The Navy, while always working very hard—no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these years—have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling, after the combat of January 24th, that perhaps our naval officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill in gunnery. Then the guns. While the Germans were building 11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13½-inch guns. Before they advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed with the 13.5. It was said by the opposite school of naval force that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and therefore the greater destructive power—and Krupp is the master gunmaker of the world—and it was very right and proper to take such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the wisdom of our policy, or the excellence of our material. The 13.5-inch gun is unequalled by any weapon yet brought on the scene. Now we have the 15-inch gun, with which the five “Queen Elizabeths” and the five “Royal Sovereigns” are all armed, coming into line, and this gun in quality equals the 13.5-inch gun, and it is vastly more powerful and destructive.

There is another remarkable feature of this action to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. I mean the steaming of our ships. All the vessels engaged in this action exceeded all their previous records without exception. I wonder if the House and the public appreciate what that means. Here is a squadron of the Fleet which does not live in harbour, but is far away from its dockyards, and which during six months of war has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden the greatest trial is demanded of their engines, and they all excel all previous peace-time records. Can you conceive a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British machinery, of the glorious industry of the engine-room branch, or of the admirable system of repairs and refits by which the Grand Fleet is maintained from month to month, and can be, if need be, maintained from year to year, in a state of ceaseless vigilance without exhaustion. Take the case of the *Kent* at the Falklands. The *Kent* is an old vessel. She was launched thirteen years ago and has been running ever since. The *Kent* was designed to go $23\frac{1}{2}$ knots. The *Kent* had to catch a ship which went considerably over $24\frac{1}{2}$ knots. They put a pressure and a strain on the engines much greater than is allowed in time of peace, and they drove the *Kent* 25 knots and caught the *Nuremberg* and sank her. It is my duty in this House to speak for the Navy, and the truth is that it is sound as a bell all through. I do not care where or how it may be tested ; it will be found good and fit and keen and honest. It will be found to be the product of good management and organisation, of sound principle in design and strategy, of sterling workmen and faithful workmanship and careful clerks and accountants and skilful engineers, and painstaking officers and hardy tars. The great merit of Admiral Sir D. Beatty's action is that it shows us and the world that there is at present no reason to assume that, ship for ship, gun for gun, and man for man, we cannot give a very good account of ourselves. It shows that a five to four in representative ships—because the quality of the ships on either side is a very fair representation of the relative qualities of the lines of battle—the Germans did not think it prudent to engage, that they accepted without doubt or hesitation their inferiority, that they thought only of flight just as our men thought only of pursuit, that they were wise in the view they took, and that if they had taken any other view they would, unquestionably, have been destroyed. That is the cruel fact, which no falsehood—and many have been issued—no endeavour to sink by official *communiqués* vessels they could not stay to sink in war, would have obscured.

When, if ever, the great Fleets draw out for general battle we shall hope to bring into the line a preponderance, not only in quality, but in numbers, which will not be five to four, but will be something consider-

ably greater than that. Therefore, we may consider this extra margin as an additional insurance against unexpected losses by mine and submarine, such as may at any moment occur in the preliminaries of a great sea battle. It is for these important reasons of test and trial that we must regard this action of the Dogger Bank as an important and, I think I may say, satisfactory event. The losses of the Navy, although small compared with the sacrifices of the Army, have been heavy. We have lost, mainly by submarine, the lives of about 5,500 officers and men, and we have killed, mainly by gun-fire an equal number, which is, of course, a much larger proportion of the German forces engaged. We have also taken, in sea fighting, 82 officers and 934 men prisoners of war. No British naval prisoners of war have been taken in fighting at sea by the Germans. When they had the inclination they had not the opportunity, and when they had the opportunity they had not the inclination. For the loss of these precious British lives we have lived through six months of this war safely and even prosperously. We have established for the time being a command of the sea such as we have never expected, such as we have never known, and our ancestors had never known, at any other period of our history.

Losses have to be incurred in war, and mistakes will certainly be made from time to time. Our Navy keeps the sea; our ships are in constant movement; valuable ships run risks every day. The enemy is continually endeavouring to strike, and from time to time accidents are inevitable. How do you suppose the battle cruiser squadron of Sir David Beatty was where it was when the action of January 24 took place? How many times is it supposed that the squadrons of the Grand Fleet, the cruiser and battle squadrons, have been patrolling and steaming through the North Sea, always exposed to risk by mine and torpedo, before at last they reaped their reward? If any mood or tendency of public opinion arises or is fostered by the newspapers, or given countenance to in this House, which makes too much of losses, even if they are cruel losses, and even if it may be said that they are in some respects avoidable losses, even then I say you will have started on a path which, pressed to its logical conclusion, would leave our Navy cowering in its harbours, instead of ruling the seas. When I think of the great scale of our operations, the enormous target we expose, the number of the ships whose movements have to be arranged for, of the novel conditions to which I have referred, it is marvellous how few have been our losses, and how great the care and vigilance exercised by the admirals afloat and by the Admiralty Staff, and it appears to me, and it will certainly be regarded by those who study this war in history, as praiseworthy in the highest degree.

The tasks which lie before us are anxious and grave. We are, it now appears, to be the object of a kind of warfare which has never before been practised by a civilized State. The scuttling and sinking at sight, without search or parley, of merchant ships by submarine agency is a wholly novel and unprecedented departure. It is a state of things which no one had ever contemplated before this war, and which would have been universally reprobated and repudiated before the war. But it must not be supposed because the attack is extraordinary that a good defence and a good reply cannot be made. The statutes of ancient Rome contain no provision for the punishment of parricides, but when the first offender appeared it was found that satisfactory arrangements could be made to deal with him. Losses no doubt will be incurred—of that I give full warning—but we believe that no vital injury can be done. If our traders put to sea regularly and act in the spirit of the gallant captain of the merchant ship *Laertes*, whose well-merited honour has been made public this morning, and if they take the precautions which are proper and legitimate, we expect that the losses will be confined within manageable limits, even at the outset, when the enemy must be expected to make his greatest effort to produce an impression.

All losses can, of course, be covered by resort on the part of ship-owners to the Government insurance scheme, the rates of which are now one-fifth of what they were at the outbreak of war. On the other hand, the reply which we shall make will not perhaps be wholly ineffective. Germany cannot be allowed to adopt a system of open piracy and murder, or what has always hitherto been called open piracy and murder on the high seas, while remaining herself protected by the bulwark of international instruments which she has utterly repudiated and defied, and which we, much to our detriment, have respected. There are good reasons for believing that the economic pressure which the Navy exerts is beginning to be felt in Germany. We have to some extent restricted their imports of useful commodities like copper, petrol, rubber, nickel, manganese, antimony, which are needed for the efficient production of war materials, and for carrying on modern war on a great scale. The tone of the German Chancellor's recent remarks, and the evidences of hatred and anger against this country which are so apparent in the German Press, encourage us to believe that this restriction is proving inconvenient. We shall, of course, redouble our efforts to make it so. So far, however, we have not attempted to stop imports of food. We have not prevented neutral ships from trading direct with German ports. We have allowed German exports in neutral ships to pass unchallenged. The time has come when the enjoyment of these immunities by a State which has, as a matter of deliberate policy, placed herself outside of all

international obligations must be reconsidered. A further declaration on the part of the Allied Governments will promptly be made which will have the effect for the first time of applying the full force of naval pressure to the enemy. I thank the House for the attention with which they have listened to me. The stresses and strains of this war are not imperceptible to those who are called on to bear a part in the responsibility for the direction of the tremendous and terrible events which are now taking place. They have a right to the generous and indulgent judgment and support of their fellow-countrymen, and to the good will of the House of Commons. We cannot tell what lies before us, or how soon or in what way the next great developments of the struggle will declare themselves, or what the state of Europe and the world will be at its close. But this, I think, we can already say, as far as the British Navy is concerned, that although no doubt new dangers and perplexities will come upon us continuously and anxiety will make its abode in our brain, yet the danger and anxiety which now are advancing upon us will not be more serious or more embarrassing than those through which we have already successfully made our way. For during the months that are to come the British Navy and the sea power which it exerts will increasingly dominate the general situation, will be the main and unfailing reserve of the Allied nations, will progressively paralyse the fighting energies of our antagonists, and will, if need be, even in default of all other favourable forces, ultimately by itself decide the issue of the war.

RETURN TO THE GOLD STANDARD

(Speech delivered in the House of Commons, April 28th, 1925).

EVER since the spring of 1919, first under war powers and later under the Gold and Silver Export Control Act of 1920, the export of gold coin and bullion from this country, except under licence, has been prohibited. By the express decision of the Parliament of 1920 the Act which prohibits the export was of a temporary character. That Act expires on December 31 of the present year, and Great Britain automatically reverts to the pre-war free market for gold. Now, his Majesty's Government have been obliged to decide whether to renew or prolong that Act on the one hand or to let it lapse on the other, and that is the issue which has presented itself to us. We have decided to allow it to lapse. I am quite ready to argue the important currency controversies which are naturally associated with a decision of that kind, but not to-day—not in a Budget speech. To-day I can only

announce and explain to the Committee what it is that the Government have decided to do, and I will do that as briefly as I can. A return to an effective gold standard has long been the settled and declared policy of the country. Every expert Conference since the war—Brussels, Genoa—every expert Committee in this country has urged the principle of a return to the gold standard. No responsible authority has advocated any other policy. No British Government—and every party has held office—no political party, no previous holder of the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer has challenged, or, so far as I am aware, is now challenging, the principle of a reversion to the gold standard in international matters at the earliest possible moment. It has always been taken as a matter of course that we should return to it, and the only question open has been the difficult and the very delicate question of how and when.

During the late Administration the late Chancellor of the Exchequer appointed a Committee of experts and high authorities to examine into the question of the amalgamation of the Treasury and the Bank of England note issue and other matters. This inquiry resolves itself mainly into an examination of whether and in what manner we shall return to the gold standard.

The Committee was presided over by my right hon. friend, who is now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. A. Chamberlain), and then a private member, and its other members were Lord Bradbury, Mr. Gaspard Farrer, Sir O. E. Niemeyer, Professor Pigou, and the Controller of Finance at the Treasury. This Committee heard evidence from a great number of witnesses representing every interest; financial and trading interests, manufacturing interests, the Federation of British Industries, and others, all were heard. It has presented a unanimous report, in which it expresses a decided opinion upon the question of the gold standard, and it sets forth its recommendations as to the manner in which a return to that standard should be effected.

I have had the report of this Committee printed, and it will be available in the Vote Office, as I finish my remarks this afternoon. It contains a reasoned marshalling of the arguments which have convinced his Majesty's Government, and it sets forth a series of recommendations, in which Mr. Chamberlain, though he ceased to be chairman on becoming Foreign Secretary, has formally concurred, which his Majesty's Government are intending to follow in every respect.

So much for the principle. There remains the question of time and of method. There is a general agreement, even among those who have taken what I think I am entitled to call the heterodox view—at any rate it is the view which we on this bench do not accept—that we ought

not to prolong the uncertainty; that, whatever the policy of the Government, it should be declared. If we are not going to renew the Act which prohibits the export of gold coin and bullion, now is the moment when we ought to say so. It is the moment for which the House has patiently waited at my request, and I express my obligation to the Committee because I have not been pressed on this matter before the moment at which it was, after long consideration, judged expedient that settlement should be made and action taken. This is the moment most favourable for action. Our exchange with the United States has for some time been stable, and is at the moment buoyant. We have no immediate heavy commitments across the Atlantic. We have entered a period on both sides of the Atlantic when political and economic stability seems to be more assured than it has been for some years. If this opportunity were missed it might not recur soon, and the whole finance of the country would be overclouded during that period by an important factor of uncertainty. Now is the appointed time. We have, therefore, decided, although the prohibition on the export of gold will continue in form on the Statute-book until December 31, that a general licence will be given to the Bank of England for the export of gold and bullion from to-day. We thus resume our international position as a gold standard country from the moment of the declaration that I have made to the Committee.

That is an important event—but I hasten to add a qualification. Returning to the international gold standard does not mean that we are going to adopt a gold coinage. That is quite unnecessary for the purpose of an international gold standard, and it is out of the question in present circumstances. It would be an unwarrantable extravagance which our present financial stringency by no means allows us to indulge in. Indeed, I must appeal to all classes in the public interest to continue to use notes, and to make no change in the habits and practices they have used for the last ten years. The practice of the last ten years has protected the Bank of England and other banks against any appreciable demand for sovereigns or half-sovereigns, but now that we are returning publicly to the gold standard in international matters, and with a free export of gold, I felt that it will be better for us to regularize what has been our practice by legislation.

I shall, therefore, propose to introduce a Bill which, among other things, will provide (1) that until otherwise provided by proclamation, the Bank of England and Treasury notes will be convertible into coin only at the option of the Bank of England; and (2) that the right to tender bullion to the Mint to be coined shall be confined in the future by law, as it has long been confined in practice, to the Bank of England.

Simultaneously with these two provisions, the Bank of England will be put under obligations to sell gold bullion, in amount not less than 400 fine ounces in exchange for legal tender at the fixed price of £3 17s. 10½d. per standard ounce. Any considerable sum of legal tender presented to the Bank of England, the Bank will be under obligation to meet it by bullion at that price.

The further steps which are recommended by the Currency Committee, such as the amalgamation of the Bank of England note and Treasury note issues, will be deferred as the Committee recommend until we have sufficient experience of the working of a free international gold market on a gold reserve of approximately £150,000,000. It is only in the light of that experience that we shall be able to fix by permanent statute the ultimate limits of the fiduciary issue. All that will be in the Bill. The Bill also has another purpose. We are convinced that our financial position warrants a return to the gold standard under the conditions that I have described. We have accumulated a gold reserve of £153,000,000—that is the amount considered necessary by the Cunliffe Committee—which gold reserve we shall use without hesitation, if necessary with the Bank rate, in order to defend and sustain our new position. In order to concentrate our reserves of gold in the most mobile form, I have arranged to transfer the £27,000,000 of gold which the Treasury hold against the Treasury note issue to the Bank of England in exchange for Bank notes, and the increase of the gold reserve of the Bank of England will, of course, figure in their accounts.

Further, when we made up our minds to take this course, now many months ago, the Treasury began discreetly to accumulate dollars, and we have already accumulated the whole of the 166,000,000 dollars which are required, not only for the June, but also for the December, payments of our American debt, and for all our other American debt obligations this year. Therefore, and it is important, the Treasury will not have any need to come on the market in the autumn, when large seasonal purchases of raw materials are taking place, as a competitor for the purchase of dollars.

Finally, although we believe that we are strong enough to achieve this important change from our own resources, and as a further precaution, to make assurance doubly sure, I have made arrangements to obtain, if required, credits in the United States of not less than 300,000,000 dollars with the possibility of expansion if need be. These credits will only be used if, as, and when they are required. We do not expect to have to use them, and we shall freely use other measures in priority. These great credits across the Atlantic Ocean have been

obtained and built up as a solemn warning to speculators of every kind and of every hue and in every country of the resistance which they will encounter and of the reserves with which they will be confronted if they attempt to disturb the gold parity which Great Britain has now established. To confirm and regularize these credit arrangements, which I had to make provisionally in the public interest, and to deal with the other points that I have mentioned, a short three-clause Bill will be required, the text of which will be issued to-morrow and which we shall ask the House to dispose of as a matter of some urgency.

These matters are very technical and, of course, I have to be very guarded in every word I use in regard to them, but I have only one observation to make on the merits. In our policy of returning to the gold standard we do not move alone. Indeed, I think we could not have afforded to remain stationary while so many others moved. The two greatest manufacturing countries in the world on either side of us, the United States and Germany, are in different ways either on or related to an international gold exchange. Sweden is on a gold exchange, Austria and Hungary are already based on gold or else on sterling, which is now the equivalent of gold, and I have reason to know that Holland and the Dutch East Indies, very important factors in world finance, will act simultaneously with us to-day.

So far as the British Empire is concerned—the self-governing Dominions—there will be complete unity of action. The Dominion of Canada is already on the gold standard; the Dominion of South Africa has given notice of her intention to revert to the gold standard as from July 1; I am authorized to inform the Committee that the Commonwealth of Australia, synchronizing its action with ours, proposes from to-day to abolish the existing restrictions on the free export of gold, and that the Dominion of New Zealand will from to-day adopt the same course as ourselves in freely licensing the export of gold. Thus, over the whole area of the British Empire, and over a very wide and important area of the world, there has been established at once one uniform standard of value, to which all international transactions are related and can be referred. The standard may, of course, vary in itself from time to time, but the position of all the countries related to it will vary together like ships in a harbour whose gangways are joined, which rise and fall together with the tide.

I believe that the establishment of this great area of common arrangement will facilitate the revival of international trade and of inter-Imperial trade. Such a revival and such a foundation are important to all countries, and to no country are they more important than to this island, whose population is larger than its agriculture or

its industry can sustain, which is the centre of a wide Empire, and which, in spite of all its burdens, has still retained, if not the primacy, at any rate the central position in the financial system of the world.

WIDOWS' PENSIONS

(Delivered in the House of Commons).

THE average British workman in good health, in full employment, at standard rates of wages, does not regard himself and his family as objects of compassion. It is when exceptional misfortune descends upon the cottage home that the slender margin upon which he floats is for the first time revealed. A year of misfortune, a year of distress, a year of unemployment, above all, the loss of the breadwinner, leave this once happy family in the grip of the cruellest calamity. Furniture, household effects, gathered together by thrift, years of toil in the prime of life, are scattered and dispersed in a few months for a tithe of their value. The waste, which is inconceivable, degenerating into havoc, takes place all over the country, and is taking place whenever a lamentable catastrophe of an exceptional character falls upon the otherwise happy, free, and prosperous workman's home. Most painful of all is the position of the widow with several young children left absolutely upon her own resources with a few pounds and a few belongings. It is idle to say that the threat of adversity is a necessary factor in stimulating self-reliance. The threat of adversity has been active all these years, and in the upshot no effective provision has been made by the great mass of the labouring class, for all their efforts, for their wives and families in the event of their death. I am not reproaching them. The circumstances of their lives, the problems of existence, their regular daily work, have not left them with the strength, or the means, or the foresight, or the habit of making such provision, and the fact remains, look at it how you will, that no such provision exists at the present time. That is the gravest evil and the gravest need at the present time.

To change into a military metaphor, it is not for the sturdy marching troops that extra rewards and indulgencies are needed; it is to the straggler, the exhausted, the weak, the wounded, the veterans, to the widow and the orphans that the ambulance of the State and the aid of the State should as far as possible be directed. The old *laissez faire* or *laissez aller* ideas of mid-Victorian Radicalism have been superseded, and no one has done more to supersede them than Mr.

Lloyd George. I am proud to have been associated with him from the very beginning of those large insurance ideas. They have been superseded by modern conceptions of scientific State organization. The conceptions of the party opposite, of course, we know, but they are conceptions which are held not less earnestly, and more practically, on this side of the House. I am sure they commend themselves to the right hon. gentleman, the father of British State insurance, which at this very moment, although by no means complete, holds an honourable pre-eminence amongst the insurance systems of every country in the world. A few years ago, the Prime Minister when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer appointed a Committee of experts to examine into the possibility of old-age pensions at an earlier age than 70, and of widows' pensions. Governments came and went, elections were won and lost, but the Committee continued to labour in the deepest recesses of Whitehall, and in the end all the actuarial and administrative positions were fully surveyed, and an immense mass of information and material was collected. The scheme of insurance we have now decided to inaugurate has been erected on that basis. Without the preliminary work which was done by that Committee it would not have been practicable to deal with this matter this year, and perhaps not next year. These conclusions were presented to Mr. Snowden, I think, in the summer of last year. I do not know what course he and his friends would have adopted with regard to it. Perhaps he will tell us for himself, but my right hon. friend the Minister of Health and I found this mass of material when we assumed office, and we have done our best to frame a scheme out of it. Any scheme to be of use must be contributory. I will give a word of caution to hon. members at the outset. Before they deride this scheme, or commit themselves to an attitude of derision, let them make quite sure what it is; let them make quite sure how great are the masses it affects in a favourable sense. Any scheme, I say, must be contributory, must be compulsory, and, above all, must cover virtually the whole area of the wage-earning population. This area is broadly represented by 15,000,000 people who are at present insured under the Health Insurance scheme. Those 15,000,000 contributors represent over 30,000,000 with their dependents, or 70 per cent. of the entire population of these islands. The first question we have to ask ourselves is this: What burden of additional contribution can be paid in existing circumstances, and shared between employers and employed? We believe that 4*d.* for men and 2*d.* for women can be assumed by both parties, employers and employed, in the circumstances of our national life at the present time. We must bear in mind in the case of the workman and the working woman the

very large remission of taxation which was made by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer last year. He made great remissions of taxation on tea and sugar and the relief granted by him provides the fund out of which the contributions of the workers can be paid. That is his share in the general architecture of the scheme if he cares to claim it, but only if he cares to claim it.

The case of the employers is more difficult because we know how heavy are the burdens upon our productive industries at the present time. I am sure my hon. friends opposite, however they may feel about these matters, and they will have weeks to debate them, would not wish to show anything like an air of levity in dealing with questions which, after all, affect not millions, but tens of millions. The case of the employers is more difficult because while unemployment is at its present height the burden is especially heavy on the 11 millions of people who, with the employers, are involved in the area of unemployment insurance. While the deficiency period lasts 10*d.* is required a week from the employer and 9*d.* from the man. That is an enormous burden.

We believe this period is temporary. That is our basis. It will be a very great falsification of our view if it should turn out not to be temporary. Once unemployment has fallen to the neighbourhood of 800,000 from its present level then the deficiency period rapidly passes away, and the contributions both of employers and of workmen in the unemployment area fall from 10*d.* to 6*d.* and 9*d.* to 6*d.* respectively. That is the temporary period, but I frankly admit it has caused me and my colleagues a great deal of anxiety in these present proposals. Before I sit down I shall hope to provide the employer with certain resources which will enable him more than to meet this extra burden and which will be a proper counterpoise in direct taxation to the immense remissions of indirect taxation which the late Chancellor of the Exchequer made this time last year.

What are the benefits which can be reaped by contributions on this scale? If everybody in the ambit of health insurance had, from the age of 16 years onwards, contributed 4*d.* a week and had had 4*d.* a week contributed by his employer—and the women at half rates—a self-supporting scheme would now be in operation, which would afford 10*s.* per week to widows, with an allowance for orphans and ordinary children, and, secondly, 10*s.* a week to all insured persons and their wives from 65 years on. Such a State scheme on such a scale would be self-supporting if everybody had contributed from the age of 16 onwards. Such a scheme is not in existence. No one has contributed from the age

of 16 onwards. Large numbers of people will never have the opportunity of contributing at all. The vast majority can never contribute on any scale sufficient to pay for benefits on this scale. The contributions of employers and of employed of 4*d.* and certain incidental savings from health and unemployment insurance, which are now levied to the extent of a penny each, would be transferred to the new fund. Such a basis could never have enabled us to overtake the immense liabilities for which no back payments have been made. Left to its own resources, the scheme could not be brought into full operation for many years. A whole generation of men and women might toil their lives out before the distribution of benefits would be wide enough sensibly to raise the general level of comfort amongst the mass of the people.

Here, then, is where the State—the capitalist State—with its long and stable finance, with its careful credit, can march in to fill the immense gap. The contributions of the State will enable the whole scheme to be brought rapidly into operation, and we intend to bring it into operation, in successive stages, beginning from January 4, 1926. The present capital value of the additional liability to be undertaken by the State under the scheme, the scope of which I have yet to explain, has been computed at nearly £750,000,000. Before the Committee can be asked to bind upon themselves and upon future Parliaments this formidable load, we must look not only to the next few years, but we must let our minds roam forward into the remote periods of the future, which we shall not see ourselves, but for which we have a solemn responsibility.

Here, I have to make a very unexpected and a very disagreeable digression. The liabilities of the new pension scheme—I am putting all the facts before the Committee, and a people who have gone through a great war and all its events, cannot be afraid to look at the facts and realities as they are—the cost of the new scheme is not the only great impending charge which we have to meet. Quite apart from the new pension scheme the actuaries who examined this matter, in their two years' routing about amongst the problems, have discovered and predicted a very great growth and increase in the existing non-contributory scheme of old-age pensions. The cause of the great increase is not the recent improvements made by the late Administration; it is due to the fact that we are now entering upon periods 70 years away from the great extension of the population which took place in Victorian times. Moreover, we are living in a period when the span of human life has been mercifully prolonged. I will give one impressive example. The Census of 1891 showed 5,200,000 persons between the ages of 40 and 60.

These persons, or their survivors, are the old-age pensioners of to-day. The Census of 1921 showed, not 5,200,000, but 9,700,000 persons between the ages of 40 and 60. Those persons, or their survivors, will be the old-age pensioners 20, 30, and 40 years hence. The tendency to a larger proportion of old people is steadily increasing in the population, and the actuaries assure me that the existing cost of old-age pensions, on the present basis, in 50 years time, will be more than double what it is now. At present it is £27,000,000; in 10 years it will be £36,000,000; in 20 years it will be £46,000,000; in 30 years it will be £54,000,000; and in 50 years it will be £60,000,000, without any addition being made, of any sort or kind, by any Government. This island, in 30 years, will have more than doubled its present number of old and feeble people. It will have to support them with an active population a little larger than it is to-day—a population robbed, we must never forget, of much of its natural increase by the slaughter of the Great War. None of this was foreseen, and perhaps none of it could be foreseen, at the time the non-contributory scheme of old-age pensions was started in 1908.

The facts and figures which I have brought before the Committee are such as to raise disturbing and anxious reflections in the mind of every serious person. I have to take these figures into account in framing the finance of the new scheme. I am bound to secure for the Parliaments of the future the opportunity of controlling the growing burdens of the State. I will not put the Parliaments of the future in the position of being fettered by quasi-contractual obligations towards contributors, albeit that those contributions are compulsory. I will not be responsible for financial arrangements which, in 20, 30, or 40 years, will lead mathematically to an over-burdened Treasury, a fettered Parliament, and a dependent people. Therefore it is provided in the finance of our scheme that the contributions both of employer and employed should be raised by one penny each for men and a half-penny each for women after the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth year of the scheme, to a maximum, in 1956, of 7d. on each side.

I cannot think that is an unfair condition for us to impose; I cannot think that it is an excessive burden for us to contemplate in relation to posterity. After all, it is less than what we shall be paying now, while the present high rate of unemployment contribution is in force during the deficiency period. I am not seeking to fetter the Parliaments, I am only seeking to make sure that whatever Parliaments there are, whatever parties they may be ruled by, they shall be free to keep the finance in this matter under control and in hand without what

would otherwise look like a breach of faith to those humble people who all their lives have been paying contributions.

On this basis the cost to the State of the new scheme will still be heavy. The capital value is what I have already stated, but it will be definite, and be controllable by Parliament, without any breach of faith. From the tenth year, the cost to the State will be £15,000,000; from the fifteenth year, £20,000,000; and from the twentieth year £24,000,000. By the thirty-fifth year the burden will decline to £21,000,000, and thereafter, slowly, it passes into periods too speculative for us to follow without the labours of the statistician. But that is not all. If the Parliaments of the future adhere to the three decimal increases of one penny which I have already explained, the whole system of old-age pensions, not only the new scheme, but the existing non-contributory scheme, will gradually come on to a self-supporting basis. That is to say, that new entrants at 16 years of age, after the year 1956, with the help of the employers' contribution, equally will pay with that help not only for all their own benefits under the new scheme, but for their own old-age pensions after 70, as well. In 80 years, therefore, when the great majority of the contributors have contributed from 16 onwards, the complete scheme—the new scheme and the existing old-age pensions scheme—will be on a wholly self-supporting basis, so far as the great mass of the population is concerned. The State will soon be called upon to pay nearly £90,000,000 a year, but that will not be for the cost of one scheme. That will not be for the benefit of the scheme. It will represent the interest on the cost of bringing this scheme into immediate operation without waiting for a whole generation until an adequate capital fund had been accumulated. That is the great division of burden which we make between the contributors and the State, and it is our guiding principle. According to this principle, the contributors will pay for the benefits and the State will pay for making those benefits immediately available in our own time instead of waiting until we have all passed from this sphere. This principle, after 1956, will apply fully not only to the new scheme but to the old-age pensions scheme as well.

Let us now see the charges to the State both for the new scheme and for old-age pensions. At present we are paying £27,000,000 a year for old-age pensions. At the tenth year the new scheme will cost £15,000,000, the old-age pensions £36,000,000; total £51,000,000. At the twentieth year the new scheme will cost £24,000,000, old-age pensions £46,000,000; total, £70,000,000. At the thirty-fifth year the new scheme will cost £21,000,000, old-age pensions £56,000,000; total, £77,000,000. The next question I have to ask is, are we justified in laying these charges upon posterity? Here I would remind the Com-

mittee of the descending scale of war pensions expenses to which I designedly referred, what seems a very long time ago, at the beginning of my remarks. This cost is at the present time £67,000,000. We are paying £67,000,000 for war pensions this year. In ten years they will have fallen to £43,000,000, a saving of £24,000,000 a year. In 20 years they will fall by £35,000,000, in 30 years they will fall by £45,000,000, and they will be virtually extinguished in 50 years. And so when we compare the ever-rising expense of the new scheme and of old-age pensions together, on the one hand, with the ever-falling cost of the existing charges of war pensions, we find that the fall of the war pensions in every year and at every stage largely exceeds the new pension scheme, and that at every stage it balances, or nearly balances, both the new pension scheme and the old-age pensions scheme put together. So that at the worst we have no need on these matters to expect greater burdens than those we are supporting at the present time. By the time that the growing relief from the decline of the war pensions has come to an end we shall have paid off our American debt, and another £35,000,000 to £40,000,000 a year will inure to the relief of our successors. Therefore, it seems to me that in nothing we are now doing are we acting in an improper sense towards posterity. We are bearing great burdens every year, and we are putting upon them nothing which in any way could cause it to be said that we have endeavoured to shirk our share at the present time.

I turn now to the first decennial period of the new pension scheme, which is, after all the one which concerns us in the most practical manner. The new pension scheme will cost nothing to the Exchequer in the first year. There is a profit, and large surpluses accrue in the next two years which will be carried to the credit of the scheme. It is only from the third full year that the charge begins to operate. It begins at about £4,000,000 a year and it rises in the tenth year to £15,000,000. But I feel very strongly, and it is the view of the Government, that this Parliament should not be generous at the expense of other Parliaments; that we should not have the advantage or the honour of introducing a great new scheme and departure of this kind and leave the bulk of the burden to be borne by the next Parliament or the next after that. Therefore we have decided to spread the payments evenly over the whole of the first decennial period, and I shall defray the charges of this scheme by ten annual instalments approximately equal. I will not go into the reasons why they are not exactly equal. It will all appear in the documents which are awaiting the attention of the Committee. They will be ten approximately equal instalments of approximately £5,750,000 a year, beginning from the year 1926.

That is the new charge, and it is for that reason among others that I have fortified the revenue to meet it. I purposely refrain from giving details of the Bill. It will be presented to the House by the Minister for Health. The Bill is ready, it is printed, and we await only the first convenient opportunity, the first convenient break in the Budget discussions, to place it before the House. It will be sufficient to-night if I sum up the benefits in general terms, not in strict legal phraseology, which I leave to the Bill and to the documents to be presented. First, the widows of all men insured in the National Health Insurance Scheme who are insured in the new scheme who die after January 4, 1926, will receive 10s. a week for life, and the eldest child will receive 5s. and the other children 3s. until they reach the age of 14. Every wife of an insured man and every child—over an area of 70 per cent. of the population—will have that security behind them from January 4 next. Secondly, all existing widows of men insured under National Health Insurance who are now mothers—those who have contributed have the pension for life as widows and those who have not contributed, and in the nature of things never can contribute, are only pensioned when they are widowed mothers, that is, when they have children under 14 with them—all existing widows of men who were insured in the ambit of National Health Insurance and who are now mothers, and on behalf of whom no contribution has been made or ever can be made, will receive as a free gift from the State the same benefit and the same allowance in respect of children as the new insured class will get after January 4.

Those pensions will begin from January 4, 1926, and will continue, not for life, but till the youngest child reaches the age of 14 and for six months thereafter. This provision affects 200,000 widowed mothers and 350,000 children as from January 4. Existing and future orphan children will receive allowances of 7s. 6d. a week and 6s. for the second orphan in the family. Thirty thousand of such children will be affected from January 4. Thirdly, from January 6, 1928, two years after, all contributors, male and female, who have been contributors to Health Insurance for five years and who will have paid under the new scheme two years' contributions—that is less than £1 a year in the case of men and 10s. for women—who are over 65 years of age or who subsequently reach 65 will receive 10s. a week without any means test or disability of any kind. The same benefits at 65 will be given to the widows of contributors who have entered upon pensions. If a man has entered upon a pension and his wife reaches 65, she will receive another pension of 10s. a week in consequence of his pensionable rights. Fourthly, the introduction of pensions at 65 has decided us to sweep away altogether the restrictions, impositions, and means test upon persons

now over 70 who were insured under the Health Insurance Scheme, that is to say, who were in the industrial area until they were 70. There are about 100,000 persons affected. They will also receive as a free gift from the State the right to become old-age pensioners, from which they are now debarred. I am informed there are 75,000 men over 70 qualified in every way for old-age pensions, but who, because they are earning wages, are not allowed to receive them. That will all be swept away. After this Act is in operation it will be nobody's business what means they have if they are in the industrial area, and it will be nobody's business how they employ their time. July 1, 1926, is the date appointed for this reform, but my right hon. friend informs me that it will be only with the utmost strain of effort by the Department that all the necessary inquiries can be carried through by that time.

Great as are the demands which I am making on the patience of the Committee, I cannot pass from this subject on the first occasion of presenting it to Parliament without attempting an example of the scale of pensions which this new scheme affords. There is no need for overstatement. The facts and figures which are supplied me by the Government Actuary's Department are frankly incredible, but I am assured they are correct. A man of 20 will obtain under this scheme, for 4*d.* a week, benefits which are actuarially worth 1*s.* 0½*d.* a week. The same benefits would cost a man of 30 1*s.* 8½*d.*, a man of 40 2*s.* 8½*d.*, a man of 50 4*s.* 11*d.*, and a man of 60 16*s.* 8*d.* Now all will receive it equally for the payment of 4*d.* An employed woman will pay half contributions; but in the nature of things the major part of the benefit of the scheme goes to widows. I take as a supreme example the case of a man of 35 who dies after January 4 next in insurance leaving a widow and three children all under five years of age. The benefits which this widow and her children will receive, allowing for the fact that the pension ceases on remarriage, are worth in capital value £600 sterling—that is to say, as much as the maximum sum awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the widow of a man who is killed in a terrible accident. Such are the miracles—I can call them nothing less—of nation-wide insurance. I have only one thing more to say on this subject, and that is, I hope the Committee understand what it is we are doing with this declining charge for war pensions. We could quite easily, and defensibly—and high authorities could have been marshalled behind us—have spread it over the life of the pensioners and secured a large and substantial revenue in the interval which could have been devoted to the reduction of direct taxation and relief of the direct taxpayers, who, after all, pay two-thirds of the whole taxation.

We have deliberately decided not to do it, but to use this diminishing charge as a great instrument and lever to bring this new scheme into existence and turn it to another and, I think, an even better purpose. If I may stray for a moment from the dusty high road of facts and figures on which we have been marching and have still to march, and turn aside into the path of fancy, I would say that I like the association of this new scheme of widows' pensions and pensions at 65 with the dying out of the cost of the war pensions. I like to think that the sorrow and sacrifice and the suffering have been the seed from which a strong tree will grow under which perhaps many generations of British people may find shelter against some at least of the storms of life. It is surely the finest war memorial you can set up to those who gave their lives, their limbs, their blood, and who lost their health or their dear ones in their country's cause.

FRANCESCO CRISPI

(1819-1901).

FRANCESCO CRISPI was born at Ribera, in Sicily, October 4th, 1819. He began his public career as a major under Garibaldi, with whom he served at Calatafimi in 1860, and a year later he was elected from Palermo to the first Italian Parliament. In 1876 he became President of the Chamber of Deputies, and in 1877 Minister of the Interior, an office he held for a single year. He became Prime Minister of Italy in 1887, holding the position until 1891, and again from 1893 to 1896. The Italy of his later public life was so heavily taxed and the restrictions on the industrial and intellectual activities of its people were so great, as a result of the attempt to keep up a display of militancy and give it a place with the "great powers," that the people showed, from time to time, in the usual blind way in which ignorance asserts itself, their sense of the injustice they could not define and the limitations they could not understand. The result was radical movements, which found in Crispi a strong Conservative opponent. More or less closely associated with the great financial and commercial interests which have succeeded the feudal nobility as the power behind the throne of European monarchy, his undoubted talents and his power as an orator, if they did not make him a heroic figure, rendered great service to the Conservative interests, with the growing power of which, as shown through increased militancy and the substitution of the standing army for the justice-declaring spirit of civil law, he now seems most likely to be identified in Italian history on the record made complete by his death at Naples, August 11th, 1901.

His early sympathies with Garibaldi and his prominence in the Italian government made him the orator of the day when the Garibaldi monument was unveiled during the great fêtes of 1895. He was never a thorough sympathizer, however, either with Garibaldi or with Mazzini, and it is said that his dissent from Mazzini did much to perpetuate monarchy in Italy, preventing the establishment of the republic so many of Mazzini's followers had ardently hoped for.

AT THE UNVEILING OF GARIBALDI'S STATUE

(Delivered at Rome, September 20th, 1895).

THE twentieth of September, 1870, could not be better commemorated than by the inauguration in Rome of a monument to Garibaldi, the faithful and devoted friend of Victor Emmanuel, who in 1860 accepted the *plebiscite* in favour of the liberation of Rome. The citizens of Rome could not be the helots of unity, the slaves of cosmopolitan patriotism. Their servitude meant the restriction of the national sovereignty, which was Italy's due in mere virtue of her existence.

The day and the place remind us of the struggle against tyranny, so laborious, yet so fruitful of liberty. The years which elapsed between July 4th, 1849, and September 20th, 1870, were the last years of trial for the civil power. The Church, having shown that she was powerless to live by her own resources, had to rely upon foreign bayonets, of which she in her turn became completely the slave. It was here that on April 30th, after a bloody battle, Garibaldi repulsed the invader who, without provocation, had undertaken the barbarous mission of restoring tyranny. When hostilities were resumed, the defenders, although with right on their side, had to yield to force and await patiently the day of resurrection, the twentieth of September, 1870.

The enemies of Italian unity have endeavoured to prove that the present celebration is an insult to the head of the Catholic Church. Their object is to excite conscientious scruples against our country. But the common sense of the people is proof against such tricks, because we all know that Christianity is a Divine institution, which is not dependent upon earthly weapons for its existence. The religion of Christ preached by Paul and Chrysostom was able to subdue the world without the aid of temporal arms, and we cannot conceive that the Vatican should persist in wishing for temporal sovereignty to exercise its spiritual mission. The Gospel, as we all believe, is truth. If it has been disseminated by Apostolic teachings, such teachings are sufficient for its existence.

It is not really for the protection and prestige of religion that our adversaries demand the restoration of the temporal power of the Holy See, but for worldly reasons, from lust of power, and from earthly covetousness. They do not consider that temporal sovereignty cannot be saintly and above sin, that it cannot aspire to celestial perfection in this world. Material weapons and legal violence, justified by reasons of State, should not belong to the Vicar of Christ on earth, who is to

preach peace, to pray, and to pardon. Religion is not and it cannot be an affair of State. Its mission is to console believers with the hope of everlasting life, and to uphold the spirit of faith.

The Catholic Church has never enjoyed in any country so much freedom and respect as in Italy. We alone of all nations have renounced every claim to jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. It is a maxim of modern law that the State should have no influence in spiritual things which cannot be interfered with by the civil power without having recourse to violence. The spiritual autonomy which we protect and guarantee should be the stronghold of the Supreme Pontiff. In that stronghold he could not be assailed. Worldly matters elude his grasp, and it would be a virtue in him not to think of them. Souls are his kingdom, and he governs them so absolutely as to elicit the envy of other rulers of men. Protestant sovereigns and even princes who do not believe in Christ bow before him and reverently accept his judgments.

The Italians, by promulgating the law of May 1871, have solved a problem which seemed incapable of solution. In this country, where freedom of thought and of conscience is acknowledged, unlimited liberty has been granted to the head of the Church with reference to his sacred office and his irresponsibility and inviolability. In regard to his acts, the Pope is subject only to God, and no human potentate can reach him. He exercises a sovereign authority over all those who believe in him, and they are many millions, while he is surrounded by all the honours and privileges of royalty without the drawbacks of civil power, without the hatred, the resentment, and the penalties inseparable from such power. No earthly prince is in a similar position or on the same level. His position is unique. He has no territory to govern. Indeed, any extent of territory would be inadequate for his position, and yet all the world is subject to his spiritual empire. Were he a temporal prince his authority would be diminished, because it would be equal to that of other rulers, and he would cease to be pre-eminent. He would be exposed to continual struggles, as he has struggled for centuries to the detriment of the faith and of his spiritual authority. We have made him an independent sovereign, and as such he is superior to all other princes. In this lies his power. He exercises his office by virtue of his authority ; he corresponds with all the world ; he prays ; he protects, without needing protection, because the Italian kingdom is his shield. Consequently, no earthly weapon can reach him, and the outrages inflicted upon Boniface VIII. cannot be repeated.

Catholics should be grateful to Italy for the services which we have rendered to the Roman Pontiff. Before September 20th, 1870, he was obliged to bow before the princes of the earth, and concordats

were concessions of divine rights made to the prejudice of the Church. It was only when relieved of his temporal dominion that Pius IX. could cope with Bismarck and make that man of iron feel the power of spiritual arms. All this is our handiwork, the work of our Parliament and our King, and we are proud of the achievement. I will say more ; it was the will of God, because the Almighty willed that Italy should gather her provinces together and become an equal of other nations.

We regret to say that those who oppose this evident will of the Creator call themselves his ministers on earth, but they will not prevail, because Italy is strong and self-reliant and will crush any effort at revolution. These men will not prevail, and perhaps they may grow wiser. They are aware that so long as they keep within lawful bounds and do not infringe the law, they are inviolable. But they ought to remember that if they rebel, if they revile their country and attack our national institutions, they will lose all the benefits which they have secured by our law of guarantees, which was granted to religion and for religion, and not for the personal advantage of any man. They know, or ought to know, that by inciting others to break the law they would help Anarchism, which denies both God and King, and they would not escape punishment. . . .

SOCIALISM AND DISCONTENT

(A Speech occasioned by the Revolutionary Outbreaks in Sicily).

WE have before us a great social problem and one that must be solved. Not the problem which agitators love to pour out before an excited mob, advocating community of goods ; the abolition of trustees, the destruction of all lawful rights of ownership. To-day the right of spoliation is being dignified to the rank of a science ; but none the less when attempts are made to realize such theories as I have referred to, a close approach is made to the domain of crime.

A favourite field with the agitator is the island of Sicily, but the field is ill chosen, for there the sentiments of life and property are strongly rooted. Glance at the scenes of our recent riots and you will not be able to say that they were caused by distress. In the Province of Trapani and in the communes of Palermo, where the riots were fiercest, the conditions of the people are unusually good. There are few large estates in the district, and land is distributed in small holdings among an indus-

trious peasantry. The outbreaks in Sicily were the result of a well-organized conspiracy and the effects would have been even more dire had not a vigilant government taken wise precautions.

The country is thickly sown with socialistic clubs, which are well known as *Fasci dei Lavoratori*. Originally they seemed to be harmless organizations created for benevolent objects. A year later, in 1892, the National Exposition was held in Palermo. Far too promising to neglect was this opportunity for disseminating pernicious doctrines, and agitators from the mainland flocked to the island and took contagion with them. From that time onward, by means of congresses and other incitements from revolutionaries who lived abroad, the real organization of the *Fasci dei Lavoratori* as revolutionary societies began. The Fasci numbered one hundred and sixty-six and had two hundred and eighty-nine thousand members. The chiefs declared that they had no trust in the labours of Parliament, but put their confidence in revolution. This was made manifest by passages in letters which had been seized.

Unpatriotic, as revolutionists of this type are sure to be, they had endeavoured to come to an understanding with clerical societies in Italy and elsewhere, and of this also we have the clearest proof. Finally, a meeting was held in Marseilles, and there it was decided that the "New Garibaldi of Anarchy" should go to Palermo.

It had been determined to rise in insurrection about the middle of February, but fearing that the government had been warned it was decided to anticipate the date originally fixed and there was a Fourth of April in which neither the "New Garibaldi" nor any of his friends took any part. The peasants had been promised that during this year lands would be divided evenly among them, and the conspirators had planned to bring about a war by the help of Russia to which country it was intended to cede a port.

If you would understand the character of the movement, listen to this proclamation published in one commune. It describes the working classes as "Children of the Vespers," and closes with these words:—

"Do you sleep? Hasten to the prison to rescue your brethren. Death to the King. Death to employers. Down with taxes. Burn the mayoralty. Burn the Civilians' Club. Long live the Fascio. When the bells ring let us rush to the castle, for all is ready for liberty. Listen for the signal."

In the province of Massa Carrara the revolution burst forth in its worst forms. There as in Sicily martial law had to be proclaimed. . . .

The conditions in Sicily are precisely the same as those in the rest of Italy and the social laws which apply to the working classes on the

mainland must apply to those on the island. The resources of Sicily are so great that the government desires to make use of them in repurchasing the *latifundia*, which it would divide among the people and so put an end to the injustices of the communal administrations, especially in regard to tithes. Concerning this we propose to ask for a magistrate specially detailed to readjust the rates:

Italy must consolidate and fortify herself, and for this time and labour are still necessary. I ask you, therefore, to follow me in my programme. Let us cleave to the King—the symbol of unity, the ark of salvation. I say now as I said in 1864, that the monarchy alone guarantees unity and the future of the country. With this faith, which is the faith of the country, we must ward off dangers, oppose internal and external enemies, and carry Italy to the greatness to which we have aspired and without which she cannot exist.

GEORGE JACQUES DANTON

(1759-1794).

DANTON, the greatest of the French Jacobins, and one of the most formidable figures in modern history, was born at Arcis-sur-Aube, October 28th, 1759, and he had not completed his thirty-fifth year when he went to the guillotine, declaring it better to live a poor fisherman than to have anything to do with the government of men.

No other man in modern times has so well and so reasonably embodied the latent fierceness of society. When the young French Republic was hemmed round with enemies; when all the forces of the world seemed leagued against the handful of radicals and fanatics who were attempting to make a constructive force out of the chaotic impulses of the Parisian mob, Danton gave the keynote of his own character and of the character of the great epoch which created him, in a single sentence: "To conquer we have need to dare, to dare again, always to dare; and France will be saved!" That sentence and yet another of Danton's overthrew Bourbonism. The other was: "Let France be free, though my name were accursed!" When a man of average abilities and average education so devotes himself to any cause that he accepts in advance, as a probable incident of his work, not merely death, but infamy, he has already more than half accomplished the possibilities of such achievement as made Danton the constructive power by virtue of which the French Republic of the last quarter of the nineteenth century developed out of the Reign of Terror. In the Arabian story those who attempt to climb an enchanted mountain to find the talisman of power at the top, are assailed at every step of their upward progress by shrieks of execration from unseen enemies attacking them from behind with every imaginable calumny, every conceivable insult. Those who stop to answer or turn back to punish these intangible "conservative forces" are at once transformed to smooth, black stones, destined to remain inert under the power of obstruction until some one comes, so strong, so self-contained, so capable of maintaining a set purpose, that, like Danton, he will press forward to his object without fearing either the death or the infamy with which he is threatened. Then

the smooth stones once more become men, and by virtue of the strength of the one leader as they crowd around him, all their failures become a part of his success.

If the story were an allegory as it seems to be, it would come nearer than any biography of Danton can come to suggesting the secret of his success and of his overthrow. He was at once devoted and desperate. Threatened with everlasting infamy, he considered what it would mean, and took the risk. He saw certain death before him, and went forward to meet it, shrinking less from it for himself than he had done in inflicting it on others. It is doubtful if such a man could be created except through the very forces he so fiercely antagonized. The impulse of tyranny, of mastering men so as to compel them at their peril to accept the will of another, is shown in the life of Danton as it was in that of the other Attilas who are recognised by the generations after them as "Scourges of God." But neither an Attila nor a Danton could exist in a normal society. It is only when a civilization is effete that the strongest men become at once disorganizers and reorganizers. It is part of the theory of Pasteur that as soon as life leaves matter the same invisible organisms which operated to keep it alive begin to disintegrate it, that it may be reorganized into other, and in the sum of things into higher forms of life. We cannot study the life and work of such menacing and Titanic figures as Danton without seeing that in its economies and the conservation of its energies, nature is a unit, true to itself in what is greatest as in what is least.

Danton was a struggling young lawyer in Paris when the Revolution overtook him. In the Cordeliers Club he fitted himself for the popular leadership which came to him as a result of his fitness, when Mirabeau, the idol of the people, deserted them for the court. Called the "Mirabeau of the Sans-Culottes," Danton did not disdain the title. He accepted as an existing fact the wild desire of the populace of Paris to be free; their fierce determination to go to any extreme rather than return to the old order of things; and counting on it not only as a fact but as a force of the greatest possibilities, he attempted to use it first to demolish entirely the ruins of the monarchy and on the old foundations to build the splendid structure of his ideal Republic. His people were not fit for his ideal, nor was he himself. Loving justice, mercy, and liberty, he could still reconcile himself to shedding the blood of those he respected for their intentions, while he opposed their purposes. In his own death he foresaw and prophesied that of Robespierre. No doubt, he foresaw the guillotine for himself in the death of Vergniaud. It is certain that he was doomed when, regretting the "logic of the situation" which sent the Girondists to the scaffold, he did not oppose to it the same

fiery energy that had saved the Republic from the Bourbons. But his character shows always the same radical fault which appears in his oratory. He had for the time being the almost omnipotent power of passion, directed by intellect, but too intense to be sustained, and ending in inevitable reaction. It was in the impotence of such a reaction that on April 5th, 1794, Danton accepted the inevitable and went to the scaffold, leaving France and civilization "in a frightful welter," out of which were to come Napoleon, Hugo, Thiers, and Gambetta, Gladstone, Bismarck, and Lincoln.

W.V.B.

TO DARE, TO DARE AGAIN ; ALWAYS TO DARE

(Delivered in the National Assembly, September 2nd, 1792, on the Defence of the Republic).

IT seems a satisfaction for the ministers of a free people to announce to them that their country will be saved. All are stirred, all are enthused, all burn to enter the combat.

You know that Verdun is not yet in the power of our enemies and that its garrison swears to immolate the first who breathes a proposition of surrender.

One portion of our people will guard our frontiers, another will dig and arm the entrenchments, the third with pikes will defend the interior of our cities. Paris will second these great efforts. The commissioners of the Commune will solemnly proclaim to the citizens the invitation to arm and march to the defence of the country. At such a moment you can proclaim that the capital deserves the esteem of all France. At such a moment this National Assembly becomes a veritable committee of war. We ask that you concur with us in directing this sublime movement of the people, by naming commissioners to second and assist all these great measures. We ask that any one refusing to give personal service or to furnish arms shall meet the punishment of death. We ask that proper instructions be given to the citizens to direct their movements. We ask that carriers be sent to all the departments to notify them of the decrees that you proclaim here. The tocsin we shall sound is not the alarm signal of danger, it orders the charge on the enemies of France. To conquer we have need to dare, to dare again, always to dare ! And France will be saved !

(Pour les vaincre, il nous faut de l'audace ; encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace ; et la France est sauvée.)

“LET FRANCE BE FREE, THOUGH MY NAME WERE
ACCURSED”

(On the Disasters on the Frontier—delivered in the French Convention,
March 10th, 1793).

THE general considerations that have been presented to you are true ; but at this moment it is less necessary to examine the causes of the disasters that have struck us than to apply their remedy rapidly. When the edifice is on fire, I do not join the rascals who would steal the furniture, I extinguish the flames. I tell you therefore you should be convinced by the dispatches of Dumouriez that you have not a moment to spare in saving the Republic.

Dumouriez conceived a plan which did honour to his genius. I would render him greater justice and praise than I did recently. But three months ago he announced to the executive power, your General Committee of Defence, that if we were not audacious enough to invade Holland in the middle of winter, to declare instantly against England the war which actually we had long been making, that we would double the difficulties of our campaign, in giving our enemies the time to deploy their forces. Since we failed to recognize this stroke of his genius, we must now repair our faults.

Dumouriez is not discouraged ; he is in the middle of Holland, where he will find munitions of war ; to overthrow all our enemies, he wants but Frenchmen, and France is filled with citizens. Would we be free ? If we no longer desire it, let us perish, for we have all sworn it. If we wish it, let all march to defend our independence. Your enemies are making their last efforts. Pitt recognizing he has all to lose dares spare nothing. Take Holland, and Carthage is destroyed and England can no longer exist but for Liberty ! Let Holland be conquered to Liberty ; and even the commercial aristocracy itself, which at the moment dominates the English people, would rise against the government which had dragged it into this despotic war against a free people. They would overthrow this ministry of stupidity, who thought the methods of the *ancien régime* could smother the genius of Liberty breathing in France. This ministry once overthrown in the interests of commerce, the party of Liberty would show itself ; for it is not dead ! And if you know your duties, if your commissioners leave at once, if you extend the hand to the strangers aspiring to destroy all forms of tyranny, France is saved and the world is free.

Expedite, then, your commissioners ; sustain them with your energy ; let them leave this very night, this very evening.

Let them say to the opulent classes, the aristocracy of Europe must succumb to our efforts, and pay our debt, or you will have to pay it ! The people have nothing but blood,—they lavish it ! Go, then, ingrates, and lavish your wealth ! See, citizens, the fair destinies that await you. What ! you have a whole nation as a lever, its reason your fulcrum and you have not yet upturned the world ! To do this we need firmness and character, and of a truth we lack it. I put to one side all passions. They are all strangers to me, save a passion for the public good.

In the most difficult situation, when the enemy was at the gates of Paris, I said to those governing : “ Your discussions are shameful, I can see but the enemy. You tire me by squabbling in place of occupying yourselves with the safety of the Republic ! I repudiate you all as traitors to our country ! I place you all in the same line ! ” I said to them : “ What care I for my reputation ! Let France be free, though my name were accursed ! ” What care I that I am called “ a blood-drinker ! ” Well, let us drink the blood of the enemies of humanity, if needful ; but let us struggle, let us achieve freedom. Some fear the departure of the commissioners may weaken one or the other section of this convention. Vain fears ! Carry your energy everywhere. The pleasantest declaration will be to announce to the people that the terrible debt weighing upon them will be wrested from their enemies or that the rich will shortly have to pay it. The national situation is cruel. The representatives of value are no longer in equilibrium in the circulation. The day of the workingman is lengthened beyond necessity. A great corrective measure is necessary ! Conquerors of Holland reanimate in England the Republican party ; let us advance France and we shall go glorified to posterity. Achieve these grand destinies ; no more debates, no more quarrels, and the Fatherland is saved.

AGAINST IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

(Delivered in the French Convention, March 9th, 1793).

BYOND a doubt, citizens, the hopes of your commissioners will not be deceived. Yes, your enemies, the enemies of liberty shall be exterminated, for your efforts shall be relentless. You are worthy the dignity of regulating and controlling the nation's energy. Your commissioners, disseminated in all parts of the Republic, will repeat to Frenchmen that the great quarrel between despotism and liberty

shall soon terminate. The people of France shall be avenged ; it becomes us then to put the political world in harmony, to make laws in accord with such harmony. But before we too deeply entertain these grander objects, I shall ask you to make a declaration of a principle too long ignored ; to abolish a baneful error, to destroy the tyranny of wealth upon misery.

If the measures I propose be adopted, then Pitt, the Breteuil of English diplomacy, and Burke, the Abbé Maury of the British Parliament, who are impelling the English people to-day against liberty, may be touched.

What do you ask ? You would have every Frenchman armed in the common defence. And yet there is a class of men sullied by no crime, who have stout arms, but no liberty. They are the unfortunates detained for debt. It is a shame for humanity, it is against all philosophy, that a man in receiving money can pawn his person as security. I can readily prove that this principle is favourable to cupidity, since experience proves that the lender takes no pecuniary security, since he has the disposition of the body of his debtor. But of what importance are these mercantile considerations ? They should not influence a great nation. Principles are eternal, and no Frenchman can be rightly deprived of his liberty unless he has forfeited it to society. The possessing and owning class need not be alarmed. Doubtless, some individuals go to extremes, but the nation, always just, will respect all the proprieties. Respect misery, and misery will respect opulence. Never wrong the unfortunate, and the unfortunate, who have more soul than the rich, will remain guiltless.

I ask that this National Convention declare that every French citizen imprisoned for debt shall be liberated, because such imprisonment is contrary to moral health, contrary to the rights of man, and to the true principles of liberty.

EDUCATION, FREE AND COMPULSORY

(Delivered in the French Convention, August 13th, 1793).

AFTER having given liberty to France ; after having vanquished her enemies, there can be no honour greater than to prepare for future generations an education in keeping with that liberty. This is the object which Lepeletier proposes : that all that is good for society shall be adopted by those who live under its social contact. . . . It has been said that paternal affection opposes the execution of such

plans. Certainly we must respect natural rights even in their perversion. But even if we do not fully sustain compulsory schooling, we must not deprive the children of the poor of an education.

The greatest objection has been that of finding the means ; but I have already said there is no real extravagance where the good result to the public is so great, and I add the principle that the child of the poor can be taught at the expense of the superfluities of the scandalous fortunes erected among us. It is to you who are celebrated among our Republicans that I appeal ; bring to this subject the fire of your imagination, the energy of your character. It is the people who must endow national education.

When you commence to sow this seed of education in the vast field of the Republic, you must not count the expense of reaping the harvest. After bread, education is the first need of a people. I ask that the question be submitted, that there be founded at the expense of the nation establishments where each citizen can have the right to send his children for free public instruction. It is to the monks—it is to the age of Louis XIV., when men were great by their acquirements, that we owe the age of philosophy, that is to say, of reason, brought to the knowledge of the people. To the Jesuits, lost by their political ambitions, we owe an impetus in education evoking our admiration. But the Republic has been in the souls of our people, twenty years ahead of its proclamation. Corneille wrote dedications to Montauron, but Corneille made the ‘Cid’ and ‘Cinna’ ; Corneille spoke like a Roman, and he who said : “For being more than a king you think you are something,” was a true Republican.

Now for public instruction ; everything shrinks in domestic teaching, everything enlarges and ennobles in public communal instruction. A mistake is made in presenting a tableau of paternal affections. I, too, am a father, and more so than the aristocrats who oppose public education for they are never sure of their paternities. When I consider my rights relatively to the general good I feel elevated ; my son is not mine. He belongs to the Republic. Let her dictate his duties, then he can best serve her. It has been said it is repugnant to the heart of our peasantry to make such sacrifice of their children. Well, do not constrain them too much. Let there be classes, if necessary, that only meet on the Sabbath. Begin the system by a gradual adaptation to the manners of the people. If you expect the State to make an instant and absolute regeneration, you will never get public instruction. It is necessary that each man develop the moral means and methods he received from nature. Have for them all communal houses and faculties for instruction, and do not stop at any secondary considerations. The rich man will pay, and will lose nothing if he will profit for the instruction of his son.

I ask, then, that under suitable and necessary modifications you decree the erection of national establishments where children can be instructed, fed, and lodged gratuitously, and the citizens who desire to retain their children at home can send them there for instruction.

Convention, December 12th, 1793.—It is a proper time to establish the principle which seems misunderstood, that the youth belong to the Republic before they belong to their parents. No one more than myself respects nature, but what avail the reasoning of the individual against the reason of the nation? In the national schools the child will suck the milk of Republicanism. The Republic is one and indivisible. Public instruction produces such a centre of unity. To none, then, can we accord the privilege of isolation from such benefits.

“SQUEEZING THE SPONGE”

(On Taxing the Rich—delivered in the French Convention, April 27th, 1793).

YOU have decreed “honourable mention” of what has been done for the public benefit by the Department De L’Hevault. In this decree you authorize the whole Republic to adopt the same measures, for your decree ratifies all the acts which have just been brought to your knowledge.

If everywhere the same measures be taken, the Republic is saved. No more shall we treat as agitators and anarchists the ardent friends of liberty who set the nation in motion, but we shall say: “Honour to the agitators who turn the vigour of the people against its enemies!” When the Temple of Liberty shall be reared, the people will know how to decorate it. Rather perish France than return to our hard slavery. Let it not be believed we shall become barbarians after we have founded liberty. We shall embellish France until the despots shall envy us: but while the ship of State is in the stress of storm, beaten by the tempest, that which belongs to each, belongs to all.

No longer are Agrarian Laws spoken of! The people are wiser than their calumniators assumed, and the people in mass have much more sense than many of those who deem themselves great men. In a people we can no more count the great men than we can count the giant trees in the vast forest. It was believed that the people wanted the Agrarian Law, and this may throw suspicion on the measures adopted by the Department De L’Hevault. It will be said of them: “They taxed the rich”; but, citizens, to tax the rich is to serve them. It is rather a veritable advantage for them than any considerable sacrifice;

and the greater the sacrifice, the greater the usufruct, for the greater is the guarantee to the foundation of property against the invasion of its enemies. It is an appeal to every man, according to his means, to save the Republic. The appeal is just. What the Department De L'Hevault had done, Paris and all France will do. See what resources France will procure. Paris has a luxury and wealth which is considerable. Well, by decree, this sponge will be squeezed ! And with singular satisfaction it will be found that the people will conduct their revolution at the expense of their internal enemies. These enemies themselves will learn the price of liberty and will desire to possess it, when they will recognize that it has preserved for them their possessions.

Paris in making an appeal to capitalists will furnish her contingent, which will afford means to suppress the troubles in La Vendée ; for, at any sacrifice, these troubles must be suppressed. On this alone depends your external tranquillity. Already, the Departments of the north have informed the combined despots that your territory cannot be divided ; and soon you will probably learn of the dissolution of this formidable league of kings. For in uniting against you, they have not forgotten their ancient hatreds and respective pretensions ; and if the Executive Council had had a little more latitude, the league might be already completely dissolved.

Paris, then, must be directed against La Vendée. All the men needed in this city to form a reserve camp should be sent at once to La Vendée. These measures once taken, the rebels will disperse, and, like the Austrians, will commence to kill each other. If the flames of this civil discord be extinguished they will ask of us peace !

LEON GAMBETTA

(1838-1882).

AMONG French opponents of monarchy, no one represents more distinctively the constructive power of the principles of popular government than Gambetta. When, under Louis Napoleon, French imperialism and all it stood for had failed so completely and so disastrously that to almost every one, except Gambetta, the condition of France seemed hopeless, he was upheld by his confidence in the people and by his faith in the reserve power of the average man to make the struggle after defeat which, if it did not succeed as he hoped, had a higher success in operating to re-establish the Republic on a permanent basis.

Gambetta was of Jewish extraction. He was born at Cahors, April 3rd, 1838, and educated for the law—a profession he began practising in Paris in 1859. In 1869 he was elected to the Corps Legislatif, in which he acted with the “Irreconcilables.” On September 4th, 1870, he joined in proclaiming France a Republic, and when appointed one of the Committee of National Defence, with a mission outside of Paris, he passed over the besieging German army in a balloon. Borrowing money in the name of the Republic, of which he was virtually dictator, he organized two armies of defence in a hopeless attempt to retrieve what Louis Napoleon had lost. After the final capitulation, he gave up the executive office and was elected to the National Assembly. In 1876 he entered the Chamber of Deputies, to the presidency of which he was elected three years later. He was Premier from November 1881 to January 1882, and, when he retired from public life, left his historical position secure as the ablest French Republican of the last half of the nineteenth century. He died December 31st, 1882.

ON THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE

(Delivered at Bordeaux, June 26th, 1871).

IDID not desire to set foot in France again, after the labours you know of, or to take part in the responsibilities and work of the Republican Party, without stopping in Bordeaux. Apropos of the grave situation in which we find our country, I wish to tell you, without mental reservation, as I am not the candidate of this department, all that I hope, all that I desire to accomplish.

Do not applaud, gentlemen ! The hour is much too solemn for anything more than the exchange of esteem and reciprocal confidences. The actual situation in France, when closely examined, and when in such examination one is animated by a passion for justice and truth,—that is to say, when, by the rules of reason, one guards against the illusions of the heart,—is such as to inspire a profound sadness ; but it invites us to the manliest measures and forbids any discouragement. Let us study it, and we will arrive at this conclusion,—that the Republican party, if it desire it, can, and, if it know how, will regenerate this country and erect a government of liberty out of this abyss of surprises, reactions, and failures. This is the demonstration which it is necessary to make to-day in the face of our competitors of the monarchical parties, not only to achieve the triumph of the principles to which we are attached, but, repeating it, we must not cease striving to give France her salvation.

At this hour what do we see in our country ? We see men who had always slandered democracy, who hated it, who ignorantly or for gain, exploiting the credulity of others, had systematically misrepresented its methods,—we see such men attributing all the excesses of the last few months to the Republic, to which they never should have been charged ; and I find an analogy full of instruction between the condition of affairs in May 1870 and the present hour. In 1870 France was put to the question—who then knew how and by whom it was done ? But it is not the less true she was invested with the right to pronounce on her destinies. Through the agency of complicated fears, excited by a suborned press, aiding the basest interests, the interests of dynasties and of parasites, France was taken unawares, and her vote was at a disadvantage, but, nevertheless, she pronounced her decision with a lightning-like rapidity. Three months afterwards, the decision accomplished its ends. She was punished, she was scourged beyond all justice, for having abandoned herself to the criminal hands of an emperor.

To-day, again, in diverse forms, the same question is put to her. Will she abdicate again, and throw her power into the lap of a dynasty ?

Under whatever name the thing is disguised, it is always the same question,—the question of whether France will govern herself in freedom, or will betray herself,—of whether the terrible experience, from which she emerged mutilated and bleeding, has taught her at last to maintain her independence.

In spite of the excesses committed and the crimes which marked the end of the Commune in Paris, notwithstanding the flow of calumnies directed against the Republican party, there is one comforting fact :—in the midst of a civil war, the people preserved their coolness. The

municipal elections attested that, on the very morn after this awful crisis, the country did not entertain reactionary schemes. This inspires us to set a like example. It should inspire us with patience and wisdom in our political actions. I really believe that all shades of Republicans can unite in France and present the spectacle of a disciplined party, firm in its principles, laborious, vigilant, and so resolute that it might convince France of its ability to govern,—in a word, a party accepting the axiom that power should be given to the wisest and most worthy.

Let us, then, be the worthiest ! This will not cost us much effort, for the excellent reason that there are no wise, constructive politics but those of the Republican party. Let us be turned from the straight path of duty neither by calumnies nor injuries. If we will remain faithful at our posts, if, at all times and on all questions, we produce republican solutions, I am convinced we shall soon demonstrate, by comparison and contrast to the pretensions of those who have disdained or ignored us, that we are a governing party capable of directing public affairs, a party of intelligence and reason, and that among the men professing our principles are found those who afford the guarantees of science, of disinterestedness and of order, without which a government is merely an affair for the profit of the predaceous and unprincipled. Our Republic must be founded on, and maintained in, truth and right. Without discussing puerile differences, let me say that a government in whose name we make laws, conclude peace, raise milliards, render justice, suppress riots that would have sufficed to overthrow ten monarchies, is a government, established and legitimate, which proves its power and its right by its acts. Such a government imposes respect on all, and whoever would menace it is a factionist.

“ To the wisest ! to the most worthy ”—this is a standard which we should accept without reserve ! It is not a new formula for republicans ; it is their dogma to see awarded the distinctions of public service only to merit and virtue. It was for merit and morality that we vainly appealed to the Empire ; it was even because morality was opposed to all compromise with a power founded on crime and maintained by corruption, that our position was irreconcilable and revolutionary. To-day, the opposition under a republican government changes its character and modifies its plan of conduct ; it must guide and control, not destroy. Yes, we shall respect your authority, respect your legality, respect your decisions, but we shall never abandon the right to criticize and to reform ; and as we have never asked of any one a favour, we shall let universal suffrage pronounce between those who disdain us and those who have the patience and constancy to contend for the Republic and for Liberty !

This conception of the rôle of an opposition under the Republic is due to the difference of the age and the time. It is certain, in the so-called heroic ages, chivalry of parties disappeared when one party realized its expectations. And to-day, to develop and apply our principles, we are under obligation to be as cold, as patient, as measured, as skilful, as we were vehement and enthusiastic when it was a question of repudiating the shams of the Lower Empire. And, gentlemen, let me tell you, the more we specialize, the more we centralize our efforts on a given point, the more rapidly we shall awaken devoted auxiliaries in the ranks of the voters who pronounce the final decision and end the delay which separates us from success. Unity, simplicity of object, should be our watchwords ; but it does not suffice firmly to propose to make the Republican party at once the party of principles and practice, the party of the government. There must be a precise programme. It must be the enemy of Utopias, and of chimeras ; nothing must divert it from its realizations. It must never cease active struggle to remake the nation, recast its morals, and, snatching it from the hands of the intriguers, to see that it shall not be constantly forced from despotism to provoked rebellion.

We must get rid of the evil which causes our woes ;—Ignorance whence emerge alternately despotism and demagoguery ! Of all the remedies, which can solicit the attention of the statesman and politician to prevent such evils, there is one that excels and includes all the rest ; it is universal education. We must discover by what measures and processes, on the morrow of our disasters, imputable not only to the government, to which we submitted, but to the degeneracy of public spirit, we can assure ourselves against the falls, the errors, the surprises, the inferiorities which have cost us so much. Let us study our misfortunes, and go back to the causes : First of all, we allowed ourselves to be distanced by other peoples, less gifted than ourselves, who, however, were making progress while we remained stationary. Yes, we can establish, by the proof in hand, that it is the inferiority of our national education which led to our reverses. We were beaten by adversaries who had enlisted on their side caution, discipline, and science. This proves that on a last analysis, even among the conflicts of material forces, intelligence remains the master. And looking within, is it not the ignorance, in which the masses were allowed to exist, that has engendered, almost at fixed epochs, the crisis, the frightful explosions, which appear in the course of our history as a sort of a chronic ill, to such a degree that we could almost announce in advance the arrival of these vast social tempests ?

We must disembarass ourselves of the past ! We must remake France ! Such was the cry from every heart on the morrow of our

disasters. For three months that plaintive cry was heard from a people who would not perish. That cry is heard no longer. To-day we hear only of plots and dynastic intrigues. It seems to be only a question of which pretender shall seize on the ruins of this imperilled country. This must cease ! We must resolutely discard these scandalous parleys, and think only of France. We must return to the disinherited and the ignorant, and make universal suffrage, which is the force of numbers, the enlightening power of reason. We must accomplish the revolution. Yes, calumniated as are to-day some of the men and the principles of the French Revolution, we should value them highly, pushing on with our work, which will end only when the revolution is accomplished. But, gentlemen, by the word " Revolution " I comprehend the diffusion of the principles of justice and reason which animated it, and I repudiate, with all my power, the calculated perfidy of our adversaries who would confuse it with enterprises of violence. The Revolution would have guaranteed to all justice, equality, liberty : it proclaimed the reign of labour, and it would have assured to all its legitimate fruits. But it had several checks. The material conquests in part remained, but the moral and political consequences are in great part yet to be realized. The working men and the peasants,—these have had but few material benefits, assuredly precious and worthy our solicitude, but as yet insufficient to make them free and complete citizens. There is nothing more natural than the acts and votes of the peasantry, of which complaint is made, without taking into account the inferior intellectual state in which society keeps them. These complaints are unjust and ill-founded. They will react on those who make them.

They are the result of the organization of society without foresight. The peasantry is intellectually several centuries behind the enlightened and educated classes of the country. Yes, the distance is immense between them and us, who have received a classical or scientific education—even the imperfect one of our day. We have learned to read our history, to speak our language, while (a cruel thing to say !) so many of our countrymen can only babble ! Ah ! that peasant, bound to the tillage of the soil, who bravely carries the burdens of his day, with no other consolation than that of leaving to his children the paternal fields, perhaps increased an acre in extent ! All his passions, joys, fears, are concentrated on the fate of his patrimony. Of the external world, of the society in which he lives, he apprehends but legends and rumours ; he is the prey of the cunning and the fraudulent ! He strikes, without knowing it, the bosom of the Revolution, his benefactress ; he gives loyally his taxes and his blood to a society for which he feels fear, as much as respect. But there his rôle ends, and if you speak to him of

principles, he knows nothing of them. It is to the peasantry, then, we must address ourselves. They are the ones we must raise and instruct. The epithets the parties have bandied of "rurality" and "rural chamber" must not be the cause of injustice. Yes, it is to be wished that there were a "rural chamber," in the profound and true sense of the term, for it is not with hobble-de-hoys a rural chamber can be made, but with enlightened and free peasants, able to represent themselves. And instead of being the cause of raillery, this reproach of a "rural chamber" would be a tribute rendered to the progress of the civilization of the masses. This new social force could be utilized for the general welfare. Unfortunately, we have not yet reached that point, and this progress will be denied us as long as the French Democracy fail to demonstrate that if we would remake our country, if we would return her to her grandeur, her power, and her genius, it is the vital interest of her superior classes to elevate, to emancipate this people of workers, who hold in reserve a force still virgin and able to develop inexhaustible treasures of activities and aptitudes. We must learn and then teach the peasant what he owes to society and what he has the right to ask of her.

On the day when it will be well understood that we have no grander or more pressing work; that we should put aside and postpone all other reforms; that we have but one task, the instruction of the people, the diffusion of education, the encouragement of science,—on that day a great step will have been taken in your regeneration. But our action needs to be a double one, that it may bear upon the body as well as the mind. To be exact, each man should be intelligent, trained not only to think, read, and reason, but able also to act, to fight! Everywhere beside the teacher, we should place the gymnast and the soldier, to the end that our children, our soldiers, our fellow-citizens, should be able to hold a sword, to carry a gun on a long march, to sleep under the canopy of the stars, to support valiantly all the hardships demanded of a patriot. We must push to the front these two educations. Otherwise you make a success of letters, but do not create a bulwark of patriots.

Yes, gentlemen, if they have outclassed us, if you had to submit to the supreme agony of seeing the France of Kleber and of Hoche lose her two most patriotic provinces, those best embodying at once the military, commercial, industrial, and democratic spirit, we can blame only our inferior physical and moral condition. To-day the interests of our country command us to speak no imprudent words, to close our lips, to sink to the bottom of our hearts our resentments, to take up the grand work of national regeneration, to devote to it all the time necessary, that it may be a lasting work. If it need ten years, if it need twenty years, then we must devote to it ten or twenty years. But we must

commence at once, that each year may see the advancing life of a new generation, strong, intelligent, as much in love with science as with the Fatherland, having in their hearts the double sentiment that he serves his country well only when he serves it with his reason and his arm.

We have been educated in a rough school. We must therefore cure ourselves of the vanity which has caused us so many disasters. We must also realize conscientiously where our responsibility exists and, seeing the remedy, sacrifice all to the object to be attained—to remake and reconstitute France ! For that, nothing should be accounted too good and we shall ask nothing before this—the first demand must be for an education as complete from base to summit as is known to human intelligence. Naturally, merit must be recognized, aptitude awakened and approved, and honest and impartial judges freely chosen by their fellow citizens, deciding publicly in such a way that merit alone will open the door. Reject as authors of mischief those who have put words in the place of action ; all those who have put favouritism in the place of merit ; all those who made the profession of arms not a means for the protection of France, but a means of serving the caprices of a master, and sometimes of becoming the accomplices of his crimes. In one word let us get back to truth, and let it be known to all the world that when a citizen is born in France, he is born a soldier ; and that no matter who he is, who would shirk his double duty of civil and military instruction, he will be pitilessly deprived of his rights as a citizen and an elector. Let the thought enter the very soul of the present and coming generations, that in a democratic government whoever is not ready to bear a share of its troubles and trials is not fit to take part in the government. Thus, gentlemen, you enter into the verity of democratic principles, which are to honour labour and to make of industry and science the two elements constituting the whole of free society. Oh, what a nation we could make with such a discipline followed religiously for a term of years, with the admirable adaptability of our race for the production of thinkers, savants, heroes, and liberal spirits ! In thinking on this great subject, we rise swiftly above the sadness of the present, to view the future with confidence. . . .

It is better to have a Republican minority—firm, energetic, vigilant in its attitude towards the acts of the majority—than to be one of a majority of inconstant, lukewarm men, who seem to be only able to carry on public affairs by compromising their principles.

Following this first line of conduct, I would demonstrate by such logic that there is to-day no other experiment in the way of national reform possible than this of public education and national armament.

In seeing the accomplishment of this double reform, I shall not take the time and patience to discuss lengthily the attendant and lateral questions which are subordinated to the realization of these first and capital necessities.

It means the reconstruction of the blood, the bone, the very marrow of France. Know it well : we must give everything, our time, our money, to this supreme interest. The people will not haggle over the millions needed for the education of the poor and ignorant. They will question expenditure on the part of those whose designs tend always to the restoration of monarchies, to ridiculous disbursement, or to the subjection of the country itself.

And in passing, gentlemen, one reason why the monarchy cannot be restored among us is that we are no longer rich enough to support it.

As a result we shall have resolved thereby the most vital of all problems ; the equalization of the classes, and the dissipation of the pretended antagonism between the cities and the country. We shall have suppressed political parasites and, by the diffusion of knowledge to all, shall have given to the country its moral and political vigour. Thus we may attain a double insurance,—one against crimes threatening the common right, by the elevation of the standard of public morality ; the other against risk of revolution, by giving satisfaction and security to the acquired rights of some and to the legitimate aspirations of others.

Such is the programme at once radical and conservative which the Republic alone can accomplish. Then throughout the world the friends of France would be reassured. She would emerge regenerated by her great trials, and even under the blows of ill fortune she would appear grander, more prosperous, prouder than ever.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

(1863-).

THE office of Prime Minister of Great Britain is one of great honour and dignity. The friends of David Lloyd George brevetted him with a title higher still. When he was first called "The Prince of Wales" in England, there may have been some suspicion of humour in it, but his own Welsh constituents confirmed the title and it was added that he succeeded to it direct from Owen Glendower.

The reappearance of Owen Glendower in person could scarcely have been more sensation^{al} than the apparently sudden and dazzling way in which the oratory of Lloyd George disclosed him to the British Empire, to continental Europe and to the United States, as the Man of a Crisis. Without straining metaphor, it may be said that to some who did not know his history, he seemed to blaze, all at once, into world-wide celebrity.

This was more apparent than real. Readers of John Wesley's Journal will hardly need to be reminded of the meaning of "Providential preparation," as Wesley understood the "merciful methods" through which gradual education is imposed on some. Wesley finally gave thanks to Providence for the mercy which educated him most as a public speaker while he was being most earnestly mobbed to prevent him from speaking at all. Perhaps Mr. Lloyd George may consider that view seriously before deciding finally what had been the most important factors in his own education as an orator, up to the time his opponents became willing to concede his unmistakable pre-eminence as a statesman and great debater.

The "accident of birth," in Manchester in 1863, did not impair in any way his close connection with Wales. His father, William George, was master of the Hope Street Unitarian Schools in Liverpool. Educated in the Llanystymdwy Church school and privately, David Lloyd George married Margaret Owen, of Mynyddednyfed, Criccieth, in 1888, and began his parliamentary career in 1890 as a representative of the Welsh district of Carnarvon. When at Carnarvon in 1909, he said that such blessings as "clearing the Jebusites out of the land" are not to be reached "without fighting for them," he was autobiographical, for he has fought his way up from the bottom to the Premiership.

He made his reputation while at the Board of Trade ; and led the Welsh revolt against the Education Act of 1902. He was also a strong advocate of Welsh Disestablishment.

Mr. Lloyd George's Budget of 1909 contained the famous Land Tax proposals which brought about the great election of 1910, when violent controversy raged over these new taxes. The National Insurance Bill of 1911, and the Land Campaign of 1913, were also introduced and fought by him.

When the war began Mr. Lloyd George promoted some important financial measures, such as the moratorium, to protect British finance and commerce. On the formation of the Coalition Ministry a steady flow of munitions followed his efforts as Minister of Munitions. In 1916 he became Prime Minister on the retirement of the Asquith Ministry. In 1919 he received the O.M., but his Ministry fell towards the end of 1922.

RESTITUTION, REPARATION—NO REPETITION

(Delivered in the House of Commons, December 19th, 1916).

I APPEAR before the House of Commons to-day with the most terrible responsibility that can fall upon the shoulders of any living man as the chief adviser of the Crown in the most gigantic war in which the country has ever been engaged—a war upon the events of which its destiny depends. It is the greatest war ever waged. The burdens are the heaviest that have been cast upon this or any other country, and the issues which hang on it are the gravest that have been attached to any conflict in which humanity has ever been involved. The responsibilities of the new Government have been suddenly accentuated by a declaration made by the German Chancellor, and I propose to deal with that at once. The statement made by him in the German Reichstag has been followed by a Note presented to us by the United States of America without any note or comment. The answer that will be given by the Government will be given in full accord with all our brave Allies. Naturally there has been an interchange of views, not upon the Note, because it only recently arrived, but upon the speech which propelled it, and, inasmuch as the Note itself is practically only a reproduction or certainly a paraphrase of the speech, the subject-matter of the Note itself has been discussed informally between the Allies, and I am very glad to be able to state that we have each of us, separately and independently, arrived at identical conclusions.

I am very glad that the first answer that was given to the statement of the German Chancellor was given by France and by Russia. They have the unquestionable right to give the first answer to such an invitation. The enemy is still on their soil. Their sacrifices have been greater. The answer they have given has already appeared in all the papers, and I simply stand here to-day on behalf of the Government to give clear and definite support to the statement which they have already made. Let us examine what the statement is and examine it calmly. Any man or set of men who wantonly, or without sufficient cause, prolonged a terrible conflict like this would have on his soul a crime that oceans could not cleanse. Upon the other hand it is equally true that any man or set of men who, out of a sense of weariness or despair, abandoned the struggle without achieving the high purpose for which he had entered into it when nearly fulfilled would have been guilty of the costliest act of poltroonery ever perpetrated by any statesman. I should like to quote the very well-known words of Abraham Lincoln under similar conditions :—

We accepted this war for an object, and a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time.

Are we likely to achieve that object by accepting the invitation of the German Chancellor? That is the only question we have to put to ourselves. There has been some talk about proposals of peace. What are the proposals? There are none. To enter at the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she proposes to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of Germany. This country is not altogether without experience in these matters. This is not the first time we have fought a great military despotism that was overshadowing Europe, and it will not be the first time we shall have helped to overthrow military despotism. We have an uncomfortable historical memory of these things, and we can recall when one of the greatest of these despots had a purpose to serve in the working of his nefarious schemes. His favourite device was to appear in the garb of the Angel of Peace. He usually appeared under two conditions. Firstly, when he wished for time to assimilate his conquests or to reorganise his forces for fresh conquests; and, secondly, when his subjects showed symptoms of fatigue and war weariness, and invariably the appeal was always made in the name of humanity, and he demanded an end to bloodshed, at which he professed himself to be horrified, but for which he himself was mainly responsible. Our ancestors were taken in once, and bitterly they and

Europe rued it. The time was devoted to reorganising his forces for a deadlier attack than ever upon the liberties of Europe, and examples of that kind cause us to regard this Note with a considerable measure of reminiscent disquiet. We feel that we ought to know, before we can give favourable consideration to such an invitation, that Germany is prepared to accede to the only terms on which it is possible for peace to be obtained and maintained in Europe. What are those terms? They have been repeatedly stated by all the leading statesmen of the Allies. My right hon. friend has stated them repeatedly here and outside and all I can do is to quote, as my right hon. friend the Leader of the House did last week, practically the statement of the terms put forward by my right hon. friend :

“ Restitution, reparation, guarantee against repetition,” so that there shall be no mistake, and it is important that there should be no mistake in a matter of life and death to millions.

Let me repeat again—complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantee. Did the German Chancellor use a single phrase to indicate that he was prepared to concede such terms? Was there a hint of restitution, was there any suggestion of reparation, was there any indication of any security for the future that this outrage on civilization would not be again perpetrated at the first profitable opportunity? The very substance and style of the speech constitutes a denial of peace on the only terms on which peace is possible. He is not even conscious now that Germany has committed any offence against the rights of free nations. Listen to this from the Note :

“ Not for an instant have they (they being the Central Powers) swerved from the conviction that the respect of the rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests.”

When did they discover that? Where was the respect for the rights of other nations in Belgium and Serbia? Oh, that was self-defence! Menaced, I suppose, by the overwhelming armies of Belgium, the Germans had been intimidated into invading that country, to the burning of Belgian cities and villages, to the massacring of thousands of inhabitants, old and young, to the carrying of the survivors into bondage; yea, and they were carrying them into slavery at the very moment when this precious Note was being written about the unswerving conviction as to the respect of the rights of other nations! I suppose these outrages are the legitimate interest of Germany? We must know that it is not the mood of peace. If excuses of this kind for palpable crimes can be put forward two and a half years after the exposure by grim

facts of the guarantee, is there, I ask in all solemnity, any guarantee that similar subterfuges will not be used in the future to overthrow any treaty of peace you may enter into with Prussian militarism? This Note and that speech prove that not yet have they learned the very alphabet of respect for the rights of others. Without reparation, peace is impossible. Are all these outrages against humanity on land and on sea to be liquidated by a few pious phrases about humanity? Is there to be no reckoning for them? Are we to grasp the hand that perpetrated these atrocities in friendship without any reparation being tendered or given? I am told that we are to begin, Germany helping us, to exact reparation for all future violence committed after the war. We have begun already. It has already cost us so much, and we must exact it now so as not to leave such a grim inheritance to our children. Much as we all long for peace, deeply as we are horrified with war, this Note and the speech which propelled it afford us small encouragement and hope for an honourable and lasting compact.

What hope is given by that speech that the whole root and cause of this great bitterness, the arrogant spirit of the Prussian military caste, will not be as dominant as ever if we patch up a peace now? Why, the very speech in which these peace suggestions are made resounds to the boasts of Prussian military triumphs of victory. It is a long pæan over the victory of von Hindenburg and his legions. This very appeal for peace is delivered ostentatiously from the triumphant chariot of Prussian militarism. We must keep a steadfast eye upon the purpose for which we entered the war, otherwise the great sacrifices we have been making will be all in vain. The German Note states that it was for the defence of their existence and the freedom of national development that the Central Powers were constrained to take up arms. Such phrases cannot even deceive those who pen them. They are intended to delude the German nation into supporting the designs of the Prussian military caste. Whoever wishes to put an end to their existence and the freedom of their national development? We welcomed their development as long as it was on the paths of peace—the greater their development upon that road, the greater will all humanity be enriched by their efforts. That was not our design, and it is not our purpose now. The Allies entered this war to defend themselves against the aggression of the Prussian military domination, and, having begun it, they must insist that it can only end with the most complete and effective guarantee against the possibility of that caste ever again disturbing the peace of Europe. Prussia, since she got into the hands of that caste, has been a bad neighbour—arrogant, threatening, bullying, litigious, shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field after another from weaker

neighbours, and adding them to her own domain. With her belt ostentatiously full of weapons of offence, and ready at a moment's notice to use them, she has always been an unpleasant, disturbing neighbour in Europe. No wonder that she got thoroughly on the nerves of Europe. There was no peace near where she dwelt. It is difficult for those who are fortunate enough to live thousands of miles away to understand what it has meant to those who lived near her boundaries. Even here, with the protection of the broad seas between us, we know what a disturbing factor the Prussians were with their constant naval menace, but even we can hardly realize what it has meant to France and to Russia. Several times there were threats directed to them within the lifetime of this generation which presented the alternative of war or humiliation. There were many of us who hoped that internal influence in Germany would have been strong enough to check and ultimately to eliminate this hectoring. All our hopes proved illusory, and now that this great war has been forced by the Prussian military leaders upon France, Russia, Italy, and ourselves, it would be folly, it would be cruel folly, not to see to it that this swashbuckling through the streets of Europe to the disturbance of all harmless and peaceful citizens shall be dealt with now as an offence against the law of nations. The mere word that led Belgium to her own destruction will not satisfy Europe any more. We all believed it. We all trusted it. It gave way at the first pressure of temptation, and Europe has been plunged into this vortex of blood. We will, therefore, wait until we hear what terms and guarantees the German Government offer other than those, better than those, surer than those, which she so lightly broke, and meanwhile we shall put our trust in an unbroken Army rather than in a broken faith. For the moment I do not think it would be advisable for me to add anything upon this particular invitation. A formal reply will be delivered by the Allies in the course of the next few days.

I shall therefore proceed with the other part of the task which I have in front of me. What is the urgent task in front of the Government? To complete, and make even more effective, the mobilisation of all our national resources—mobilisation which has been going on since the commencement of the war—so as to enable the nation to bear the strain, however prolonged, and to march through to victory, however lengthy and however exhausting may be the journey. It is a gigantic task, and let me give this word of warning: If there be any who have given their confidence to the new Administration in expectation of a speedy victory they will be doomed to disappointment. I am not going to paint a gloomy picture of the military situation—if I did it would not be a true picture—but I must paint a stern picture, because

that accurately represents the facts. I have always insisted on the nation being taught to realise the actual facts of this war. I have attached enormous importance to that, at the risk of being characterised as a pessimist. I believe that a good many of our misunderstandings have arisen from exaggerated views which have been taken about successes and from a disposition to treat as trifling real set-backs. To imagine that you can only get the support and the help, and the best help, of a strong people by concealing difficulties is to show a fundamental misconception. The British people possess as sweet a tooth as anybody, and they like pleasant things put on the table. But that is not the stuff that they have been brought up on. That is not what the British Empire has been nourished on. Britain has never shown at its best except when it was confronted with a real danger and understood it.

Let us for a moment look at the worst. The Rumanian blunder was an unfortunate one. But, at worst, it prolongs the war; it does not alter the fundamental facts of the war. I cannot help hoping that it may even have a salutary effect in calling the attention of the Allies to obvious defects in their organisation, not merely the organisation of each, but the organisation of the whole, and if it does that and braces them up to fresh effort, it may prove, bad as it is, a blessing. That is the worst. That has been a real set-back. It is the one cloud—well, it is the darkest cloud—and it is a cloud that appeared on a clearing horizon. We are doing our best to make it impossible that that disaster shall lead to worse. That is why we have taken in the last few days very strong action in Greece. We mean to take no risks there. We have decided to take definite and decisive action, and I think it has succeeded. We have decided also to recognise the agents of that great Greek statesman, M. Venizelos.

I wanted to clear out of the way what I regarded as the worst features in the military situation, but I should like to say one word about the lesson of the fighting on the Western front, not about the military strategy, but about the significance of the whole of that great struggle, one of the greatest struggles ever waged in the history of the world. It is full of encouragement and of hope. Just look at it. An absolutely new Army! The old had done its duty, and spent itself in the achievement of its great task. This is a new Army. But a year ago it was ore in the earth of Britain, yea, and of Ireland. It became iron. It has passed through a fiery furnace, and the enemy knows that it is now fine steel—an absolutely new Army, new men, new officers, taken from schools. Boys from schools, from colleges, from counting-houses, never trained to war, never thought of war, many of them, perhaps, never handled a

weapon of war ; generals never given the opportunity of handling great masses of men. Some of us had seen the manœuvres. What would now be regarded as a Division attacking a small village is more than our generals ever had the opportunity of handling before the war. Compared with the great manœuvres on the Continent, they were toy manœuvres. And yet this new Army, new men, new officers, generals new to this kind of work, they have faced the greatest army in the world, the greatest army the world has ever seen, the best equipped and the best trained, and they have beaten them, beaten them, beaten them ! Battle after battle, day after day, week after week ! From the strongest entrenchments ever devised by human skill, they have driven them out by valour, by valour which is incredible when you read the story of it.

There is something which gives us hope, which fills us with pride in the nation to which they belong. It is a fact, and it is a fact full of significance for us—and for the foe. It is part of his reckoning as well. He has seen that Army grow and proved under his very eyes. A great French general said to me : “ Your Army is a new Army. It must learn, not merely generals, not merely officers, but the men must learn, not merely what to do, but how and when to do it.” They are becoming veterans, and therefore, basing our confidence upon these facts, I am as convinced as I ever was of ultimate victory if the nation proves as steady, as valorous, as ready to sacrifice, and as ready to learn and to endure as that great Army of our sons in France. That is all I shall say at the present moment about the military situation.

I should like now to say a word or two about the Government itself, and in doing so I am anxious to avoid all issues that excite irritation or controversy or disunion. This is not the time for that, but it must not be assumed if I do so that I accept as complete the accounts which have been given of the way in which the Government was formed. My attitude towards the policy of the late Administration of which I was a member, and for all whose deeds I am just as responsible as any one of them, has been given in letters and memoranda, and my reasons for leaving have also been given in a letter. If it were necessary, I should have, on personal grounds, welcomed its publication, but I am convinced that controversies as to the past will not help us as to the future, and therefore, as far as I am concerned, I place them on one side and go on with what I regard as the business of the Government under these trying conditions. I should like to say something first of all as to the unusual character and composition of the Government as an executive body.

The House has realised that there has been a separation between the functions of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House. That

was because we came to the conclusion that it was more than any one man, whatever his energy or physical strength might be, could do to undertake both functions in the middle of a great war. The task of the Leader of the House is a very anxious and absorbing task, even in war. I have not been able to attend the House very much myself during the last two or three years. But I have been here often enough to realise that the task of the Leader of the House of Commons is not a sinecure even in a war—friends of mine took care that it should not be so. So much for that point. Now there are three characteristics in the present Administration in which it may be said it has departed perhaps from precedent. First of all, there is the concentration of the Executive in a very few hands. The second is the choosing of men of administrative and business capacity rather than men of Parliamentary experience, where we were unable to obtain both for the headship of a great Department, and the third is a franker and fuller recognition of the partnership of Labour in the Government of this country. No Government that has ever been formed to rule this country has had such a share—such a number of men who all their lives have been associated with labour and with the labour organisations of this country. We realise that it is impossible to conduct war without getting the complete and unqualified support of labour, and we were anxious to obtain their assistance and their counsel for the purpose of the conduct of the war.

The fact that this is a different kind of organisation to any that preceded it is not a criticism upon its predecessors—not necessarily. They were peace structures. They were organised for a different purpose and a different condition of things. The kind of craft you have for river or canal traffic is not exactly the kind of vessel you construct for the high seas. I have no doubt that the old Cabinets—I am not referring to the last Cabinet—I am referring to the old system of Cabinets, where the heads of every department were represented inside the Cabinet—I have no doubt that the old Cabinets were better adapted to navigate the Parliamentary river with its shoals and shifting sands, and perhaps for a cruise in home waters. But a Cabinet of twenty-three is rather top-heavy for a gale. I do not say that this particular craft is best adapted for Parliamentary navigation, but I am convinced it is the best for the war, in which you want quick decision above everything. Look at the last two and a half years. I am not referring to what has happened in this country. When I say these things I would rather the House of Commons looked at the war as a whole and took the concerns of the Allies as a whole, and we are all perfectly certain, and I shall have the assent of my right hon. friend in this, that the Allies have suffered disaster after disaster through tardiness of decision and action,

very largely for reasons I shall give later on. I know in this I am in complete agreement with my right hon. friend. It is true that in a multitude of counsellors there is wisdom. That was written for Oriental countries in peace times. You cannot run a war with a Sanhedrin. That is the meaning of the Cabinet of five, with one of its members doing sentry duty outside, manning the walls and defending the Council Chamber against attack while we are trying to do our work inside.

Some concern has been expressed at the relations of this small executive to other members. It has been suggested that there is danger of lack of co-ordination and common direction; it has been wondered how we can ever meet: one very respectable newspaper suggests there ought to be weekly dinners to discuss matters of common concern. What is the difficulty? Whenever anything concerns a particular Department you follow precedent. This is not the first time you have had heads of Departments outside the Cabinet. As a matter of fact, the practice of putting every head of a Department inside the Cabinet is quite a modern innovation, and the way in which Governments have been in the habit of dealing with that situation is that whenever there is anything that concerns a particular Department the head of that Department, with his officers, attends the executive committee, and you immediately get into contact with each other and discuss those problems which require solution. That is an old practice. I think it is a very effective practice. It is very much better, especially in time of war, than keeping men away from their Departments discussing things which do not directly concern them. But while undoubtedly their counsel may be very valuable, when you have a considerable number of people brought together you are apt to create confusion and thus to delay decision. There is another point of departure and another change, and that is the amalgamation of the old War Committee with the Cabinet. The old War Committee had what the Cabinet had not—it had secretaries to keep a complete record of all decisions, and this no Cabinet has ever had. They were always a question of memory. That is the real difference between the War Committee and the Cabinet. In the War Committee a full record was taken of every decision, and the minutes were sent round to each member for correction. The matters dealt with there were just as confidential—I might even say more confidential—than the vast majority of questions decided in the Cabinet. Henceforth there will be no distinction between your War Committee and your War Cabinet. The secretary will always be there. We propose to strengthen his staff, so that we may have more direct means of communication and a more organised means of communication between the Cabinet and various Departments than you have ever had in the past. I come now to the

other point which has caused some misgiving. There seems to be a little concern lest the new organisation should have the effect of lessening Parliamentary control. I wonder why on earth it should do that. Each Minister answers for his Department exactly in the same way as under the old system. Each Minister is accountable for his department to Parliament, and the Government as a whole are accountable to Parliament. The control of Parliament as a whole must, and always must, be supreme because it represents the nation. There is not the slightest attempt here to derogate in any particular from the complete control of Parliament. I do not think the present methods of Parliamentary control are efficient, but that is not a change which has come about with the new Administration. I have always thought that the methods of Parliamentary control—and I speak here as a fairly old Parliamentarian—rather tended to give undue prominence to trivialities—my right hon. friend and I have talked over this matter many a time—and on the other hand it rather tended to minimise and ignore realities. Whether you can improve upon that I personally have never had any doubt, but I have always thought—I do not know whether I carry any one with me on this except my hon. friend who sits there—that the French system was a more effective one—the system whereby Ministers have to appear before Parliamentary Committees, where questions can be asked them, and where they can give an answer which they would not care to give in public. I think that in many respects that system has helped to save France from one or two very serious blunders. I am not committing the Government to that beyond this, that we are investigating that question. It is just possible we might refer the matter to Parliament to settle for itself, because it is not so much a question for the Government as a question for Parliament itself to decide, subject, of course, to any criticism or suggestion which the Government might wish to make, as to the best and most efficient methods during a period of war of exercising Parliamentary control over the Departments. Now I come to the work of the Government which the Government is cutting out for itself. I had hoped to be able to tell the House of Commons a good deal more upon three or four very vital matters than I am in a position to do, owing to reasons over which I have no control. I have not been able to confer with heads of Departments, nor with my friends in the Cabinet, and there are two or three questions upon which I should have liked to pronounce decisions to-day, but I am not in a position, unfortunately, to do so. My right hon. friend yesterday—the Home Secretary (Sir George Cave) in introducing a Bill and the Leader of the House subsequently—gave a very detailed account of the probable working of the new

Ministries, and therefore I shall have very little to say with regard to these. Take the Ministry of Labour. It has been urged for thirty years by organised Labour in this country, and my experience in the Ministry of Munitions has taught me this, that it was desirable there should be a Department which was not altogether in the position of employer to employed, to those who were concerned whenever there was a dispute about labour conditions or wages, but I hope that this Department will not confine itself merely to the settling of disputes. That is but a small part of the whole industrial problem which I hope this Ministry will assist in solving. I hope it will become in a real sense a Ministry with the well-being of labour in its charge. In the Munitions Department I had the privilege of setting up something that was known as the Welfare Department, which was an attempt to take advantage of the present malleability of industry in order to impress upon it more humanitarian conditions, to make labour less squalid and less repellent, and more attractive and more healthy. A number of very able volunteers are organising that Department, and I am glad to be able to say about some of them that they belong to the Society of Friends, and have had a rooted objection to war, which is due to the creed they profess—no one has doubted their sincerity—but they have never carried it so far as to say that during a war they should take no part in any national burden, and they are working hard in this Department. Then I am hoping that this Department will take a leading part in assisting in the mobilisation of labour for the purposes of the war, a matter to which I shall refer later on. I think my right hon. friend has already indicated to the House what we propose to do with regard to shipping. It was never so vital to the life of the nation as it is at the present moment during the war. It is the jugular vein which if severed would destroy the life of the nation, and the Government felt the time had come for taking over more complete control of all the ships of this country and placing them in practically the same position as are the railways of the country at the present moment, so that during the war shipping will be nationalised in the real sense of the term. The prodigious profits which were made out of freights were contributing in no small measure to the high cost of commodities, and I always found not only that, but that they were making it difficult for us in our task with labour. Whenever I met organised labour, under any conditions where I would persuade them to give up privileges, I always had hurled at me phrases about the undue and extravagant profits of shipping. This is intolerable in war time, when so many are making so great sacrifices for the State. Sir Joseph Maclay, one of the ablest shipowners in the United Kingdom, has undertaken to direct this great enterprise

with one sole object—the service of the country. He is now conferring with the Admiralty and the very able Shipping Control Committee, over which Lord Curzon presided, and I hope I shall be in a position to inform the House of the plans and projects he recommends should be taken, not merely for the more effective nationalisation of the ships which we have already on the register, but the speedy construction of more, so as to make up the wastage which I fear is inevitable in any great war, especially when you are dealing with such piratical methods as those which have characterised the maritime policy of the German Empire. With regard to mines, here the Government also feels, as the late Government did, that they are dealing with an essential commodity, which is the very life of industry. It is an essential ingredient to our military and industrial efficiency, and we ought to assume more direct control over, not merely one coalfield, but over the whole industry. The conditions are being carefully considered and will be stated to the House of Commons, but I am not sure whether we can place our plans before it before we separate. Now I feel I must say something about the food problem. It is undoubtedly serious and will be grave unless not merely the Government, but the nation is prepared to grapple with it courageously without loss of time. The main facts are fairly well known. The available harvests of the world have failed. Take Canada and the United States of America. As compared with last year, the harvests were hundreds of millions of bushels down, and that means that the surplus available for sale abroad is diminished to an extent which is disastrous. In times of peace we can always make up the deficiency in any particular country by resorting to another. If America failed there was Russia or the Argentine—but the Argentine promises badly—and Australia. Russia is not available; Australia means almost prohibitive transport. When we come to our own harvest, which is not a mean ingredient in the whole, not merely was the harvest a poor one, but, what is still more serious, during the time when the winter wheat ought to have been sown the weather was almost prohibitive, if not altogether, and I do not believe more than three-eighths of the usual sowing has taken place. Let us clearly understand what it means. Let us get to the bottom of this. Unless the nation knows what it means you cannot ask them to do their duty. It is true that to a certain extent you can make up by the spring sowing, but, as any agriculturist knows, that never produces anything comparable to the winter sowing.

Those are the main features so far as the harvest is concerned. We have always got the submarine menace, which in this respect is not the most important one to consider. Under these conditions it was

decided by the late Government to appoint a Food Controller, and we have actually appointed him—an able, experienced administrator, especially in these matters, and a man of great determination and force of character. He is assisted by the ablest experts in this House. We always know the quality of a man by opposing him for years, and my hon. friend (Captain Bathurst) many a time found it to be his duty to make himself very active on Bills which I had the burden of carrying through this House, so that I know something about his qualities. At the head of the Board of Agriculture we have a man who is singularly gifted, and who has as thorough a knowledge of the principles and the practices of this question as any man in this or any other country. I felt it important that we should secure the very best brains in the country to bear upon this very difficult and very dangerous problem. The problem is a double one—it is one of distribution and of production. In respect of both we must call upon the people of this country to make real sacrifices, but it is essential when we do so that the sacrifices should be equal. Over-consumption by the affluent must not be allowed to create a shortage for the less well-to-do. I am sure we can depend upon men and women of all conditions—to use an ordinary phrase which I am sure the House will allow me to use because it is thoroughly well understood—I hope we can appeal to men and women of all ranks and conditions to play the game. Any sort of concealment hurts the nation. It hurts it when it is fighting for its life. Therefore we must appeal to the nation as a whole, men and women—without the help of the whole nation we can accomplish nothing—to assist us so to distribute our resources that there shall be no man, woman, or child who will be suffering from hunger because some one else has been getting too much.

When you come to production, every available square yard must be made to produce food. The labour available for tillage should not be turned to more ornamental purposes until the food necessities of the country have been adequately safeguarded. The best use must be made of land and of labour to increase the food supplies of this country—corn, potatoes, and all kinds of food products. All those who have the opportunity must feel it is their duty to the State to assist in producing and in contributing to the common stock upon which everybody can draw. If they do this, we shall get food without any privation, without any want, everybody having plenty of the best and healthiest food. By that means, and that means alone, will the nation be able to carry through the war to that triumphal issue to which we all are looking forward. It means sacrifice. But what sacrifice? Talk to a man who has returned from the horrors of the Somme or who has been through the haunting wretchedness of a winter campaign, and you will

know something of what those gallant men are enduring for their country. They are enduring much, they are hazarding all, whilst we are living in comfort and security at home. You cannot have absolute equality of sacrifice. In a war that is impossible. But you can have equal readiness to sacrifice from all. There are hundreds of thousands who have given their lives, there are millions who have given up comfortable homes and exchanged them for a daily communion with death. Multitudes have given up those whom they love best. Let the nation as a whole place its comforts, its luxuries, its indulgencies, its elegancies, on a national altar, consecrated by such sacrifices as these men have made. Let us proclaim during the war a National Lent. The nation will be better and stronger for it, mentally and morally as well as physically. It will strengthen its fibre, it will ennoble its spirit. Without it we shall not get the full benefit of this struggle. Our Armies might drive the enemy out of the battered villages of France, across the devastated plains of Belgium. They might hurl them across the Rhine in battered disarray. But unless the nation as a whole shoulders part of the burden of victory it will not profit by the triumph, for it is not what a nation gains, it is what a nation gives that makes it great.

While the nation is making such enormous sacrifices as those I have already pointed out, it is intolerable that any section should be permitted to make exceptional profits out of those sacrifices, and by that means actually increase the burdens borne by others. A good deal has already been done by the late Administration to arrest unfair private profiteering out of the war. The Government have come to the conclusion that they cannot ask the nation for more sacrifices without even more drastic steps yet being taken. There are several ways of dealing with this problem. One is the annexation of all war profits. Another is the cutting down of prices so as to make excessive profits impossible. The Munitions Act adopted both of those expedients. Eighty per cent. of the profits in controlled firms were annexed. In addition to that, there has been a most searching and minute revision of prices in the controlled firms, and enormous reductions have already been achieved in those firms. The problem is now being carefully examined by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others, and we hope to be able to make an announcement shortly as to the course the Government intend to adopt. It is quite clear that if the nation must be asked to make further sacrifices in order to win the war the road should be cleared by action of this kind.

I now come to an even more difficult subject—one which is equally vital to the success of this country in this great war. I have hitherto talked largely of the mobilisation of the material resources of the nation.

I now come to the mobilisation of the labour reserves of the country, which are even more vital to our success than the former. Without this—let us make no mistake—we shall not be able to pull through. It is not the mere haphazard law of supply and demand that will accomplish that which is necessary to save the nation within the time that it is essential it should be accomplished. It is not a question of years. It is a question of months, perhaps of weeks. And unless not merely the material resources of the country, but the labour of the country is used to the best advantage, and every man is called upon to render such service to the State as he can best give, victory is beyond our reach. The problem with which we are confronted is a difficult one. Nearly a year ago we decided that in order to maintain our Armies in the field the nation must have complete control over all its military resources in men. But it is impossible to take men into the Army without taking them from civil employment of greater or less utility, and it has been our object—an object that becomes more and more plain as time goes on: it was plain to the late Administration as well as to ourselves—to establish such a system of recruiting as will ensure that no man is taken into the Army who is capable of rendering more useful service in industry. To complete our plan for the organisation of all the national resources, we ought to have power to say that every man who is not taken into the Army, whatever his position or rank, really is employed on work of national importance. For instance, I was constantly appealed to as Secretary of State for War to release men for agricultural work. The Army Council and those in charge were quite prepared to do so, but there was absolutely no guarantee that, if the men were released, they would be used for agricultural purposes—not the least. The moment they were released from the Army they were free to go to munition work, or to any other work where they thought they could sell their labour to the best advantage, or where they thought they could live under the most pleasant conditions.

We could not ensure that these men if released would be used for agricultural purposes, and we were constantly confronted with these difficulties. That is one of the problems with which you must deal if the nation is to have the full benefit of such labour reserves as are still left to it. At present it is only the man who is fitted for military service, and has not established a claim for exemption, on whom the nation can call. The unfit man and the exempted man are surely under the same moral obligation. But still there is no means of enforcing it. It is with this imperfect organisation of our industrial man-power that we are called upon to confront an enemy who not only exercises to the full his undoubted right over his own population, but has introduced the practice hitherto

unknown to civilised warfare of removing the civilian inhabitants of occupied territory to make good the shortage of labour in his own factories. It is necessary that we should make a swift and effective answer to Germany's latest move. As our Armies grow, our needs for munitions grow. There is a large part of our labour for munition purposes which is immobile. There may be a surplus in one factory and a shortage in another. We have no power to transfer men. As the months go by the cost of the war increases. Our purchases in neutral countries become more difficult to finance, yet there may be and there are thousands of men occupied in industries which consume our wealth at home, and do nothing to strengthen our credit abroad. Yet we have no power to transfer them from employment where they are wasting our strength and their own to employments where they could increase it. We have not even the organisation necessary for utilising them as volunteers.

These are the powers which we must take, and this is the organisation which we must complete. I could dwell upon it by the illustration of agriculture. There is undoubtedly in this country a considerable number of people skilled in tillage of the soil who are not producing food, but we cannot mobilise them. We cannot direct them. I believe that there are scores, if not hundreds of thousands, of people of that kind—there is no question here of military age—who if we could utilise them to the best advantage could produce great quantities of food in this country. But we cannot do it. Not only that. The difficulty in agriculture is the want of skilled men. You may have two or three skilled men on a particular farm, or the farmers may have no skilled men at all, yet two or three skilled men, if you could treat them as commissioned officers, could look after not merely one farm, but several farms, with the aid of unskilled men or women working under them. I cannot in the course of a speech like this give the whole details of the plans of my right hon. friends here, with regard to agriculture, but I can give an assurance that there are schemes of very great magnitude which have been formulated, and which are in course of being put into operation. They will involve great local organisation throughout the country. The matter was considered by the War Committee of the late Government, and it was unanimously decided by them that the time had come for the adoption of the principle of universal national service. It was one of the first matters taken up by the present Government, and the War Cabinet have unanimously adopted the conclusions come to by the preceding War Cabinet. I believe that the plans which we have made will secure every worker all that he has the right to ask for.

In order to do this it is proposed to appoint at once a Director of National Service to be in charge of both the military and the civil side

of universal National Service. The civil and military sides of the directory are to be entirely separate, and there will be a military and a civil director responsible to the Director of National Service. The military director will be responsible for recruiting for the Army, and will hand over to the War Office the recruits obtained. Here I need not elaborate, because it is not proposed to make any change in recruiting for military service. As regards civilian service, it is proposed that the director of National Service shall proceed by the scheduling of industries and of services according to their essential character during the war. Certain industries are regarded as indispensable, and the Departments concerned will indent upon the Director of National Service for the labour which they require for those services, and other services will be rationed in such matters as labour, raw material, and power. Labour that is set free from non-essential and rationed industries will be available to set free potential soldiers who are at present exempted from military service, and to increase the available supply of labour for essential services. This labour will be invited to enrol at once and be registered as war workers on lines analogous to the existing munitions volunteers, with similar provisions as to rates of pay and separation allowance.

I have no doubt that when it is realised how essential to the life of the nation it is that the services of every man should be put to the best use we shall secure an adequate supply of these volunteers. We are taking immediate steps to secure by this means the men we want. We shall begin as soon as may be to classify industries and invite the enrolment of volunteers. If it is found impossible to get the numbers we require—and I hope it will be possible—we shall not hesitate to come to Parliament and ask Parliament to release us from pledges given in other circumstances, and to obtain the necessary power for rendering our plans fully effective. The nation is fighting for its life, and it is entitled to the best services of all its sons. We have been fortunate in inducing the Lord Mayor of Birmingham (Mr. Neville Chamberlain) to accept the position of Director-General under this scheme. It was with very great difficulty that we induced him to undertake this very onerous duty, as the task with which he is identified in Birmingham is a matter of first-class importance to that great city, and it was only the urgent appeals made to him that induced him to undertake this great and onerous task. He will immediately proceed to organise this great new system of enrolment for industrial purposes, and I hope that before Parliament resumes its duties in another few weeks we shall be able to report that we have secured a sufficiently large industrial

army in order to mobilise the whole of the labour strength of this country for war purposes.

I wish it had been possible for me to have said something to-day about Ireland. I had hoped to be able to do so, but the circumstances to which I have already referred have made it impossible for me to devote my time and attention to the problems which have arisen in that country. I have had one or two preliminary interviews with my right hon. friend the Chief Secretary, and I have made arrangements for others on certain questions, but unfortunately I have not been able to attend to this and to many other equally insistent matters in the last few days. All I should like to say is this : I wish it were possible to remove the misunderstanding between Britain and Ireland which has for centuries been such a source of misery to the one and of embarrassment and weakness to the other. Apart from the general interest which I have taken in it, I should consider that a war measure of the first importance. I should consider it a great victory for the Allied Forces, something that would give strength to the armies of the Allies. I am convinced now that it is a misunderstanding—partly racial and partly religious. It is to the interest of both to have this misunderstanding removed ; but there seems to have been some evil chance that frustrated every effort made for the achievement of better relations. I wish that that misunderstanding could be removed. I tried once. I did not succeed.

The fault was not entirely on one side. I felt the whole time that we were moving in an atmosphere of nervous suspicion and distrust—pervasive, universal, of everything and everybody. I was drenched with suspicion of Irishmen by Englishmen and of Englishmen by Irishmen, and, worst and most fatal of all, suspicion by Irishmen of Irishmen. It was a quagmire of distrust which clogged the footsteps and made progress impossible. That is the real enemy of Ireland. If that could be slain I believe that it would accomplish an act of reconciliation that would make Ireland greater and Britain greater, and would make the United Kingdom and the Empire greater than they ever were before. That is why I have always thought and said that the real solution of the Irish problem is largely one of the better atmosphere. I am speaking not merely for myself, but for my colleagues when I say that we shall strive to produce that better feeling.

We shall strive by every means and by many hazards to produce that atmosphere, and we ask men of all races and men of all creeds and faith to help us, not to solve a political question, but to help us to do something that will be a real contribution to the winning of the war.

The achievements of the Navy speak for themselves. I do not

think that anything I can say would be in the least adequate to recognise the enormous and incalculable services that the great Navy of Britain has rendered, not merely to the Empire, but to the whole Allied cause. Not merely would victory have been impossible, but the war could not have been kept on for two and a half years had it not been for the services of the Navy. Now I come to the question of the Dominions. Ministers have repeatedly acknowledged the splendid assistance which the Dominions have given of their own free will to the old country in its championship of the cause of humanity. The great ideals of national fair play and justice appeal to the Dominions just as insistently as to us. They have recognised throughout that our fight is not a selfish one, that it is not merely a European quarrel, but that there are great world issues involved which their children are as concerned in as our children. The new Administration are as full of gratitude as the old for the superb valour which our kinsmen have shown in so many stricken fields. But that is not why I introduce the subject now. I introduce the subject now because I want to say that we feel the time has come when the Dominions ought to be more formally consulted as to the progress and course of the war, as to the steps that ought to be taken to secure victory, and as to the best methods of garnering in the fruits of their efforts as well as of our own. We propose, therefore, at an early date to summon an Imperial Conference, to place the whole position before the Dominions, and to take counsel with them as to what further action they and we can take together in order to achieve an early and complete triumph for the ideals they and we have superbly fought for.

As to our relations with the Allies—and this is the last topic I shall refer to—I ventured to say earlier in the year that there were two things we ought to seek as Allies—the first was unity of aim and the other unity of action. The first we have achieved. Never have Allies worked in better harmony or more perfect accord than the Allies in this great struggle. There has been no friction and there has been no misunderstanding. But when I come to the question of unity of action, I still think that there is a good deal left to be desired. I have only got to refer to the incident of Rumania, and each man can spell out for himself what I mean. The enemy have got two advantages—two supreme advantages. One is that they act on an internal line, and the other is that there is one great dominant power that practically directs the forces of all. We have neither of these advantages. We must therefore achieve the same end by other means. The advantages we possess are advantages which time improves. No one can say that we have made the best of that time. There has been a tardiness of decision and action. I forget who said about Necker

that he was like a clock that was always too slow. There is a little of that in the great Alliance clock—Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania.

Before we can take full advantage of the enormous resources at the command of the Allies there must be some means of arriving at quicker and readier decisions, and of carrying them out. I believe that that can be done, and if we quicken our action, as well as our decisions, it will equalise the conditions more than we have succeeded in doing in the past. There must be more consultation, more real consultation, between the men who matter in the direction of affairs. There must be less of the feeling that each country has got its own front to look after. They have carried it so far that almost each Department might have a front of its own. The policy of a common front must be a reality. It is on the other side. Austrian guns are helping German infantry, and German infantry are stiffening Austrian arms. The Turks are helping Germans and Austrians, and Bulgarians mix with all. There is an essential feeling that there is but one front, and I believe we have got to get that more and more, instead of having overwhelming guns on one side, and bare breasts, gallant breasts, on the other. It is essential for the Allies, not merely to realize that, but to carry it out in policy and action. I take this opportunity at the beginning of this new Administration of emphasizing that point, because I believe it is the one essential for great victory, and for the curtailment of the period before victory arrives.

I end with one personal note, for which I hope the House will forgive me. May I say, and I say it in all sincerity, that it is one of the deepest regrets of my life that I should part from the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Asquith). Some of his friends know how I strove to avert it. For years I served under the right hon. gentleman, and I am proud to say so. I never had a kinder or more indulgent chief. If there were any faults of temper, they were entirely mine, and I have no doubt I must have been difficult at times. No man had greater admiration for his brilliant intellectual attainments, and no man was happier to serve under him. For eight years we differed as men of such different temperaments must necessarily differ, but we never had a personal quarrel, in spite of serious differences in policy, and it was with deep, genuine grief that I felt it necessary to tender my resignation to my right hon. friend. But there are moments when personal and party considerations must sink into absolute insignificance, and if in this war I have given scant heed to the call of party, and so I have—although I have been as strong a party man as any in this House—if I have not done that during this war it is because I realised from the moment the Prussian cannon hurled death at a peaceable and inoffensive little country, that a challenge had been sent to civilisation to decide an issue higher than party, deeper

than party, wider than all parties, an issue upon the settlement of which will depend the fate of men in this world for generations when existing parties will have fallen like dead leaves on the highway. Those issues are the issues that I want to keep in front of the nation, so that we shall not falter or faint in our resolve. There is a time in every prolonged and fierce war in the passion and rage of conflict when men forget the high purpose with which they entered it. This is a struggle for international right, international honour, international good faith—the channel along which peace, honour, and goodwill must flow amongst men. The embankment laboriously built up by generations of men against barbarism has been broken, and, had not the might of Britain passed into the breach, Europe would have been inundated with a flood of savagery and unbridled lust of power. The plain sense of fair play amongst nations, the growth of an international conscience, the protection of the weak against the strong by the stronger, the consciousness that justice has a more powerful backing in this world than greed, the knowledge that any outrage upon fair dealing between nations, great or small, will meet with prompt and meritable chastisement—these constitute the causeway along which humanity was progressing slowly to higher things. The triumph of Prussia would sweep it all away, and leave mankind to struggle helpless in the morass. That is why since this war began I have known but one political aim. For that I have fought with a single eye. That is, the rescue of mankind from the most overwhelming catastrophe that has ever yet menaced its well-being.

BRITAIN'S WELCOME TO AMERICA AS AN ALLY

(Delivered at the American Luncheon Club, London, April 12th, 1917).

I AM in the happy position, I think, of being the first British Minister of the Crown who, speaking on behalf of the people of this country, can salute the American nation as comrades in arms. I am glad. I am proud. I am glad not merely because of the stupendous resources which this great nation can bring to the succour of the Alliance, but I rejoice as a democrat that the advent of the United States into this war gives the final stamp and seal to the character of the conflict as a struggle against military autocracy throughout the world.

That was the note that rang through the great deliverance of President Wilson. The United States of America have a noble tradition, never broken, of having never engaged in a war except for liberty, and

this is the greatest struggle for liberty they have ever embarked upon. I am not at all surprised, when one recollects the wars of the past, that America took its time to make up its mind about the character of this struggle. In Europe most of the great wars of the past were waged for dynastic aggrandizements and for conquest. No wonder that when this great war started there were some elements of suspicion still lurking in the minds of the people of the United States of America. . . .

The fact that the United States of America has made up its mind finally makes it abundantly clear to the world that this is no struggle of that character, but a great fight for human liberty. . . .

There are two great facts which clinch the argument that this is a great struggle for freedom. The first is the fact that America has come in. She could not have done otherwise. The second is the Russian Revolution. When France in the eighteenth century sent her soldiers to America to fight for the freedom and independence of that land France also was an autocracy. But when the Frenchmen were in America their aim was freedom, their atmosphere was freedom, and their inspiration was freedom. They acquired a taste for freedom and they took it home, and France became free. That is the story of Russia. Russia engaged in this great war for the freedom of Serbia, of Montenegro, and Bulgaria. Russians have fought for the freedom of Europe, and they wanted to make their own country free. They have done it. The Russian Revolution is not merely the outcome of the struggle for freedom. It is a proof of its character as a struggle for liberty. And if the Russian people realize, as there is evidence they are doing, that national discipline is not incompatible with national freedom, and know that national discipline is essential to the security of national freedom, they will indeed become a free people. . . .

We know what America can do ; and we also know that now she is in it she will do it. She will wage an effective and successful war.

There is something more important. She will ensure a beneficent peace. I am the last man in the world—knowing for three years what our difficulties have been, what our anxieties have been, what our fears have been—to deny that the succour which is given us from America is something to rejoice in, and rejoice greatly ; but I do not mind telling you that I rejoice even more in the knowledge that America is going to win her right to be at the conference table when the terms of peace are being discussed. That conference will settle the destiny of nations, the course of human life, for God knows how many ages. It would have been a tragedy for mankind if America had not been there, and there with all the influence, and the power, and the right which she has now won by flinging herself into this great struggle.

I can see peace coming now, not a peace which would be a beginning of war, not a peace which would be an endless preparation for strife and bloodshed ; but a real peace. The world is an old world which has never had peace. It has been rocking, swaying like the ocean, and Europe—poor Europe—has always lived under the menace of the sword. When this war began two-thirds of Europe was under autocratic rule. It is the other way about now, and democracy means peace. The democracy of France did not want war. The democracy of Italy hesitated long before entering the war. The democracy of this country shrank from it and shuddered, and would never have entered that cauldron if it had not been for the invasion of Belgium. Democracy sought peace, strove for peace, and if Prussia had been a democracy there would have been no war.

But strange things have happened in this war, and stranger things are to come—and they are coming rapidly. There are times in history when the world spins so leisurely along its destined course that it seems for centuries to be at a standstill. There are also times when it rushes along at a giddy pace covering the track of centuries in a year. These are the times we are living in now. Six weeks ago Russia was an autocracy. She is now one of the most advanced democracies in the world. To-day we are waging the most devastating war that the world has ever seen. To-morrow—not perhaps a distant to-morrow—war may be abolished for ever from the categories of human crimes.

WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE

(1809-1898).

GLADSTONE made more speeches and better ones on a greater variety of subjects than any other Englishman of his generation.

In politics, in literature, in everything that concerned the world's forward movement, his intellectual sympathies were universal, or as nearly so as it is possible for any man's to be. If men less intellectual, less self-contained than he, have learned a road to power over other minds shorter than the purely intellectual by so living—

"Ut ridentibus arident, ita flentibus adflent—"

Gladstone certainly had everything as an orator which the broadest culture of the scholar and the steadiest tension of the thinker can give any man.

In such speeches as that accepting the freedom of the city of Glasgow in 1865, Mr. Gladstone surpasses himself as some may hold, but if, under the inspiration of great ideas, he shows an enthusiasm and freedom, which do not characterize his political speeches, it must be remembered that the tone of English parliamentary speeches is almost conversational; that, by force of an authoritative habit, only broken down in great emergencies, the discussion of English public affairs tends to the prosaic.

Born at Liverpool, December 29th, 1809, Gladstone received the most careful and thorough education the English system can give. He graduated with double honours (in classics and mathematics) at Oxford, and a year later (1832) entered public life under what he must afterwards have considered inauspicious conditions. His father, Sir John Gladstone, Bart., a prominent Liverpool merchant, of aristocratic Scotch descent, was a Tory, and in the first election after the passage of the Reform Bill, the young Double-Honours man from Oxford was sent to Parliament to represent a "pocket borough" controlled by the Duke of Newcastle. Like Fox in this particular, he was like him also in following a natural bent towards the Whigs or "Liberals," as they were now called.

After holding Cabinet positions as a Conservative, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer under the Coalition Ministry of 1852, and, through the action and reaction of the opposing forces of English politics developed into the leading Liberal of his day, recognized at his retirement in 1894 as one of the greatest statesmen of Europe. His influence as a Liberal

leader during the last ten years of his political life had been so overwhelming that his death, May 19th, 1898, left his party unable or unwilling to give his successor the confidence it had given him, and the result was a strong political reaction against the Liberalism which, as he understood it, meant enlarged liberty for the individual, better defined sovereignty for the people, and freer, more peaceful co-operation among all nations.

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

(Delivered at the City Hall, Glasgow, November 1st, 1865, on the Presentation of the Freedom of that City to Mr. Gladstone).

I NEED hardly tell you that it is with the liveliest and deepest feelings of satisfaction that I accept from your hands, my lord, the gift you have been pleased to present to me, to be preserved, I hope, for many long years, among the records and the treasures of my family. I have no doubt—indeed, I feel too well assured—that a critical judgment might find ample scope for remark upon the too flattering terms in which you have been pleased to advert to my public conduct, but still I presume to say that such acknowledgments as you are pleased to make on occasions like the present, of the feeble and humble efforts of any individual to render services to his country, are the choicest rewards that we can receive for the past, and are the greatest encouragements and incentives, the greatest and most powerful aids for the future. But such occasions lead us to review the position in which we stand, and to reflect upon that which has been and that which is to be ; and perhaps it might at first sight appear strange if upon an occasion so joyous, when I have received at your hands an honour so deeply valued, I confess to you that a powerful, perhaps a predominant, feeling in my mind at the present juncture is a feeling of solitariness in the struggles and in the career of public life. The Lord Provost has alluded briefly, but touchingly and justly alluded, to the loss we have just sustained, and has intimated to you that the covenant which brings me before you was a covenant concluded before that loss had taken place ; but, indeed, the retrospect of the last five years is in this regard a touching and melancholy retrospect. Sad, numerous, and wide have been the blanks which death has made in the ranks of our public men, and not alone of our official public men, for many in this country are the public men, many are the statesmen who render true and vital service to the land, but who have never touched a public salary. Within these five years we have

lost him whom I must name as the most illustrious in his position and his office,—the beloved husband of our Queen, revered, admired, loved by all classes of the community, and one whose departure from this mortal home has inflicted on the Sovereign so dear to our hearts a loss that never on this side the grave can be repaired. I pass from the Prince Consort to another name, widely, indeed, separated from him in social rank, but yet a name which is great at this moment in the esteem of the country, and which will be forever great in its annals,—I mean the name of Richard Cobden,—so simple, so true, so brave, and so far-seeing a man, who knew how to associate himself at their very root with the deep interests of the community in which he lived, and to whom it was given to achieve, through the moral force of reason and persuasion, numerous triumphs that have made his name immortal. But if I look to the ranks of official life, perhaps it may cause even surprise, though we know that our losses have been heavy, when I say that my own recollection supplies me,—and there may be more which that recollection does not suggest,—that my own recollection supplies me with the names of no less than seventeen persons who have died within the last five years, and whose duty and privilege it was to advise the Sovereign as members of the Government of this country. As to the last of these men, the distinguished man whose loss at this moment the whole community in every class and in every corner of the land deeply and sincerely deplores, we have this consolation—that it had pleased the Almighty to afford him strength and courage which carried him to a ripe old age in the active service of his country. It has not been so with all. It has been my lot to follow to the grave several of those distinguished men who have been called away from the scene of their honourable labours—not, indeed, before they had acquired the esteem and confidence of the country, but still at a period when the minds and expectations of their fellow-countrymen were fondly fixed upon the thought of what they might yet achieve for the public good. Two of your own countrymen, Lord Elgin and Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning, Lord Herbert, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, and the Duke of Newcastle, by some singular dispensation of Providence, have been swept away in the full maturity of their faculties, and in the early stages of middle life—a body of men strong enough of themselves in all the gifts of wisdom and of knowledge, of experience and of eloquence, to have equipped a cabinet for the service of the country.

And, therefore, my lord, when I look back upon the years that have passed, though they have been joyful years in many respects, because they have been years in which the Parliament of this country has earned fresh and numerous titles to the augmented confidence of its citizens,

they are also mournful in that I seem to see the long procession of the figures of the dead, and I feel that those who are left behind are in one sense solitary upon the stage of public life. But, my Lord Provost, it is characteristic of this country that her people have been formed for many generations in those habits of thought and action which belong to regulated freedom, and one happy and blessed result of that description of public education is, that the country ceases to be dependent for its welfare upon this man or upon that. There never has yet been in the history of the world a nation truly free—I mean a nation that is free, not only in laws and institutions, but also in thoughts and acts ; there has never been a nation in this sense possessed of freedom, and which has likewise had large and spreading and valuable interests, which has found a want of men to defend them. Nor, my Lord Provost, I am thankful to say, have we yet been reduced to this extremity, and I trust that I am not going beyond the liberty of an occasion such as this when, standing before you at a moment of such public interest, I venture to express my confidence personally in the state of the Government and the country. Her Majesty, well aware of the heavy loss which we have sustained, and wisely exercising her high prerogative, has chosen from among the statesmen of the country Earl Russell to fill the place of Prime Minister. I know well the inclination of those whom I am addressing, and also of the whole community, to trust more to the evidence of facts than to that of words, which may be idle and delusive, and I presume to say before you that the name of Lord Russell is in itself a pledge and a promise to a people. A man who fought for British liberty, for our institutions, and for our laws, but with a view to the strengthening of those laws—who has fought on a hundred fields for their improvement, is not likely now, when in his seventy-third honourable year, to unlearn the lesson of his whole life, to change the direction of his career, and to forfeit the inheritance which he has secured in the hearts and memories of his countrymen. Therefore, my Lord Provost, I venture to think that the country has reasonable assurance in the name of the person who has for the second time assumed the responsibility of guiding the councils of the Crown, with the aid of many experienced and distinguished persons whom I am happy to call my colleagues,—I therefore hope that the country has reasonable assurance that the same wise and enlightened spirit which has for the last thirty or thirty-five years distinguished in the main the policy of British legislation, and the conduct of the Executive Government, will still continue to be exhibited by those who will have the responsibility and direction of public affairs. My Lord Provost, if we look to the acts of the period through which we have been passing, they are, indeed, too numerous to allow of reference in detail. The

acts of legislation and of government in which my share has been, if earnest, yet secondary—those acts of legislation and government have embraced almost every subject that can be of interest to a free and civilized community. In the period which our own recollection comprehends, we have seen the popular franchise wisely and temperately, yet boldly, enlarged ; we have seen the education of the people immensely extended, with, at the same time, all due regard to the sanctity and integrity of religion on the one hand, and to the feelings of private conscience on the other ; we have seen religious disabilities, for the most part, swept away ; we have seen questions of social policy, deeply interesting and deeply momentous, asserting from year to year greater and still greater importance ; we have seen, as I have said, the principle on which and the method by which taxes are taken from the people largely reconsidered and revised ; and we have seen all these changes made with a view to the promotion of one great end—the freedom of intercourse, not only among the members of our own community, but also among the various members of the great human family, the nations of the world. Well, my Lord Provost, in my prime I have taken part in the struggles of political parties, and it may be my lot to continue to bear a share in them. I do not desire to shrink from them, and I will not disavow nor undervalue the use of party combinations. It is by means of party combinations as a general rule, and by those means alone, that the matured convictions of experience can find the final and distinctive expression in the form of laws and institutions ; but yet party is only an instrument ; it is an instrument for ends higher than itself, and those ends are the strength, the welfare, and the prosperity of our country. We may now presume to say that it is the peculiar felicity of our time that the good of each to the country is not now to be regarded, as it was in old times, as something distinct from the good of the rest of mankind ; but on the contrary, when we labour for the advancement of our countrymen we labour likewise for the advantage of the whole world. Therefore, my Lord Provost, when I look back on the numberless changes in these various chapters of legislative and constitutional improvement, I confess that the most fertile result of all,—although I have no desire to disparage the others, for they are intimately woven together, as it were, with a silver cord,—the most fertile result, probably, is that which I may describe in the well-known familiar and beloved words, the promotion of free trade.

It is quite unnecessary before this audience—I may venture to say it is unnecessary before any audience of my countrymen—to dwell at this period of our experience upon the material benefits that have resulted from free trade, upon the enormous augmentation of national power which it has produced, or even upon the increased concord which it has

tended so strongly to promote throughout the various sections of the community. But it is the characteristic of the system which we so denominate, that while it comes forward with homely pretensions, and professes, in the first instance, to address itself mainly to questions of material and financial interests, yet, in point of fact, it is fraught and charged throughout with immense masses of moral, social, and political results. I will not now speak of the very large measure of those results which are domestic, but I would ask you to consider with me for a few moments the effect of the system of unrestricted intercourse upon the happiness of the human family at large. Now, as far as that happiness is connected with the movements of nations, war has been its great implement. And *what have been the great causes of wars?* They do not come upon the world by an inevitable necessity, or through a providential visitation. They are not to be compared with pestilences and famines, even; in that respect, though, we have learned, and justly learned, that much of what we have been accustomed to call providential visitation is owing to our neglect of the wise and prudent means which man ought to find in the just exercise of his faculties for the avoidance of calamity; but with respect to wars, they are the direct and universal consequence of the unrestricted, too commonly of the unbridled, passions and lusts of men. If we go back to a very early period of society, we find a state of things in which, as between one individual and another, no law obtained—a state of things in which the first idea almost of those who desired to better their condition was simply to better it by the abstraction of their neighbour's property. In the early periods of society, piracy and unrestrained freebooting among individuals were what wars, for the most part, have been in the more advanced periods of human history. Why, what is the case with a war? It is a case in which both cannot be right, but in which both may be wrong. I believe if the impartiality of the historian survey a very large proportion of the wars that have desolated the world—some, indeed, there may be, and undoubtedly there have been, in which the arm of valour has been raised simply for the cause of freedom and justice—that the most of them will be found to belong to that less satisfactory category in which folly, passion, greediness, on both sides have led to effects which afterwards, when too late, have been so much deplored. We have had in the history of the world religious wars. The period of these wars I trust we have now outlived. I am not at all sure that there was not quite as much to be said for them as for a great many other wars which have been recorded in the page of history. The same folly which led to the one led, in another form, to the other. We have had dynastic wars, wars of succession, in which, for long periods of years, the heads of rival

families have fought over the bleeding persons of their people, to determine who should govern them. I trust we have overlived the period of wars of that class. Another class of wars, of a more dangerous and yet a more extensive description, have been territorial wars. No doubt it is a very natural, though it is a very dangerous and a very culpable sentiment, which leads nations to desire their neighbours' property, and I am sorry to think that we have had examples—perhaps we have an example even at this moment before our eyes—to show that even in the most civilized parts of the world, even in the midst of the oldest civilization upon the continent of Europe, that thirst for territorial acquisition is not yet extinct. But I wish to call your attention to a peculiar form in which, during the later part of human history, this thirst for territorial acquisition became an extensive cause of bloodshed. It was when the colonizing power took possession of the European nations. It seems that the world was not wide enough for them. One would have thought, upon looking over the broad places of the earth, and thinking how small a portion of them is even now profitably occupied, and how much smaller a portion of them a century or two centuries ago—one would have thought there would have been ample space for all to go and help themselves ; but, notwithstanding this, we found it necessary, in the business of planting colonies, to make those colonies the cause of bloody conflicts with our neighbours ; and there was at the bottom of that policy this old lust of territorial aggrandizement. When the state of things in Europe had become so far settled that that lust could not be as freely indulged as it might in barbarous times, we then carried our armaments and our passions across the Atlantic, and we fought upon American and other distant soils for the extension of our territory. That was one of the most dangerous and plausible, in my opinion, of all human errors ; it was one to which a great portion of the wars of the last century was due ; but had our forefathers then known, as we now know, the blessings of free commercial intercourse, all that bloodshed would have been spared. For what was the dominant idea that governed that policy ? It was this, that colonizing, indeed, was a great function of European nations, but the purpose of that colonization was to reap the profits of extensive trade with the colonies which were founded, and, consequently, it was not the error of one nation or of another—it was the error of all nations alike. It was the error of Spain in Mexico, it was the error of Portugal in Brazil, it was the error of France in Canada and Louisiana, it was the error of England in her colonies in the West Indies and her possessions in the East ; and the whole idea of colonization, all the benefits of colonization, were summed up in this, that when you had planted a colony on the other side of the ocean,

you were to allow that colony to trade exclusively and solely with yourselves. But from that doctrine flowed immediately all those miserable wars, because if people believed, as they then believed, that the trade with colonies must, in order to be beneficial, necessarily be exclusive, it followed that at once there arose in the mind of each country a desire to be possessed of the colonies of other countries, in order to secure the extension of this exclusive trade. In fact, my Lord Provost, I may say, such was the perversity of the misguided ingenuity of man, that during the period to which I refer, he made commerce itself, which ought to be the bond and link of the human race, the cause of war and bloodshed, and wars were justified both here and elsewhere—justified when they were begun, and gloried in when they had ended—upon the ground that their object and effect had been to obtain from some other nation a colony which previously had been theirs, but which now was ours, and which, in our folly, we regarded as the sole means of extending the intercourse and the industry of our countrymen. Well, now, my Lord Provost, that was a most dangerous form of error, and for the very reason that it seemed to abandon the old doctrine of the unrestricted devastation of the world, and to contemplate a peaceful end ; but I am thankful to say that we have entirely escaped from that delusion. It may be that we do not wisely when we boast ourselves over our fathers. The probability is that as their errors crept in unperceived upon them, they did not know their full responsibility ; so other errors in directions as yet undetected may be creeping upon us. Modesty bids us in our comparison, whether with other ages or with other countries, to be thankful—at least, we ought to be—for the downfall of every form of error, and determined we ought to be that nothing shall be done by us to give countenance to its revival, but that we will endeavour to assist those less fortunate than ourselves in emancipating themselves from the like delusions. I need not say that as respects our colonies they have ceased to be—I would almost venture to say a possible, at any rate they have ceased to be a probable cause of war, for now we believe that the greatness of our country is best promoted in its relations with our colonies by allowing them freely and largely to enjoy every privilege that we possess ourselves ; and so far from grudging it, if we find that there are plenty of American ships trading with Calcutta, we rejoice in it, because it contributes to the wealth and prosperity of our Indian empire, and we are perfectly assured that the more that wealth and prosperity are promoted, the larger will be the share of it accruing to ourselves through the legitimate operation of the principles of trade. But the beneficial influence of free trading intercourse is far wider than this. You stated that a treaty had been made with France, and certainly a treaty with France

is even in itself a measure of no small consequence ; but that which gives to a measure of the kind its highest value is its tendency to produce beneficial imitations in other quarters ; it is the influence which is given to the cause of freedom of trade by the great example held out by the two most powerful nations of Europe ; it is the fact that in concluding that treaty we did not give to one a privilege which was withheld from another, and that our treaty with France was, in effect, a treaty with the world. And what are the moral consequences which engagements of this kind carry in their train ? I know there is no part of the providential government of the world which tends more deeply to impress the mind with a sense of the profound wisdom and boundless benevolence of the Almighty than when we observe how truly and how universally great effects spring from small causes, and high effects from causes which appear to have been mean. Now, we have said that, with respect to the freedom of commercial intercourse, reduction of tariffs, abolition of duties, and readjustment of commercial laws, that these are things which, in the first instance, touch material interests, and there are some men so widely mistaken as to suppose that they touch material interests alone. There are some men, aye, and high-minded men too, who would bid you beware of such things, lest they should lead simply to the worship of Mammon. Now, the worship of Mammon is dangerous to us all, but, as far as regards the great masses, the more numerous masses of every community, that portion of the human family which at present has not much to spare in respect to the essentials of raiment, of food, and of lodging—that portion of the human family has hardly yet reached the province in which the worship of Mammon is wont to be dreaded ; but that is a subject for the private conscience, and a subject of the greatest importance.

There is no doubt that an infinity of moral danger surrounds a state of things in which multitudes of men find themselves rapidly possessed of great fortunes and entirely changing their social position. I do not deny that at the proper time and in the proper place it is a subject for the most solemn consideration ; but I don't think it the duty of Parliament to withhold laws which are good from any fear of their leading to the worship of Mammon. That is an argument which, if good in one case, would be urged with equal force against all blessings of Providence ; for what is more dangerous to the human soul than those blessings of Providence when their great author is forgotten ? But, I say, it is marvellous to see how the Almighty makes provision through the satisfaction of our lower wants and appetites for the attainment of higher aims, and the relations of business are doubtless founded upon pecuniary profit, as are also the relations of the tradesmen and customers ; yet

what is their immediate aim? The customer wants to be supplied wherever those supplies are best and cheapest, while the tradesman seeks to dispose of them wherever they are dearest. What are the relations between the employer and the employed? The master wishes to produce as cheaply as he can, and the workman wishes to get the best wages he can. The landlord obtains the highest rent he can safely ask, and the tenant obtains his farm as cheaply as he can; and such is the rule that runs through all these pecuniary relations of life. Human beings on the two sides of the water are coming to know one another better, and to esteem one another more; they are beginning to be acquainted with one another's common interest and feeling, and to unlearn the prejudices which make us refuse to give to other nations and peoples in distant lands credit for being governed by the same motives and principles as ourselves. We may say that labelled upon all those parcels of goods there is a spark of kindly feeling from one country to the other, and the ship revolving between those lands is like the shuttle upon a loom, weaving the web of concord between the nations of the earth. Therefore I feel that that which may be in its first and in its outer aspect a merely secular work is in point of fact a work full of moral purpose, and those who have given themselves to it, either in times when the system of free trade has become prosperous, or in earlier times before those principles were accepted as they now are, could easily afford to bear the reproach that they were promoting the worship of Mammon, or that they were conversant only with the exterior and inferior interests of men. In all cases it is the quiet, unassuming prosecution of daily duty by which we best fulfil the purpose to which the Almighty has appointed us; and the task, humble as it may appear, of industry and of commerce, contemplating, in the first instance, little more than the necessities and the augmentation of our comforts, has in it nothing that prevents it from being pursued in a spirit of devotion to higher interests; and if it be honestly and well pursued, I believe that it tends, with a power quiet and silent, indeed, like the power of your vast machines, but at the same time manifold and resistless, to the mitigation of the woes and sorrows that afflict humanity, and to the acceleration of better times for the children of our race. Wars, my Lord Provost, are not to be put down by philosophical nor, I believe, even exclusively religious argument. The deepest prejudices of man and the greatest social evils are only supplanted and undermined by causes of silent operation; and I must say that, for my own part, I am given to dwell upon the thought that the silent and tranquil operations of these causes in connection with the vast industry of this country constitute for us, not only a promise of stability and material power, but likewise a mission that has been

placed in our hands, that in being benefactors to ourselves we may also hope to be benefactors to the world. And, Sir, I trust, and I may say I feel well convinced, that the ideas upon which the whole of these movements depend are now well rooted in this country. Such prejudices as may remain adverse to freedom of industry or freedom of trade in any of its developments are, I hope and believe, gradually fading away. It is not easy to part with them, because we must admit, and especially we must admit, so far as the working classes are concerned, that the first reorganization of these principles may involve, or may appear to involve, something of a personal sacrifice ; but the whole mind in this community is perfectly, I believe, fixed in the conviction that these principles are the only principles upon which a country can be justly governed ; nor need I say that which is so well known, that this, at least, is a country in which the conviction of the people must be the regulator of the State. My Lord Provost, I once more thank you for the honour that you have been pleased to do me. I think that, so far as the prospects of our politics are concerned, the reference that I have made to the name of the distinguished person who has succeeded to the head of the Government is, perhaps, more becoming, and is likewise of a character to carry greater weight, than any mere professions that I could lay down before you of a desire to serve my country. It is an arduous task to which we are called.

I do not hesitate to say that the most painful, the most frequently recurring sentiments of public life must, I think, be a sense of the inadequacy of resources, inadequacy of physical strength, inadequacy of mental strength, to meet its innumerable obligations ; at the same time that pain is not aggravated by a sense that our shortcomings are severely judged. We serve a sovereign whose confidence has ever been largely given to the counsellors who are charged with public responsibility, and we act for a people ever ready to overlook shortcomings, to pardon errors, to construe intentions favourably, and to recognize, with a warmth and generosity beyond measure, any amount of real service that may have been conferred. We ought, therefore, to be cheerful ; we ought, above all, to be grateful in the position in which we stand. And these are not mere idle words, but they are what the situation evidently demands and exacts from us all, when we assure you that it is a rich reward to come among great masses of our most cultivated and intelligent fellow-citizens, to find ourselves cheered on, in our course, by acknowledgments such as that which you have given me to-day. We have little to complain of ; we have much, indeed, to acknowledge with thankfulness ; and most of all, we have to delight in the recollection that the politics of this world are—perhaps very slowly, with many hindrances, many

checks, many reverses, yet that upon the whole they are—gradually assuming a character which promises to be less and less one of aggression and offence ; less and less one of violence and bloodshed ; more and more one of general union and friendliness ; more and more one connecting the common reciprocal advantages, and the common interests pervading the world, and uniting together the whole of the human family in a manner which befits rational and immortal beings, owing their existence to one Creator, and having but one hope either for this world or the next.

HOME RULE AND AUTONOMY

(Delivered in the House of Commons, May 10th, 1886).

I WAS the latest of the Members of this House who had an opportunity of addressing the House in the debate on the introduction of this bill, yet I think no one will be surprised at my desiring to submit some observations in moving the second reading. And this, on the double ground : First of all, because unquestionably the discussion has been carried on since the introduction of the bill throughout the country with remarkable liveliness and activity ; and, second, because so many criticisms have turned on an important particular of the bill with respect to which the Government feels it to be an absolute duty on our part that we should, without delay whatever, render to the House the advantage of such explanations, as, consistently with our public duty, it may be in our power to make.

I am very sorry to say that I am obliged to introduce into this speech—but only, I hope, to the extent of a very few sentences—a statement of my own personal position in regard to this question, which I refrained from mentioning to the House at the time when I asked for leave to bring in the bill. But I read speeches which some gentlemen opposite apparently think it important to make to their constituencies, and which contain statements so entirely erroneous and baseless that, although I do not think it myself to be a subject of great importance and relevancy to the question, yet as they do think it to be so, I am bound to set them right, and to provide them with the means of avoiding similar errors on future occasions. Although it is not a very safe thing for a man who has been for a long time in public life—and sometimes not very safe even for those who have been for a short time in public life—to assert a negative, still I will venture to assert that I have never,

in any period of my life, declared what is now familiarly known as Home Rule in Ireland to be incompatible with imperial unity. Yes; exactly so. My sight is bad, and I am not going to make personal references; but I dare say the interruption comes from some Member who has been down to his constituents and has made one of those speeches stuffed full of totally untrue and worthless matter.

I will go on to say what is true in this matter. In 1871 the question of Home Rule was an extremely young question. In fact, Irish history on these matters in my time has divided itself into three great periods. The first was the Repeal period under Mr. O'Connell, which began about the time of the Reform Act, and lasted until the death of that distinguished man. On that period I am not aware of ever having given an opinion; but that is not the question which I consider is now before us. The second period was that between the death of Mr. O'Connell and the emergence, so to say, of the subject of Home Rule. That was the period in which physical force and organizations with that object were conceived and matured, taking effect under the name generally of what is known as Fenianism. In 1870 or 1871 came up the question of Home Rule. In a speech which I made in Aberdeen at that period, I stated the great satisfaction with which I heard and with which I accepted the statements of the proposers of Home Rule, that under that name they contemplated nothing that was at variance with the unity of the Empire.

But while I say this, do not let it be supposed that I have ever regarded the introduction of Home Rule as a small matter, or as entailing a slight responsibility. I admit, on the contrary, that I have regarded it as a subject of the gravest responsibility, and so I still regard it. I have cherished, as long as I was able to cherish, the hope that Parliament might, by passing—by the steady and continuous passing—of good measures for Ireland, be able to encounter and dispose of the demand for Home Rule in that manner which obviously can alone be satisfactory. In that hope undoubtedly I was disappointed. I found that we could not reach that desired point. But two conditions have always been absolute and indispensable with me in regard to Home Rule. In the first place, it was absolutely necessary that it should be shown, by marks at once unequivocal and perfectly constitutional, to be the desire of the great mass of the population of Ireland; and I do not hesitate to say that that condition has never been absolutely and unequivocally fulfilled, in a manner to make its fulfilment undeniable, until the occasion of the recent election. It was open for any one to discuss whether the honourable Member for Cork—acting as he acted in the last Parliament, with some forty-five Members—it was open to any one to question how far he spoke the sentiments of the mass of the Irish population. At any rate,

it is quite evident that any responsible man in this country, taking up the question of Home Rule at that time, and urging the belief that it was the desire of the mass of the Irish population, would have been encountered in every quarter of the House with an incredulity that it would have been totally impossible for him to have overcome. Well, I own that to me that question is a settled question. I live in a country of representative institutions ; I have faith in representative institutions ; and I will follow them out to their legitimate consequences ; and I believe it to be dangerous in the highest degree, dangerous to the Constitution of this country and to the unity of the Empire, to show the smallest hesitation about the adoption of that principle. Therefore, that principle for me is settled.

The second question—and it is equally an indispensable condition with the first—is this : Is Home Rule a thing compatible or incompatible with the unity of the Empire ? Again and again, as may be in the recollection of Irish Members, I have challenged, in this House and elsewhere, explanations upon the subject, in order that we might have clear knowledge of what it was they so veiled under the phrase, not exceptionable in itself, but still open to a multitude of interpretations. Well, that question was settled in my mind on the first night of the present session, when the honourable gentleman, the leader of what is termed the Nationalist party from Ireland, declared unequivocally that what he sought under the name of Home Rule was autonomy for Ireland. “Autonomy” is a name well known to European law and practice as importing, under a historical signification sufficiently definite for every practical purpose, the management and control of the affairs of the territory to which the word is applied, and as being perfectly compatible with the full maintenance of Imperial unity. If any part of what I have said is open to challenge, it can be challenged by those who read my speeches, and I find that there are many readers of my speeches when there is anything to be got out of them and turned to account. I am quite willing to stand that test, and I believe that what I have said now is the exact and literal and absolute truth as to the state of the case. . .

What was the cry of those who resisted the concession of autonomy to Canada ? It was the cry which has slept for a long time, and which has acquired vigour from sleeping,—it was the cry with which we are now becoming familiar,—the cry of the unity of the Empire. Well, Sir, in my opinion the relation with Canada was one of very great danger to the unity of the Empire at one time, but it was the remedy for the mischief and not the mischief itself which was regarded as dangerous to the unity of the Empire. Here I contend that the cases are precisely parallel, and that there is danger to the unity of the Empire in your

relations with Ireland ; but, unfortunately, while you are perfectly right in raising the cry, you are applying the cry and the denunciation to the remedy, whereas you ought to apply it to the mischief.

In those days what happened ? In those days, habitually in this House, the mass of the people of Canada were denounced as rebels. Some of them were Protestants and of English and Scotch birth. The majority of them were Roman Catholic and of French extraction. The French rebelled. Was that because they were of French extraction and because they were Roman Catholics ? No, sir ; for the English of Upper Canada did exactly the same thing. They both of them rebelled, and perhaps I may mention,—if I may enliven the strain of the discussion for a moment,—that I remember Mr. O'Connell, who often mingled wit and humour with his eloquence in those days when the discussion was going on with regard to Canada, and when Canada was the one dangerous question,—the one question which absorbed interest in this country as the great question of the hour,—when we were engaged in that debate, Mr. O'Connell intervened, and referred to the well-known fact that a French orator and statesman named Papineau had been the promoter and the leader of the agitation in Canada ; and what said Mr. O'Connell ? He said : “ The case is exactly the case of Ireland with this difference, that in Canada the agitator had got the ‘ O ’ at the end of his name instead of at the beginning.” Well, these subjects of her Majesty rebelled,—were driven to rebellion and were put down. We were perfectly victorious over them, and what then happened ? Directly the military victory was assured—as Mr. Burke told the men of the day of the American War—the moment the military victory was assured, the political difficulty began. Did they feel it ? They felt it ; they gave way to it. The victors were the vanquished, for if we were victors in the field we were vanquished in the arena of reason. We acknowledged that we were vanquished, and within two years we gave complete autonomy to Canada. And now gentlemen have forgotten this great lesson of history. By saying that the case of Canada has no relation to the case of Ireland, I refer to that little sentence written by Sir Charles Duffy, who himself exhibits in his own person as vividly as anybody the transition from a discontented to a loyal subject. “ Canada did not get Home Rule because she was loyal and friendly, but she has become loyal and friendly because she got Home Rule.”

Now I come to another topic, and I wish to remind you as well as I can of the definition of the precise issue which is at the present moment placed before us. In the introduction of this bill, I ventured to say that its object was to establish, by the authority of Parliament, a legislative body to sit in Dublin for the conduct of both legislation and

administration under the conditions which may be prescribed by the Act defining Irish as distinctive from Imperial affairs. I laid down five, and five only, essential conditions which we deemed it to be necessary to observe. The first was the maintenance of the unity of the Empire ; the second was political equality ; the third was the equitable distribution of Imperial burdens ; the fourth was the protection of minorities ; and the fifth was that the measure which we proposed to Parliament,—I admit that we must stand or fall by this definition quite as much as by any of the others,—that the measure should present the essential character and characteristics of a settlement of the question.

Well, Sir, that has been more briefly defined in a resolution of the Dominion Parliament of Canada, with which, although the definition was simpler than my own, I am perfectly satisfied. In their view there are three vital points which they hope will be obtained, and which they believe to be paramount, and theirs is one of the most remarkable and significant utterances which have passed across the Atlantic to us on this grave political question. I just venture to put to the test the question of the equity of those gentlemen. You seem to consider that these manifestations are worthless. Had these manifestations taken place in condemnation of the bills and policy of the Government, would they have been so worthless ?

A question so defined for the establishment of a legislative body to have effective control of legislation and administration in Ireland for Irish affairs, and subject to those conditions about which, after all, there does not appear in principle to be much difference of opinion among us,—that is the question on which the House is called to give a vote, as solemn and as important as almost, perhaps, any in the long and illustrious records of its history.

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

(Delivered in the House of Commons, August 8th and 10th, 1870).

SIR, in view of the approaching prorogation of Parliament, I am anxious to state at as early a period as possible that Her Majesty's Government are not in a position to lay further papers upon the table relating to the subject alluded to in the Question of the hon. member for Wakefield (Mr. Somerset Beaumont). Knowing well the anxiety which the House must feel with reference to the course which the Government intend to follow, I will, in a few sentences, explain to them exactly what we have done and what we have endeavoured to do. In so doing

I shall confine myself strictly to statements of fact, not mixing up with them anything in the nature of explanation or defence, if, indeed, defence be requisite, but will allow such explanation or defence to stand over until the proper opportunity for making it shall arrive. On Saturday, the 30th of July, the Government made a proposal to France and Prussia severally in identical terms, and that proposal was that an agreement should be contracted by this country with each of them, whether under the name of a treaty or whatever other designation might be given to the agreement, to this effect : that if the armies of either one of the belligerents should, in the course of the operations of the war, violate the neutrality of Belgium, as secured by the terms of the Treaty of 1839, this country should co-operate with the other belligerent in defence of that neutrality by arms. It was signified in the document so transmitted that Great Britain would not by that engagement, or by acting upon that engagement in case of need, be bound to take part in the general operations of the war. And, of course, the other contracting party was to enter into a similar undertaking to use force for the preservation of the neutrality of Belgium against the offending Power. We proposed that the treaty or engagement—for it has now taken the form of a treaty—should hold good for twelve months after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent Powers, after which period it is stipulated that the respective parties, being parties to the Treaty of 1839, shall fall back upon the obligations they took upon themselves under that treaty. Briefly stated and divested of all technical language, that, I think, is the whole of the contents of the proposed treaty. On the same day—last Saturday week—and two days before the discussion which occurred in this House in connexion with foreign affairs, the whole proposal was made known by the British Government to the Austrian and Russian Governments, and confidence was expressed that, under the extreme pressure that existed as to time, those Powers would not hesitate to adopt a similar measure. That is the course Her Majesty's Government have followed in the matter. Now as to the reception of this proposal by the other Powers. As far as we have been informed, the Governments of both Austria and Russia take a favourable view of the proposal. I will not say that the negotiation has proceeded so far as to entitle us to regard them as held bound to a particular course, but, in the main, I may say that the reception of our proposal has been favourable by both of those Powers. And now, with regard to the two belligerent Powers. The proposal, having been sent to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 30th ult., on Friday, the 5th inst., Count Bernstorff informed Earl Granville that Count Bismarck had left Berlin for headquarters, and that, consequently the communi-

cation with him through Lord Augustus Loftus had been delayed. The terms of the proposed treaty, however, having been communicated on the same day—Saturday week—to the respective Ambassadors in London, Count Bernstorff had telegraphed their substance to Count Bismarck, who had informed him that he had not then received any proposal from Lord Augustus Loftus, that he was ready to agree to any engagement that would tend to the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium ; but that, as the intended instrument was not before him, he could only give a general assent to its purport, and must not be regarded as bound to any particular mode of proceeding intended to secure that neutrality. Count Bernstorff subsequently informed Earl Granville on the same day, on the 5th of August, that he had received a later telegram from Count Bismarck to the effect that he had then received a summary of the draft treaty from him, that he had submitted it to the King of Prussia, and that he was authorized to state that His Majesty had agreed to the plan. Later still on the same day Count Bernstorff informed Earl Granville that Count Bismarck again telegraphed to him stating that he had seen the actual document, and authorizing him to sign the treaty. Count Bernstorff has not yet—at least, had not when I came down to the House—received his full powers in the technical sense, but he expects to receive them in the course of the day, and therefore I think that the engagement may be regarded as being completed on the part of Prussia. Now as regards France. That country has accepted the principle of the treaty, but the French Government were desirous to introduce some modifications into the terms of the instrument that were not of a nature, as we thought, in any degree to interfere with the substance of the clauses. The House will perceive that as we had made an identical proposal to the two Powers, it was impossible for us to undertake to alter the body of the instrument, for fear the whole arrangements might come to nothing, although the sole object of the modifications so proposed was to prevent misunderstanding. We had no difficulty in giving such an explanation as we thought amounted to no more than a simple and clear interpretation of the document. That explanation was sent to Paris on Saturday evening. Perhaps the pressure of affairs in Paris may naturally account for the fact that an answer did not arrive by return of post in a regular manner this morning ; but we have reason to believe that this explanation will remove all difficulty on the part of the French Government and will lead to the signing of the treaty. Possibly, therefore, even before the termination of the present sitting it will be in our power to make a further communication to the House. In the meantime I shall be glad to answer any question, if my statement has not been sufficiently clear ; but, as I said before, I should wish to

refrain from saying more than is absolutely necessary on the present occasion, and I hope the House will not enter into any general discussion upon the subject.

As far as I understand, my hon. and gallant friend the member for Waterford has complained that we have destroyed the Treaty of 1839 by this instrument. As I pay so much attention to everything that falls from him, I thought that by some mistake I must have read the instrument inaccurately ; but I have read it again, and I find that by one of the articles contained in it the Treaty of 1839 is expressly recognized. But there is one omission I made in the matter which I will take the present opportunity to supply. The House, I think, have clearly understood that this instrument expresses an arrangement between this country and France, but an instrument has been signed between this country and the North German Confederation precisely the same in its terms, except that where the name of the Emperor of the French is read in one instrument, the name of the German Confederation is read in the other, and vice versa. I have listened with much interest to the conversation which has occurred, and I think we have no reason to be dissatisfied at the manner in which, speaking generally, this treaty has been received. My hon. friend the member for Brighton (Mr. White) speaking, as he says, from below the gangway, is quite right in thinking that his approval of the course the Government have taken is gratifying to us, on account of the evidently independent course of action which he always pursues in this House. The hon. and gallant gentleman opposite has expressed a different opinion from ours on the great question of policy, and he asks whether we should not have done well to limit ourselves to the Treaty of 1839. We differ entirely on that subject from the hon. and gallant gentleman ; but we cannot complain of the manner in which he has expressed his opinion and recognized the intentions of the Government. From gentlemen who sit behind me we have had more positive and unequivocal expressions of approval than fell from the hon. and gallant gentleman. The only person who strongly objects to the course taken by the Government is my hon. and gallant friend the member for Waterford ; and I do not in the least object to his frank method of stating whatever he feels in opposition to our proceedings in a matter of so much consequence, though I do not think it necessary to notice some of his objections. In the first place, he denounces this treaty as an example of the mischiefs of secret diplomacy. He thinks that if the treaty had been submitted to the House it would not have been agreed to. My hon. and gallant friend is a man much enamoured of public diplomacy. He remembers, no doubt, that three weeks ago the Duc de Gramont went to the Legislative body of France

and made an announcement as to the policy which the French Government would pursue with respect to Prussia. The result of that example of public diplomacy no doubt greatly encouraged my hon. and gallant friend. Then we have a specimen in the speech of my hon. and gallant friend of the kind of public diplomacy which we should have in this case if his hopes and desires were realized. He says that if Belgium were in the hands of a hostile Power the liberties of this country would not be worth twenty-four hours' purchase. I protest against that statement. With all my heart and soul I protest against it. A statement more exaggerated, a statement more extravagant, I never heard fall from the lips of any member in this House. Whatever my hon. and gallant friend's accurate acquaintance with the correspondence of Napoleon may induce him to say, I may be permitted to observe that I am not prepared to take my impression of the character, of the strength, of the dignity, of the duty, or of the danger, of this country, from that correspondence. I will avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my opinion, if I may presume to give it, that too much has been said by my hon. and gallant friend and others of the specially distinct, separate, and exclusive interest which this country has in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium. What is our interest in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium? It is the same as that of every great Power in Europe. It is contrary to the interest of Europe that there should be unmeasured aggrandizement. Our interest is no more involved in the aggrandizement supposed in this particular case than is the interest of other Powers. That it is a real interest, a substantial interest, I do not deny; but I protest against the attempt to attach to it the exclusive character which I never knew carried into the region of caricature to such a degree as it has been by my hon. and gallant friend. What is the immediate moral effect of those exaggerated statements of the separate interest of England? The immediate moral effect of them is this, that every effort we make on behalf of Belgium on other grounds than those of interest, as well as on grounds of interest, goes forth to the world as a separate and selfish scheme of ours; and that which we believe to be entitled to the dignity and credit of an effort on behalf of the general peace, stability, and interest of Europe actually contracts a taint of selfishness in the eyes of other nations because of the manner in which the subject of Belgian neutrality is too frequently treated in this House. If I may be allowed to speak of the motives which have actuated Her Majesty's Government in the matter, I would say that while we have recognized the interest of England, we have never looked upon it as the sole motive, or even as the greatest of those considerations which have urged us forward. There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It

is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen—such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston—never, to my knowledge, took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is the common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever. But there is one other motive, which I shall place at the head of all, that attaches peculiarly to the preservation of the independence of Belgium. What is that country ? It is a country containing 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of people, with much of an historic past, and imbued with a sentiment of nationality and a spirit of independence as warm and as genuine as that which beats in the hearts of the proudest and most powerful nations. By the regulations of its internal concerns, amid the shocks of revolution, Belgium through all the crises of the age, has set to Europe an example of a good and stable government, gracefully associated with the widest possible extension of the liberty of the people. Looking at a country such as that, is there any man who hears me who does not feel that if, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed the absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe ? But we have an interest in the independence of Belgium, which is wider than that—which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin ? And now let me deal with the observation of the hon. member for Waterford. The hon. member asks : What if both these Powers with whom we are making this treaty should combine against the independence of Belgium ? Well, all I can say is that we rely on the faith of these parties. But if there be danger of their combining against that independence now, unquestionably there was much

more danger in the position of affairs that was revealed to our astonished eyes a fortnight ago, and before these later engagements were contracted. I do not undertake to define the character of that position which, as I have said, was more dangerous a fortnight ago. I feel confident that it would be hasty to suppose that these great States would, under any circumstances, have become parties to the actual contemplation and execution of a proposal such as that which was made the subject of a communication between persons of great importance on behalf of their respective States. That was the state of facts with which we had to deal. It was the combination, and not the opposition, of the two Powers which we had to fear, and I contend—and we shall be ready on every proper occasion to argue—that there is no measure so well adapted to meet the peculiar character of such an occasion as that which we have proposed. It is said that the Treaty of 1839 would have sufficed, and that we ought to have announced our determination to abide by it. But if we were disposed at once to act upon the guarantee contained in that treaty, what state of circumstances does it contemplate? It contemplates the invasion of the frontiers of Belgium and the violation of the neutrality of that country by some other Power. That is the only case in which we could have been called upon to act under the Treaty of 1839, and that is the only case in which we can be called upon to act under the treaty now before the House. But in what, then, lies the difference between the two treaties? It is in this: that, in accordance with our obligations, we should have to act under the Treaty of 1839 without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter whatever against any combination, however formidable; whereas by the treaty now formally before Parliament, under the conditions laid down in it, we secure powerful support in the event of our having to act—a support with respect to which we may well say that it brings the object in view within the sphere of the practicable and attainable, instead of leaving it within the sphere of what might have been desirable, but which might have been most difficult, under all the circumstances, to have realized. The hon. member says that by entering into this engagement we have destroyed the Treaty of 1839. But if he will carefully consider the terms of this instrument he will see that there is nothing in them calculated to bear out that statement. It is perfectly true that this is a cumulative treaty, added to the Treaty of 1839, as the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli), with perfect precision, described it. Upon that ground I very much agree with the general opinion he expressed; but, at the same time, peculiar circumstances call for a departure from general rules, and the circumstances are most peculiar under which we have thought it right to adopt the method of proceeding which we have actually

done. The Treaty of 1839 loses nothing of its force even during the existence of this present treaty. There is no derogation from it whatever. The Treaty of 1839 includes terms which are expressly included in the present instrument, lest by any chance it should be said that, in consequence of the existence of this instrument, the Treaty of 1839 had been injured or impaired. That would have been a mere opinion; but it is an opinion which we thought fit to provide against. The hon. member has said that this is a most peculiar method of bringing a treaty before the House. I admit it. There is no doubt at all that it is so. But is it not easy to say what circumstances there are that will justify the breaking up of general rules in a matter so delicate and important as the making of communications to Parliament upon political negotiations of great interest. The rule which has been uniformly followed in this country is this: that no treaty is communicated to Parliament unless it becomes binding; and it does not become absolutely binding upon the signatories until it has been ratified; and, by the law and usage of all civilized countries, ratification requires certain forms to be gone through which cannot be concluded in a moment. Under these circumstances, we had only this choice—whether we should be contented to present a treaty to Parliament without the usual forms having been gone through, or whether we should break down the rule which we think it is, on the whole, most desirable to observe, and we thought it best to adopt the course we have followed in the matter. The hon. member for Wakefield (Mr. Somerset Beaumont) has asked whether this treaty has been concluded with the sanction of Belgium. My answer is that I do not doubt the relevancy of that inquiry, but that the treaty has not been concluded with the sanction of Belgium, for we have advisedly refrained from any attempt to make Belgium a party to the engagement. In the first place, Belgium was not a party to the Treaty of 1839. But that is a matter of secondary importance. What we had to consider was, what was the most prudent, the best, and the safest course for us to pursue in the interest of Belgium. Independently of Belgium, we had no right to assume that either of the parties would agree to it, and we had also to contemplate the case in which one party might agree to it and the other might not. If we had attempted to make Belgium a party we should have run the risk of putting her in a very false position in the event of one of the parties not agreeing to the proposal. It was, therefore, from no want of respect or friendly feeling towards Belgium, but simply from prudential considerations, that we abstained from bringing that country within the circle of these negotiations. The hon. member has also asked whether Austria and Russia have been consulted upon the subject of the treaty, but upon that point I have nothing to add to

what I communicated to the House the other day. Both these parties have been invited—as Her Majesty has been advised to announce from the Throne—to accede to the treaty, and I said on Monday that the reception of the treaty, as far as those Powers were concerned, had been generally favourable. I have no reason to alter that statement; but, on the part of Russia, a question has arisen with regard to which I cannot quite say how it may eventually close, especially from the circumstance that the Emperor and his chief advisers upon foreign affairs do not happen to be in the same place. That question, so raised, is whether it might be wise to give a wider scope to any engagements of this kind; but if there is any hesitation on this point, it is not of a kind which indicates an objection of principle, but, on the contrary, one which shows a disposition to make every possible effort in favour of the treaty. We are in full communication with friendly and neutral Powers on the subject of maintaining neutrality, and upon every side the very best dispositions prevail. There is the greatest inclination to abstain from all officious intermeddling between two Powers who, from their vast means and resources, are perfectly competent for the conduct of their own affairs; and there is not a less strong and decided desire on the part of every Power to take every step at the present moment that can contribute to restrict and circumscribe the area of the war, and to be ready without having lost or forfeited the confidence of either belligerent to avail itself of the first opportunity that may present itself to contribute towards establishing a peace which shall be honourable, and which shall present the promise of being permanent. That is the general state of the case, with regard to which I do not, in the least degree, question the right of the hon. member behind me to form his own judgment. I cannot help expressing the opinion that, allowing for all the difficulties of the case, and the rapidity with which it was necessary to conduct these operations, we have done all that appeared to be essential in the matter; and the country may feel assured that the conduct which we have pursued in relation to this matter has not been unworthy of the high responsibility with which we are entrusted.

LORD GREY OF FALLODON

(SIR EDWARD GREY)

(1862-).

THE future diplomat was educated at Winchester and at Balliol, Oxford; succeeding to the baronetcy at the age of twenty. Although one of the most brilliant of contemporary statesmen, his real desires point away from politics and in the direction of a country life with time to pursue his favourite sport of fishing. Gladstone's dictum on Sir Edward Grey is well known: "I never remember so signal a capacity for Parliamentary life and so small a disposition to it."

He is a Liberal Imperialist, and in the Liberal Ministry of 1892-1895 he was Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In this position he made a reputation as a politician who would do his best for his country regardless of party. With the advent of the Campbell-Bannerman Government in December, 1905, he became Foreign Minister and retained the position during Mr. Asquith's Premiership.

His labours to avert war during the months of July and part of August, 1914, were unhappily unsuccessful but his revelations of the honourable part played by British statesmen caused a deep impression throughout the world.

He was raised to the Peerage as Viscount Grey of Fallodon in July, 1916. His great book on the War, "Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916," was published in 1925.

BRITISH WAR POLICY

(Delivered in the House of Commons, August 3rd, 1914).

LAST week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all, let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate, to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace, as far as the Great Powers are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now, from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish Papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace ; and when those Papers are published, I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we would spring upon the House,

and tell the House that, because we had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the "Triple Entente" for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an Alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan crisis, originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—*up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support*. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a General Election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—and I think very reasonably—"If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise

in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between Naval and Military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between Military or Naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in progress. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister. I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between Military and Naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on November 22nd, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between Military and Naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:

"My dear Ambassador,—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of

the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government have grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." That was on November 22nd, 1912. That is the starting-point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Govern-

ment and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French Fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French Fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French Fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do—with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her Northern and Western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German Fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French Fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying: "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose that the French Fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war: and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral, because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen—and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a Fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not despatch more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not, in the event of attack upon her unprotected Northern and Western coasts, she could depend

upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement :—

“ I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place.”

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way ; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its Fleet would not attack the Northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a Treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that, confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the Treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these Treaty rights.

What was our own attitude ? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on August 8th, 1870, used these words. He said :—

“ We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound either morally or

internationally or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium : though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later :—

" There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty ; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The Treaty is an old Treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those Treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply :—

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find itself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was :—

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers :—

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the communication, and replies that Belgium will, to the utmost of her power, maintain neutrality, and expects and desires other Powers to observe and uphold it. He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the neighbouring Powers were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that the Belgian Government believe, in the case of violation, they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George :—

“ Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now ? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part of it—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in “ Hansard,” Volume 203, Page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said :—

“ We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.”

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British

interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that whatever happened in the course of this war at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we ran away from those obligations of honour and interests as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful Fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment, that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that has been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagements yet with regard to sending an Expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the Fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the Army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagements, because I do feel that in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an Expeditionary Force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say. The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium, which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having

to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intended aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those Forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed from which no country in Europe will escape and from which no abdication or neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy's ships to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week, the House will see from the Papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually

happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

JANE ELLEN HARRISON

(1850-1925).

DR. HARRISON was for many years one of the foremost of our Greek scholars and contributed much both by teaching and by several books to the knowledge of Greek art and Greek religion. She was educated at Cheltenham and at Newnham College, Cambridge, where she was sometime Fellow and Lecturer in Classical Archæology. Her distinctions included Hon. LL.D., Aberdeen, and Hon. D. Litt., Durham. From 1889-1896 she was a member of the Council of the Hellenic Society, and in 1890 a member of the committee of the British School of Archæology at Athens.

Chief among her publications are "Myths of the Odyssey in Art and Literature," 1882; "Introductory Studies in Greek Art," 1885; "Religion of Ancient Greece," and "Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion."

HERESY AND HUMANITY

THE word "heretic" has still about it an emotional thrill—a glow reflected, it may be, from the fires at Smithfield, the ardours of those who were burnt at the stake for love of an idea.

Free personal choice sounds to us now so splendid and inspiring; why, then, in the past, was it so hated and so hunted? Why instinctively in our minds, when we hear the word "heresy," does there rise up the adjective "damnable"? To be a heretic in the days of Latimer and Cranmer was to burn. To be a heretic in the days of our grandfathers was to be something of a social outcast. To be a heretic to-day is almost a human obligation.

The gist of heresy is free personal choice in act, and specially in thought—the rejection of traditional faiths and customs, *quâ* traditional. When and why does heresy cease to be dangerous, and become desirable? It may be worth while inquiring.

The study of anthropology and sociology has taught us that only a very civilized person ever is or can afford to be a heretic. For a savage to be a heretic is not only not safe, it is practically impossible. We all know nowadays that the simple savage leading a free life is, of

all mythical beings, most fabulous. No urbane citizen in the politest society is half so hide-bound by custom as the simple savage. He lives by imitation of his ancestors—*i.e.*, by tradition. Long before he obeys a king he is the abject slave of that master with the iron rod—the Past ; and the Past is for him embodied in that most dire and deadly of all tyrannies, an oligarchy of old men. The Past, they feel, has made them what they are ; why seek to improve on it or them ? In such a society, personal choice, heresy, is impossible.

How came such a state of things to be ? Why is it tolerated ? Why is it not only not disastrous, but for a time, as a stage, desirable ?

Because, at the outset, what draws society together is sympathy, similarity, uniformity. In the fierce struggle for existence, for food, for protection, the herd and the homogeneity of the herd, its collective, unreflecting action, are all-important. If you are in danger of extinction, you must act swiftly, all together, all but automatically, you must not be a heretic.

We see this clearly in that noblest of latter-day survivals, the “good soldier.” The good soldier is not a heretic ; he does not, and may not, reflect and make personal choice. To him the order of his commanding officer voicing the herd is sacrosanct. Be it contrary to reason, be it contrary to humanity, it must still be obeyed. War has many horrors. To me not the least is this—that it must turn a thinking human being into an at least temporary automaton ; it bids a man forego his human heritage of heresy.

What I want for the moment to emphasize is this : that only certain elements in civilization, which later will be particularized, make heresy safe and desirable ; primitive man is always, and rightly, suspicious of heresy. The instinct to burn a heretic was in a sense, and for a season, socially sound ; the practice went on perhaps needlessly long. The instinct of savage law is the defence of collective, the repression of individual, opinion and action.

The milder forms of heresy-hunting, those that most of us remember in our childhood, deserve consideration.

It has puzzled—it has, alas ! exasperated—many that society should be so alert and angry, should feel so intensely, about heterodoxy. If I deny the law of gravitation, no one will worry me about it. Privately, and rightly, they will think me a fool ; but they will not come and argue at, and browbeat, and socially ostracize me. But if I doubt the existence of a God, or even, in the days of my childhood, if I doubted the doctrine of eternal damnation—well, I become a “moral leper.” The expression has now gone out ; its mild, modern substitute is looking at you sadly.

Such treatment naturally makes the honest patient boil with indignation ; but the young science of sociology comes to smooth him down by explaining how this is, and, so long as the strength of society is in its collective homogeneity, must be.

Religious views, sociology teaches us, and many other views on matters social and political—in fact, all traditional views—are held with such tenacity, such almost ferocity, because they belong to the class of views induced, not by individual experience, still less by reason, but by collective, or, as it is sometimes called, “herd,” suggestion. This used to be called “faith.” The beliefs so held may or may not be true ; collective suggestion is not in the least necessarily collective hallucination. Mere collective suggestions—that is the interesting point—have the quality of obviousness ; they do not issue from the individual, but seem imposed from outside, and ineluctable ; they have all the inevitableness of instinctive opinion ; they are what Mr. William James would call “a priori syntheses of the most perfect sort.” Hence they are held with an intensity of emotion far beyond any reasoned conviction. To doubt them is felt to be at once idiocy and irreverence. Inquiry into their rational bases is naturally, and in a sense rightly, resented, because they are not rationally based, though they may be rationally supported. It is by convictions such as this that a society of the homogeneous kind—a society based on and held together by uniformity—lives and thrives. To attack them is to cripple and endanger its inmost life.

To realise this is clear gain. We feel at once quieter and kinder ; all or most of the sting is gone from the intolerance, or even ostracism, of our friends. When they look sad, and hint that certain views are not respectable, we no longer think of our friends as unreasonable and cruel. They are non-reasonable, pre-reasonable, and they are hypnotized by herd-suggestion. They become, not cruel, but curious and interesting, even heroic ; they are fighting for the existence of the homogeneous type of herd—a forlorn hope, we believe, but still intelligible. Further, we begin to see what we, as heretics, must do ; not reason with our opponents—that would be absurd—but try, so far as we can, to get this immense force of herd-suggestion on to the side we believe to be right. Suggest to people that an unverifiable opinion is as unsatisfactory an implement as, say, a loose tooth ; and as to a mental prejudice, it is simply a source of rottenness, a decayed fang—out with it !

Why, and how, has heresy ceased, or almost ceased, to be disreputable ?

Two causes have brought this about : Science and another movement towards what I will call Humanity, and which I shall try later to define.

Science is from the outset the sworn foe of herd-suggestion. Herd-suggestion, being a strange blend of the emotions and imaginings of many men, is always tolerant of contradictions. Religion revels in them ; with God all things are possible. Science classifies, draws ever clearer distinctions ; herd-suggestion is always in a haze. Herd-suggestion is all for tradition, authority ; science has for its very essence the exercise of free thought. So long as we will not take the trouble to know exactly and intimately, we may not—must not—choose. We must advance as Nature prescribes, by slow, laborious imitation ; we must follow custom, we must accept the mandates of the Gerontes—the old men who embody and enforce tradition. We must be content to move slowly.

We must not be unjust to collective opinion ; it does move, though slowly, and moves, even without the actual protest of open heresy. Things were said and written a century or two ago which, though no definite protest has been made, could not be written or said now. There has been a slow, unconscious shift. In the regulations of the University of Cambridge it is still enacted that every year “ a prize be offered for the best poem on the Attributes of the Deity,” and that this prize be annually awarded until such time as, in the opinion of the Master of X College, “ the said Attributes shall have been exhausted.” Somehow, nowadays, we should word our regulations differently.

Collective opinion, then, advances, but very slowly. Many people think that to be slow is sure ; but our wise copybooks used to say, “ Delays are dangerous.” You may prop up an ancient building till it topples about your ears ; adherence to tradition may land you in straits made desperate by the advancing tide of knowledge. You may delay a reform till the exacerbation caused by your delay is worse than the original evil.

Heresy, then, is the child of Science ; and so long as the child holds fast her mother's hand, she may run her swiftest, she will not faint or fall. Science opens wide the doors that turned so slowly on tradition's hinges, and opens them on clean, quiet places where we breathe a larger air. If heresy has in it too much of the fever and fret of self-assertion and personal choice, our remedy is to enter that “ great kingdom where the strain of disturbing passions grows quiet, and even the persecuting whisper of egotism dies at last almost completely away.”

It is well to remember our debt to science—our inward and spiritual as well as material debt, because the generation is passed or passing

which saw and was wellnigh blinded by the great flood of light that came last century. But the complete heretic needs more than science, he needs humanity, and this in no vague general sense, but after a fashion that it is important to understand as exactly as may be.

Science broke the binding spell of herd-suggestion. For that great boon let us now and ever bless and praise her holy name. She cleared the collective haze, she drew sharp distinctions appealing to individual actual experience, to individual powers of reasoning. But by neither individual sense-perception nor ratiocination alone do we live. Our keenest emotional life is through the herd, and hence it was that, at the close of last century, the flame of scientific hope, the glory of scientific individualism that had blazed so brightly, somehow died down and left a strange chill. Man rose up from the banquet of reason and law unfed. He hungered half unconsciously for the herd. It seemed an impasse: on the one side orthodoxy, tradition, authority, practical slavery; on the other science, individual freedom, reason, and an aching loneliness.

But life meanwhile was feeling its way blindly to a solution, to what was literally a harmony. Something happened akin to what goes on in biology. The old primitive form of society grew by segmentation, by mere multiplication of homogeneous units; the new and higher form was to develop by differentiation of function—a differentiation that would unite, not divide. Instead of a mechanical homogeneous unity we get a disparate organism. We live now just at the transition moment; we have broken with the old, we have not quite adjusted ourselves to the new. It is not so much the breaking with old faiths that makes us restless as the living in a new social structure.

What is actually meant by organic as opposed to mechanical unity is seen, of course, very clearly—has long been seen, though not rightly understood—in the ever-increasing development of the Division of Labour. Professor Durkheim has shown that the real significance of this is social and moral even more than economic. Its best result is not material wealth, but the closer, more vital sympathy and interdependence of man with and on his fellow-man. Its influence extends far beyond the supply of material needs. If one man depends on you for his supply of butter, and you on him for your supply of tea, you are drawn into a real relation; but if the interchange be of thought and sympathy induced by that material commerce, the links are closer, more vital. This is no metaphor; it is a blessed and sometimes bitter reality. A close companionship withdrawn is a wound to our actual spiritual life: if our egotism and self-sufficiency be robust, we recover from it; if weak, we go maimed and halting, with minished personality.

Division of labour has often been supposed to damage the individual. Anthropology corrects this mistake. To the savage division of labour is almost unknown ; each man builds his own boat, carves his own weapons, and makes them scrupulously, religiously, as his fathers made them before him. Yet the savage has the minimum of individuality. In his case it is not that individuality is crushed out by the herd, but that it has not begun to exist, or only in faint degree, because the savage has scarcely begun to co-operate. It is through this co-operation that we at once differentiate and organically unite. This is our new gospel : we are saved, not by science, not by abstraction, but by a new mode of life.

As the individual emerges through co-operation and differentiation the force of tradition is gradually broken. What takes its place ? The answer is at first depressing. Fashion, a new and modified collectivism. Under the sway of tradition, as M. Tarde has pointed out, we copy our ancestors in all things ; under the sway of fashion we follow our contemporaries in a ~~few~~ ^{few}. Fashion, it will escape no one, rules us now, not only in matters of dress or food, but in the things of the spirit ; and more and more, it would seem, as we escape more completely from tradition. But the rule of fashion, though sometimes foolish and light-headed, is on the whole beneficent, and makes for freedom. It is better to be swayed by our contemporaries, because, unlike the ancients, they lack prestige, and never become sacrosanct ; about their heads is no semi-religious halo. Moreover, fashion is fickle, swift to change ; small movements and associations grow up to promote particular fads, and die as swiftly as they rose ; each association implies a dissociation, and by this frequency of association and dissociation we get rid of the permanent homogeneous class, that insistent incubus of progress. Each person belongs to many temporary associations ; and at the cross-roads, as it were, his individuality emerges.

More strange still at first, but assuredly true, is the fact that only through and by this organic individuality can the real sense and value of Humanity emerge. We are humane so far as we are conscious or sensitive to individual life. Patriotism is collective herd-instinct ; it is repressive of individuality. You feel strongly because you feel alike ; you are reinforced by the other homogeneous units ; you sing the same song and wave the same flag. Humanity is sympathy with infinite differences, with utter individualism, with complete differentiation, and it is only possible through the mystery of organic spiritual union. We have come, most of us, now, to a sort of physical union by sympathy and imagination. To torture even an enemy's body would be to us physical pain, physical sickness. There will come the day when to hurt

mentally and spiritually will be equally impossible, because the spiritual life will by enhanced sympathy be one. But this union is only possible through that organic differentiation that makes us have need one of the other.

In a word, if we are to be true and worthy heretics, we need not only new heads, but new hearts, and, most of all, that new emotional imagination, joint offspring of head and heart which is begotten of enlarged sympathies and a more sensitive habit of feeling. About the moral problem there is nothing mysterious; it is simply the old, old question of how best to live together. We no longer believe in an unchanging moral law imposed from without. We know that a harder incumbency is upon us; we must work out our law from within. The first crude attempt was by agglutination—*Qui se rassemble s'assemble*; differ at your peril. A long discipline of agglutination backed by religious sanctions was needful, it seems, to tame the tiger-cat egotism within us. Primitive religion, most of us who investigate the subject are now agreed, has made for civilisation mainly because it is the emphasis of social values, or, to put it more exactly, of herd-instincts.

But in mere religious agglutination man was not to find his goal. We heretics believe the time for that is past, and that we must adventure a harder and higher spiritual task. Our new altruism involves a steady and even ardent recognition of the individual life, in its infinite variety, with its infinite interactions. We decline to be ourselves part of an undifferentiated mass; we refuse to deal with others in classes and masses. Parents no longer treat their children as children, as a subject-class to be manipulated for their pleasure, but as human beings, with views, outlooks, lives, of their own. Children, it may even be hoped, will learn in time to treat their parents not merely as parents—*i.e.*, as persons privileged to pay and to protect and at need to efface themselves—but as individual human beings, with their own passions and absorptions. We are dissatisfied now not only with the herd-sanctions of religion, but with many of those later sanctities of law to which some even emancipated thinkers ascribe a sort of divinity. We feel the inherent savagery of law in that it treats individuals as masses. Only in a civilized anarchy, we some of us feel, can the individual come to his full right and function.

Yet all the time we know that we can, with spiritual safety, rebel only in so far as we are personally sensitive to the claims of other individual lives that touch our own. The old herd-problem remains of how to live together; and as the union grows closer and more intricate the chances of mutual hurt are greater, and the sensitiveness must

grow keener. Others are safe from and with us only when their pain is our pain, their joy ours ; and that is not yet. Meantime, whenever the old tiger-cat egotism snarls within us, we should resign our membership of the Society of Heretics, and go back for a season to the " godly discipline " of the herd.

ROBERT G. INGERSOLL

(1833-1899).

IT is said of Isocrates among Athenian orators that he was "the first who perfected prose rhythm." It is so hard to read Attic Greek with even an approximation to the musical "time" in which Isocrates wrote it that those who wish to realize the meaning of this significant compliment to his style will do well to study the rhythms of Robert Green Ingersoll—of whom among American orators it may be said as truly as of Isocrates among the Greek, that he first perfected the prose rhythms of the language in which he expressed himself. Indeed, his ear for musical "time" is so nearly that of a poet, that many of his most eloquent passages have only to be divided and capitalized properly to become blank verse, governed by recurrent vowels as are the hexameters of Homer, the pentameters of the Greek tragedians, or the odes of Pindar. Colonel Ingersoll was born at Dresden, New York, August 11th, 1833. Removing to Peoria, Illinois, in 1857, he practised law until 1862, when he entered the volunteer service as Colonel of the Eleventh Illinois Cavalry. He became Attorney-General of Illinois in 1866, and so great was public admiration for his oratory that he might have commanded any office in the gift of the people of the State had he not chosen to devote his great talents to theological controversy. He is most celebrated for his lectures attacking theological tenets which displeased him, but his speeches in political conventions and at the bar illustrate the same remarkable qualities he showed on the platform. He was a man of extensive reading, typically American in his entire freedom from any approach to social aloofness. He was popular as an orator, primarily, because he felt the unity of his own mind, both in its strength and in its weaknesses, with the average mind of the average American community. His greatest strength lies less in severity of thought, less in the piling up of idea on idea, fact on fact, than in a compelling power of musical expression, voicing his own emotions, and appealing to the related emotions of his hearers through their sense of the harmonies of language. In the ability to do this, he has not been equalled by any other American orator. He died July 21st, 1899.

[The selection following is made by permission of Colonel Ingersoll's family from the authorised text in "Prose Poems and Selections from the Writings and Sayings of Robert G. Ingersoll." Copyright: C. P. Farrell, Publisher, New York City, 1895.]

THE GRAVE OF NAPOLEON

(An Address on "The Liberty of Man, Woman, and Child.")

A LITTLE while ago, I stood by the grave of the old Napoleon—a magnificent tomb of gilt and gold, fit almost for a dead deity—and gazed upon the sarcophagus of black Egyptian marble, where rest at last the ashes of that restless man. I leaned over the balustrade and thought about the career of the greatest soldier of the modern world.

I saw him walking upon the banks of the Seine, contemplating suicide. I saw him at Toulon—I saw him putting down the mob in the streets of Paris—I saw him at the head of the army of Italy—I saw him crossing the bridge of Lodi with the tricolour in his hand—I saw him in Egypt in the shadow of the Pyramids—I saw him conquer the Alps and mingle the eagles of France with the eagles of the crags. I saw him at Marengo—at Ulm and Austerlitz. I saw him in Russia, where the infantry of the snow and the cavalry of the wild blast scattered his legions like winter's withered leaves. I saw him at Leipsic in defeat and disaster—driven by a million bayonets back upon Paris—clutched like a wild beast—banished to Elba. I saw him escape and retake an empire by the force of his genius. I saw him upon the frightful field of Waterloo, where Chance and Fate combined to wreck the fortunes of their former king. And I saw him at St. Helena, with his hands crossed behind him, gazing out upon the sad and solemn sea.

I thought of the orphans and widows he had made—of the tears that had been shed for his glory, and of the only woman who ever loved him, pushed from his heart by the cold hand of ambition. And I said I would rather have been a French peasant and worn wooden shoes. I would rather have lived in a hut with a vine growing over the door, and the grapes growing purple in the kisses of the autumn sun. I would rather have been that poor peasant with my loving wife by my side, knitting as the day died out of the sky—with my children upon my knees and their arms about me. I would rather have been that man and gone down to the tongueless silence of the dreamless dust than to have been that imperial impersonation of force and murder.

It is not necessary to be great to be happy ; it is not necessary to be rich to be just and generous and to have a heart filled with divine affection. No matter whether you are rich or poor, treat your wife as though she were a splendid flower, and she will fill your life with perfume and with joy.

And do you know, it is a splendid thing to think that the woman you really love will never grow old to you. Through the wrinkles of time, through the mask of years, if you really love her, you will always see the face you loved and won. And a woman who really loves a man does not see that he grows old ; he is not decrepit to her ; he does not tremble ; he is not old ; she always sees the same gallant gentleman who won her hand and heart. I like to think of it in that way ; I like to think that love is eternal. And to love in that way and then go down the hill of life together, and as you go down, hear, perhaps, the laughter of grandchildren, while the birds of joy and love sing once more in the leafless branches of the tree of age.

I believe in the fireside. I believe in the democracy of home. I believe in the republicanism of the family. I believe in liberty, equality and love.

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, K.G.

(1850-1916).

HORATIO HERBERT KITCHENER was born at Bally Longford, County Kerry, June 1850. He entered the Royal Military Academy in 1868 and received his commission in the Royal Engineers in 1871. He was first employed in survey work in Cyprus and Palestine, and on promotion to Captain in 1883 was attached to the Egyptian Army then being modelled. As Sirdar he conducted operations against the Khalifa, built a railway to Omdurman, and there gained a great victory over the Khalifa's army, September 2nd, 1898. For these services he was raised to the peerage and received a grant of £30,000 from the nation. About a year later he was appointed Chief of Staff to Lord Roberts for the South African War. After Lord Roberts returned to England in November 1900, he succeeded him as Commander in Chief. In June 1902 the war ended and Kitchener was advanced to the rank of viscount, in addition to receiving the thanks of Parliament, and a grant of £50,000.

After peace was concluded, he went to India and reorganised the Indian Army. On leaving India in 1909, he was created Field-Marshal. He next made a tour, visiting Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to advise on the best means of Colonial Home Defence.

In 1911, he succeeded Sir Eldon Gorst as British Consul-General in Egypt and received an earldom in June, 1914. On the outbreak of war in August, 1914, Lord Kitchener became Secretary for War, with a seat in the Cabinet; a post that gave ample scope to his unrivalled powers as a director and organiser of the new armies. Lord Kitchener's death occurred on June 5th, 1916, when he was lost with Colonel Fitzgerald and other members of his staff by the sinking of H.M.S. Hampshire off the wild coast of the Orkneys.

BRITAIN'S MAN POWER

(Delivered at the Guildhall, London, 1915).

HITHERTO the remarks that I have found it necessary to make on the subject of recruiting have been mainly addressed to the House of Lords ; but I have felt that the time has now come when I may with advantage avail myself of the courteous invitation of the Lord Mayor to appear among you, and in this historic Guildhall make another and a larger demand on the resources of British manhood. Enjoying, as I do, the privilege of a Freeman of this great City, I can be sure that words uttered in the heart of London will be spread broadcast throughout the Empire.

Our thoughts naturally turn to the splendid efforts of the Oversea Dominions and India, who, from the earliest days of the war, have ranged themselves side by side with the Mother Country. The prepared armed forces of India were the first to take the field, closely followed by the gallant Canadians who are now fighting alongside their British and French comrades in Flanders, and are there presenting a solid and impenetrable front against the enemy.

In the Dardanelles the Australians and New Zealanders, combined with the same elements, have already accomplished a feat of arms of almost unexampled brilliancy, and are pushing the campaign to a successful conclusion. In each of these great Dominions new and large contingents are being prepared, while South Africa, not content with the successful conclusion of the arduous campaign in South-West Africa, is now offering large forces to engage the enemy in the main theatre of war.

Strengthened by the unflinching support of our fellow citizens across the seas, we seek to develop our own military resources to their utmost limits, and this is the purpose which brings us together to-day. Napoleon, when asked what were the three things necessary for a successful war, replied, ' Money, money, money.' To-day we vary that phrase, and say, ' Men, material, and money.' As regards the supply of money for the war, the Government are negotiating a new Loan, the marked success of which is greatly due to the very favourable response made by the City. To meet the need for material, the energetic manner in which the new Ministry of Munitions is coping with the many difficulties which confront the production of our great requirements affords abundant proof that this very important work is being dealt with in a highly satisfactory manner.

There still remains the vital need for men to fill the ranks of our armies, and it is to emphasize this point and bring it home to the people of this country that I have come here this afternoon. When I took up the office that I hold, I did so as a soldier, not as a politician, and I warned my fellow countrymen that the war would be not only arduous, but long. In one of my earliest statements, made after the beginning of the war, I said that I should require 'More men, and still more, until the enemy is crushed.' I repeat that statement to-day with even greater insistence. All the reasons which led me to think in August 1914 that this war would be a prolonged one hold good at the present time. It is true we are in an immeasurably better situation now than ten months ago, but the position to-day is at least as serious as it was then.

The thorough preparedness of Germany, due to her strenuous efforts, sustained at high pressure for some forty years, has issued in a military organization as complex in character as it is perfect in machinery. Never before has any nation been so elaborately organized for imposing her will upon the other nations of the world; and her vast resources of military strength are wielded by an autocracy which is peculiarly adapted for the conduct of war. It is true that Germany's long preparedness has enabled her to utilize her whole resources from the very commencement of the war, while our policy is one of gradually increasing our effective forces. It might be said with truth that she *must* decrease, while we *must* increase.

Our voluntary system, which as you well know has been the deliberate choice of the English people, has rendered it necessary that our forces in peace time should be of relatively slender dimensions, with a capacity for potential expansion; and we have habitually relied on time being allowed us to increase our armed forces during the progress of hostilities.

The opening of the war found us, therefore, in our normal military situation, and it became our immediate task—concurrently with the dispatch of the first Expeditionary Force—to raise new armies, some of which have already made their presence felt at the front, and to provide for a strong and steady stream of reinforcements to maintain our Army in the field at full fighting strength.

From the first there has been a satisfactory and constant flow of recruits, and the falling-off in numbers recently apparent in recruiting returns has been, I believe, in great degree due to circumstances of a temporary character.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of the response that has been made to my previous appeals, but I am here to-day to make another demand on the manhood of the country to come forward to its

defence. I was from the first unwilling to ask for a supply of men in excess of the equipment available for them. I hold it to be most undesirable that soldiers keen to take their place in the field should be thus checked and possibly discouraged, or that the completion of their training should be hampered owing to lack of arms. We have now happily reached a period when it can be said that this drawback has been surmounted and that the troops in training can be supplied with sufficient arms and material to turn them out as efficient soldiers.

When the great rush of recruiting occurred in August and September of last year, there was a natural difficulty in finding accommodation for the many thousands who answered to the call for men to complete the existing armed forces and the New Armies. Now, however, I am glad to say, we have throughout the country provided accommodation calculated to be sufficient and suitable for our own requirements. Further, there was in the early autumn a very natural difficulty in clothing and equipping the newly raised units. Now we are able to clothe and equip all recruits as they come in, and thus the call for men is no longer restricted by any limitations such as the lack of material for training.

It is an axiom that the larger an army is, the greater is its need of an ever-swelling number of men of recruitable age to maintain it at its full strength; yet, at the very same time, the supply of those very men is automatically decreasing. Nor must it be forgotten that the great demand which has arisen for the supply of munitions, equipment, &c., for the armed forces of this country and of our Allies also, as well as the economic and financial necessity of keeping up the production of manufactured goods, involves the retention of a large number of men in various trades and manufactures, many of whom would otherwise be available for the Colours.

In respect of our great and increasing military requirements for men, I am glad to state how much we are indebted to the help given to the Recruiting Staff of the Regular Army and to the Territorial Associations throughout the country by the many Voluntary Recruiting Committees formed in all the counties and cities and in many important boroughs for this purpose. The recruiting by the regular Staff and the Territorial Associations has been most carefully and thoroughly carried out, and the relations between them and the various committees I have referred to have been both cordial and mutually helpful. The Parliamentary Recruiting Committee has done most excellent work in organizing meetings and providing speakers in all parts of the country in conjunction with the various local committees. It is impossible to refer by name to all committees that have helped, but I must just mention the work of the Lord Mayor's Committee in the City of London; of the committees

in the several districts of Lancashire, where we are much indebted to the organizing powers and initiative of Lord Derby; and of the several committees in Greater London, Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dublin, and Belfast. To these must be added the Central Recruiting Council for Ireland, with a number of county committees, as well as the Automobile Association.

The time has now come when something more is required to ensure the demands of our forces overseas being fully met, and to enable the large reserve of men imperatively required for the proper conduct of the war to be formed and trained. The public has watched with eager interest the growth and the rapidly acquired efficiency of the New Armies, whose dimensions have already reached a figure which only a short while ago would have been considered utterly unthinkable. But there is a tendency perhaps to overlook the fact that these larger Armies require still larger reserves, to make good the wastage at the front. And one cannot ignore the certainty that our requirements in this respect will be large, continuous, and persistent; for one feels that our gallant soldiers in the fighting line are beckoning, with an urgency at once imperious and pathetic, to those who remain at home to come out and play their part too.

Recruiting meetings, recruiting marches, and the unwearied labours of the recruiting officers, committees, and individuals have borne good fruit, and I look forward with confidence to such labours being continued as energetically as hitherto.

But we must go a step further, so as to attract and attach individuals who, from shyness or other causes, have not yet yielded to their own patriotic impulses. The Government have asked Parliament to pass a Registration Bill, with the object of ascertaining how many men and women there are in the country between the ages of 15 and 65, eligible for the national service, whether in the Navy or Army, or for the manufacture of munitions, or to fulfil other necessary services. When this registration is completed we shall anyhow be able to note the men between the ages of 19 and 40 not required for munition or other necessary industrial work, and therefore available, if physically fit, for the fighting line. Steps will be taken to approach, with a view to enlistment, all possible candidates for the Army—unmarried men to be preferred before married men, as far as may be.

Of course the work of completing the Registration will extend over some weeks, and meanwhile it is of vital and paramount importance that as large a number of men as possible should press forward to enlist so that the men's training may be complete when they are required for the field. I would urge all employers to help in this matter, by

releasing all men qualified for service with the Colours and replacing them by men of unrecruitable age, or by women, as has already been found feasible in so many cases. An acknowledgment is assuredly due to those patriotic employers who have not merely permitted but actively encouraged their men to enlist, and have helped the families of those who have joined the Colours.

When the registration becomes operative I feel sure that the Corporation of the City of London will not be content with its earlier efforts, intensely valuable as they have been, but will use its great facilities to set an example of canvassing for the cause. This canvass should be addressed with stern emphasis to such unpatriotic employers as, according to returns, have restrained their men from enlisting.

What the numbers required are likely to be it is clearly inexpedient to shout abroad. Our constant refusal to publish either these or any other figures likely to prove useful to the enemy needs neither explanation nor apology. It is often urged that if more information were given as to the work and whereabouts of various units recruiting would be strongly stimulated. But this is the precise information which would be of the greatest value to the enemy, and it is agreeable to note that a German Prince in high command ruefully recorded the other day his complete ignorance as to our New Armies.

But one set of figures, available for everybody, and indicating with sufficient particularity the needs of our forces in the field, is supplied by the casualty lists. With regard to these lists, however, serious and sad as they necessarily are, let two points be borne in mind. First, that a very large percentage of the casualties represents comparatively slight hurts, the sufferers from which in time return to the front ; and, secondly, that, if the figures seem to run very high, the magnitude of the operations is thereby suggested. Indeed, these casualty lists, whose great length may now and again induce undue depression of spirits, are an instructive indication of the huge extent of the operations undertaken now reached by the British forces in the field.

There are two classes of men to whom my appeal must be addressed:—

(1) Those for whom it is claimed that they are indispensable, whether for work directly associated with our military forces or for other purposes, public or private : and

(2) Those to whom has been applied the ugly name of ‘shirkers.’

As regards the former the question must be searchingly driven home whether their duties, however responsible and however technical, cannot in this time of stress be adequately carried out by men unfit for active military service or by women—and here I cannot refrain from a tribute of grateful recognition to the large number of women, drawn from every

class and phase of life, who have come forward and placed their services unreservedly at their country's disposal. The harvest, of course, is looming large in many minds. It is possible that many men engaged in agriculture have so far not come forward owing to their harvest duties. This may be a good reason at the moment, but can only be accepted if they notify their names at once as certain recruits on the very day after the harvest has been carried. Also the question of the private employment of recruitable men for any sort of domestic service is an acute one, which must be gravely and unselfishly considered by master and man alike.

There has been much said about 'slackers'—people, that is to say, who are doing literally nothing to help the country. Let us by all means avoid over-statement in this matter. Let us make every allowance for the very considerable number of men, over and above those who are directly rendering their country genuine service, who are engaged indirectly in patriotic work, or are occupied in really good and necessary work at home. Probably the residuum of absolute 'do-nothings' is relatively small, or at least smaller than is commonly supposed. At any rate, it is not of those that I am speaking for the moment. I am anxious specially to address myself to the large class drawn from the category of those who devote themselves to more or less patriotic objects or to quite good and useful work of one kind or another. I want each one of those to put this question to himself seriously and candidly: 'Have I a real reason for not joining the Army, or is that which I put before myself as a reason, after all only an excuse?'

Excuses are often very plausible and very arguable, and seem quite good until we examine them in the light of duty before the tribunal of our conscience. To take only a single instance. Are there not many special constables who, being of recruitable age, are really qualified to undertake the higher service which is open to them? Perhaps the favourite excuse for neglecting to join the colours is one which appears in various forms—'I am ready to go when I am fetched'; 'I suppose they will let me know when they want me'; 'I don't see why I should join while so many others remain behind'; 'To be fair, let us all be asked to join together'; 'After all, if the country only entreats and does not command us to enlist, does not that prove that it is not a duty to go, that only those need go who choose?'

Granted that legally you need only go if you choose, is it not morally 'up to you' to choose to go? If you are only ready to go when you are fetched, where is the merit of that? Where is the patriotism of it? Are you only going to do your duty when the law says you must? Does the call to duty find no response in you until reinforced, let us rather say superseded, by the call of compulsion?

It is not for me to tell you your duty ; that is a matter for your conscience. But make up your minds, and do so quickly. Don't delay to take your decision and, having taken it, to act upon it at once. Be honest with yourself. Be certain that your so-called reason is not a selfish excuse. Be sure that hereafter, when you look back upon to-day and its call to duty, you do not have cause, perhaps bitter cause, to confess to your conscience that you shirked your duty to your country and sheltered yourself under a mere excuse.

It has been well said that in every man's life there is one supreme hour towards which all earlier experience moves and from which all future results may be reckoned. For every individual Briton, as well as for our national existence, that solemn hour is now striking. Let us take heed to the great opportunity it offers and which most assuredly we must grasp *now and at once—or never*. Let each man of us see that we spare nothing, shirk nothing, shrink from nothing, if only we may lend our full weight to the impetus which shall carry to victory the cause of our honour and of our freedom.

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI

(1805-1872).

MAZZINI was born in 1805. Soon after his graduation from the University of Genoa in 1826, he joined the Carbonari, and in 1832 founded "Young Italy," a revolutionary society whose object was to unify Italy under a Republic. Obligated to live in exile for many years, he returned to Italy in 1848 and headed the revolutionary movement which inaugurated the "Republic of Rome." After its overthrow in 1849, he again went into exile, and during the next ten years worked incessantly to unify Italy. No doubt he did more than anyone else to make this unification possible, but he was greatly disappointed that it came under a Monarchy instead of a Republic, and rather than take the oath of allegiance to Victor Emmanuel he remained in exile. In 1870 he took part in the insurrection of Palermo and was among the number of those captured by the Government and released under a general amnesty.

TO THE YOUNG MEN OF ITALY

(Delivered at Milan in Memory of the Martyrs of Cosenza, July 25th, 1848).

WHEN I was commissioned by you, young men, to proffer in this temple a few words sacred to the memory of the brothers Bandiera and their fellow-martyrs at Cosenza, I thought that some of those who heard me might exclaim with noble indignation: "Wherefore lament over the dead? The martyrs of liberty are only worthily honoured by winning the battle they have begun; Cosenza, the land where they fell, is enslaved; Venice, the city of their birth, is begirt by foreign foes. Let us emancipate them, and until that moment let no words pass our lips save words of war."

But another thought arose: "Why have we not conquered? Why is it that, while we are fighting for independence in the north of Italy, liberty is perishing in the south? Why is it that a war, which should have sprung to the Alps with the bound of a lion, has dragged itself along for four months, with the slow uncertain motion of the

scorpion surrounded by a circle of fire? How has the rapid and powerful intuition of a people newly arisen to life been converted into the weary helpless effort of the sick man turning from side to side? Ah! had we all arisen in the sanctity of the idea for which our martyrs died; had the holy standard of their faith preceded our youth to battle; had we reached that unity of life which was in them so powerful, and made of our every action a thought, and of our every thought an action; had we devoutly gathered up their last words in our hearts, and learned from them that Liberty and Independence are one, that God and the People, the Fatherland and Humanity, are the two inseparable terms of the advance of every people striving to become a nation; that Italy can have no true life till she be One, holy in the equality and love of all her children, great in the worship of eternal truth, and consecrated to a lofty mission, a moral priesthood among the peoples of Europe,—we should now have had, not war, but victory; Cosenza would not be compelled to venerate the memory of her martyrs in secret, nor Venice be restrained from honouring them with a monument; and we, gathered here together, might gladly invoke their sacred names, without uncertainty as to our future destiny, or a cloud of sadness on our brows, and say to those precursor souls: "Rejoice! for your spirit is incarnate in your brethren, and they are worthy of you."

The idea which they worshipped, young men, does not as yet shine forth in its full purity and integrity upon your banner. The sublime programme which they, dying, bequeathed to the rising Italian generation is yours; but mutilated, broken up into fragments by the false doctrines, which, elsewhere overthrown, have taken refuge amongst us. I look around, and I see the struggles of desperate populations, an alternation of generous rage and of unworthy repose; of shouts for freedom and of formulæ of servitude, throughout all parts of our Peninsula; but the soul of the country, where is it? What unity is there in this unequal and manifold movement—where is the Word that should dominate the hundred diverse and opposing counsels which mislead or seduce the multitude? I hear phrases usurping the national omnipotence—"The Italy of the North—the league of the States—Federation—compacts between Princes," but Italy, where is it? Where is the common country, the country which the Bandieras hailed as thrice Initiatrix of a new era of European civilization?

Intoxicated with our first victories, improvident for the future, we forgot the idea revealed by God to those who suffered; and God has punished our forgetfulness by deferring our triumph. The Italian movement, my countrymen, is, by decree of Providence, that of Europe. We arise to give a pledge of moral progress to the European world.

But neither political fictions, nor dynastic aggrandizements, nor theories of expediency, can transform or renovate the life of the peoples. Humanity lives and moves through faith; great principles are the guiding stars that lead Europe towards the future. Let us turn to the graves of our martyrs, and ask inspiration of those who died for us all, and we shall find the secret of victory in the adoration of a faith. The angel of martyrdom and the angel of victory are brothers; but the one looks up to heaven, and the other looks down to earth; and it is when, from epoch to epoch, their glance meets between earth and heaven, that creation is embellished with a new life, and a people arises from the cradle or the tomb, evangelist or prophet.

I will sum up for you in a few words this faith of our martyrs; their external life is known to you all; it is now a matter of history, and I need not recall it to you.

The faith of the brothers Bandiera, which was and is our own, was based upon a few simple incontrovertible truths, which few, indeed, venture to declare false, but which are nevertheless forgotten or betrayed by most:—

God and the People.

God at the summit of the social edifice; the people, the universality of our brethren, at the base. God, the Father and Educator; the people, the progressive interpreter of his law.

No true society can exist without a common belief and a common aim. Religion declares the belief and the aim. Politics regulate society in the practical realization of that belief, and prepare the means of attaining that aim. Religion represents the principle, politics the application. There is but one sun in heaven for all the earth. There is one law for all those who people the earth. It is alike the law of the human being and of collective humanity. We are placed here below, not for the capricious exercise of our own individual faculties,—our faculties and liberty are the means, not the end,—not to work out our own happiness upon earth; happiness can only be reached elsewhere, and there God works for us; but to consecrate our existence to the discovery of a portion of the Divine law; to practise it as far as our individual circumstances and powers allow, and to diffuse the knowledge and love of it among our brethren.

We are here below to labour fraternally to build up the unity of the human family, so that the day may come when it shall represent a single sheepfold with a single shepherd,—the spirit of God, the Law.

To aid our search after truth, God has given to us tradition and the voice of our conscience. Wherever they are opposed, is error. To attain harmony and consistence between the conscience of the individual

and the conscience of humanity, no sacrifice is too great. The family, the city, the fatherland, and humanity are but different spheres in which to exercise our activity and our power of sacrifice towards this great aim. God watches from above the inevitable progress of humanity, and from time to time he raises up the great in genius, in love, in thought, or in action, as priests of his truth, and guides to the multitude on their way.

These principles,—indicated in their letters, in their proclamations, and in their conversations,—with a profound sense of the mission intrusted by God to the individual and to humanity, were to Attilio and Emilio Bandiera, and their fellow-martyrs, the guide and comfort of a weary life ; and, when men and circumstances had alike betrayed them, these principles sustained them in death, in religious serenity and calm certainty of the realization of their immortal hopes for the future of Italy. The immense energy of their souls arose from the intense love which informed their faith. And could they now arise from the grave and speak to you, they would, believe me, address you, though with a power very different from that which is given to me, in counsel not unlike this which I now offer to you.

Love ! love is the flight of the soul towards God ; towards the great, the sublime, and the beautiful, which are the shadow of God upon earth. Love your family, the partner of your life, those around you ready to share your joys and sorrows ; love the dead who were dear to you and to whom you were dear. But let your love be the love taught you by Dante and by us,—the love of souls that aspire together ; do not grovel on the earth in search of a felicity which it is not the destiny of the creature to reach here below ; do not yield to a delusion which inevitably would degrade you into egotism. To love is to give and take a promise for the future. God has given us love, that the weary soul may give and receive support upon the way of life. It is a flower springing up on the path of duty ; but it cannot change its course. Purify, strengthen, and improve yourselves by loving. Act always,—even at the price of increasing her earthly trials,—so that the sister soul united to your own may never need, here or elsewhere, to blush through you or for you. The time will come when, from the height of a new life, embracing the whole past and comprehending its secret, you will smile together at the sorrows you have endured, the trials you have overcome.

Love your country. Your country is the land where your parents sleep, where is spoken that language in which the chosen of your heart blushing whispered the first word of love ; it is the home that God has given you, that by striving to perfect yourselves therein, you may prepare to ascend to him. It is your name, your glory, your sign among the people. Give to it your thoughts, your counsels, your blood. Raise

it up, great and beautiful as it was foretold by our great men, and see that you leave it uncontaminated by any trace of falsehood or of servitude ; unprofaned by dismemberment. Let it be one, as the thought of God. You are twenty-five millions of men, endowed with active, splendid faculties ; possessing a tradition of glory the envy of the nations of Europe. An immense future is before you ; you lift your eyes to the loveliest heaven, and around you smiles the loveliest land in Europe ; you are encircled by the Alps and the sea, boundaries traced out by the finger of God for a people of giants—you are bound to be such, or nothing. Let not a man of that twenty-five millions remain excluded from the fraternal bond destined to join you together ; let not a glance be raised to that heaven which is not the glance of a free man. Let Rome be the ark of your redemption, the temple of your nation. Has she not twice been the temple of the destinies of Europe ? In Rome two extinct worlds, the Pagan and the Papal, are superposed like the double jewels of a diadem ; draw from these a third world greater than the two. From Rome, the Holy-city, the city of love (Amor), the purest and wisest among you, elected by the vote and fortified by the inspiration of a whole people, shall dictate the Pact that shall make us one, and represent us in the future alliance of the peoples. Until then you will either have no country, or have her contaminated and profaned.

Love humanity. You can only ascertain your own mission from the aim set by God before humanity at large. God has given you your country as cradle, and humanity as mother ; you cannot rightly love your brethren of the cradle if you love not the common mother. Beyond the Alps, beyond the sea, are other peoples now fighting or preparing to fight the holy fight of independence, of nationality, of liberty ; other peoples striving by different routes to reach the same goal,—improvement, association, and the foundation of an authority which shall put an end to moral anarchy and re-link earth to heaven, an authority which mankind may love and obey without remorse or shame. Unite with them ; they will unite with you. Do not invoke their aid where your single arm will suffice to conquer ; but say to them that the hour will shortly sound for a terrible struggle between right and blind force, and that in that hour you will ever be found with those who have raised the same banner as yourselves.

And love, young men, love and venerate the ideal. The ideal is the word of God. High above every country, high above humanity, is the country of the spirit, the city of the soul, in which all are brethren who believe in the inviolability of thought and in the dignity of our immortal soul ; and the baptism of this fraternity is martyrdom. From that high sphere spring the principles which alone can redeem the peoples. Arise

for the sake of these, and not from impatience of suffering or dread of evil. Anger, pride, ambition, and the desire of material prosperity, are arms common alike to the peoples and their oppressors, and even should you conquer with these to-day, you would fall again to-morrow ; but principles belong to the peoples alone, and their oppressors can find no arms to oppose them. Adore enthusiasm, the dreams of the virgin soul, and the visions of early youth, for they are a perfume of paradise which the soul retains in issuing from the hands of its Creator. Respect above all things your conscience ; have upon your lips the truth implanted by God in your hearts, and, while labouring in harmony, even with those who differ from you, in all that tends to the emancipation of our soil, yet ever bear your own banner erect and boldly promulgate your own faith.

Such words, young men, would the martyrs of Cosenza have spoken had they been living amongst you ; and here, where it may be that, invoked by our love, their holy spirits hover near us, I call upon you to gather them up in your hearts and to make of them a treasure amid the storms that yet threaten you ; storms which, with the name of our martyrs on your lips and their faith in your hearts, you will overcome.

God be with you, and bless Italy !

COMTE DE MIRABEAU

(GABRIEL HONORÉ RIQUETTI, COMTE DE MIRABEAU)

(1749-1791).

MIRABEAU'S supremacy among the orators of the French Revolution is generally conceded. Governed by intellect and impulse, controlled usually by good intentions, and full of sympathy for progress, as he understood it, it does not appear that he was ever hampered either in expression or in action by purely moral considerations. Born March 9th, 1749, near Nemours, he inherited the worst, as well as the best, traits of a family in which intellect had been developed at the expense of morals. His father who has been judged severely by historians and critics seems to have resented with great bitterness his son's infirmities and criminal tendencies, though it has been asserted with reason that the worst of them were hereditary. As a result, the younger Mirabeau was a victim of a *lettre de cachet*, and spent a considerable part of his youth in the Bastille. He improved his time in prison by acquiring a great deal of the knowledge he afterwards used to such advantage in politics, but he employed it also in compiling a book of the most dissolute character—unmentionable except as it illustrates his vital weakness of mind and morals—a weakness which appeared at the crisis of his life—which, when he undertook to be the ruling spirit of the French Revolution, "guiding the whirlwind and directing the storm," brought him premature death followed by the infamy of the potter's field, inflicted by those who believed with too much reason that he had deserted the cause of popular government for the service of the court. It is asserted, and in some instances proven, that speeches and addresses which helped to make his great reputation as an orator were prepared for him by the circle of highly intellectual men who surrounded him, but even if all were conceded that is claimed, it would still remain true that as an extemporaneous speaker he has been seldom surpassed. It is said of him that in delivering his extemporaneous harangues "his frame dilated, his face was wrinkled and contorted; he roared and stamped; his whole system was seized with an electric irritability, and writhed as under an almost preternatural agitation."

ON NECKER'S PROJECT—"AND YET YOU DELIBERATE"

(Delivered in the French Constituent Assembly on Necker's Financial Project of a Twenty-five per cent Income Tax, September 26th, 1789).

IN the midst of this tumultuous debate can I not bring you back to the question of the deliberation by a few simple questions? Deign to hear me and to vouchsafe a reply.

The minister of finance,—has he not shown you a most formidable picture of our actual situation? Has he not told you that every delay aggravates the danger—that a day, an hour, an instant, may make it fatal?

Have we any other plan to substitute for the one he proposes? "Yes," cries some one in the assembly! I conjure the one making this reply of "Yes," to consider that his plan is unknown; that it would take time to develop, examine, and demonstrate it; that even were it at once submitted to our deliberation, its author may be mistaken; were he even free of all error, it might be thought he was wrong, for when the whole world is wrong, the whole world makes wrong right. The author of this other project in being right might be wrong against the world, since without the assent of public opinion the greatest talents could not triumph over such circumstances.

And I—I myself—do not believe the methods of M. Necker the very best possible. But heaven preserve me in such a critical situation from opposing my views to his! Vainly I might hold them preferable! One does not in a moment rival an immense popularity achieved by brilliant services; a long experience, the reputation of the highest talent as a financier, and, it can be added, a destiny such as has been achieved by no other man!

Let us then return to this plan of M. Necker. But have we the time to examine, to prove its foundation, to verify its calculations? No, no, a thousand times no! Insignificant questions, hazardous conjectures, doubts, and gropings, these are all that at this moment are in our power. What shall we accomplish by rejecting this deliberation? Miss our decisive moment, injure our self-esteem by changing something we neither know nor understand, and diminish by our indiscreet intervention the influence of a minister, whose financial credit is, and ought to be, much greater than our own. There assuredly is in this neither wisdom nor foresight. Does it even show good faith? If no less solemn declarations guarantee our respect for the public faith, our horror of the infamous word "bankruptcy," I might dare to scrutinize the secret

motives which make us hesitate to promulgate an act of patriotic devotion which will be inefficacious if not done immediately and with full confidence.

I would say to those who familiarize themselves with the idea of failing to keep the public faith, either by fear of taxes or of excessive sacrifices : What is bankruptcy, if not the most cruel, the most iniquitous, the most unequal, the most disastrous of imposts ? My friends, hear but a word—a single word :—

Two centuries of depredations and brigandage have made the chasm in which the kingdom is ready to engulf itself. We must close this fearful abyss. Well, here is a list of French proprietors ! Choose among the richest, thus sacrificing the least number of citizens ! But choose ! For must not a small number perish to save the mass of the people ? Well, these two thousand notables possess enough to make up the deficit. This will restore order in the finances and bring peace and prosperity to the kingdom !

Strike, immolate without pity these wretched victims, cast them into the abyss until it is closed. You recoil in horror, inconsistent and pusillanimous men ! Do you not see that in decreeing bankruptcy, or what is still more odious, in rendering it inevitable, without decreeing it, you do a deed a thousand times more criminal, and—folly inconceivable—gratuitously criminal ? For at least this horrible sacrifice would cause the disappearance of the deficit. But do you imagine that in refusing to pay, you will cease to owe ? Do you believe that the thousands, the millions of men, who will lose in an instant, by the terrible explosion or its repercussion, all that made the consolation of their lives, and constituted, perhaps, the sole means of their support, would leave you peaceably to enjoy your crime ? Stoical contemplators of the incalculable evils, which this catastrophe would disgorge upon France ! Impassive egoists who think that these convulsions of despair and misery shall pass like so many others, and the more rapidly as they are the more violent ! Are you sure that so many men without bread will leave you tranquilly to the enjoyment of those dainties, the number and delicacy of which you are unwilling to diminish. No ! you will perish, and in the universal conflagration you do not hesitate to kindle, the loss of your honour will not save a single one of your detestable enjoyments !

Look where we are going ! . . . I hear you speak of patriotism, and the *élan* of patriotism, of invocations to patriotism. Ah, do not prostitute the words, “country” and “patriotism” ! Is it so very magnanimous—the effort to give a portion of one’s revenue to save all of one’s possessions ? This is only simple arithmetic ; and he who hesitates cannot disarm indignation except by the contempt he inspires through his stupidity. Yes this is the plainest pru-

dence, the commonest wisdom ! It is your gross material interests I invoke ! I shall not say to you as formerly : Will you be the first to exhibit to the nations the spectacle of a people assembled to make default in their public obligations ? I shall not say again : What titles have you to liberty ? What means remain to you to preserve it, if in your first act you surpass the turpitude of the most corrupt governments ; if the first care of your vigilant co-operation is not for the guarantee of your constitution ? I tell you, you will all be dragged into a universal ruin, and you yourselves have the greatest interests in making the sacrifices the Government asks of you. Vote, then, for this extraordinary subsidy ; and it may be sufficient ! Vote for it, for if you have any doubts on the means adopted (vague and unenlightened doubts), you have none as to its necessity, or our inability to provide an immediate substitute. Vote, then, because public necessity admits no delay and we shall be held accountable for any delay that occurs. Beware of asking for time ! Misfortune never grants it !

Apropos of a ridiculous disturbance at the Palais Royal, of a laughable insurrection, which never had any importance save in the weak imaginations or perverted designs of a few faith-breakers, you have heard these mad words : " Catiline is at the gates of Rome ! And yet you deliberate ! "

And certainly there has been about us no Catiline, no peril, no faction, no Rome. But to-day bankruptcy—hideous bankruptcy is here—it threatens to consume you, your properties, your honour ! And yet you deliberate !

DR. WALTER HINES PAGE

(1855-1918).

DR. Page, after graduating at Macon College, Virginia, turned to journalism as a profession. He soon rose to the editorial chair, directing such important magazines as "The Forum" (1890-95), and afterwards "The Atlantic Monthly."

His knowledge and skill were made widely known in both hemispheres by his able editorship of "The World's Work" magazine. He was United States Ambassador to Great Britain from 1913 to 1918 during which time he proved a pillar of strength to the Entente.

His "Life and Letters" when published aroused so much interest that further letters have been given in "The World To-day," formerly "The World's Work."

THE UNION OF TWO GREAT PEOPLES

(Delivered at Plymouth, on Saturday, August 4th, 1917).

THE honour you pay me by your great reception in this town and by this large audience moves me profoundly. I am glad to stand here and, at the beginning of this new era in the life of our race, to pledge the unwavering fellowship of free men across the sea—that sea that once separated us but now unites us. I pay homage here to the immortal memory of your great masters of the sea, and especially of those sturdy heroes and spiritual adventurers who sailed from this harbour nearly 300 years ago and carried to the making of our New World that love of freedom which now impels us to come to the defence of the imperilled freedom of the old world.

The idealism of the Republic rests on their unconquerable spirit, which spirit we keep yet, thank God, when a high duty calls us. In memory of them and in the comradeship of this righteous war, whose awful shadow will darken the world till we win, I greet you as kinsmen and companions. We meet on the most tragic anniversary in history. It is not a day to celebrate for its own sake. What we shall be glad to celebrate will be the day of victory and its anniversary for ever after. But before we achieve victory it is fit that we meet on this dire anniversary

to fortify our purpose, if it needs fortifying, to pledge ourselves that the brave men who have died shall not have died in vain and to re-assert our purpose to finish this task even if it exhaust the vast resources and take all the valiant lives of the Allies in Europe and of the Republic across the seas. For what would the future of the human race be worth if the deliberate and calculated barbarism of our enemies overran the world? The supreme gift of free government which this brave island gave to the earth, and to which all free lands chiefly owe their freedom, would be swept away. We do not need to review these terrible three years. Everyone of us is constantly doing that whether we would or not. For the war has shut most preceding experiences and memories of normal and joyful tasks out of our memories, but there are several facts that we may profitably recall.

The chief fact is that the war was thrust upon us. Not only did the Allied countries not begin it; they did everything to prevent it. Documentary proof of this is abundant, and has so often and clearly been stated that I shall not weary you with another recital of it. Another fact is the persistent denial by German public men and soldiers that the war was of their making. That is important not only as a measure of their moral accuracy, but as an indication of their method of retreat. They will appeal to the pity of the world they set out to subdue. It is particularly proper for us on this tragic anniversary to ponder on these large facts, while we strengthen our resolve. After the war is ended and we can look back calmly on these years they will, I imagine, stand out in our memory as a horrible nightmare in certain moods, and in certain other moods as a time of the heroic cleansing of the earth of an ancient and deadly malady. Military despotisms have ever been one of the greatest evils of human society; and we have now learnt that under modern physical progress they are become far more dangerous as well as far more loathsome than in simpler times.

But, after these general reflections on the nature of this great conflict, I think it will be proper to speak in this place of sacred historic associations, of one great by-product of the war—the best of it—I mean the closer coming together of the two great English-speaking parts of the world. No American can come to Plymouth without thinking of the going of the English from these shores to the new land where they set up a new freedom and laid the foundations of the most prosperous and hopeful community on the earth.

In the course of time these new communities fell apart from political allegiance to the old land, but they fell apart only in political allegiance. If we had need to discuss this political divergence I should then maintain that that political separation was just as well for you as it was necessary

for us. That by reason of it human freedom has been further advanced and a new chapter in free men's growth opened throughout the English-speaking world.

The American Revolution was a civil war fought on each side by men of the same race. And this civil war was fought in the colonial assemblies and in your Parliament as well as on the battlefields in America, and it was won in the colonial assemblies and in your Parliament as well as on the battlefields of America, for from that day on you have regarded colonies as free and equal communities to the mother country, and you have had the happiness to see them giving of their best for their help.

Now this civil war naturally left a trail of distrust, the greater because of the long distance between us by sail. But when the first steamship came over the ocean, and still more when the cable bound us together, a new union began to come about, because these eliminations of distance set the side of feeling in the natural course laid out by kinship and common aims.[†]

But in the meantime the American community had developed in its own way, and our life had become more and more different from life in this kingdom. We became so fixed and so different in our conventions and ways of life that we could not easily come back to your conventions of life if we would. In fact there is no other test that the British people have had—no test that any people has ever had—which proved its great qualities so well as the British settlement and management of America. Here were men in a new land, cut off from close contact with their kinsmen at home, who took their political affairs in their own management, and thereafter were without guidance or support from their more numerous community left behind. How did the race stand such a test? No other migrating race has stood such a test so well, and those first English colonists have now grown, by natural increase and by numerous adoptions, into a people who to-day include more English-speaking white men than the whole British Empire.

They have not only outgrown in numbers all the British elsewhere, but they have kept what may be called the faith of the race. They have kept the racial and national characteristics. They have kept British law, British freedom, British Parliaments, British character, and they are reared on English literature. I am not boasting of my own land, I am only reciting how your race has endured and survived separation from you and your land. Our foundations were British, our political structure is British with variations, our social structure is British, also with important variations; more important still, our

standards of character and of honour and of duty are your standards, and life and freedom have the same meaning to us that they have to you.

These are the essential things, and in these we have always been one. Our admixture of races to make a richer American stock is similar to the admixture of race that went, in an earlier time, to the making of a richer British stock in these islands. In most of our steps forward in human advancement we have but repeated in a larger land and under new conditions the steps that you took in these islands in the struggling days of the making of our race and in the beginnings of its institutions. During the long period of sailing craft and before the telegraph we lost no racial characteristics. We lost only close personal contact. We lost personal acquaintance. We even had sharp differences of opinion, which, in fact, is a quality of our race.

But if you review our history carefully you will discover that no difference that ever arose between us was ever half so important as it got credit for being at the time. Most of them were superficial differences. Such as were more serious found settlement—once again by war and many times by thorough study that led to understanding. And when they were settled they were settled. That has always been our way with one another, and it will always be. We were, under the influence of swift communication and travel, already losing our long isolation, and you were relaxing your misjudgments, when our Civil War again proved we were made of the same stuff that you were made of, and we swung into a period of even closer understanding.

And now, the day of our supreme test and of the heroic mood is come. There is now a race reason why we should have a complete understanding, and such a complete understanding has come. I hope you will pardon me for alluding to these old differences, for they are now long forgotten, far-off things. I allude to them only to clear the way, for it is not the going of the Pilgrims nor the falling away of the Colonies that we are met to celebrate to-night, but rather the coming of American warships which symbolizes our new union. Politically two peoples, in all high aims and in the love of freedom we are one and must remain one for ever. Not only have our warships come, but our troopships have landed an Army on the soil of our brave Ally across the Channel, where the enemy yet keeps the wavering line of an invader. And more warships will come and more troopships—million-laden if you need them—till that line is for ever driven back, until the submarines are withdrawn or for ever submerged.

There is coming the greatest victory for free government that was ever won, and the day of this victory which we are both fighting for may

turn out the most important date in history. The necessity to win it has cleared the air as no other event in modern times has done, and but for the millions of brave lives it has cost this clearing of the air would richly repay all the treasure the war has cost. For it has revealed the future of the world to us, not as its conquerors, but as its necessary preservers of peace.

Free peace-loving nations will have no more of this colossal armed and ordered pillage, and no combination of peace-loving nations can be made effective without both branches of our race. This Empire and the great Republic must then be the main guardians of civilization in the future—the conscious and leagued guardians of the world.

It is this that the war is revealing to us. It is not a task of our seeking ; but it is a task that we will, with other free peoples of the earth, under God, gladly undertake. To undertake it our comradeship must be perpetual and our task is to see to it that it be not broken nor even strained. That is our task and our children's task and their children's task after them ; for we are laying new foundations of human freedom. Of course, it is the function of Governments to keep friendly nations in proper relations to one another, and both our nations fortunately can and do trust both our Governments to do that. Through all the difficulties and differences that arose between our two Governments during the early stages of the war there was no rupture of friendly dealing. When the full story of these years of delicate relations comes to be told it will be seen that mutual toleration and forbearance played a far larger part than a rigid insistence on disputed points. Such differences as we had were differences between friends. I am sure I may say without impropriety that the two distinguished British statesmen who were his Majesty's Chief Foreign Secretaries during this period showed a spirit in their dealings with the United States Government that put the whole English-speaking world in their debt. I am equally sure that they would say the same thing for the Government of the United States.

While fortunately our two Governments may be fully trusted to bind us together in every possible way, Governments come and Governments go. In free countries they are as a rule short-lived ; and they are always and properly, even in the conduct of foreign relations, the servants of public opinion if public opinion strongly asserts itself. Far more important, then, than any particular Government is the temper and action of public opinion in every country such as ours, and permanent union in our large aims of our two nations, generation after generation, for ever, must therefore rest on the broad basis of a friendly and informed public opinion in both countries. If this argument be sound it leads every one of us to a high duty. The lasting friendship of two demo-

cratic countries must rest on the sympathetic knowledge that the people of each country have of the other, even upon the personal friendship of large numbers of people one with another.

Personal friendships make for a friendly public opinion. It is therefore the highest political duty of British citizens and American citizens to build up political friendship by personal knowledge and personal friendship. It is your duty to learn all you can about the United States, about the country, about its people, their institutions, their occupations, their aims, and to make acquaintance with as many Americans as you can. It may be you will not like them all. It may be you don't like all your own countrymen. But you will, I think, like most Americans. Certainly most of them like you. Most of all, make an opportunity to come and see them and see their country, and get a sympathetic knowledge of their methods and ways of life. Make a proper appraisal of their character and aims.

And of course this action must be mutual. In normal times many thousands of Americans do pay visits to your Kingdom. They make pilgrimages. They come for pleasure and instruction. As soon as the war ends they will come again in still greater numbers. But in spite of visits, either way or both ways, of large numbers of individuals, each people has a vast deal of ignorance about the other. This very day I saw a statuette of Benjamin Franklin labelled George Washington. It is a priceless treasure that I shall take away from Plymouth. Few merely private visitors get beneath the superficial conventions. By deliberately going about the task we may get far more thoroughly acquainted than we can get by the mere interchange of personal visits.

I venture to put together a few definite suggestions. Put in your schools an elementary book about the United States—not a dull text-book, but a book written by a sympathetic man of accurate knowledge, which shall tell every child in Britain about the country, about the people, how they work, how they live, what results they achieve, what they aim at ; about the United States Government, about our greatest men, about our social structure—a book that shall make the large facts plain to any child, and require that every child shall read it.

A perfunctory book will fail. Have a hundred books written if necessary till the right one is written. There is, you know, one great book written by an Englishman about the United States—Lord Bryce's "American Commonwealth." I wish it were read by as many persons here as in America. But that is not a book for children ; there ought to be a more elementary book. You have often criticized certain old text-books of American history on which American children were supposed to be brought up—I was brought up on them, and I was never brought

up to hate the English. You have properly criticized them for laying undue emphasis on our war of revolution and on the conflicts our forefathers had with your forefathers. Now prepare a proper book for your own children, correct any disproportions these old American school books may have had, and give the chief emphasis not to our old differences, but to our present likenesses, and to our necessary close understanding for the future.

On the American side the disproportion and the wrong temper of these old books that have been so much criticized is fast disappearing. Newer text-books have corrected this old fault. On the American side I want to see a modern elementary book about Great Britain put into our schools that shall tell children of the present Great Britain, and point in the right spirit to the future. If we rear our children to understand the friendly similarities of our two peoples instead of lodging old differences in their minds we may lie down and die at ease and entrust to them the future, not only of our two lands, but of the whole world as well.

Another suggestion I make is to encourage the giving of popular lectures by well-informed Americans about our country and our people. If you show that you wish to hear them they will come. There is at this moment a considerable number of well-informed countrymen of yours lecturing in the United States on some phases of British life and activity. I think they labour under the delusion that they need to wake us up. No matter, we are glad to hear them. And a large and well-informed group of my countrymen are in this kingdom lecturing on phases of American life, perhaps also under the delusion that they need to wake you up. I heartily hope that this popular form of instruction will continue and grow long after the war.

It is a commonplace to say there is no other land so full of pleasant and useful information for Americans as your land and no people so well worth our intimate acquaintance as your people, and it is equally true that no other land and no other people are so well worth your sympathetic study as the United States and those that dwell there, for they have the spirit of the modern world as no others have it. I hope you will pardon me if I say that a visit to America and to your great colonies is an excursion into the future of human society.

We ought, too, to welcome and encourage all sorts of popular instruction, even moving pictures, if they show the right pictures. Another useful piece of the machinery of popular education—perhaps the most useful of all—is the Press. Many of the most energetic editors of each country, of course, frequently visited the other, but if visits of groups of them were arranged and definite programmes were made for them to

touch the real spirit of the other country, better results would follow than casual visits. Then, if either country or Government seems to do anything contrary to a proper understanding with the other, if then instead of making judgments, newspaper judgments at a distance, a group of journalists who control the chief organs of opinion in each country would themselves visit the other country and make personal first-hand investigations of what had gone wrong, many of our mistakes would be corrected instantly, and well nigh all our misunderstandings would disappear before they arise. This is the thing to do first to achieve right understanding, and then it will be hard for a wrong understanding to arise.

I believe in the suggestion also that has been made of regular personal correspondence between persons in each country. In spite of the newspapers, accurate and full information about what each country is doing to prosecute the war is difficult to procure in the other country. I know several gentlemen who got their best measure of opinion of what goes on in the United States from American correspondents. In addition to welcome information that can thus be conveyed, there will be many cases of personal friendship formed. That is the best bond of continuous amity between nations. I think that much pleasure and instruction would come of such personal correspondence. Try it. I might make many such practical suggestions. Among them I should certainly include the encouragement of British students to go to American universities, where they will be most heartily welcomed, and of more American students to British universities. I should include pilgrimages both ways of them, as well as of large bodies of educational workers.

You will say that all these things cost money. They are less costly than ignorance. If our two peoples are to come together as we hope, travel must become much cheaper than it has ever been. And, most important of all, I would suggest frequent visits by our public men, especially those who hold high office. I need cite only the recent historic visit of Mr. Balfour to the United States and his historic reception there. I doubt if any member of the Government of any people since Governments began has had so great an effect as that.

Now, none of these suggestions may prove practicable to you, and whether any suggestion be practical for any particular person or community can be tested only by trial. But some plan is practical here in Plymouth, and about this your judgment is better than mine. My plea is that the people of every British community and the people of every American community shall find a way to inform themselves about the other country, and all such information brings with it a closer sympathy. The sympathetic understanding between any two free

countries depends on the number of citizens in each country who themselves have a sympathetic understanding with one another. One plan is that one town in each country should "adopt" a town of the same name in the other country. If you did that you would start with about fifty Plymouths. And then Great Britain and the United States, who understand one another far better than any other two great countries in the world, would come much closer together if in every community in each country there were a group of men who made the furthering of such an understanding their particular business. There is no other task so important for the security of civilization. I venture to say that it is our duty thus to lay broad and deep the basis of an everlasting unity.

Most valuable of all the activities that lead to a permanent sympathy is our present fellowship in war. Americans now here confer daily with most Departments of your Government, and your corresponding representatives in the United States confer with most Departments of the American Government, so that the greatest possible unity of action may be secured. Our highest naval and military officers are in command of our forces in your waters and on the soil of France. Our fleets in your seas are constantly becoming larger and our advanced army in France secures constant additions. The most skilful American surgeons attend the Allied wounded of all armies, and American nurses in ever-increasing numbers assist them. American engineers and labourers are laying railways behind the British and French lines. American scientific men are giving their skill not only at home but at the front to perfect scientific methods of making military activities more accurate. American lumbermen are felling your forests and cutting the trees for war uses. Labourers under American engineers are building and rebuilding military roads in France, and our money is pouring into the war coffers of all the Allies.

Most of all, American fighting units, naval and army and air service, are come and very many more will come. They will all work side by side with your men and the other Allies. Most of them, of course, are young men, and, like your young men, the flower of our race. These are forming companionships that nothing can sever. Men who go forth to die together, if fate so wills it, understand one another as long as they survive. Beside the companionship of arms, formed where death comes swift and frequently, other companionships seem weak. For men's naked souls are then bared to one another. In this extremest trial that men ever underwent, anywhere and at any time, for any cause, where only the high emotions and the guns are at work, everything else of life is still or pushed out of consciousness.

And men who come together then are forever inseparable. Already there is many, many a corner of a foreign land that is "for ever England's" and presently there will be many a corner of a foreign land that is an American grave also. Those that die and those that live will hereafter so bind our two peoples in mutual understanding that any disturber of that understanding will play but the poor part of a sacrilegious fool.

In comparison with this cementing of the two great branches of our common civilization how cheap is my poor task or any other man's and how little worth while your kind and patient hearing. Our common peril and our companionship in staying it have already made us one for ever. I greet you as kinsmen and companions in this great effort to save the world. I shall leave you linked in my memory with the undying recollection of these heroic days which have made our peoples at one for ever in high aims.

LORD PALMERSTON

(1784-1865).

HENRY JOHN TEMPLE, VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, whose name is connected with some of the most important events in modern English politics, was born near Romsey, in Hants, October 20th, 1784. At the age of eighteen the death of his father made him Viscount Palmerston and opened to him the official career for which he was fitted by his versatility and his talents. He entered Parliament as a representative of a pocket borough, and was at once made one of the junior lords of the admiralty. When only twenty-five years of age his admirers offered to make him Chancellor of the Exchequer, but he declined the place on the ground that he knew nothing of finance. From 1809 to 1828 he served as Secretary for War, and it is said that he was "entirely devoted to the Tory party of that day." Later, he became eminent as a Whig, though it is said he never really changed his opinion, being as always a "statesman of the old English aristocratic type, liberal in his sentiments, favourable to the cause of justice and the march of progress, but entirely opposed to the claims of democratic government." He was twice Prime Minister of England, and he is remarkable for such apparent inconsistencies as that between his sympathy for the Revolutionists of 1848, especially for the Italian Revolutionists, and his approval of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* in 1851. He died October 18th, 1865.

THE DIVISION OF POLAND

(Delivered in Parliament March 1st, 1848).

LET us take the whole Polish question at once, for that is really what the honourable member means by this part of the motion. I am not aware of any commercial rights enjoyed by Great Britain which have been much affected in Poland by any changes that have taken place. Nor do I recollect any commercial rights which have been affected, except those of individuals, which might in some degree have been so by changes in the tariff. The charge made by the honourable member is in effect this—that when the Polish revolution broke out in

1835, England, in conjunction with France, should have taken up arms in favour of the Poles, but she did not do so ; that she abandoned France in her attempt, and thus deprived the Poles of their independence ; and finally—and here the honourable member made an assertion I was astonished to hear—that we prevented Austria uniting with France and England for the same object. [Mr. Anstey : I said, Austria was ready to have joined with us if we had acted differently.] Well, then, the honourable member says we balked the readiness of Austria to interpose in favour of the Poles, when we had many reasons to adopt a different course. This question has been so often discussed that I can only repeat what I have said in former Parliaments. It is well known that when we came into office in 1830, Europe was in a state which, in the opinion of any impartial man, and of the best political judges, threatened to break out into a general war. I remember being told by a right honourable gentleman, in the course of a private conversation in the House, that ‘ if an angel came down from heaven to write my despatches, I could not prevent Europe from a war in six months.’ Well, Sir, not months, but years, rolled by, and no war took place. It was the anxious desire of the Government of Earl Grey to prevent war ; and the maintenance of peace was one of the objects at which they expressly aimed, and succeeded. What were the dangers which threatened the peace of Europe ? There had just been a great revolution in France, there had been another in Belgium, and these had been followed by a great rising of the Poles against the sway of Russia. In these struggles there was a conflict of principle as well as one of political relations. There was the popular principle in France, in Belgium, and in Poland, to be resisted by the monarchical principle of Austria, of Russia, and of Prussia. The danger apprehended in 1831 was, that these three Powers should attempt by a hostile attack to control France in the exercise of her judgment with respect to who should be her sovereign, or what should be her constitution. The British Government, under the Duke of Wellington, with the most laudable regard for the public interests, not only of England but of Europe, hastened to acknowledge the new Sovereign of France, and to withdraw their country from the ranks of any confederacy against her ; and this conduct laid the foundation of that peace which it was our duty to maintain and cultivate. The great anxiety of England was that peace should be maintained. There was no doubt great sympathy with the Poles in their contest against Russia ; and it was thought there was a chance of their succeeding in their attempt. The result, however, was different ; but then it was said by the honourable member, ‘ Oh, it is the fault of England that she did not establish the independence of Poland. If she had joined with France and Austria (which now for the first time I am told

was anxious to favour the cause of Poland), the Poles would have been in full enjoyment of their constitutional freedom.' The honourable gentleman actually said that Austria, in 1831, was in favour of the Poles, who were closely pressed by the Russians and Prussians, who had already got possession of Militsch, and felt, if the kingdom of Poland were independent, the chances were that she (Militsch) would rise also to assert her liberties. This statement is excessively extraordinary. I am quite surprised even that the honourable member for Youghal should have made it. I will tell him what was passing in his mind when he said so, and what led him to make this statement ; for I am at least desirous of giving a rational solution to it, as far as I can, under his correction. The fact of which he was probably thinking was this : In 1814, when the issue of the war between Napoleon and the other Powers of Europe was doubtful, a treaty, of which part has been made public, was signed at Reichenbach between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, for the entire partition of Poland between ~~them~~^{the}, in the event of their success against France. The effect of this treaty would have been to extinguish the name of Poland as a separate and independent element of European geography. In 1815, after Napoleon had been repulsed from Russia, and the war had retired to the westward of Germany and of Europe, where shortly after it was brought to a close, discussions took place at Vienna as to what should be done with Poland. Austria called for the execution of the compact, and, with England, demanded that either the Treaty of Reichenbach should be completely carried out, and Poland divided equally into three parts for each of the contracting parties, or that she should be reconstructed and made anew into a substantive state between the three Powers. Russia was of a different opinion, and contended not for the execution of the Treaty of Reichenbach, but for the arrangement which was subsequently carried into effect, namely, that the greater part of Poland was to be made into a kingdom and annexed to her Crown, and that the remaining parts should be divided between the two other states. After a great deal of discussion the Treaty of Reichenbach was set aside, and the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna were made. I suppose this is what led the honourable member to his statement that Austria would join with us, because in 1814 she was favourable to the re-establishment of Poland as a separate kingdom, as one alternative in contradiction to her partition ; for any other ground than this I cannot conceive for his assertion. If Austria were favourable to the Polish insurrection subsequently, I can only say that it is a fact as unknown to me as was the existence of the four days of danger, and I am inclined to place both assertions on the same foundation. The interest of Austria was in fact quite different ; and it was owing to her feeling respecting

Poland, that the Russians ultimately succeeded in crushing the insurrection. But then, says the honourable and learned member, you should have accepted the offers of France. I have often argued the question before, and what I said before I say again. If France had gone to the extent of proposing to England to join with her against Russia, this would have been nothing more nor less than the offer of a war in Europe, which, as our great object was to keep down such a war, we should never have thought of accepting. It would have been a war without the chance of anything but a war, for let us look to the position of the kingdom of Poland—let us consider that it was surrounded by Austria, by Russia, and by Prussia, that there was a large Russian army actually in Poland, and that there was a Prussian army on her frontiers—and we shall at once see that at the very first intimation that England was about to take up arms with France for the independence of Poland, the three armies would have fallen on the Poles, the insurrection would have been crushed, the spark of Polish independence extinguished; and all this having been done, the three Powers would have marched their armies to the Rhine, and said: ‘We shall now make France and England answer for their conduct.’ This course would have been sure to involve the country in a Continental war, for a purpose which would be defeated before the war could be terminated. But, says the honourable member, you have very powerful allies, who would have assisted you. France is a large military power, capable of great efforts. Then you have Sweden, too, burning with desire to break a lance with Russia, on the question of Polish independence. What man in his sober senses, even if Sweden made such a proposition, and were ready to join us against Russia, would not have said, ‘For God’s sake, remain quiet and do nothing?’ [Mr. Anstey: I said, that Sweden was arming her fleet, with the intention of making a demonstration against the Russian provinces in the Baltic; but the noble Lord remonstrated with Sweden for doing so, and induced her to disarm.] Well, there is not much difference between us. I do not think a demonstration by a Swedish fleet on the shores of the Baltic would have been long maintained without a corresponding demonstration of the Russian fleet in Cronstadt, and it is pretty clear which of them would go to the wall; and then we should have had to defend Sweden against Russian attack; and unless we had been prepared to send a large army to her aid, we should have sacrificed her to no purpose. I say, Sir, the man with the interests of Russia most dearly at his heart, could have done nothing better for Russia than stimulate Sweden into a dispute with Russia, by inducing her to make an armed demonstration on her shores, and thus to draw down upon her the vengeance and overwhelming power of that empire. If Sweden had been ready to make such a demon-

stration with her gunboats on the coast of Russia, and had asked us for our advice, the best thing we could have said would have been, "Don't do anything half so foolish; we are not prepared to send an army and a fleet to defend you, and don't give Russia a cause to attack you." But there was another empire burning with desire to join us against Russia. Turkey, we were told by the honourable and learned member, with 200,000 cavalry, was ready to carry demonstration to the very walls of St. Petersburg—perhaps to carry off the Emperor himself from his throne. What was the state of Turkey then? In 1831 she had engaged in a war with Russia, in which, after two campaigns, her arms were repulsed and driven back into their own empire, so that she was compelled at Adrianople to accept conditions of peace, hard in their nature, and demanding a sacrifice of an important part of her territory, but to which she was advised in friendly counsel by the British Ambassador to submit, for fear of having to endure still worse. We are told that, two or three years after this great disaster, Turkey was of such amazing enterprise and courage, and was furnished with such a wonderful quantity of cavalry, that she was prepared to send 200,000 horse (which she never had in all her life) over the frontiers of Russia, and sweep her territory. Now this is, of all the wild dreams that ever crossed the mind of man, one of the most unlikely and extraordinary. But supposing all this had been true, and that Turkey really was prepared to do all the honourable and learned gentleman said she was, I should have given her just the same advice that I should have offered Sweden under the same circumstances, and should have said, 'Have you not been beaten enough? Are you mad? Do you want the Russians to get Constantinople instead of Adrianople? Will nothing satisfy you? We cannot come and defend you against your powerful neighbour. She is on your frontiers, and do not give her any just cause for attacking you.' Then the honourable and learned gentleman told us of the Shah of Persia, how the gunboats of Sweden, the troops of Austria, the fine cavalry of Turkey, the magnificent legions of Persia, were ready all to pour in upon Russia in revenge for the injuries which the inhabitants of the Baltic coasts inflicted upon Europe in former centuries, and would have stripped Russia of her finest provinces. Now, what had happened to Persia? In 1827, she had very foolishly and thoughtlessly, against advice, rushed into a conflict with Russia, and had seen herself reduced to make a treaty, not only surrendering important provinces, but giving Russia the advantage of hoisting her flag in the Caspian. She had gone to war with a powerful antagonist, and been compelled to submit to humiliating concessions. Can you suppose that Persia, in that state of things, would have been ready to march against Russia for the sake of assisting Poland? In

the disastrous struggle which ensued, Poland was overthrown ; the suspension of its constitution followed, and the substitution of what was called the 'organic statute.' The Russian Government pronounced that civil war had abrogated it, and they re-entered Poland as conquerors. I am not asserting the justice of that, but the contrary ; we always maintained a different view. I need not remind the House how deep a sympathy the sufferings of Poland excited in this country. Many things have passed in Poland since that time which the British Government greatly regrets, and in respect to which the rights laid down by treaty have been violated. But when we are asked why the British Government have not enforced treaty rights in every case, my answer is, that the only method of enforcing them would have been by methods of hostility ; and that I do not think those questions were questions of sufficient magnitude in their bearing on the interests of England to justify any Government in calling on the people of this country to encounter the burdens and hazards of war for the purpose of maintaining those opinions. Then comes the question of Cracow. I deny the justice of the reproach which the honourable member has directed against me on that head, of an infraction of the just requirements of good faith. It is perfectly true, that in a discussion in this House we stated our intention of sending a Consul to Cracow ; but we were not at that time aware of all the objections entertained to that step by other Powers who had an interest in the question, and who possessed great influence in Cracow. Communications and correspondence took place, not only with them, but with the Cracovian authorities, and we were plainly told, that if our Consul went to Cracow he would not be received. What were we to do under those circumstances ? The Government of Cracow, though nominally independent, was practically under the control and protection of the three protecting Powers ; and whatever they ordered that Government to do, it was plain they would do. It therefore became the Government to consider whether there really was any cause for the presence of a British Consul at Cracow, which was of sufficient importance to make it worth while to insist on his presence, at the risk of not obtaining the end. We should then have been exposed to an affront from the miserable little Government at Cracow, not acting on its own responsibility, towards whom nothing could have been directed in vindication of the honour of the British Crown ; and our only course would have been a rupture with the three Powers, after we had been warned of the rejection of our Consul. Well, then, considering the importance attached in this country, not merely to peace, but to a really good understanding with foreign Powers, wherever there are great interests and powerful motives to amity which would be violated by hostilities, I thought the best

course would be to abandon the intention we had entertained, and which we had announced in the discussion in this House. It does not follow, when a Minister announces in Parliament an intention to perform a public act, that it is to be considered like a promise made to an individual, or by one private man to another, and that it is to be made a reproach to him if the intention be not carried out. We are here responsible to the country for the advice we give the Crown. We are responsible for all the consequences which that advice may bring on the country. We are not dealing with our own affairs ; it is not a question of what we may do with our private property ; but when a Minister finds he cannot do a particular act without compromising the interests of the country, and that these will suffer from his executing his intention, it is his duty to give up that intention, and to consult the interests of the country in preference to every other consideration. That is the history of the Consul who was to have been at Cracow. We have been asked to produce the correspondence relating to the transaction ; and I do not know that there would be any particular objection to doing so. It consists of angry notes on one side and the other, and I cannot think we should be promoting a good understanding with the three Powers by producing it ; but as far as concerns its being a record of anything I have done, or have not done, I have no objection. The honourable member asks for all the correspondence which may have passed from the year 1835 downwards on the subject of the Russian fleet in commission in the Baltic. I do not recollect that any particular communications took place on this subject between the British Government on the one hand, and those of Russia or France on the other. Of course, it is utterly impossible for a Power which, like England, depends mainly for its security on its naval defence, not to watch with attentive anxiety the armaments or the state of naval preparation which from time to time may exist in other great countries. Therefore our attention may, no doubt, have been more or less directed, especially when questions of great difficulty and delicacy have been pending between Russia and England, and a state of mutual distrust to some extent existed, towards the naval footing of Russia both in the Baltic and Black Sea. Of course, also, though I do not particularly recollect the circumstance as having happened in 1835 or 1836, the immense amount of naval preparation in France must always form an element in the consideration of the Government of this country, in taking into account the means which England must possess to maintain its station amongst the empires of the world. I have now gone through, as far as memory and time permitted, the principal topics on which he touched. It was only last night I was able to put together the observations I have ventured to offer to the

House. I have taken them in the order he stated them in the motion of which he gave notice. Upon the general character of my public conduct I can only repeat what I said when last I had the honour to address this House. I can only say, if any one in this House should think fit to make an inquiry into the whole of my political conduct, both as recorded in official documents, or in private letters and correspondence, there is nothing which I would not most willingly submit to the inspection of any reasonable man in this House. I will add, that I am conscious of some of those offences which have been charged against me by the honourable and learned member. I am conscious that, during the time for which I have had the honour to direct the foreign relations of this country I have devoted to them all the energies which I possess. Other men might have acted, no doubt, with more ability—none could have acted with a more entire devotion both of their time and faculties. The principle on which I have thought the foreign affairs of this country ought to be conducted is, the principle of maintaining peace and friendly understanding with all nations, so long as it was possible to do so consistently with a due regard to the interests, the honour, and the dignity of this country. My endeavours have been to preserve peace. All the Governments of which I have had the honour to be a member have succeeded in accomplishing that object. The main charges brought against me are, that I did not involve this country in perpetual quarrels from one end of the globe to the other. There is no country that has been named, from the United States to the empire of China, with respect to which part of the honourable member's charge has not been, that we have refrained from taking steps that might have plunged us into conflict with one or more of these Powers. On these occasions we have been supported by the opinion and approbation of Parliament and the public. We have endeavoured to extend the commercial relations of the country, or to place them where extension was not required, on a firmer basis, and upon a footing of greater security. Surely in that respect we have not judged amiss, nor deserved the censure of the country ; on the contrary, I think we have done good service. I hold with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong, sufficiently powerful, to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. I hold that the real policy of England—apart from questions which involve her own particular interests, political or commercial—is to be the champion of justice and right ; pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks that justice is, and wherever she thinks that wrong has been done.

LORD EUSTACE PERCY

(1887-).

LORD EUSTACE PERCY is the brother of the present Duke of Northumberland. He was educated at Oxford, and served for some years in the Diplomatic Service. He was for a time Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health and became in 1924 President of the Board of Education. Under his direction a sound constructive educational programme has been outlined. In a recent speech he has made a noteworthy announcement of his wish to have all children properly examined when they leave school as to their potential capabilities in the world.

He published in 1920 "The Responsibilities of the League."

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL POLITICS

ONE of the most curious facts about education is that every one is afraid of it. The parliamentary debates on various education bills in the middle of last century are full of the fear that state education might breed scepticism and revolution. That was at a time when the activities of the state, in England at any rate, were comparatively small and unimportant. Men were therefore chiefly afraid that the intervention of the state in education would unsettle and destroy the existing educational efforts of the Church and private individuals. To-day, when we are all accustomed to state intervention in many directions, when all men's eyes are turned to the state and to politics as a means of progress, when, especially, we take for granted the duties of the state as the educator of the nation, this same fear takes a different form. Instead of being afraid that some new development in state education will harm religion or diminish liberty, many people are now afraid that any new spontaneous educational movement may harm political creeds and lessen men's allegiance to political parties.

That is why one constantly hears the question asked, "What is the relation of adult education to the Labour movement?" ; or, "Is the tendency of adult education socialistic?" ; or, "Will adult education help the reactionaries?" Such questions throw a very curious light on our state of mind at the present moment. Writing

many years ago, Lord Morley commented on the "inveterate national characteristic" of Englishmen—"a silent but most pertinacious measurement of philosophic truths by political tests." Since then we have become very familiar with the evil effects of such an avowed worship of the state as we have seen in Germany. But an avowed programme is less insidious than a tacit assumption. Are we really going in the same direction ourselves? Are we tending to judge all human interests and all human development by the standard of political ideals, however noble?

Looking back on history, we can see that the greatest struggle of the western world has been for liberty of conscience. We have vindicated that liberty against all outside authorities, against kings and popes and parliaments. The question to-day is whether, having secured that liberty, we can defend it against ourselves. If conscience and thought and character, all our interests in life, the conduct of our work and the occupations of our leisure—in short, everything that education means—are to be squeezed into the mould of a political party or a particular conception of state organization, then such a tendency can only be called the suicide of liberty.

The fact is that adult education, like all education, has no relation whatever to political parties. Any educational movement will affect political parties only because it will affect individual minds. Party creeds were made for man, not man for party creeds, and such creeds will, in the long run, be moulded by the development of individual minds. But these results are neither the beginning nor the end of education; they are merely by-products of it. We are familiar enough to-day with the distinction drawn between liberal and technical education, but the idea would be better expressed as the difference between education and technical instruction. There is nothing particularly technical about learning joinery as opposed to learning history. It only becomes technical when joinery or history is studied, not for the sake of knowledge as an end in itself, but as an instrument for use in a trade or profession. Sir Philip Sidney defined the distinction when he wrote of astronomy, philosophy, and mathematics as "but serving sciences, which, as they have each a private end in themselves, so yet are they all directed to the highest end of the mistress Knowledge." The idea of study as a means of acquiring arguments for political use in effect turns all education into mere technical instruction. That is why the political pre-occupations of the present day are the gravest danger to all sound education. No one need despise party politics; they are part, and under a free constitution a necessary part, of government and citizenship. But government and citizenship however loftily

conceived, do not constitute the chief end of man. They are themselves but 'serving sciences,' and there is perhaps some danger in the present tendency, both in this country and America, to give prominence to the teaching of political economy and sociology with immediate reference to the legislative and administrative problems of the day. The gift of "the mistress Knowledge" is breadth of vision, but pre-occupation with politics, just like pre-occupation with a trade or profession, narrows a man's mind to a point, ready for instant use, instead of opening it out into a treasury whence, as the expansion of his life requires, he may "bring forth things new and old."

To ask, therefore, whether the tendency in adult education is conservative or the reverse is like asking whether Glaxo is Christian or Mohammedan. But as a matter of fact, when such questions are asked, there is usually a much more practical question lurking in the background, the question whether the adult education movement has, in fact, been captured or is likely to be captured by any political party. The question is quite a fair one, but it is also one that it is very easy to answer. It is quite impossible for any organization to "capture" an educational movement unless that organization has the power of coercion. Even the Church, at the time when it had the greatest power over the minds and even over the bodies of men, never really succeeded in capturing education by its own power. It was only when and in so far as it secured the support of the state with the state's power of coercion that it succeeded for a time in capturing education. The state is the only power that we have to fear in this matter, and for that very reason adult education must always be freer and less exposed to the danger of being forced into any particular mould than child education. Adult education must, in its essence, always be voluntary, a thing offered and accepted or rejected at will. There can be no forced attendance, there cannot even be any compulsory examinations. Where there is no compulsion we may safely rely upon the student's discrimination, and if any voluntary educational movement falls into the hands of political propagandists, it may safely be predicted that it will die an early and an ignominious death.

But while adult education has no relation whatever to party politics, it has a very close relation to the general character of social movements and political discussions. Compare for one moment the London of to-day with the London of eighty years ago. Greatly as conditions of housing and employment have improved in that time, wide as is the difference between the London of "Across the Bridges" and the London of "Alton Locke," the sense of grievance and the desire for radical reform is probably as strong in the working Londoner of

to-day as in his Chartist ancestor. But compare a march of the unemployed to Downing Street with the crowds who mobbed the Duke of Wellington in 1832. What has made the difference? To a certain extent, no doubt, the creation of a national system of child education. To a certain extent the improvement of housing conditions, the opening up of communications, the extension of the franchise. But the moment we come to the extension of the franchise we realise that we mean by that, not the opportunity for a man to register his vote, but the growth of educative political discussion and organisation arising out of that opportunity. In the same way, trade unionism has been perhaps the most potent factor in this change, not so much because of the improvement in the conditions of employment which it has secured, as because of the education in co-operative action and administration which it has given to its members. In fact, the change has been mainly due to a long process of adult education. That process has reached a point where it has created a demand for more specific study, and it is that demand which the present adult education movement is seeking to meet.

In the same period, something like a contrary development has taken place in the so-called upper classes. The old "governing class" in England had a culture founded no doubt on public school and university education, but continuously maintained and extended by study and educative work in after life. But in the last seventy or eighty years, though instruction in public schools and universities has become much more elaborate and extensive, it has largely failed to cultivate tastes in after life; while, owing to a number of influences, the amount of leisure available, even to the comparatively rich, has been greatly reduced. A depressing comparison might be drawn between the average intelligent member of the upper classes to-day, possessed of a considerable store of miscellaneous knowledge and getting through a good deal of desultory reading, and his great-grandfather who, though his reading was less extensive, had an intimate intensive knowledge of the classics, spoke two European languages fluently besides his own, and had moved, during his Grand Tour on the Continent, in the best intellectual society of Italy and France. Even the advance in knowledge among the best educated has hardly compensated for what has been lost; in historical studies, for instance, it is very doubtful whether the closest acquaintance with the critical historians of the last generation can ever give us what Gibbon's "Decline and Fall" or Clarendon's "History of the Great Rebellion" gave to our less critical ancestors. "He was familiar with the ancient writers and loved to sit up till midnight discussing philological and metrical questions with Bentley . . . He spoke and wrote French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese,

German, even Swedish. He had pushed his researches into the most obscure nooks of literature." This is Macaulay's picture of Carteret, and though few public men in any age can be expected to attain this standard, scholarship was for many years the stamp of an English statesman. It is a long step from this to the public school man of to-day who finds his way into Parliament.

Into the gap between the slow beginnings of working-class culture and the slow decay of the old upper-class culture, there came the growth, during the Victorian era, of middle-class education. This may almost be called the child of the Industrial Revolution, and it was nurtured under the influence of the utilitarian philosophers. This, which we call "modern education," has been the great achievement of the Victorian age, but good as it has been, it has suffered from its utilitarian bias. It has emphasized the "private ends" of the sciences, it has made them subservient, not to knowledge, but to the attainment of material social well-being, it has bred experts rather than educated men. In such dry ground it has sought recently to plant the latest of the sciences, sociology, and we have only to glance at some of the American States to see what crude experiments in government too often lodge in its branches.

It is these three factors that created the party politics of the last twenty years before the war—conservative, labour, and liberal. If adult education means anything, it means the revival of that almost intangible factor in civilization which, for want of a better name, we call culture, and any such movement must have a very real effect upon a condition of politics from which culture is, on the whole, remarkably absent.

The stuffiness of the political atmosphere to-day is indeed remarkable. It is perhaps most evident in the international sphere. We are accustomed to think of the past century as an era in which the nations of the world have been drawn closer and closer together. Yet, in fact, at the outbreak of the war English politicians were immeasurably more insular than their predecessors. We only need to compare Sir Edward Grey's personal knowledge of European countries with Lord Clarendon's or Lord Granville's. In the years of last century which saw the growth of Italian unity, English interest in and sympathy with Italy was represented by the visits to that country of men like Mr. Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll; but at the outbreak of war it was not to any man prominent in the political life of England that we could look for knowledge of Croatia or Bohemia, but to independent investigators such as Mr. Seton Watson. A few of our younger politicians took a keen interest in the East, but we were becoming increasingly remote from

Europe. We talked a great deal about the European family of nations and we often ignorantly thought that we had invented that phrase ourselves, but in fact it is at least as old as Grotius. Our predecessors had really believed in a "system" of Europe, but we, while we somewhat pharisaically discarded their ideas of the European balance of power as unworthy, almost ceased to be conscious of Europe at all.

This growing insularity of our politics was unfortunately not compensated for by the growth of intercourse between the workers' organizations of the various nations. There was certainly a very real growth of this kind which did undoubtedly broaden the outlook of English labour leaders and their followers, but the very fact that such intercourse centred round definite movements, working-class demands or labour disputes, made it to a large extent educationally ineffective. A knowledge of foreign languages and a knowledge of foreign conditions of life are essential to even a rudimentary understanding of foreign peoples. These things can only be acquired either by residence—by a leisurely, indeed an almost purposeless, mixing in a foreign society—or at any rate by an equally open-minded study of its history and literature. Consequently, at the outbreak of war, both our "upper class" diplomacy and our "working-class" internationalism were almost equally open to the charge of regarding foreign peoples as inanimate "factors" rather than as human beings. We had lost—the political life of England had lost—that spectrum of culture which breaks up the dead surface of distant bodies into the varied colours of life.

The same is true of our domestic affairs. Whatever may have been the faults of our grandfathers, and they were many, they brought to politics a certain broad coherence of outlook. As in foreign affairs they thought in terms of the system of Europe, so in national affairs they saw king, nobility, clergy, and people as inter-dependent members of an ordered constitution. The lofty ideas of government elaborated and illumined by the genius of Burke were not the invention of his mind but were the gradual growth of centuries. They can be traced in the State Papers, the sermons, and the literature of two continents—in the England of Elizabeth and the first Stuarts and in the New England of Mather's "Magnalia." Even when least expressed they formed the background of all political thought and action. Nor was this political culture of the upper classes unaffected by the growth of what we should now call liberal thought. On the bookshelves of any private library of the period you are pretty sure to find not only Locke and Hume, but Beccaria and the French physiocrats or histories of the practical reforms of Leopold in Tuscany and Pombal in Portugal. In a similar library in course of formation to-day, taking even the best specimens, you would

be apt to find such works replaced by Blue Books and reports of committees. The growing complication of every problem of government tends to throw the student of politics into a continual struggle to keep abreast of an endless series of dry official publications uninformed by any coherent spirit. The accumulation of mere knowledge as to facts is enough to occupy the whole of the ordinary politician's leisure. The exceptional man may be able to take the second step from observation to analysis, but no one ever gets within hailing distance of synthesis. In a sense Coalition was the logical result of such a state of affairs. Where there is no philosophy of politics there can be no heresies or orthodoxies, and the party system becomes at best an affair of personal antagonisms and at worst a hypocritical sham.

It is probably the realization of these facts which is responsible for the almost passionate interest in education observable just now in all parts of the country. So far from indicating a desire to bolster up any political party, it is born of a deepening impatience with them all. The adult education movement, small as its beginnings have been, has grown up spontaneously in response to this demand. It is the expression of no preconceived ideas, of no particular social or political philosophy, but rather of a realization that a new birth in politics, as in art or literature, comes not by observation; that these are wind-blown seeds borne by currents of air beyond our knowledge; and that it lies with us only to prepare for them the soil of minds fertilized by "this purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of conceit which commonly we call learning."

been performed, and that in one remarkable instance the present subsidy differs from every other, in as much as a part of it is not to be paid until after the conclusion of a peace by common consent. I think gentlemen would act more consistently if they would openly give their opposition on the principle that they cannot support the war under any circumstances of the country and of Europe, than in this equivocal and cold manner to embarrass our deliberations and throw obstacles in the way of all vigorous co-operation. There is no reason, no ground to fear that that magnanimous prince will act with infidelity in a cause in which he is so sincerely engaged, and which he knows to be the cause of all good government, of religion and humanity, against a monstrous medley of tyranny, injustice, vanity, irreligion, and folly. Of such an ally there can be no reason to be jealous; and least of all have the honourable gentlemen opposite me grounds of jealousy, considering the nature and circumstances of our engagements with that monarch. As to the sum itself, I think no man can find fault with it. In fact, it is comparatively small. We take into our pay forty-five thousand of the troops of Russia, and I believe if any gentleman will look to all former subsidies, the result will be, that never was so large a body of men subsidized for so small a sum. This fact cannot be considered without feeling that this magnanimous and powerful prince has undertaken to supply at a very trifling expense a most essential force, and that for the deliverance of Europe. I still must use this phrase, notwithstanding the sneers of the honourable gentlemen. Does it not promise the deliverance of Europe when we find the armies of our allies rapidly advancing in a career of victory at once the most brilliant and auspicious that perhaps ever signalized the exertions of any combination? Will it be regarded with apathy, that that wise and vigorous and exalted prince has already, by his promptness and decision, given a turn to the affairs of the continent? Is the House to be called upon to refuse succour to our ally, who, by his prowess and the bravery of his arms, has attracted so much of the attention and admiration of Europe?

The honourable gentleman says he wishes for peace, and that he approved more of what I said on this subject towards the close of my speech, than of the opening. Now what I said was, that if by powerfully seconding the efforts of our allies, we could only look for peace with any prospect of realizing our hopes, whatever would enable us to do so promptly and effectually would be true economy. I must, indeed, be much misunderstood, if generally it was not perceived that I meant that whether the period which is to carry us to peace be shorter or longer, what we have to look to is not so much when we make peace, as whether we shall derive from it complete and solid security; and that whatever

other nations may do, whether they shall persevere in the contest, or untimely abandon it, we have to look to ourselves for the means of defence, we are to look to the means to secure our Constitution, preserve our character, and maintain our independence, in the virtue and perseverance of the people. There is a high-spirited pride, an elevated loyalty, a generous warmth of heart, a nobleness of spirit, a hearty, manly gaiety, which distinguish our nation, in which we are to look for the best pledges of general safety, and of that security against an aggressing usurpation, which other nations in their weakness or in their folly have yet nowhere found. With respect to that which appears so much to embarrass certain gentlemen,—the deliverance of Europe,—I will not say particularly what it is. Whether it is to be its deliverance from that under which it suffers, or that from which it is in danger; whether from the infection of false principles, the corroding cares of a period of distraction and dismay, or that dissolution of all governments, and that death of religion and social order which are to signalize the triumph of the French republic, if unfortunately for mankind she should, in spite of all opposition, prevail in the contest;—from whichever of these Europe is to be delivered, it will not be difficult to prove that what she suffers and what is her danger are the power and existence of the French Government. If any man says that the Government is not a tyranny, he miserably mistakes the character of that body. It is an insupportable and odious tyranny, holding within its grasp the lives, the characters, and the fortunes of all who are forced to own its sway, and only holding these that it may at will measure out of each the portion which from time to time it sacrifices to its avarice, its cruelty, and injustice. The French Republic is diked and fenced round with crime, and owes much of its present security to its being regarded with a horror which appals men in their approaches to its impious battlements.

The honourable gentleman says that he does not know whether the Emperor of Russia understands what we mean by the deliverance of Europe. I do not think it proper here to dwell much at length on this curious doubt. But whatever may be the meaning which that august personage attaches to our phrase, "the deliverance of Europe," at least he has shown that he is no stranger to the condition of the world; that whatever be the specific object of the contest, he has learned rightly to consider the character of the common enemy, and shows by his public proceedings that he is determined to take measures of more than ordinary precaution against the common disturbers of Europe and the common enemy of man. Will the honourable gentleman continue in his state of doubt? Let him look to the conduct of that prince during what has passed of the present campaign. If in such conduct there be not unfolded

some solicitude for the deliverance of Europe from the tyranny of France, I know not, sir, in what we are to look for it. But the honourable gentleman seems to think no alliance can long be preserved against France. I do not deny that unfortunately some of the nations of Europe have shamefully crouched to that power, and receded from the common cause at a moment when it was due to their own dignity, to what they owed to that civilized community of which they are still a part, to persevere in the struggle, to reanimate their legions with that spirit of just detestation and vengeance which such inhumanity and cruelty might so well provoke. I do not say that the powers of Europe have not acted improperly in many other instances ; and Russia in her turn ; for, during a period of infinite peril to this country, she saw our danger advance upon us, and four different treaties entered into of offensive alliance against us, without comment, and without a single expression of its disapprobation. This was the conduct of that power in former times. The conduct of his present Majesty raises quite other emotions, and excites altogether a different interest. His Majesty, since his accession, has unequivocally declared his attachment to Great Britain, and, abandoning those projects of ambition which formed the occupation of his predecessor, he chose rather to join in the cause of religion and order against France than to pursue the plan marked out for him to humble and destroy a power which he was taught to consider as his common enemy. He turned aside from all hostility against the Ottoman Porte and united his force to the power of that prince the more effectually to check the progress of the common enemy. Will gentlemen then continue to regard with suspicion the conduct of that prince ? Has he not sufficiently shown his devotion to the cause in which we are engaged, by the kind, and number, and value of his sacrifices, ultimately to prevail in the struggle against the tyranny which, in changing our point of vision, we everywhere find accompanied in its desolating progress by degradation, misery, and nakedness, to the unhappy victims of its power,—a tyranny which has magnified and strengthened its powers to do mischief in the proportion that the legitimate and venerable fabrics of civilized and polished society have declined from the meridian of their glory and lost the power of doing good,—a tyranny which strides across the ill-fated domain of France, its foot armed with the scythe of oppression and indiscriminate proscription, that touches only to blight, and rests only to destroy ; the reproach and the curse of the infatuated people who still continue to acknowledge it ? When we consider that it is against this monster the Emperor of Russia has sent down his legions, shall we not say that he is entitled to our confidence ?

But what is the constitutional state of the question ? It is competent, undoubtedly, for any gentleman to make the character of an ally the subject of consideration ; but in this case it is not to the Emperor of Russia we vote a subsidy, but to his Majesty. The question, therefore, is, whether his Majesty's Government affix any undue object to the message, whether they draw any undue inference from the deliverance of Europe. The honourable gentleman has told us that his deliverance of Europe is the driving of France within her ancient limits—that he is not indifferent to the restoration of the other States of Europe to independence, as connected with the independence of this country ; but it is assumed by the honourable gentleman that we are not content with wishing to drive France within her ancient limits—that on the contrary, we seek to overthrow the Government of France ; and he would make us say that we never will treat with it as a republic. Now I neither meant anything like this, nor expressed myself so as to lead to such inferences. Whatever I may in the abstract think of the kind of government called a republic, whatever may be its fitness to the nation where it prevails, there may be times when it would not be dangerous to exist in its vicinity. But while the spirit of France remains what at present it is, its Government despotic, vindictive, unjust, with a temper untamed, a character unchanged, if its power to do wrong at all remains, there does not exist any security, for this country or Europe. In my view of security, every object of ambition and aggrandizement is abandoned. Our simple object is security, just security, with a little mixture of indemnification. These are the legitimate objects of war at all times ; and when we have attained that end, we are in a condition to derive from peace its beneficent advantages ; but until then, our duty and our interest require that we should persevere unappalled in the struggle to which we were provoked. We shall not be satisfied with a false security. War, with all its evils, is better than a peace in which there is nothing to be seen but usurpation and injustice, dwelling with savage delight on the humble, prostrate condition of some timid suppliant people. It is not to be dissembled, that in the changes and chances to which the fortunes of individuals, as well as of States, are continually subject, we may have the misfortune, and great it would be, of seeing our allies decline the contest. I hope this will not happen. I hope it is not reserved for us to behold the mortifying spectacle of two mighty nations abandoning a contest, in which they have sacrificed so much and made such brilliant progress.

In the application of this principle I have no doubt but the honourable gentleman admits the security of the country to be the legitimate object of the contest ; and I must think I am sufficiently intelligible on this topic. But wishing to be fully understood, I answer the honourable

gentleman when he asks : “ Does the right honourable gentleman mean to prosecute the war until the French Republic is overthrown ? Is it his determination not to treat with France while it continues a republic ? ” I answer : I do not confine my views to the territorial limits of France ; I contemplate the principles, character, and conduct of France ; I consider what these are ; I see in them the issues of distraction, of infamy and ruin, to every State in her alliance ; and, therefore, I say that until the aspect of that mighty mass of iniquity and folly is entirely changed,—until the character of the Government is totally reversed,—until, by common consent of the general voice of all men, I can with truth tell Parliament, France is no longer terrible for her contempt of the rights of every other nation—she no longer avows schemes of universal empire—she has settled into a state whose government can maintain those relations in their integrity, in which alone civilized communities are to find their security, and from which they are to derive their distinction and their glory,—until in the situation of France we have exhibited to us those features of a wise, a just, and a liberal policy, I cannot treat with her. The time to come to the discussion of a peace can only be the time when you can look with confidence to an honourable issue ; to such a peace as shall at once restore to Europe her settled and balanced Constitution of general polity, and to every negotiating power in particular, that weight in the scale of general empire which has ever been found the best guarantee and pledge of local independence and general security. Such are my sentiments. I am not afraid to avow them. I commit them to the thinking part of mankind, and if they have not been poisoned by the stream of French sophistry, and prejudiced by her falsehood, I am sure they will approve of the determination I have avowed for those grave and mature reasons on which I found it. I earnestly pray that all the powers engaged in the contest may think as I do, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, which, indeed, I do not doubt ; and, therefore, I do contend that with that power it is fit that the House should enter into the engagement recommended in his Majesty’s message.

ENGLAND’S SHARE IN THE SLAVE TRADE

(A Speech in the House of Commons, April 2nd, 1792).

WHY ought the slave trade to be abolished ? Because it is incurable injustice ! How much stronger, then, is the argument for immediate than gradual abolition ! By allowing it to continue even for one hour, do not my right honourable friends weaken—do not they

desert their own argument of its injustice ? If on the ground of injustice it ought to be abolished at last, why ought it not now ? Why is injustice to be suffered to remain for a single hour ? From what I hear without doors, it is evident that there is a general conviction entertained of its being far from just, and from that very conviction of its injustice some men have been led, I fear, to the supposition that the slave trade never could have been permitted to begin, but from some strong and irresistible necessity,—a necessity, however, which, if it was fancied to exist at first, I have shown cannot be thought by any man whatever to exist at present. This plea of necessity, thus presumed, and presumed as I suspect, from the circumstances of injustice itself, has caused a sort of acquiescence in the continuance of this evil. Men have been led to place it in the rank of those necessary evils which are supposed to be the lot of human creatures, and to be permitted to fall upon some countries or individuals, rather than upon others, by that Being whose ways are inscrutable to us, and whose dispensations, it is conceived, we ought not to look into. The origin of evil is, indeed, a subject beyond the reach of the human understanding ; and the permission of it by the Supreme Being is a subject into which it belongs not to us to inquire. But where the evil in question is a moral evil which a man can scrutinize, and where that moral evil has its origin with ourselves, let us not imagine that we can clear our consciences by this general, not to say irreligious and impious, way of laying aside the question. If we reflect at all on this subject, we must see that every necessary evil supposes that some other and greater evil would be incurred, were it removed. I therefore desire to ask : What can be that greater evil which can be stated to overbalance the one in question ? I know of no evil that ever has existed, nor can imagine any evil to exist, worse than the tearing of eighty thousand persons annually from their native land, by a combination of the most civilized nations in the most enlightened quarter of the globe,—but more especially by that nation which calls herself the most free and the most happy of them all. Even if these miserable beings were proved guilty of every crime before you take them off (of which, however, not a single proof is adduced), ought we to take upon ourselves the office of executioners ? And even if we condescend so far, still can we be justified in taking them, unless we have clear proof that they are criminals ?

But if we go much further,—if we ourselves tempt them to sell their fellow-creatures to us, we may rest assured that they will take care to provide by every method, by kidnapping, by village-breaking, by unjust wars, by iniquitous condemnations, by rendering Africa a scene of bloodshed and misery, a supply of victims increasing in proportion to our demand. Can we, then, hesitate, in deciding whether the wars in

Africa are their wars or ours ? It was our arms in the River Cameroon, put into the hands of the trader, that furnished him with the means of pushing his trade ; and I have no more doubt that they are British arms, put into the hands of Africans, which promote universal war and desolation, than I can doubt their having done so in that individual instance.

I have shown how great is the enormity of this evil, even on the supposition that we take only convicts and prisoners of war. But take the subject in the other way ; take it on the grounds stated by the right honourable gentleman over the way, and how does it stand ? Think of eighty thousand persons carried away out of their country, by we know not what means, for crimes imputed ; for light or inconsiderable faults ; for debt, perhaps ; for the crime of witchcraft ; or a thousand other weak and scandalous pretexts ! Besides all the fraud and kidnapping, the villainies and perfidy, by which the slave trade is supplied, reflect on these eighty thousand persons thus annually taken off ! There is something in the horror of it that surpasses all the bounds of imagination. Admitting that there exists in Africa something like to courts of justice, yet what an office of humiliation and meanness is it in us to take upon ourselves to carry into execution the partial, the cruel, iniquitous sentences of such courts, as if we also were strangers to all religion, and to the first principles of justice.

Thus, Sir, has the perversion of British commerce carried misery instead of happiness to one whole quarter of the globe. False to the very principles of trade, misguided in our policy, and unmindful of our duty, what astonishing—I had almost said, what irreparable mischief—have we brought upon that continent ! How shall we hope to obtain, if it be possible, forgiveness from Heaven for those enormous evils we have committed, if we refuse to make use of those means which the mercy of Providence hath still reserved to us, for wiping away the guilt and shame with which we are now covered. If we refuse even this degree of compensation,—if, knowing the miseries we have caused, we refuse even now to put a stop to them, how greatly aggravated will be the guilt of Great Britain ! and what a blot will these transactions forever be in the history of this country ! Shall we, then, delay to repair these injuries, and to begin rendering justice to Africa ? Shall we not count the days and hours that are suffered to intervene and to delay the accomplishment of such a work ? Reflect what an immense object is before you ; what an object for a nation to have in view and to have a prospect, under the favour of Providence, of being now permitted to attain ! I think the House will agree with me in cherishing the ardent wish to enter without delay upon the measures necessary for these great

ends ; and I am sure that the immediate abolition of the slave trade is the first, the principal, the most indispensable act of policy, of duty, and of justice, that the Legislature of this country has to take, if it is, indeed, their wish to secure those important objects to which I have alluded, and which we are bound to pursue by the most solemn obligations.

Having now detained the House so long, all that I will further add shall be on that important subject, the civilization of Africa, which I have already shown that I consider as the leading feature in this question. Grieved am I to think that there should be a single person in this country, much more that there should be a single Member in the British Parliament, who can look on the present dark, uncultivated, and uncivilized state of that continent as a ground for continuing the slave trade ; as a ground, not only for refusing to attempt the improvement of Africa, but even for hindering and intercepting every ray of light which might otherwise break in upon her, as a ground for refusing to her the common chance and the common means with which other nations have been blessed, of emerging from their native barbarism. . . .

I trust we shall no longer continue this commerce to the destruction of every improvement on that wide continent, and shall not consider ourselves as conferring too great a boon in restoring its inhabitants to the rank of human beings. I trust we shall not think ourselves too liberal, if, by abolishing the slave trade, we give them the same common chance of civilization with other parts of the world, and that we shall now allow to Africa the opportunity, the hope, the prospect of attaining to the same blessings which we ourselves, through the favourable dispensations of Divine Providence, have been permitted, at a much more early period, to enjoy. If we listen to the voice of reason and duty, and pursue this night the line of conduct which they prescribe, some of us may live to see a reverse of that picture from which we now turn our eyes with shame and regret. We may live to behold the natives of Africa engaged in the calm occupations of industry, in the pursuits of a just and legitimate commerce. We may behold the beams of science and philosophy breaking in upon their land, which at some happy period in still later times may blaze with full lustre, and, joining their influence to that of pure religion, may illuminate and invigorate the most distant extremities of that immense continent. Then may we hope that even Africa, though last of all the quarters of the globe, shall enjoy at length, in the evening of her days, those blessings which have descended so plentifully upon us in a much earlier period of the world. Then, also, will Europe, participating in her improvement and prosperity, receive an ample recompense for the tardy kindness (if kindness it can be called) of no longer hindering that continent from extricating herself out of the

darkness which, in other more fortunate regions, has been so much more speedily dispelled.

It is in this view, Sir,—it is an atonement for our long and cruel injustice toward Africa, that the measure proposed by my honourable friend most forcibly recommends itself to my mind. The great and happy change to be expected in the state of her inhabitants is, of all the various and important benefits of the abolition, in my estimation, incomparably the most extensive and important.

I shall vote, Sir, against the adjournment, and I shall also oppose to the utmost every proposition which in any way may tend either to prevent, or even to postpone for an hour, the total abolition of the slave trade,—a measure which, on all the various grounds I have stated, we are bound, by the most pressing and indispensable duty, to adopt.

OVERTURES OF PEACE WITH FRANCE

(Delivered in the House of Commons, February 3rd, 1800).

I WILL not enlarge on the origin of the war between England and France. I have read and detailed to you a system which was in itself a declaration of war against all nations, which was so intended, and which has been so applied, which has been exemplified in the extreme peril and hazard of almost all who for a moment have trusted to treaty, and which has not at this hour overwhelmed Europe in one indiscriminate mass of ruin, only because we have not indulged to a fatal extremity, that disposition, which we have, however, indulged too far ; because we have not consented to trust to profession and compromise, rather than to our own valour and exertion, for security against a system from which we never shall be delivered till either the principle is extinguished or till its strength is exhausted. I might, Sir, if I found it necessary, enter into much detail upon this part of the subject ; but at present I only beg leave to express my readiness at any time to enter upon it, when either my own strength, or the patience of the House will admit of it ; but I say, without distinction, against every nation in Europe, and against some out of Europe, the principle has been faithfully applied. You cannot look at the map of Europe and lay your hand upon that country against which France has not either declared an open and aggressive war, or violated some positive treaty, or broken some recognized principle of the law of nations.

This subject may be divided into various periods. There were some acts of hostility committed previous to the war with this country, and very little indeed subsequent to that declaration, which abjured the love

of conquest. The attack upon the Papal State, by the seizure of Avignon in 1791, was accompanied by a series of the most atrocious crimes and outrages that ever disgraced a revolution. Avignon was separated from its lawful sovereign, with whom not even the pretence of quarrel existed, and forcibly incorporated in the tyranny of one and indivisible France. The same system led, in the same year, to an aggression against the whole German Empire, by the seizure of Porentrui, part of the dominions of the Bishop of Basle. Afterwards, in 1792, unprecedented by any declaration of war, or any cause of hostility, and in direct violation of the solemn pledge to abstain from conquest, an attack was made upon the King of Sardinia, by the seizure of Savoy, for the purpose of incorporating it, in like manner, with France. In the same year, they had proceeded to the declaration of war against Austria, against Prussia, and against the German Empire, in which they have been justified only on a ground of rooted hostility, combination, and league of sovereigns for the dismemberment of France. I say that some of the documents brought to support this pretence are spurious and false ; I say that even in those that are not so there is not one word to prove the charge principally relied upon, that of an intention to effect the dismemberment of France, or to impose upon it by force any particular constitution. I say that, as far as we have been able to trace what passed at Pilnitz, the declaration there signed referred to the imprisonment of Louis XVI. ; its immediate view was to effect his deliverance, if a concert sufficiently extensive could be formed with other sovereigns for that purpose. It left the internal state of France to be decided by the King restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of his kingdom, and it did not contain one word relative to the dismemberment of France.

In the subsequent discussions, which took place in 1792, and which embraced at the same time all the other points of jealousy which had arisen between the two countries, the declaration of Pilnitz was referred to, and explained on the part of Austria in a manner precisely conformable to what I have now stated ; and the amicable explanations which took place, both on this subject and on all the matters in dispute, will be found in the official correspondence between the two Courts, which has been made public ; and it will be found, also, that, as long as the negotiation continued to be conducted through M. Delessart, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, there was a great prospect that those discussions would be amicably terminated ; but it is notorious, and has since been clearly proved, on the authority of Brissot himself, that the violent party in France considered such an issue of the negotiation as likely to be fatal to their projects, and thought, to use his own words, that ‘ war was necessary to consolidate the revolution.’ For the express purpose of producing the

war, they excited a popular tumult in Paris; they insisted upon and obtained the dismissal of M. Delessart. A new Minister was appointed in his room, the tone of the negotiation was immediately changed, and an ultimatum was sent to the Emperor, similar to that which was afterwards sent to this country, affording him no satisfaction on his just grounds of complaint, and requiring him, under those circumstances, to disarm. The first events of the contest proved how much more France was prepared for war than Austria, and afford a strong confirmation of the proposition which I maintain—that no offensive intention was entertained on the part of the latter Power.

War was then declared against Austria; a war which I state to be a war of aggression on the part of France. The King of Prussia had declared that he should consider war against the Emperor or Empire, as war against himself. He had declared that, as a co-estate of the Empire, he was determined to defend their rights; that, as an ally of the Emperor, he would support him to the utmost against any attack; and that, for the sake of his own dominions he felt himself called upon to resist the progress of French principles, and to maintain the balance of power in Europe. With this notice before them, France declared war upon the Emperor, and the war with Prussia was the necessary consequence of this aggression, both against the Emperor and the Empire. The war against the King of Sardinia follows next. The declaration of that war was the seizure of Savoy, by an invading army; and on what ground? On that which has been stated already. They had found out by some light of nature, that the Rhine and the Alps were the natural limits of France. Upon that ground Savoy was seized; and Savoy was also incorporated with France.

Here finishes the history of the wars in which France was engaged, antecedent to the war with Great Britain, with Holland, and with Spain. With respect to Spain, we have seen nothing in any part of its conduct which leads us to suspect that either attachment to religion, or the ties of consanguinity, or regard to the ancient system of Europe, was likely to induce that Court to connect itself in offensive war against France. The war was evidently and incontestably begun by France against Spain. The case of Holland is so fresh in every man's recollection and so connected with the immediate causes of the war with this country, that it cannot require one word of observation. What shall I say, then, on the case of Portugal? I cannot indeed say that France ever declared war against that country; I can hardly say even that she ever made war, but she required them to make a treaty of peace, as if they had been at war; she obliged them to purchase that treaty; she broke it as soon as it was purchased, and she had originally no other ground of complaint than

this : that Portugal had performed, though inadequately, the engagements of its ancient defensive alliance with this country, in the character of an auxiliary—a conduct which cannot of itself make any Power a principal in a war.

I have now enumerated all the nations at war at that period, with the exception only of Naples. It can hardly be necessary to call to the recollection of the House the characteristic feature of revolutionary principles which was shown, even at this early period, in the personal insult offered to the King of Naples by the commander of a French squadron, riding uncontrolled in the Mediterranean, and (while our fleets were yet unarmed) threatening destruction to all the coast of Italy.

It was not till a considerably later period that almost all the other nations of Europe found themselves equally involved in actual hostility : but it is not a little material to the whole of my argument, compared with the statement of the learned gentleman, and with that contained in the French note,* to examine at what period this hostility extended itself. It extended itself, in the course of 1796, to the states of Italy which had hitherto been exempted from it. In 1797 it ended in the destruction of most of them ; it had ended in the virtual deposition of the King of Sardinia, it had ended in the conversion of Genoa and Tuscany into democratic republics ; it had ended in the revolution of Venice, in the violation of treaties with the new Venetian republic ; and finally, in transferring that very republic, the creature and vassal of France, to the dominion of Austria.

I observe from the gestures of some honourable gentlemen that they think we are precluded from the use of any argument founded on this last transaction. I already hear them saying, that it was as criminal in Austria to receive, as it was in France to give. I am far from defending or palliating the conduct of Austria upon this occasion : but because Austria, unable at last to contend with the arms of France, was forced to accept an unjust and insufficient indemnification from the conquests France had made from it, are we to be debarred from stating what, on the part of France, was not merely an unjust acquisition, but an act of the grossest and most aggravated perfidy and cruelty, and one of the most striking specimens of that system which has been uniformly and indiscriminately applied to all the countries which France has had within its grasp ? This can only be said in vindication of France (and it is still more a vindication of Austria), that, practically speaking, if there is any part of this transaction for which Venice itself has reason to be grateful, it can only be for the permission to exchange the embraces of French fraternity for what is called the despotism of Vienna.

Let these facts, and these dates, be compared with what we have heard. The honourable gentleman has told us, and the author of the note from France has told us also, that all the French conquests were produced by the operations of the allies. It was when they were pressed on all sides, when their own territory was in danger, when their own independence was in question, when the confederacy appeared too strong ; it was then they used the means with which their power and their courage furnished them ; and, 'attacked upon all sides, they carried everywhere their defensive arms' (*vide* M. Talleyrand's note). I do not wish to misrepresent the learned gentleman, but I understood him to speak of this sentiment with approbation : the sentiment itself is this, that if a nation is unjustly attacked in any one quarter by others, she cannot stop to consider by whom, but must find means of strength in other quarters, no matter where ; and is justified in attacking, in her turn, those with whom she is at peace, and from whom she has received no species of provocation.

Sir, I hope I have already proved, in a great measure, that no such attack was made upon France ; but, if it was made, I maintain, that the whole ground on which that argument is founded cannot be tolerated. In the name of the laws of nature and nations, in the name of everything that is sacred and honourable, I demur to that plea, and I tell that honourable and learned gentleman that he would do well to look again into the law of nations, before he ventures to come to this House to give the sanction of his authority to so dreadful and execrable a system.

I certainly understood this to be distinctly the tenor of the learned gentleman's argument ; but as he tells me he did not use it, I take it for granted he did not intend to use it, I rejoice that he did not : but, at least, I then have a right to expect that the learned gentleman should now transfer to the French note some of the indignation which he has hitherto lavished upon the declarations of this country. This principle, which the learned gentleman disclaims, the French note avows : and I contend, without fear of contradiction, it is the principle upon which France has uniformly acted. But while the learned gentleman disclaims this proposition, he certainly will admit, that he himself asserted, and maintained in the whole course of his argument, that the pressure of the war upon France imposed upon her the necessity of those exertions which produced most of the enormities of the revolution and most of the enormities practised against the other countries of Europe. The House will recollect that, in the year 1796, when all these horrors in Italy were beginning, which are the strongest illustrations of the general character of the French revolution, we had begun that negotiation to which the learned gentleman has referred. England then possessed numerous conquests ; England, though not having

at that time had the advantage of three of her most splendid victories, England, even then, appeared undisputed mistress of the sea ; England, having then engrossed the whole wealth of the colonial world ; England, having lost nothing of its original possessions ; England then comes forward, proposing general peace, and offering—what ? offering the surrender of all that it had acquired, in order to obtain—what ? not the dismemberment, not the partition of ancient France, but the return of a part of those conquests, no one of which could be retained but in direct contradiction to that original and solemn pledge which is now referred to as the proof of the just and moderate disposition of the French Republic. Yet even this offer was not sufficient to procure peace, or to arrest the progress of France in her defensive operations against other offending countries. From the pages, however, of the learned gentleman's pamphlet (which, after all its editions, is now fresher in his memory than in that of any other person in this House, or in the country), he is furnished with an argument on the result of the negotiation, on which he appears confidently to rely. He maintains that the single point on which the negotiation was broken off, was the question of the possession of the Austrian Netherlands ; and that it is, therefore, on that ground only, that the war has, since that time, been continued. When this subject was before under discussion, I stated, and I shall state again (notwithstanding the learned gentleman's accusation of my having endeavoured to shift the question from its true point), that the question then at issue was not whether the Netherlands should, in fact, be restored, though even on that question I am not, like the learned gentleman, unprepared to give any opinion ; I am ready to say, that to leave that territory in the possession of France would be obviously dangerous to the interests of this country, and is inconsistent with the policy which it has uniformly pursued at every period in which it has concerned itself in the general system of the Continent ; but it was not on the decision of this question of expediency and policy that the issue of the negotiation then turned ; what was required of us by France was, not merely that we should acquiesce in her retaining the Netherlands, but that, as a preliminary to all treaty, and before entering upon the discussion of terms, we should recognise the principle, that whatever France, in time of war, had annexed to the Republic must remain inseparable for ever, and could not become the subject of negotiation. I say that, in refusing such a preliminary, we were only resisting the claim of France to arrogate to itself the power of controlling, by its own separate and municipal acts, the rights and interests of other countries, and moulding at its discretion, a new and general code of the law of nations.

In reviewing the issue of this negotiation, it is important to observe that France, who began by abjuring a love of conquest, was desired to give

up nothing of her own, not even to give up all that she had conquered ; that it was offered to her to receive back all that had been conquered from her ; and when she rejected the negotiation for peace upon these grounds, are we then to be told of the unrelenting hostility of the combined Powers, for which France was to revenge itself upon other countries, and which is to justify the subversion of every established government, and the destruction of property, religion, and domestic comfort, from one end of Italy to the other ? Such was the effect of the war against Modena, against Genoa, against Tuscany, against Venice, against Rome, and against Naples ; all of which she engaged in, or prosecuted, subsequent to this very period.

After this, in the year 1797, Austria had made peace, England and its ally, Portugal (from whom we could expect little active assistance, but whom we felt it our duty to defend), alone remained in the war. In that situation, under the pressure of necessity, which I shall not disguise, we made another attempt to negotiate. In 1797 Prussia, Spain, Austria, and Naples having successively made peace, the princes of Italy having been destroyed, France having surrounded itself, in almost every part in which it is not surrounded by the sea, with revolutionary republics, England made another offer of a different nature. It was not now a demand that France should restore anything. Austria having made a peace upon her own terms, England had nothing to require with regard to her allies ; she asked no restitution of the dominions added to France in Europe. So far from retaining anything French out of Europe, we freely offered them all, demanding only, as a poor compensation, to retain a part of what we had acquired by arms from Holland, then identified with France, and that part useless to Holland and necessary for the security of our Indian possessions. This proposal also, Sir, was proudly refused, in a way which the learned gentleman himself has not attempted to justify, indeed of which he has spoken with detestation. I wish, since he has not finally abjured his duty in this House, that that detestation had been stated earlier, that he had mixed his own voice with the general voice of his country on the result of that negotiation.

Let us look at the conduct of France immediately subsequent to this period. She had spurned at the offers of Great Britain ; she had reduced her Continental enemies to the necessity of accepting a precarious peace ; she had (in spite of those pledges repeatedly made and uniformly violated) surrounded herself by new conquests, on every part of her frontier but one ; that one was Switzerland. The first effect of being relieved from the war with Austria, of being secured against all fears of Continental invasion on the ancient territory of France, was their unprovoked attack against this unoffending and devoted country. This was one of the scenes which

satisfied even those who were the most incredulous, that France had thrown off the mask, '*if indeed she had ever worn it.*' It collected, in one view, many of the characteristic features of that revolutionary system which I have endeavoured to trace. The perfidy which alone rendered their arms successful, the pretext of which they availed themselves to produce division and prepare the entrance of Jacobinism in that country, the proposal of armistice, one of the known and regular engines of the revolution, which was, as usual, the immediate prelude to military execution, attended with cruelty and barbarity, of which there are few examples : all these are known to the world. The country they attacked was one which had long been the faithful ally of France, which, instead of giving cause of jealousy to any other Power, had been, for ages, proverbial for the simplicity and innocence of its manners, and which had acquired and preserved the esteem of all the nations of Europe ; which had almost, by the common consent of mankind, been exempted from the sound of war, and marked out as a land of Goshen, safe and untouched in the midst of surrounding calamities.

Look, then, at the fate of Switzerland, at the circumstances which led to its destruction, add this instance to the catalogue of aggression against all Europe, and then tell me whether the system I have described has not been prosecuted with an unrelenting spirit, which cannot be subdued in adversity, which cannot be appeased in prosperity, which neither solemn professions, nor the general law of nations, nor the obligation of treaties (whether previous to the revolution or subsequent to it), could restrain from the subversion of every state into which, either by force or fraud, their arms could penetrate. Then tell me whether the disasters of Europe are to be charged upon the provocation of this country and its allies, or on the inherent principle of the French revolution, of which the natural result produced so much misery and carnage in France, and carried desolation and terror over so large a portion of the world.

Sir, much as I have now stated, I have not finished the catalogue. America, almost as much as Switzerland, perhaps, contributed to that change, which has taken place in the minds of those who were originally partial to the principles of the French Government. The hostility against America followed a long course of neutrality adhered to, under the strongest provocations, or rather of repeated compliances to France, with which we might well have been dissatisfied. It was, on the face of it, unjust and wanton ; and it was accompanied by those instances of sordid corruption which shocked and disgusted even the enthusiastic admirers of revolutionary purity, and threw a new light on the genius of revolutionary government.

After this, it remains only shortly to remind gentlemen of the aggression against Egypt, not omitting, however, to notice the capture of Malta, in the way to Egypt. Inconsiderable as that island may be thought, compared with the scenes we have witnessed, let it be remembered, that it is an island of which the Government had long been recognized by every state of Europe, against which France pretended no cause of war, and whose independence was as dear to itself and as sacred as that of any country in Europe. It was, in fact, not unimportant from its local situation to the other Powers of Europe, but in proportion as any man may diminish its importance the instance will only serve the more to illustrate and confirm the proposition which I have maintained. The all-searching eye of the French revolution looks to every part of Europe, and every quarter of the world, in which can be found an object either of acquisition or plunder. Nothing is too great for the temerity of its ambition, nothing too small or insignificant for the grasp of its rapacity. From hence Buonaparte and his army proceeded to Egypt. The attack was made, pretences were held out to the natives of that country in the name of the French King, whom they had murdered; they pretended to have the approbation of the grand seignior, whose territories they were violating; their project was carried on under the profession of a zeal for Mahometanism; it was carried on by proclaiming that France had been reconciled to the Mussulman faith, and abjured that of Christianity, or, as he in his impious language termed it, of '*the sect of the Messiah.*'

The only plea which they have since held out to colour this atrocious invasion of a neutral and friendly territory, is, that it was the road to attack the English power in India. It is most unquestionably true, that this was one and a principal cause of this unparalleled outrage; but another, and an equally substantial cause (as appears by their own statements), was the division and partition of the territories of what they thought a falling Power. It is impossible to dismiss this subject without observing that this attack against Egypt was accompanied by an attack upon the British possessions in India, made on true revolutionary principles. In Europe, the propagation of the principles of France had uniformly prepared the way for the progress of its arms. To India, the lovers of peace had sent the messengers of Jacobinism, for the purpose of inculcating war in those distant regions, on Jacobin principles, and of forming Jacobin clubs, which they actually succeeded in establishing, and which in most respects resembled the European model, but which were distinguished by this peculiarity, that they were required to swear in one breath, *hatred to tyranny, the love of liberty, and the destruction of all kings and sovereigns—except the good and faithful ally of the French Republic, CITIZEN TIPPOO.*

What, then, was the nature of this system? Was it anything but what I have stated it to be—an insatiable love of aggrandizement, an implacable spirit of destruction directed against all the civil and religious institutions of every country? This is the first moving and acting spirit of the French revolution; this is the spirit which animated it at its birth, and this is the spirit which will not desert it till the moment of its dissolution, which grew with its growth, which strengthened with its strength, but which has not abated under its misfortunes nor declined in its decay; it has been invariably the same in every period, operating more or less, according as accident or circumstances might assist it; but it has been inherent in the revolution in all its stages, it has equally belonged to Brissot, to Robespierre, to Tallien, to Reubel, to Barras, and to every one of the leaders of the Directory, but to none more than to Buonaparte, in whom now all their powers are united. What are its characters? Can it be accident that produced them? No, it is only from the alliance of the most horrid principles with the most horrid means, that such miseries could have been brought upon Europe. It is this paradox, which we must always keep in mind when we are discussing any question relative to the effects of the French revolution. Groaning under every degree of misery, the victim of its own crimes, and, as I once before expressed it in this House, asking pardon of God and of man for the miseries which it has brought upon itself and others, France still retains (while it has neither left means of comfort nor almost of subsistence to its own inhabitants) new and unexampled means of annoyance and destruction against all the other Powers of Europe.

Its first fundamental principle was to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole property of the country; the practical application of this principle was to devote the whole of that property to indiscriminate plunder, and to make it the foundation of a revolutionary system of finance, productive in proportion to the misery and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of proselytism, diffusing itself over all the nations of the earth; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations, which can furnish a list of grievances, and hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations, which inspired the teachers of French liberty with the hope of alike recommending themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German Empire; to the various states of Italy, under all their different institutions, to the old republicans of Holland, and to the new republicans of America; to the Catholic of Ireland, whom it was to deliver from Protestant usurpation; to the Protestant of Switzerland, whom it was to deliver from popish super-

stitution ; and to the Mussulman of Egypt, whom it was to deliver from Christian persecution ; to the remote Indian, blindly bigoted to his ancient institutions ; and to the natives of Great Britain, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and justly attached to their constitution, from the joint result of habit, of reason, and of experience. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which nothing can bind, which no tie of treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French revolution marched forth, the terror and dismay of the world. Every nation has in its turn been the witness, may have been the victims, of its principles, and it is left for us to decide whether we will compromise with such a danger, while we have yet resources to supply the sinews of war, while the heart and spirit of the country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe.

Much more might be said on this part of the subject ; but if what I have said already is a faithful, though only an imperfect, sketch of those excesses and outrages, which even history itself will hereafter be unable fully to record, and a just representation of the principle and source from which they originated, will any man say that we ought to accept a precarious security against so tremendous a danger ? Much more will he pretend, after the experience of all that has passed, in the different stages of the French revolution, that we ought to be deterred from probing this great question to the bottom, and from examining, without ceremony or disguise, whether the change which has recently taken place in France is sufficient now to give security, not against a common danger, but against such a danger as that which I have described ?

In examining this part of the subject, let it be remembered that there is one other characteristic of the French revolution, as striking as its dreadful and destructive principles ; I mean the instability of its Government, which has been of itself sufficient to destroy all reliance, if any such reliance could, at any time, have been placed on the good faith of any of its rulers. Such has been the incredible rapidity with which the revolutions in France have succeeded each other, that I believe the names of those who have successively exercised absolute power, under the pretence of liberty, are to be numbered by the years of the revolution ; and each of the new constitutions, which, under the same pretence, has, in its turn been imposed by force on France, every one of which alike was founded upon principles which professed to be universal, and was intended to be established and perpetuated among all the nations of the earth—each of these will be found, upon an average, to have had about two years as the period of its duration.

Under this revolutionary system, accompanied with this perpetual fluctuation and change, both in the form of the Government and in the persons of the rulers, what is the security which has hitherto existed, and what new security is now offered ? Before an answer is given to this question, let me sum up the history of all the revolutionary Governments of France, and of their characters in relation to other Powers, in words more emphatical than any which I could use—the memorable words pronounced, on the eve of this last constitution, by the orator who was selected to report to an assembly, surrounded by a file of grenadiers, the new form of liberty which it was destined to enjoy under the auspices of General Buonaparte. From this reporter, the mouth and organ of the new Government, we learn this important lesson : ‘ It is easy to conceive why peace was not concluded before the establishment of the constitutional Government. The only Government which then existed described itself as revolutionary ; it was, in fact, only the tyranny of a few men who were soon overthrown by others, and it consequently presented no stability of principles or of views, no security either with respect to men, or with respect to things. It should seem that that stability and that security ought to have existed from the establishment, and as the effect, of the constitutional system ; and yet they did not exist more, perhaps even less, than they had done before. In truth, we did make some partial treaties, we signed a continental peace, and a general congress was held to confirm it ; but these treaties, these diplomatic conferences, appear to have been the source of a new war, more inveterate and more bloody than before. Before the 18th Fructidor (September 4th) of the fifth year, the French Government exhibited to foreign nations so uncertain an existence that they refused to treat with it. After this great event the whole power was absorbed in the Directory ; the legislative body can hardly be said to have existed ; treaties of peace were broken, and war carried everywhere, without that body having any share in those measures. The same Directory, after having intimidated all Europe, and destroyed, at its pleasure, several Governments, neither knowing how to make peace or war, or how even to establish itself, was overturned by a breath, on the 13th Prairial (June 18th), to make room for other men, influenced, perhaps, by different views, or who might be governed by different principles. Judging, then, only from notorious facts, the French Government must be considered as exhibiting nothing fixed, neither in respect to men or to things.’

Here, then, is the picture, down to the period of the last revolution, of the state of France under all its successive Governments !

Having taken a view of what it was, let us now examine what it is. In the first place, we see, as has been truly stated, a change in the description and form of the sovereign authority ; a supreme power is placed at the

head of this nominal republic, with a more open avowal of military despotism than at any former period ; with a more open and undisguised abandonment of the names and pretences under which that despotism long attempted to conceal itself. The different institutions, republican in their form and appearance, which were before the instruments of that despotism, are now annihilated ; they have given way to the absolute power of one man, concentrating in himself all the authority of the State, and differing from other monarchs only in this, that, as my honourable friend truly stated it, he wields a sword instead of a sceptre. What, then, is the confidence we are to derive either from the frame of the Government or from the character and past conduct of the person who is now the absolute ruler of France? Had we seen a man, of whom we had no previous knowledge, suddenly invested with the sovereign authority of the country ; invested with the power of taxation, with the power of the sword, the power of war and peace, the unlimited power of commanding the resources, of disposing of the lives and fortunes of every man in France ; if we had seen, at the same moment, all the inferior machinery of the revolution, which, under the variety of successive shocks, had kept the system in motion, still remaining entire, all that, by requisition and plunder, had given activity to the revolutionary system of finance, and had furnished the means of creating an army, by converting every man, who was of age to bear arms, into a soldier, not for the defence of his own country, but for the sake of carrying unprovoked war into surrounding countries. If we had seen all the subordinate instruments of Jacobin power subsisting in their full force, and retaining (to use the French phrase) all their original organization ; and had then observed this single change in the conduct of their affairs, that there was now one man, with no rival to thwart his measures, no colleague to divide his powers, no council to control his operations, no liberty of speaking or writing, no expression of public opinion to check or influence his conduct ; under such circumstances, should we be wrong to pause, or wait for the evidence of facts and experience, before we consented to trust our safety to the forbearance of a single man, in such a situation, and to relinquish those means of defence which have hitherto carried us safe through all the storms of the revolution ? If we were to ask what are the principles and character of this stranger, to whom Fortune has suddenly committed the concerns of a great and powerful nation ?

But is this the actual state of the present question ? Are we talking of a stranger of whom we have heard nothing ? No, Sir ; we have heard of him ; we, and Europe, and the world, have heard both of him and the satellites by whom he is surrounded ; and it is impossible to discuss fairly the propriety of any answer which could be returned to his overtures of

negotiation, without taking into consideration the inferences to be drawn from his personal character and conduct. I know it is the fashion with some gentlemen to represent any reference to topics of this nature as invidious and irritating ; but the truth is, that they rise unavoidably out of the very nature of the question. Would it have been possible for Ministers to discharge their duty, in offering their advice to their sovereign, either for accepting or declining negotiation, without taking into their account the reliance to be placed on the disposition and the principles of the person on whose disposition and principles the security to be obtained by treaty must, in the present circumstances, principally depend ? Or would they act honestly or candidly towards Parliament and towards the country, if, having been guided by these considerations, they forbore to state publicly and distinctly the real grounds which have influenced their decision ; and if, from a false delicacy and groundless timidity, they purposely declined an examination of a point, the most essential towards enabling Parliament to form a just determination on so important a subject ?

What opinion, then, are we led to form of the pretensions of the Consul to those particular qualities which, in the official note, are represented as affording us, from his personal character, the surest pledge of peace ? We are told this is his *second attempt* at general pacification. Let us see, for a moment, how this *second attempt* has been conducted. There is, indeed, as the learned gentleman has said, a word in the first declaration which refers to general peace, and which states this to be the second time in which the Consul has endeavoured to accomplish that object. We thought fit, for the reasons which have been assigned, to decline altogether the proposal of treating, under the present circumstances ; but we, at the same time, expressly stated that, whenever the moment for treaty should arrive, we would in no case treat but in conjunction with our allies. Our general refusal to negotiate at the present moment did not prevent the Consul from renewing his overtures ; but were they renewed for the purpose of general pacification ? Though he had hinted at general peace in the terms of his first note ; though we had shown, by our answer, that we deemed negotiation, even for general peace, at this moment, inadmissible ; though we added that, even at any future period, we would treat only in conjunction with our allies ; what was the proposal contained in his last note ? To treat, not for *general peace*, but for a *separate peace* between Great Britain and France.

Such was the second attempt to effect *general pacification* : a proposal for a *separate* treaty with Great Britain. What had been the first ? The conclusion of a *separate* treaty with Austria ; and, in addition to this fact, there are two anecdotes connected with the conclusion of this treaty.

which are sufficient to illustrate the disposition of this pacificator of Europe. This very treaty of Campo Formio was ostentatiously professed to be concluded with the Emperor, for the purpose of enabling Buonaparte to take the command of the army of England, and to dictate a separate peace with this country on the banks of the Thames. But there is this additional circumstance, singular beyond all conception, considering that we are now referred to the Treaty of Campo Formio as a proof of the personal disposition of the Consul to general peace ; he sent his two confidential and chosen friends, *Berthier* and *Monge*, charged to communicate to the Directory this Treaty of Campo Formio ; to announce to them that one enemy was humbled, that the war with Austria was terminated, and, therefore, that now was the moment to prosecute their operations against this country ; they used, on this occasion, the memorable words, '*the Kingdom of Great Britain and the French Republic cannot exist together.*' This, I say, was the solemn declaration of the deputies and ambassadors of Buonaparte himself, offering to the Directory the first-fruits of this first attempt at general pacification.

So much for his disposition towards general pacification : let us look next at the part he has taken in the different stages of the French revolution, and let us then judge whether we are to look to him as the security against revolutionary principles ; let us determine what reliance we can place on his engagements with other countries, when we see how he has served his engagements to his own. When the constitution of the third year was established under Barras, that constitution was imposed by the arms of Buonaparte, then commanding the army of the Triumvirate in Paris. To that constitution he then swore fidelity. How often he has repeated the same oath I know not ; but twice at least we know that he has not only repeated it himself, but tendered it to others, under circumstances too striking not to be stated.

Sir, the House cannot have forgotten the revolution of September 4th, which produced the dismissal of Lord Malmesbury from Lisle. How was that revolution procured ? It was procured chiefly by the promise of Buonaparte (in the name of his army) decidedly to support the Directory in those measures which led to the infringement and violation of everything that the authors of the constitution of 1795, or its adherents, could consider as fundamental, and which established a system of despotism inferior only to that now realized in his own person. Immediately before this event, in the midst of the desolation and bloodshed of Italy, he had received the sacred present of new banners from the Directory ; he delivered them to his army with this exhortation : ' Let us swear, fellow soldiers, by the names of the patriots who have died by our side, eternal hatred to the enemies of the constitution of the third year '—that very constitution

which he soon after enabled the Directory to violate, and which, at the head of his grenadiers, he has now finally destroyed. Sir, that oath was again renewed, in the midst of that very scene to which I have last referred; the oath of fidelity to the constitution of the third year was administered to all members of the assembly then sitting (under the terror of the bayonet), as the solemn preparation for the business of the day; and the morning was ushered in with swearing attachment to the constitution, that the evening might close with its destruction.

If we carry our views out to France, and look at the dreadful catalogue of all the breaches of treaty, all the acts of perfidy at which I have only glanced, and which are precisely commensurate with the number of treaties which the Republic have made (for I have sought in vain for any one which it has made and which it has not broken); if we trace the history of them all from the beginning of the revolution to the present time, or if we select those which have been accompanied by the most atrocious cruelty, and marked the most strongly with the characteristic features of the revolution, the name of Buonaparte will be found allied to more of them than that of any other that can be handed down in the history of the crimes and miseries of the last ten years. His name will be recorded with the horrors committed in Italy, in the memorable campaign of 1796 and 1797, in the Milanese, in Genoa, in Modena, in Tuscany, in Rome, and in Venice.

His entrance into Lombardy was announced by a solemn proclamation, issued on April 27th, 1796, which terminated with these words: 'Nations of Italy! the French army is come to break your chains; the French are the friends of the people in every country; your religion, your property, your customs, shall be respected.' This was followed by a second proclamation, dated from Milan, May 20th, and signed 'Buonaparte,' in these terms: 'Respect for property and personal security, respect for the religion of countries: these are the sentiments of the Government of the French Republic and of the army of Italy. The French, victorious, consider the nations of Lombardy as their brothers.' In testimony of this fraternity, and to fulfil the solemn pledge of respecting property, this very proclamation imposed on the Milanese a provisional contribution to the amount of twenty millions of livres, or near one million sterling; and successive exactions were afterwards levied on that single state to the amount, in the whole, of near six millions sterling. The regard to religion and to the customs of the country was manifested with the same scrupulous fidelity. The churches were given up to indiscriminate plunder. Every religious and charitable fund, every public treasure, was confiscated. The country was made the scene of every species of disorder and rapine. The priests, the established form of wor-

ship, all the objects of religious reverence, were openly insulted by the French troops ; at Pavia, particularly, the tomb of St. Augustine, which the inhabitants were accustomed to view with peculiar veneration, was mutilated and defaced. This last provocation having roused the resentment of the people, they flew to arms, surrounded the French garrison, and took them prisoners, but carefully abstained from offering any violence to a single soldier. In revenge for this conduct, Buonaparte, then on his march to the Mincio, suddenly returned, collected his troops, and carried the extremity of military execution over the country : he burnt the town of Benasco, and massacred eight hundred of its inhabitants ; he marched to Pavia, took it by storm, and delivered it over to general plunder, and published, at the same moment, a proclamation, of May 26th, ordering his troops to shoot all those who had not laid down their arms and taken an oath of obedience, and to burn every village where the *tocsin* should be sounded, and to put its inhabitants to death.

The transactions with Modena were on a smaller scale, but in the same character. Buonaparte began by signing a treaty, by which the Duke of Modena was to pay twelve millions of livres, and neutrality was promised him in return ; this was soon followed by the personal arrest of the Duke, and by a fresh extortion of two hundred thousand sequins ; after this he was permitted, on the payment of a further sum, to sign another treaty, called a *Convention de Sûreté*, which of course was only the prelude to the repetition of similar exactions. Nearly at the same period, in violation of the rights of neutrality, and of the treaty which had been concluded between the French Republic and the Grand Duke of Tuscany in the preceding year, and in breach of a positive promise given only a few days before, the French army forcibly took possession of Leghorn, for the purpose of seizing the British property which was deposited there, and confiscating it as prize ; and shortly after, when Buonaparte agreed to evacuate Leghorn in return for the evacuation of the island of Elba, which was in the possession of the British troops, he insisted upon a separate article, by which, in addition to the plunder before obtained, by the infraction of the law of nations, it was stipulated that the Grand Duke should pay to the French the expense which they had incurred by this invasion of his territory.

In the proceedings towards Genoa we shall find not only a continuation of the same system of extortion and plunder (in violation of the solemn pledge contained in the proclamations already referred to), but a striking instance of the revolutionary means employed for the destruction of independent governments. A French Minister was at that time resident at Genoa, which was acknowledged by France to be in a state

of neutrality and friendship : in breach of this neutrality, Buonaparte began, in the year 1796, with the demand of a loan ; he afterwards, from the month of September, required and enforced the payment of a monthly subsidy, to the amount which he thought proper to stipulate : these exactions were accompanied by repeated assurances and protestations of friendship ; they were followed, in May, 1797, by a conspiracy against the Government, fomented by the emissaries of the French Embassy, and conducted by the partisans of France, encouraged and afterwards protected by the French Minister. The conspirators failed in their first attempt ; overpowered by the courage and voluntary exertions of the inhabitants, their force was dispersed, and many of their number were arrested. Buonaparte instantly considered the defeat of the conspirators as an act of aggression against the French Republic ; he dispatched an aide-de-camp with an order to the Senate of this independent state ; first, to release all the French who were detained ; secondly, to punish those who had arrested them ; thirdly, to declare that they had had no share in the insurrection ; and fourthly, to disarm the people. Several French prisoners were immediately released, and a proclamation was preparing to disarm the inhabitants, when, by a second note, Buonaparte required the arrest of the three Inquisitors of State, and immediate alterations in the constitution ; he accompanied this with an order to the French Minister to quit Genoa if his commands were not immediately carried into execution ; at the same moment his troops entered the territory of the republic, and shortly after the councils, intimidated and overpowered, abdicated their functions. Three deputies were then sent to Buonaparte to receive from him a new constitution ; on June 6th, after the conferences at Montebello, he signed a convention, or rather issued a decree, by which he fixed the new form of their Government ; he himself named provisionally all the members who were to compose it, and he required the payment of seven millions of livres, as the price of the subversion of their constitution and their independence. These transactions require but one short comment ; it is to be found in the official account given of them at Paris, which is in these memorable words : ' General Buonaparte has pursued the only line of conduct which could be allowed in the representative of a nation which has supported the war only to procure the solemn acknowledgment of the right of nations to change the form of their Government. He contributed nothing towards the revolution of Genoa, but he seized the first moment to acknowledge the new Government, as soon as he saw that it was the result of the wishes of the people.'

It is unnecessary to dwell on the wanton attacks against Rome, under the direction of Buonaparte himself, in the year 1796, and in the

beginning of 1797, which led first to the Treaty of Tolentino, concluded by Buonaparte, in which, by enormous sacrifices, the Pope was allowed to purchase the acknowledgment of his authority as a sovereign prince ; and secondly, to the violation of that very treaty, and to the subversion of the papal authority by Joseph Buonaparte, the brother and the agent of the general, and the Minister of the French Republic to the Holy See : a transaction accompanied by outrages and insults towards the pious and venerable Pontiff (in spite of the sanctity of his age and the unsullied purity of his character), which even to a Protestant seemed hardly short of the guilt of sacrilege.

But of all the disgusting and tragical scenes which took place in Italy, in the course of the period I am describing, those which passed at Venice are perhaps the most striking and the most characteristic : in May, 1796, the French army, under Buonaparte, in the full tide of its success against the Austrians, first approached the territories of this Republic, which, from the commencement of the war, had observed a rigid neutrality. Their entrance on these territories was as usual accompanied by a solemn proclamation in the name of their general ' Buonaparte to the Republic of Venice ! ' ' It is to deliver the finest country in Europe from the iron yoke of the proud House of Austria that the French army has braved obstacles the most difficult to surmount. Victory in union with justice has crowned its efforts. The wreck of the enemy's army has retired behind the Mincio. The French army, in order to follow them, passes over the territory of the Republic of Venice ; but it will never forget that ancient friendship unites the two republics. Religion, government, customs, and property, shall be respected. That the people may be without apprehension, the most severe discipline shall be maintained. All that may be provided for the army shall be faithfully paid for in money. The general-in-chief engages the officers of the Republic of Venice, the magistrates, and the priests, to make known these sentiments to the people, in order that confidence may cement that friendship which has so long united the two nations, faithful in the path of honour, as in that of victory. The French soldier is terrible only to the enemies of his liberty and his Government. Buonaparte.'

This proclamation was followed by exactions similar to those which were practised against Genoa, by the renewal of similar professions of friendship, and the use of similar means to excite insurrection. At length, in the spring of 1797, occasion was taken from disturbances thus excited, to forge, in the name of the Venetian Government, a proclamation hostile to France ; and this proceeding was made the ground for military execution against the country, and for effecting by force the subversion

of its ancient government and the establishment of the democratic forms of the French revolution. This revolution was sealed by a treaty, signed in May, 1797, between Buonaparte and commissioners appointed on the part of the new and revolutionary Government of Venice. By the second and third secret articles of this treaty, Venice agreed to give as a ransom, to secure itself against all further exactions or demands, the sum of three millions of livres in money, the value of three millions more in articles of naval supply, and three ships of the line : and it received in return the assurances of the friendship and support of the French Republic. Immediately after the signature of this treaty, the arsenal, the library, and the palace of St. Mark were ransacked and plundered, and heavy additional contributions were imposed upon its inhabitants : and, in not more than four months afterwards, this very Republic of Venice, united by alliance to France, the creature of Buonaparte himself, from whom it had received the present of French liberty, was by the same Buonaparte transferred under the Treaty of Campo Formio, to 'that iron yoke of the proud House of Austria,' to deliver it from which he had represented in his first proclamation to be the great object of all his operations.

Sir, all this is followed by the memorable expedition into Egypt, which I mention, not merely because it forms a principal article in the catalogue of those acts of violence and perfidy in which Buonaparte has been engaged ; not merely because it was an enterprise peculiarly his own, of which he was himself the planter, the executor, and the betrayer ; but chiefly because, when from thence he retires to a different scene to take possession of a new throne, from which he is to speak upon an equality with the kings and governors of Europe, he leaves behind him, at the moment of his departure, a specimen, which cannot be mistaken, of his principles of negotiation. The intercepted correspondence, which has been alluded to in this debate, seems to afford the strongest ground to believe that his offers to the Turkish Government to evacuate Egypt were made solely with a view '*to gain time*' ;—that the ratification of any treaty on this subject was to be delayed with the view of finally eluding its performance, if any change of circumstances favourable to the French should occur in the interval. But whatever gentlemen may think of the intention with which these offers were made there will at least be no question with respect to the credit due to those professions by which he endeavoured to prove, in Egypt, his pacific dispositions. He expressly enjoins his successor strongly and steadily to insist, in all his intercourse with the Turks, that he came to Egypt with no hostile design, and that he never meant to keep possession of the country ; while, on the opposite page of the same instructions, he states in the most

unequivocal manner his regret at the discomfiture of his favourite project of colonizing Egypt, and of maintaining it as a territorial acquisition. Now, Sir, if in any note addressed to the Grand Vizier, or the Sultan, Buonaparte had claimed credit for the sincerity of his professions, that he forcibly invaded Egypt with no view hostile to Turkey, and solely for the purpose of molesting the British interests, is there any one argument now used to induce us to believe his present professions to us which might not have been equally urged on that occasion to the Turkish Government? Would not those professions have been equally supported by solemn asseverations, by the same reference which is now made to personal character, with this single difference, that they would then have been accompanied with one instance less of that perfidy which we have had occasion to trace in this very transaction?

It is unnecessary to say more with respect to the credit due to his professions, or the reliance to be placed on his general character: but it will, perhaps, be argued that, whatever may be his character, or whatever has been his past conduct, he has now an interest in making and observing peace. That he has an interest in making peace is at best but a doubtful proposition, and that he has an interest in preserving it is still more uncertain. That it is his interest to negotiate, I do not indeed deny; it is his interest above all to engage this country in separate negotiation, in order to loosen and dissolve the whole system of the confederacy on the Continent, to palsy, at once, the arms of Russia or of Austria, or of any other country that might look to you for support; and then either to break off his separate treaty, or if he should have concluded it, to apply the lesson which is taught in his school of policy in Egypt: and to revive, at his pleasure, those claims of indemnification which *may have been reserved to some happier period.*

This is precisely the interest which he has in negotiation; but on what grounds are we to be convinced that he has an interest in concluding and observing a solid and permanent pacification? Under all the circumstances of his personal character, and his newly acquired power, what other security has he for retaining that power, but the sword? His hold upon France is the sword, and he has no other. Is he connected with the soil, or with the habits, the affections, or the prejudices of the country? He is a stranger, a foreigner, and an usurper; he unites in his own person everything that a pure Republican must detest; everything that an enraged Jacobin has abjured; everything that a sincere and faithful Royalist must feel as an insult. If he is opposed at any time in his career, what is his appeal? *He appeals to his fortune*; in other words, to his army and his sword. Placing, then, his whole reliance upon military support, can he afford to let his military renown pass away, to

let his laurels wither, to let the memory of his achievements sink in obscurity? Is it certain that with his army confined within France, and restrained from inroads upon her neighbours, he can maintain at his devotion a force sufficiently numerous to support his power? Having no object but the possession of absolute dominion, no passion but military glory, is it certain that he can feel such an interest in permanent peace as would justify us in laying down our arms, reducing our expense, and relinquishing our means of security, on the faith of his engagements? Do we believe that, after the conclusion of peace, he would not still sigh over the lost trophies of Egypt, wrested from him by the celebrated victory of Aboukir and the brilliant exertions of that heroic band of British seamen whose influence and example rendered the Turkish troops invincible at Acre? Can he forget that the effect of these exploits enabled Austria and Russia, in one campaign, to recover from France all which she had acquired by his victories, to dissolve the charm which, for a time, fascinated Europe, and to show that their generals contending in a just cause, could efface, even by their success and their military glory, the most dazzling triumphs of his victories and desolating ambition?

Can we believe, with these impressions on his mind, that if, after a year, eighteen months, or two years, of peace had elapsed, he should be tempted by the appearance of a fresh insurrection in Ireland, encouraged by renewed and unrestrained communication with France, and fomented by the fresh infusion of Jacobin principles, if we were at such a moment without a fleet to watch the ports of France, or to guard the coasts of Ireland, without a disposable army, or an embodied militia, capable of supplying a speedy and adequate reinforcement, and that he had suddenly the means of transporting thither a body of twenty or thirty thousand French troops; can we believe, that at such a moment his ambition and vindictive spirit would be restrained by the recollection of engagements, or the obligation of treaty? Or, if in some new crisis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman Empire, with no British Navy in the Mediterranean, no confederacy formed, no force collected to support it, an opportunity should present itself for resuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt, for renewing the avowed and favourite project of conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile country, and of opening the way to wound some of the vital interests of England, and to plunder the treasures of the East, in order to fill the bankrupt coffers of France, would it be the interest of Buonaparte, under such circumstances, or his principles, his moderation, his love of peace, his aversion to conquest, and his regard for the independence of other nations—would it be all or any of these that would secure us against an attempt, which would leave us only the option of submitting, without a struggle, to certain loss and

disgrace, or of renewing the contest which we had prematurely terminated, and renewing it without allies, without preparation, with diminished means, and with increased difficulty and hazard ?

Hitherto I have spoken only of the reliance which we can place on the professions, the character, and the conduct of the present First Consul ; but it remains to consider the stability of his power. The revolution has been marked throughout by a rapid succession of new depositaries of public authority, each supplanting his predecessor ; what grounds have we as yet to believe that this new usurpation, more odious and more undisguised than all that preceded it, will be more durable ? Is it that we rely on the particular provisions contained in the code of the pretended constitution, which was proclaimed as accepted by the French people, as soon as the garrison of Paris declared their determination to exterminate all its enemies, and before any of its articles could even be known to half the country, whose consent was required for its establishment ?

I will not pretend to inquire deeply into the nature and effects of a constitution which can hardly be regarded but as a farce and a mockery. If, however, it could be supposed that its provisions were to have any effect, it seems equally adapted to two purposes ; that of giving to its founder for a time an absolute and uncontrolled authority, and that of laying the certain foundation of future disunion and discord, which, if they once prevail, must render the exercise of all the authority under the constitution impossible, and leave no appeal but to the sword.

Is, then, military despotism that which we are accustomed to consider as a stable form of government ? In all ages of the world it has been attended with the least stability to the persons who exercised it, and with the most rapid succession of changes and revolutions. The advocates of the French revolution boasted in its outset, that by their new system they had furnished a security for ever, not to France only but to all countries in the world, against military despotism ; that the force of standing armies was vain and delusive ; that no artificial power could resist public opinion ; and that it was upon the foundation of public opinion alone that any government could stand. I believe that in this instance, as in every other, the progress of the French revolution has belied its professions ; but so far from its being a proof of the prevalence of public opinion against military force, it is, instead of the proof, the strongest exception from that doctrine which appears in the history of the world. Through all the stages of the revolution military force has governed ; public opinion has scarcely been heard. But still I consider this as only an exception from a general truth ; I still believe that in every civilized country (not enslaved by a Jacobin faction) public opinion is the only sure support of any government : I believe this with the more satisfaction,

from a conviction that, if this contest is happily terminated, the established Governments of Europe will stand upon that rock firmer than ever ; and whatever may be the defects of any particular constitution, those who live under it will prefer its continuance to the experiment of changes which may plunge them in the unfathomable abyss of revolution, or extricate them from it only to expose them to the terrors of military despotism. And to apply this to France, I see no reason to believe that the present usurpation will be more permanent than any other military despotism which has been established by the same means, and with the same defiance of public opinion.

What, then, is the inference I draw from all that I have now stated ? Is it that we will in no case treat with Buonaparte ? I say no such thing. But I say, as has been said in the answer returned to the French note, that we ought to wait for *experience, and the evidence of facts*, before we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible. The circumstances I have stated would well justify us if we should be slow in being convinced ; but on a question of peace and war, everything depends upon degree, and upon comparison. If, on the one hand, there should be an appearance that the policy of France is at length guided by different maxims from those which have hitherto prevailed ; if we should hereafter see signs of stability in the Government, which are not now to be traced ; if the progress of the allied army should not call forth such a spirit in France as to make it probable that the act of the country itself will destroy the system now prevailing ; if the danger, the difficulty, the risk of continuing the contest, should increase, while the hope of complete ultimate success should be diminished ; all these, in their due place, are considerations which, with myself and (I can answer for it) with every one of my colleagues, will have their just weight. But at present these considerations all operate one way ; at present there is nothing from which we can presage a favourable disposition to change in the French councils. There is the greatest reason to rely on powerful co-operation from our allies ; there are the strongest marks of a disposition in the interior of France to active resistance against this new tyranny : and there is every ground to believe, on reviewing our situation, and that of the enemy, that if we are ultimately disappointed of that complete success which we are at present entitled to hope, the continuance of the contest, instead of making our situation comparatively worse, will have made it comparatively better.

ON THE INVASION OF ENGLAND

(Delivered in the House of Commons, October 18th, 1796).

AFTER the unanimous vote which the House gave upon the first day of the session, and their general concurrence in that part of the address which respects a foreign invasion, it would be doing injustice to the feelings which were then expressed, were I to make any apology for calling their attention to the subject on the present occasion. I shall not detain them therefore a single moment in showing the propriety of laying before them at so early a period the measures which I mean this day to propose. It is equally our duty and our interest by every means in our power, and by every exertion of which we are capable, if possible, in the language of the address, to preclude the attempt, and at the same time to take such measures of defence as shall cause the invasion, if it should be attempted, to issue in the confusion and ruin of the enemy. I shall not at present go much at large into the detail of preparations, but merely suggest a general outline of defence, which, if it should be approved of by the committee, may be particularly discussed when the bills are afterwards brought in upon the resolutions. The general considerations are few and obvious. The natural defence of this kingdom, in case of invasion, is certainly its naval force. This presents a formidable barrier, in whatever point the enemy may direct their attack. In this department, however, little now remains to be done, our fleet at this moment being more respectable and more formidable than ever it was at any other period in the history of the country. But strong and powerful even as it at present is, it is capable of considerable increase, could an additional supply of seamen, or even landsmen, who in a very short time might be trained to an adequate knowledge of the naval service, be procured. For this purpose I would suggest a levy upon the different parishes throughout the kingdom—an expedient precisely similar to that which was practised with so much success nearly two years ago. This levy, however, I would not confine as a mode of supply for the sea service. It is certainly of the highest importance both for the internal defence of the country and the security of our foreign possessions, that all the old regiments should be complete. But every one must be sensible, that from the numbers in those regiments who have fallen a sacrifice to sickness and the fortune of war, a more expeditious method must be adopted for their completion, than the ordinary mode of recruiting supplies, in order that the country may be able to avail itself of this arm of strength. I would propose, therefore,

in the first place, a levy of fifteen thousand men from the different parishes for the sea service, and for recruiting the regiments of the line. The committee, however, must be sensible when a plan of invasion is in agitation—a scheme, which almost at another time would not have been conceived, and an attempt, which, by any other enemy than that with whom we have now to contend, might have been justly deemed impracticable—that a more enlarged and a more expensive plan of prevention and of defence is necessary.

In digesting this plan there are two considerations of which we ought not to lose sight. The first is the means (which must not be altogether new) of calling together a land force, sufficiently strong to frustrate the attempt, keeping our naval force entirely out of view; and secondly, to adopt such measures in raising this force as shall not materially interfere with the industry, the agriculture and the commerce of the country. It will be for the house to decide upon the degree to which the former consideration ought to be permitted to interfere with the latter. A primary object will be to raise, and gradually to train, such a force as may in a short time be fit for service. Of all the modes of attaining this object, there is none so expeditious, so effectual, and attended with so little expense, as that of raising a supplemental levy of militia, to be grafted upon the present establishment. I should propose that this supplement shall consist of sixty thousand men, not to be immediately called out, but to be enrolled, officered and gradually trained, so as to be fit for service at a time of danger. The best mode of training them without withdrawing too many at one time from their regular pursuits, will be to embody one-sixth part in regular succession, each to be trained for twenty days, in the course of which they may become tolerable proficient in the military exercise. With respect to the mode of conducting the levy, the returns that have been lately made from the different counties show the present levies to be extremely disproportioned, and that the clause in the Act which provides against this abuse has never been executed. Accordingly we find that in some counties the proportion is one out of seven, and in others one out of three. It will be expedient therefore to regulate the future levy, not by the proportions now existing, but by a general estimate of the inhabitants who are able to bear arms.

The next consideration which merits attention, is the manner in which the troops are to be furnished, which I think ought to be generally from all parts of the kingdom, and that an obligation be imposed upon those who are balloted, either to serve in person, or to provide a substitute; and the better to preserve the general proportion, that this substitute be provided either from the parish in which the person balloted resides, or from a parish immediately adjoining. It will be proper also to remove

the present exemption from those who have more than one child, on the express condition that they shall not be called upon to serve out of the parish in which they live. The mode of training only one-sixth part of the whole, twenty days in succession, as it will only withdraw ten thousand at a time from their usual occupations, consequently will not much infringe upon the general order of the community. Of course they must be provided with some sort of uniform, but it will be of the coarsest kind, and such as may be purchased at a small expense. A sufficient number of arms will also be in readiness for supplying each man in the moment of danger.

Another measure which I would suggest to the committee, is to provide a considerable force of irregular cavalry. The regular cavalry on the present establishment is certainly by no means inconsiderable, and the yeomanry cavalry, which from their numbers are sufficiently respectable, we have found to be highly useful in securing the quiet and maintaining the internal tranquillity of the country. But with a view to repelling an invasion, the more that this species of force is extended, the greater advantage is likely to accrue from it, as an invading enemy, who must be destitute of horses, can have no means to meet it upon equal terms. Besides, it is a species of force which may be provided in a mode that will be attended with almost no expense to the public, and with little hardship to individuals. In order to calculate the extent to which these irregular cavalry may be raised, it is necessary to estimate the number of horses which are kept for pleasure throughout the kingdom, and by raising the levy in this proportion we shall have the satisfaction to think that it will fall upon those only who have a considerable stake to defend. By the produce of the tax, which is as good a criterion as any, of the number of horses kept for pleasure, we find that in Scotland, England and Wales, they amount to about two hundred thousand, one hundred and twenty thousand of which belong to persons who keep only one horse of the kind, the rest to persons, some of whom keep ten, and various other proportions. It certainly would not be a very severe regulation when compared with the object meant to be accomplished, to require one-tenth of these horses for the public service. I would therefore propose that every person who keeps ten horses, shall be obliged to furnish one horse and a horseman to serve in a corps of cavalry ;—that every person who keeps more than ten horses, and a number falling short of twenty, after furnishing a horse and horseman, for the first ten, shall subscribe a proportionate sum for the rest, which shall be applied to defray the general expense ;—that those who keep twenty shall furnish two, three of thirty, &c., and that those who keep fewer than ten shall form themselves into a class, when it shall

be decided by ballot, who at the common expense shall furnish the horse and the horseman. These troops thus raised will be provided with uniform and accoutrements, formed into corps, and put under proper officers. And surely when the means are compared with the object to be attained and the expense to which individuals will be subjected, with the security of the property which they possess, no one will complain that that end or that security is purchased at too dear a price.

There is still another resource which, though it may not appear so serious as those which have been already mentioned, ought not to be neglected. Upon the supposition of an invasion, it would certainly be of no small importance to form bodies of men, who, from their dexterity in using fire-arms, might be highly useful in harassing the operations of the enemy. The employment of such men for the purpose of defending the country, and harassing the enemy in case of an invasion, must be attended with the most serious and important consequences. Gentlemen will naturally guess that I am now alluding to that description of men called gamekeepers, and to others of the same class. I do most certainly allude to them, for there are many whose personal services would be of the utmost advantage. But I also, and more particularly, allude to those instances where gentlemen are gamekeepers for their own amusement, where they are gamekeepers merely for the satisfaction of being so, not gamekeepers of necessity but of choice ; in such cases there can be no hardship in obliging those gentlemen, if we cannot have their personal services, at least to find a substitute, who may be as well calculated to defend the country as themselves. I do therefore propose, that those persons who shall have taken out licences to shoot game, or deputations for gamekeepers, shall, within a certain period, be at liberty to return the same if they think proper ; but if after that period they shall continue their licences or deputations for gamekeepers, then they shall be obliged to find substitutes. I observe gentlemen smiling at the idea of raising a force by such means, but that smile will be converted into surprise, when they hear that the number of persons who have taken out those licences, are no fewer than 7,000. Such a plan cannot be considered as a means of internal defence likely to be approved of by every person in the country.

I have stated to the committee the general outline of the bill. I shall defer saying much more on the subject ; it will be more satisfactory to speak particularly when the resolution is reported to the house, than to enter into any further detail at this moment. The number of cavalry which I propose to raise in the manner I have mentioned will be 20,000 ; but with respect to whether there must not be some other additional mode adopted, it is impossible to say exactly, from not being able to

ascertain with certainty how many persons it may be necessary to exempt, on account of their being in orders, or for other reasons. Thus have I pointed out the means by which I propose to raise 15,000 men, to be divided between the sea and the land service, to raise the supplemental levy of 60,000 for the militia, of which one-sixth part is to be forthwith called out to exercise ; to raise 20,000 men by means of persons taking out the licences to shoot game and keep gamekeepers, or on such other persons as may hereafter be deemed necessary. If the propositions I have mentioned should be approved, I should wish the resolutions to be printed, and if immediately, to introduce the bill, to carry it on to a committee, and to fill up the blanks, and then to allow an interval of a week for its discussion. I mention this in order that more time should not be taken up than is absolutely necessary for the due examination of the principles of the bill ; since, gentlemen, you cannot but recollect, when you are once satisfied, and have determined upon the propriety of any particular measure, every day, every hour of delay, is attended with additional danger.

MAXIMILIEN MARIE ISIDORE ROBESPIERRE

(1758-1794).

WITHOUT Danton's audacity or Mirabeau's brilliancy in impromptu speaking, Robespierre exceeded them both in tense, intellectual activity. As an orator, he is remarkable among all the speakers of the French Revolution because of his mastery of the method of Rousseau—the attempt to grasp abstract truth as an entity and apply it as a guiding principle in politics. In his earlier speeches, Robespierre shows a mind sincere and patriotic, if narrow and suspicious. Under the strain of the great and terrible events with which he was connected, without being able to control or even to direct them, his intellect ceased to be normal in its operations. He remained logical at the expense of his reason; and finally he became one of the most formidable of many formidable madmen, ready to sacrifice to their objects, not only their opponents, but themselves.

Mirabeau judged Robespierre correctly in saying of him: "This man will go far. He believes what he says." As a young enthusiast he believed in liberty, justice, and a future of increasing happiness for the world, to be attained by the overthrow of tyranny. As a Terrorist, he attempted to re-establish "the worship of the Supreme Being," and after he had made up his mind that he would inevitably be guillotined, he spent his leisure time taking long walks in the woods and fields around Paris, reading Young's poems and meditating on the meaning of nature and of life. He was the most dangerous of all fanatics—an idealist, who to achieve his purpose had adopted the most criminal methods of those whose oppressive systems he condemned. He was born at Arras, May 6th, 1758, and educated as an advocate, but at thirty-one years of age he entered politics as a member of the Third Estate in the States-General (1789), and during the remaining five years of his life so divested himself of all restraining influences that the terror inspired by his name made it impossible for his generation to judge either his motives or his achievements by any standard which did not presuppose his condemnation before the evidence was heard. When on July 28th, 1794, he went to the guillotine, he left a world in which he was universally execrated.

AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(Delivered in the French Constituent Assembly, May 30th, 1791).

THE news having been brought to Athens that Athenian citizens had been sentenced to death in the town of Argos, the people hastened to the temples to implore the gods to divert the Athenians from thoughts so cruel and so baleful. I come to urge, not the gods, but the legislators, who should be the organ and the interpreters of the eternal laws the Divinity has dictated to men, to strike from the French code the laws of blood, which command judicial murder,—which are repugnant to their habits and to their new Constitution. I will prove to them: Firstly, that the death penalty is essentially unjust; secondly, that it is not the most repressive of punishments, and that it increases crimes much more than it prevents them.

Outside of civil society, let an inveterate enemy attempt to take my life, or, twenty times repulsed, let him again return to devastate the field my hands have cultivated. Inasmuch as I can only oppose my individual strength to his, I must perish or I must kill him, and the law of natural defence justifies and approves me. But in society, when the strength of all is armed against one single individual, what principle of justice can authorize it to put him to death? What necessity can there be to absolve it? A conqueror who causes the death of his captive enemies is called a barbarian! A man who causes a child that he can disarm and punish, to be strangled, appears to us a monster! A prisoner that society convicts is at the utmost to that society but a vanquished, powerless, and harmless enemy. He is before it weaker than a child before a full-grown man.

Therefore, in the eyes of truth and justice, these death scenes which it orders with so much preparation are but cowardly assassinations,—solemn crimes committed, not by individuals, but by entire nations, with due legal forms. However cruel, however extravagant these laws may be, be not astonished. They are the handiwork of a few tyrants; they are the chains with which they load down humankind; they are the arms with which they subjugate them! They were written in blood! "It is not permitted to put to death a Roman citizen"—this was the law that the people had adopted; but Sylla conquered and said: "All those who have borne arms against me deserve death." Octavius, and the companions of his misdeeds, confirmed this law.

Under Tiberius, to have praised Brutus was a crime worthy of death. Caligula sentenced to death those who were sacrilegious enough to

undress before the image of the Emperor. When tyranny had invented the crimes of *lèse-majesté* (which might be either trivial acts, or heroic deeds), he who should have dared to think that they could merit a lighter penalty than death would himself have been held guilty of *lèse-majesté*.

When fanaticism, born of the monstrous union of ignorance and despotism, in its turn invented the crimes of *lèse-majesté* against God,—when it thought, in its frenzy, to avenge God himself,—was it not obliged to offer him blood and to place him on the level of the monsters who called themselves his images? The death penalty is necessary, say the partisans of antiquated and barbarous routine! Without it there is no restraint strong enough against crime. Who has told you so? Have you reckoned with all the springs through which penal laws can act upon human sensibility? Alas! before death how much physical and moral suffering cannot man endure!

The wish to live gives way to pride, the most imperious of all the passions which dominate the heart of man. The most terrible punishment for social man is opprobrium; it is the overwhelming evidence of public execration. When the legislator can strike the citizens in so many places and in so many ways, how can he believe himself reduced to employ the death penalty? Punishments are not made to torture the guilty, but to prevent crime from fear of incurring them.

The legislator who prefers death and atrocious punishments to the mildest means within his power outrages public delicacy, and deadens the moral sentiment of the people he governs, in a way similar to that in which an awkward teacher brutalizes and degrades the mind of his pupil by the frequency of cruel chastisements. In the end, he wears and weakens the springs of government, in trying to bend them with greater force.

The legislator who establishes such a penalty renounces the wholesome principle that the most efficacious method of repressing crimes is to adapt the punishments to the character of the various passions which produce them, and to punish them, so to speak, by their own selves. He confounds all ideas, he disturbs all connections, and opposes openly the object of all penal laws.

The penalty of death is necessary, you say? If such is the case, why have several nations been able to do without it? By what fatality have these nations been the wisest, the happiest, and the freest? If the death penalty is the proper way to prevent great crimes, it must then be that they were rarer with these people who have adopted and extended it. Now, the contrary is exactly the case. See Japan; nowhere are the death penalty and extreme punishments so frequent; nowhere are crimes so frequent and atrocious. It is as if the Japanese

tried to dispute in ferocity the barbarous laws which outrage and irritate them. The republics of Greece, where punishments were moderate, where the death penalty was either very rare or absolutely unknown,—did they produce more crimes or less virtues than the countries governed by the laws of blood? Do you believe that Rome was more disgraced by heinous crimes, when, in the days of her glory, the Porcian law had abolished the severe punishments applied by the kings and by the decemvirs, than she was under Sylla who had revived them, and under the emperors who exerted their rigour to a degree in keeping with their infamous tyranny? Has Russia suffered any upheaval since the despot who governs her suppressed entirely the death penalty, as if he wished to expiate by that act of humanity and philosophy the crime of keeping millions of men under the yoke of absolute power?

Listen to the voice of justice and of reason; it cries to us that human judgments are never certain enough to warrant society in giving death to a man convicted by other men liable to error. Had you imagined the most perfect judicial system; had you found the most upright and enlightened judges, there will always remain some room for error or prejudice. Why interdict to yourselves the means of reparation? Why condemn yourself to powerlessness to help oppressed innocence? What good can come of the sterile regrets, these illusory reparations you grant to a vain shade, to insensible ashes? They are the sad testimonials of the barbarous temerity of your penal laws. To rob the man of the possibility of expiating his crime by his repentance or by acts of virtue; to close to him without mercy every return towards a proper life, and his own esteem; to hasten his descent, as it were, into the grave still covered with the recent blotch of his crime, is in my eyes the most horrible refinement of cruelty.

The first duty of the lawmaker is to form and to conserve public morals, as the source of all liberty, the source of all social happiness. When, to attain some special aim, he loses sight of this general and essential object, he commits the grossest and most fatal of errors. Therefore the laws must ever present to the people the purest model of justice and of reason. If, in lieu of this puissant severity, of this moderate calmness which should characterize them, they replace it by anger and vengeance; if they cause human blood to flow which they can prevent—which they have no right to spill; if they exhibit to the eyes of the people cruel scenes and corpses bruised by tortures,—then they change in the hearts of the citizens all ideas of the just and of the unjust; they cause to germinate in the bosom of society ferocious prejudices which in their turn again produce others. Man is no longer for man an object so sacred as before. One has a lower idea of his dignity when public authority

makes light of his life. The idea of the murder fills us with less horror when the law itself sets the example and provides the spectacle ; the horror of the crime diminishes from the time law no longer punishes it except by another crime. Have a care not to confound the efficacy of punishment with excess of severity ; the one is absolutely opposed to the other. Everything favours moderate laws ; everything conspires against cruel laws. It has been remarked that in free countries crimes are of rarer occurrence and the penal laws lighter ; all ideas are linked together. Free countries are those in which the rights of man are respected, and where, consequently, the laws are just. Where they offend humanity by an excess of rigour, it is a proof that there the dignity of man is not known and that the dignity of the citizen does not exist. It is a proof that the legislator is but a master who commands slaves and punishes them mercilessly according to his whim.

“ IF GOD DID NOT EXIST, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
INVENT HIM ”

(Delivered at the Jacobin Club, Paris, November 21st, 1793).

LET men, animated by pure zeal, lay on the altar of their country the useless and pompous monuments of superstition. Let others renounce such ceremonies, and adopt on all matters the opinion which seems to them most conformable with true reason. Philosophy can only applaud their conduct. But by what title does hypocrisy come here to mingle with that of civism and virtue ? What right have men, hitherto unknown in the Revolution, to come into the midst of you, to seek in passing events false popularity, to hurry on patriots to fatal measures, and to throw among them the seeds of trouble and discord ? By what right do they disturb the existing worship in the name of liberty, and attack fanaticism by fanaticism of another kind ? By what right will they degrade the solemn homage rendered to truth into an eternal and ridiculous farce ? One would suppose the convention had proscribed the Catholic faith : it has done no such thing. It has, on the contrary, by a solemn decree, established the liberty of worship. It will alike proscribe the ministers of religion who disturb and protect those who respect the public peace. It is the Royalist, not the Catholic priesthood whom it has with justice persecuted. We have heard of priests being

cenounced for having said Mass ; they will only say it the more for being disturbed : whoso would prevent them is a greater fanatic than he who says the Mass. There are men who would go further ; who, under the guise of destroying superstition, would establish atheism itself. Every philosopher, every individual, is at liberty to adopt whatever opinion he pleases, but the legislator would be a thousand times blameable who adopted such a system. The convention abhors all such attempts ; it is no maker of metaphysical theories : it is a popular body, whose mission is to cause, not only the rights, but the character of the French people to be respected. Not in vain has it proclaimed the rights of man in the presence of the Supreme Being.

They will say, perhaps, that I am prejudiced, that I am a man of narrow mind, that I am a fanatic. I have already said that I do not here speak as an individual, nor as a systematic philosopher, but a representative of the people. Atheism is aristocratic. The idea of a Supreme Being, who watches over oppressed innocence, and punishes triumphant crime, is altogether popular. The people, the unfortunate, will always applaud me ; I shall find detractors only among the rich and the guilty. I have from my youth upwards been but an indifferent Catholic, but I have never been a cold friend, or a faithless defender of humanity. I am even more strongly attached to moral than political truth. If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him. I speak here in a tribune where the impudent Guadet dared to accuse me of having pronounced the word " Providence," as if that were a crime. And when ? When my heart was ulcerated with all the crimes of which we were the witnesses and the victims,—when shedding bitter, powerless tears on the misery of the people, eternally betrayed, eternally oppressed, I endeavoured to raise myself above the crowd of impure conspirators who environed me, and invoked against them celestial vengeance, in default of the thunder of the people ! And if every tyranny should reappear amongst us, where is the energetic and virtuous soul that would not appeal in secret to that eternal justice which seems to have been written in all hearts ? It seems to me that the last martyr of liberty would exhale his soul with a more tender sentiment relying on that consoling idea. This sentiment is the sentiment of Europe, of the Universe ; it is that of the French people. The people is not attached, either to priests, or to superstition ; it is only attached to the idea of an incomprehensible power, the terror of crime, the support of virtue, to whom it is pleased to render those homages which are due to it, and which are so many anathemas against injustice and triumphant crime !

HIS DEFENCE OF TERRORISM

(Address to the French Convention, February 5th, 1794).

AFTER having marched for a long time at hazard, and, as it were, carried away by the movement of contrary factions, the representatives of the people have at last formed a government. A sudden change in the nation's fortune announced to Europe the regeneration which had been operated in the national representation ; but up to this moment we must admit that we have been rather guided in these stormy circumstances by the love of good, and by a sense of the country's wants, than by any exact theory or precise rules of conduct.

It is time to distinguish clearly the aim of the Revolution and the term to which we would arrive. It is time for us to render account to ourselves, both of the obstacles which still keep us from that aim, and of the means which we ought to take to attain it.

What is the aim to which we tend ?

The peaceful enjoyment of liberty and equality ; the reign of that eternal justice, of which the laws have been engraved, not upon marble, but upon the hearts of all mankind—even in the hearts of the slaves who forget them, or of the tyrants who have denied them ! We desire a state of things, wherein all base and cruel passions shall be enchained, all generous and beneficent passions awakened by the laws ; wherein ambition should be the desire of glory, and glory the desire of serving the country ; wherein distinctions should arise but from equality itself ; wherein the citizen should submit to the magistrate, the magistrate to the people, and the people to justice ; wherein the country assures the welfare of every individual ; wherein every individual enjoys with pride the prosperity and the glory of his country ; wherein all minds are enlarged by the continual communication of republican sentiments, and by the desire of meriting the esteem of a great people ; wherein arts should be the decorations of that liberty which they ennoble, and commerce the source of public wealth, and not the monstrous opulence of some few houses. We desire to substitute morality for egotism, probity for honour, principles for usages, duties for functions, the empire of reason for the tyranny of fashions, the scorn of vice for the scorn of misfortune, pride for insolence, greatness of soul for vanity, the love of glory for the love of money, good citizens for good society, merit for intrigue, genius for cleverness, truth for splendour, the charm of happiness

for the *ennui* of voluptuousness, the grandeur of man for the pettiness of the great, a magnanimous people, powerful, happy, for a people amiable, frivolous, and miserable ; that is to say, all the virtues and all the miracles of a republic for all the vices and all the follies of a monarchy.

What is the nature of the government which can realize these prodigies ? The democratic, or republican government.

Democracy is that state in which the people, guided by laws which are its own work, executes for itself all that it can well do, and, by its delegates, all that it cannot do itself. But to found and consolidate democracy, we must first end the war of liberty against tyranny, and traverse the storm of the Revolution. Such is the aim of the revolutionary system which you have organized ; you ought, therefore, to regulate your conduct by the circumstances in which the republic finds itself ; and the plan of your administration ought to be the result of the spirit of revolutionary government, combined with the general principles of democracy.

The great purity of the French Revolution, the sublimity even of its object, is precisely that which makes our force and our weakness. Our force, because it gives us the ascendancy of truth over imposture, and the rights of public interest over private interest. Our weakness, because it rallies against us all the vicious ; all those who in their hearts meditate the robbery of the people ; all those who, having robbed them, seek impunity ; all those who have rejected liberty as a personal calamity ; and those who have embraced the Revolution as a trade, and the republic as a prey. Hence the defection of so many ambitious men, who have abandoned us on our route, because they did not commence the journey to arrive at the same object as we did. We must crush both the interior and exterior enemies of the republic, or perish with her. And in this situation, the first maxim of your policy should be to conduct the people by reason and the enemies of the people by terror. If the spring of popular government during peace is virtue, the spring of popular government in rebellion is at once both virtue and terror ; virtue, without which terror is fatal ! terror, without which virtue is powerless ! Terror is nothing else than justice, prompt, secure, and inflexible ! It is, therefore, an emanation of virtue ; it is less a particular principle than a consequence of the general principles of democracy, applied to the most urgent wants of the country.

It has been said that terror is the instrument of a despotic government. Does yours then resemble despotism ? Yes, as the sword which glitters in the hand of a hero of liberty resembles that with which the satellites of tyranny are armed ! The government of a revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny. Is force, then, only made

to protect crime? Is it not also made to strike those haughty heads which the lightning has doomed? Nature has imposed upon every being the law of self-preservation. Crime massacres innocence to reign, and innocence struggles with all its force in the hands of crime. Let tyranny but reign one day, and on the morrow there would not remain a single patriot. Until when will the fury of tyranny continue to be called justice, and the justice of the people barbarity and rebellion? How tender they are to oppressors,—how inexorable to the oppressed! Nevertheless, it is necessary that one or the other should succumb. Indulgence for the Royalist! exclaimed certain people. Pardon for wretches! No! Pardon for innocence, pardon for the weak, pardon for the unhappy, pardon for humanity!

DEMANDING THE KING'S DEATH

(Address to the French Convention, December 3rd, 1792).

WHAT is the conduct prescribed by sound policy to cement the republic? It is to engrave deeply into all hearts a contempt for royalty, and to strike terror into the partisans of the King. To place his crime before the world as a problem, his cause as the object of the most imposing discussion that ever existed, to place an immeasurable space between the memory of what he was and the title of a citizen, is the very way to make him most dangerous to liberty. Louis XVI. was King, and the republic is established. The question is solved by this single fact. Louis is dethroned by his crimes, he conspired against the republic; either he is condemned or the republic is not acquitted. To propose the trial of Louis XVI. is to question the Revolution. If he may be tried, he may be acquitted; if he may be acquitted, he may be innocent. But, if he be innocent, what becomes of the Revolution? If he be innocent, what are we but his calumniators? The coalition is just; his imprisonment is a crime; all the patriots are guilty; and the great cause which for so many centuries has been debated between crime and virtue, between liberty and tyranny, is finally decided in favour of crime and despotism!

Citizens, beware! you are misled by false notions. The majestic movements of a great people, the sublime impulses of virtue present themselves as the eruption of a volcano, and as the overthrow of political society. When a nation is forced to recur to the right of insurrection, it returns to its original state. How can the tyrant appeal to the social

compact? He has destroyed it! What laws replace it? Those of nature: the people's safety. The right to punish the tyrant or to dethrone him is the same thing. Insurrection is the trial of the tyrant—his sentence is his fall from power; his punishment is exacted by the liberty of the people. The people dart their thunderbolts, that is, their sentence; they do not condemn kings, they suppress them—thrust them back again into nothingness. In what republic was the right of punishing a tyrant ever deemed a question? Was Tarquin tried? What would have been said in Rome if any one had undertaken his defence? Yet we demand advocates for Louis! They hope to gain the cause; otherwise we are only acting an absurd farce in the face of Europe. And we dare to talk of a republic! Ah! we are so pitiful for oppressors because we are pitiless towards the oppressed!

Two months since, and who would have imagined there could be a question here of the inviolability of kings? Yet to-day a member of the National Convention, Citizen Pétion, brings the question before you as though it were one for serious deliberation! O crime! O shame! The tribune of the French people has echoed the panegyric of Louis XVI. Louis combats us from the depths of his prison, and you ask if he be guilty, and if he may be treated as an enemy. Will you allow the Constitution to be invoked in his favour? If so, the Constitution condemns you; it forbids you to overturn it. Go, then, to the feet of the tyrant and implore his pardon and clemency.

But there is another difficulty,—to what punishment shall we condemn him? The punishment of death is too cruel, says one. No, says another, life is more cruel still, and we must condemn him to live. Advocates, is it from pity or from cruelty you wish to annul the punishment of crimes? For myself I abhor the penalty of death; I neither love nor hate Louis; I hate nothing but his crimes. I demanded the abolition of capital punishment in the Constituent Assembly, and it is not my fault if the first principles of reason have appeared moral and judicial heresies. But you who never thought this mercy should be exercised in favour of those whose offences are pardonable, by what fatality are you reminded of your humanity to plead the cause of the greatest of criminals? You ask an exception from the punishment of death for him who alone could render it legitimate! A dethroned King in the very heart of a republic not yet cemented! A King whose very name draws foreign war on the nation! Neither prison nor exile can make his an innocent existence. It is with regret I pronounce the fatal truth! Louis must perish rather than a hundred thousand virtuous citizens! Louis must perish because our country must live!

RICHARD BRINSLEY SHERIDAN

(1751-1816).

BORN at Dublin, September 30th, 1751, Sheridan went to Harrow for his schooling and settled in London when only twenty-two years of age. Three years later (1776) he became interested with Garrick in the Drury Lane Theatre, of which he was afterwards the sole proprietor. Here appeared 'The School for Scandal,' and other plays which made him not less celebrated as a dramatist than he afterwards became as an orator. He was elected to Parliament in 1780 and remained in it until 1812, with intervals of service in executive places under Whig administrations. He was Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1782, Secretary of the Treasury in 1783, and Treasurer of the Navy in 1806. His greatest political achievement was the part he took in the prosecution of Hastings, but he was constantly active, and his utterances on the side of Liberalism had a marked influence on his times. He died July 7th, 1816. It is said that "Burke, in spite of his gorgeous periods, was often coughed down; while Pitt wearied his hearers by his starch and mannerisms, and Fox tired them by his repetitions; but Sheridan won his way by a sort of fascination"—due, no doubt, to the playwright's habit of sympathy with the intellectual weaknesses as well as with the strength of his audiences. Perhaps it was this habit of not being too deep or too severe which commended him to Moore as—

"The orator, dramatist, minstrel who ran
Through each mode of the lyre and was master of all;
Whose mind was an essence compounded with art
From the finest and best of all other men's powers,
Who ruled like a wizard the world of the heart
And could call up its sunshine or bring down its showers!"

ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

(From a Speech delivered in 1794).

THE noble lord's purpose is to prove that France began the war with Great Britain. This, he appears to think he has established the moment he has shown that Brissot and others have promulgated in print a great many foolish and a great many wicked general principles,

mischievous to all established governments. But what was the sum of all that the noble lord told the House? What did it all prove? What, but that eternal and unalterable truth, that a long-established despotism so far degraded and debased human nature as to render its subjects, on the first recovery of their rights, unfit for the exercise of them; but never have I met, or will I meet, but with reprobation, that mode of argument which goes, in fact, to establish, as an inference from this truth, that those who have been long slaves ought, therefore, to remain so forever.

It is contended that the present state of things in France cannot stand. Without disputing any of his premises, for the present, I will grant the noble lord, not only his principle, but the foundation upon which he builds it. I agree with him, that it is contrary to the eternal and unalterable laws of nature, and to the decrees of the Maker of man and of nations, that a government, founded on and maintained by injustice, rapine, murder, and atheism, can have a fixed endurance or a permanent success; that there are, self-sown in its own bosom, the seeds of its own inevitable dissolution. But, if so, whence is our mission to become the destroying angel to guide and hasten the anger of the Deity? Who calls on us to offer, with more than mortal arrogance, the alliance of a mortal arm to the Omnipotent? Or to snatch the uplifted thunder from his hand, and point our erring aim at the devoted fabric which his original will has fated to fall and crumble in that ruin which it is not in the means of man to accelerate or prevent? I concede to the noble lord the piety of his principle: let him concede to me the justice of my conclusion; or let him attend to experience, if not to reason: and must he not admit that hitherto all the attempts of his apparently powerful, but certainly presumptuous, crusade of vengeance, have appeared unfavoured by fortune and by Providence; that they have hitherto had no other effect than to strengthen the powers, to whet the rapacity, to harden the heart, to inflame the fury, and to augment the crimes of that government and that people whom we have rashly sworn to subdue, to chastise, and to reform?

THE PRUSSIAN SUBSIDY

(Delivered February 5th, 1795).

UPON a former occasion another honourable gentleman had endeavoured to get some information of the services performed by the King of Prussia during the last campaign, in consequence of his engagements with this country. Some returns had lately been laid on the

table on that subject, but these contained no information. It appeared that the King of Prussia had received from this country the enormous sum of twelve hundred thousand pounds, without having rendered it even the smallest service. He thought it therefore necessary, previous to the discussion of the imperial loan, to come to some resolution with respect to this conduct on the part of His Prussian Majesty. It was certainly no argument against granting a loan to the Emperor, that the King of Prussia had violated his faith. But this circumstance ought certainly to enforce on the House the necessity of caution, and induce them to take some step in the present instance that might operate as a warning, with respect to future transactions of the same sort. His Majesty had stated in his message that he had received from the Emperor the strongest assurances of a disposition to make the greatest exertions, provided he should be assisted by a loan of four millions from this country. He understood, if he could rely upon the credit of public statements, that in another country the Parliament had been told of the absolute determination of His Majesty to guarantee this loan. This was a language which he considered as very unbecoming, when addressed to the representatives of the nation, and as highly improper in Ministers, who were of course responsible for whatever proceeded from the Throne. Before such a determination had been expressed, he should have wished to have had something also like a positive determination from His Imperial Majesty to make the exertions which were to be the conditions of the loan. He should more particularly have wished for such a declaration from the Imperial Court, which had, at all times, been proverbially distinguished by ill-faith. He recollected on this subject a strong expression of a right honourable gentleman (we suppose Mr. Windham), who said, that since the capture of Richard I., the conduct of the Court of Vienna had been marked by a uniform series of treachery towards this country. To guard against this treachery, he thought that nothing would be better than for the House of Commons to show themselves alive to their duty on the present occasion. There were some men who, though insensible to the calls of honour, were yet not callous to the sense of shame. Some men of that description might be found among the ministers of Austria. It might, therefore, be of importance, by way of warning to them, to come to some resolution, expressive of indignation and contempt, with respect to the violation of faith on the part of His Prussian Majesty. Mr. Sheridan here referred to that article of the treaty in which it was stipulated that sixty thousand Prussians should co-operate with the British troops, and that a commissioner should be appointed for the purpose of watching over the observance of this article. From the scraps of letters laid upon the table, it appeared that no commissioner had been appointed for this purpose. This, he

contended, would not have been the case, except Ministers had been aware that the King of Prussia, from the very first, was indisposed to perform his duty. He referred also to the memorial of the Emperor, which stated that the effective co-operation of the Prussians might have been the means of saving Brabant, and, in consequence, of preserving Holland. Such were the effects stated by His Imperial Majesty to have resulted from the breach of faith in His Prussian Majesty. In his answer to this memorial, addressed to the circles of the Empire, that monarch shows a degree of apprehension, that he should have even been supposed to have had the smallest disposition to keep faith towards this country after he had once received its money. He should therefore conclude with moving this resolution—‘That it appears to this House, that the King of Prussia received from the treasury of Great Britain the sum of £1,200,000 in consequence of the stipulations of the treaty concluded at the Hague, on the 10th of April, 1794; and that it does not appear to this House, that the King of Prussia performed the stipulation of that treaty.’

PATRIOTISM AND PERQUISITES

(Delivered in 1794).

IS this a time for selfish intrigues, and the little dirty traffic for lucre and emolument? Does it suit the honour of a gentleman to ask at such a moment? Does it become the honesty of a minister to grant? What! in such an hour as this,—at a moment pregnant with the national fate, when, pressing as the exigency may be, the hard task of squeezing the money from the pockets of an impoverished people, from the toil, the drudgery of the shivering poor, must make the most practised collector’s heart ache while he tears it from them,—can it be that people of high rank, and professing high principles,—that they or their families should seek to thrive on the spoils of misery, and fatten on the meals wrested from industrious poverty? Oh, shame! shame! Is it intended to confirm the pernicious doctrine, so industriously propagated, that all public men are impostors and that every politician has his price? Or, even where there is no principle in the bosom, why does not prudence hint to the mercenary and the vain to abstain a while, at least, and wait

the fitting of the times? Improvident impatience! Nay, even from those who seem to have no direct object of office or profit, what is the language which their actions speak?

“The Throne is in danger! we will support the Throne; but let us share the smiles of royalty!” “The order of nobility is in danger! I will fight for nobility,” says the Viscount; “but my zeal would be greater if I were made an Earl!” “Rouse all the Marquis within me,” exclaims the Earl, “and the Peerage never turned forth a more undaunted champion in its cause than I shall prove!” “Stain my green ribbon blue,” cries out the illustrious Knight, “and the fountain of honour will have a fast and faithful servant!”

What are the people to think of our sincerity? What credit are they to give to our professions? Is this system to be persevered in? Is there nothing that whispers to that right honourable gentleman that the crisis is too big, that the times are too gigantic, to be ruled by the little hackneyed and every-day means of ordinary corruption? Or, are we to believe that he has within himself a conscious feeling that disqualifies him from rebuking the ill-timed selfishness of his new allies? Let him take care that the corruptions of the Government shall not have lost it the public heart; that the example of selfishness in the few has not extinguished public spirit in the many!

GENERAL JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS

(1870-).

THE famous soldier, statesman, and orator, was born in 1870, and educated first at Victoria College, Stellenbosch ; and finally at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he took a Double First in the Law Tripos. Smuts returned to South Africa after taking his degree and practised with distinction at the Cape Town Bar. In 1896 he became State Attorney at Johannesburg. On the outbreak of the Boer War, he took up arms and quickly showed himself to be like Grant, Washington, and Cromwell, a born soldier and leader of men. This was proved by his success against professional soldiers during the period of his chief command in Cape Colony during the year 1901.

The war ended and the Peace Conference took place in 1902. The establishment of the Union of South Africa was consummated in May, 1910, with Botha Prime Minister, and Smuts Colonial Secretary.

When Germany declared war on the world in 1914, General Smuts again proved his devotion to the ideals of democracy by ranging himself against the Prussian autocrats on the side of liberty. During 1916 he commanded the Imperial troops in British East Africa with consistent success.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

(Lieutenant-General SMUTS and Sir ROBERT BORDEN were the chief guests at a Luncheon at the House of Commons given on April 2nd, 1917, by the Empire Parliamentary Association to the Overseas Ministers attending the Imperial War Conference).

EVER since I arrived in this country, about two months ago, I have received nothing but the most profound and charming kindness and hospitality, which has culminated in this unique banquet to-night. I appreciate it all the more because I know it is given at a time when the greatest storm in the world's history is raging, and when nobody in this country or great city feels inclined to indulge in any festivities or banquets. When I return home I shall be able to tell the people of South Africa that I have been received by you not as a

guest, not as a stranger, but simply as one of yourselves. Speaking with a somewhat different accent, and laying a different emphasis on many things, as no doubt becomes a barbarian from the outer marches of the Empire—and one whose mind is not yet deeply furrowed with trenches and dug-outs—I would like first of all to say how profoundly thankful I am to Lord French for the words which have fallen from his lips. Your expressions in regard to myself are largely, I feel, undeserved. At any rate, I accept them as coming from an old opponent and comrade in arms. I know they are meant in the best spirit, and I accept them as such.

Your words recall to my mind many an incident of those stirring times when we were opposing commanders in the Boer War. I may refer to two. On one occasion I was surrounded by Lord French and was practically face to face with disaster. Nothing was left me but, by the most diligent scouting, to find a way out. I ventured into a place which bore the very appropriate name of Murderers' Gap, and I was the only man who came out alive. One account of that stated that one Boer escaped, but he probably had so many bullets in him that he would be no further danger. I survived to be your guest to-night. Two days after I broke through—blessed words in these times,—and on a very dark night, I came to a railway, which I was just on the point of crossing, when we heard a train. Some of us felt inclined to wreck and capture that train, but for some reason or other I said, "No, let it pass." You can imagine my feelings when some time afterwards I learned that the only freight on that train was Sir John French with one or two A.D.C.'s, moving round from one part of his front to another to find out how I had broken through. If I had not missed that chance he would have been my guest, no doubt very welcome, though no doubt embarrassing. Fate has willed otherwise. I am his guest.

Those were very difficult and strenuous days in which one learned many a valuable lesson, good for all life. One of those lessons was that under stress of great difficulty practically everything breaks down ultimately, and the only things that survive are really the simple human feelings of loyalty and comradeship to your fellows, and patriotism which can stand any strain and bear you through all difficulty and privation. We soldiers know the extraordinary value of these simple feelings, how far they go, and what strain they can bear, and how ultimately they support the whole weight of civilization. That war was carried on by both sides in a sportsmanlike spirit, and in a clean, chivalrous way, and out of that calamity has been produced the happy state of affairs that you see to-day in South Africa, and which led to a new basis on which to build the larger and happier South Africa which is arising to-day.

I am sure in the present great struggle now being waged you will see some cause leading to lasting results. Here you have from all parts of the British Empire young men gathering on the battlefields of Europe, and whilst your statesmen keep planning a great scheme of union for the future of the Empire my feeling is that very largely the work is already done. The spirit of comradeship has been born in this campaign on the battlefields of Europe, and many of the men from the various parts of the Empire will be far more powerful than any instrument of government that you can elect in the future. I feel sure that in after days, when our successors come to sum up what has happened and draw up a balance-sheet, there will be a good credit balance due to this common feeling of comradeship which will have been built up. Now once more, as many ages ago during the Roman Empire, the Germanic volcano is in eruption, and the whole world is shaking. No doubt in this great evolution you are faced in this country with the most difficult and enormous problems which any Government or people have ever been called upon to face—problems of world-wide strategy, of man-power, communications, food supply, of every imaginable kind and magnitude, so large that it is almost beyond the wit of man to solve them, and it is intelligible that where you have so many difficulties to face one forgets to keep before one's eye the situation as a whole. And yet that is very necessary.

It is most essential that even in this bitter struggle, even when Europe is looming so large before our eyes, we should keep before us the whole situation. We should see it steadily, and see it whole. I would ask you not to forget in these times the British Commonwealth of nations. Do not forget that larger world which is made up of all the nations that belong to the Empire. Bear in mind that after all Europe is not so large, and will not always continue to loom so large as at present. Even now in the struggle the pace of Europe is being permanently slowed down. Your Empire is spread all over the world, and even where the pace is slowed down in one portion it is accelerated in another, and you have to keep the whole before you in order to judge fairly and sanely of the factors which affect the whole.

I wish to say a few words to-night on this subject, because I think there is a tendency sometimes to forget certain aspects of the great questions with which we are now confronted. That is one of the reasons why I am glad the Imperial Conference was called at this time, apparently a very opportune moment, and yet the calling of this Conference at this time has already directed attention once more to that other aspect of the whole situation which is so important to us. Remember, it is not only Europe that we have to consider, but also the future of this great commonwealth to which we all belong. It is peculiarly situated ; it is scattered

over the whole world ; it is not a compact territory ; it is dependent for its very existence on world-wide communications, which must be maintained or this Empire goes to pieces. In the past thirty years you see what has happened. Everywhere upon your communications Germany has settled down ; everywhere upon your communications of the whole globe you will find a German colony here and there, and the day would have come when your Empire would have been in very great jeopardy from your lines of communication being cut.

Now, one of the by-products of this war has been that the whole world outside Europe has been cleared of the enemy. Germany has been swept from the seas, and from all continents except Central Europe. Whilst Germany has been gaining ground in Central Europe, from the rest of the world she has been swept clean ; and, therefore, you are now in this position—almost providentially brought to this position—that once more you can consider the problem of your future as a whole. When peace comes to be made you have all these parts in your hand, and you can go carefully into the question of what is necessary for your future security and your future safety as an Empire, and you can say, so far as it is possible under war circumstances, what you are going to keep and what you are going to give away.

That is a very important precedent. I hope when the time comes—I am speaking for myself, and expressing nobody's opinion but my own—I feel when the time comes for peace we should not bear only Central Europe in mind, but the whole British Empire. As far as we are concerned, we do not wish this war to have been fought in vain. We have not fought for material gain, or for territory ; we have fought for security in the future. If we attach any value to this group of nations which compose the British Empire, then we, in settling peace, will have to look carefully at our future safety and security, and I hope that will be done, and that no arrangement will be made which will jeopardise the very valuable and lasting results which have been attained.

That is the geographical question. There remains the other question—a very difficult question—of the future constitutional relations and readjustments in the British Empire. At a luncheon given recently by the Empire Parliamentary Association I said, rather cryptically, that I did not think this was a matter in which we should follow precedents, and I hope you will bear with me if I say a few words on that theme, and develop more fully what I meant. I think we are inclined to make mistakes in thinking about this group of nations to which we belong, because too often we think of it merely as one State. The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression " Empire " is misleading, because it makes people think as if we are one single entity,

one unity, to which that term " Empire " can be applied. We are not an Empire. Germany is an Empire, so was Rome, and so is India, but we are a system of nations, a community of states and of nations far greater than any empire which has ever existed ; and by using this ancient expression we really obscure the real fact that we are larger and that our whole position is different, and that we are not one nation, or state, or empire, but we are a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations and states, and all sorts of communities under one flag. We are a system of states, not only a static system, a stationary system, but a dynamic system, growing, evolving all the time towards new destinies.

Here you have a kingdom with a number of Crown colonies ; besides that you have large protectorates like Egypt, which is an empire in itself, which was one of the greatest empires in the world. Besides that you have great dependencies like India—an empire in itself, one of the oldest civilisations in the world, and we are busy there trying to see how East and West can work together, how the forces that have kept the East going can be worked in conjunction with the ideas we have evolved in Western civilisation for enormous problems within that State. But beyond that we come to the so-called Dominions, a number of nations and states almost sovereign, almost independent, who govern themselves, who have been evolved on the principles of your constitutional system, now almost independent states, and who all belong to this group, to this community of nations, which I prefer to call the British Commonwealth of nations. Now, you see that no political ideas that were evolved in the past, no nomenclature will apply to this world which is comprised in the British Empire ; any expression, any name which we have found so far for this group has been insufficient, and I think the man who would discover the real appropriate name for this vast system of entities would be doing a great service not only to this country, but to constitutional theory.

The question is, how are you going to provide for the future government of this group of nations ? It is an entirely new problem. If you want to see how great it is you must take the United States in comparison. There you find what is essential—one nation, not perhaps in the fullest sense, but more and more growing into one ; one big State, consisting of subordinate parts, but whatever the nomenclature of the United States Constitution, you have one national State, over one big, contiguous area. That is the problem presented by the United States, and for which they discovered this federal solution, which means subordinate governments for the subordinate parts, but one national Federal Parliament for the whole.

Compare with that state of facts this enormous system comprised in the British Empire of nations all over the world, some independent, living under diverse conditions, and all growing towards greater nations than they are at present. You can see at once that the solution which has been found practicable in the case of the United States probably never will work under our system. That is what I feel in all the empires of the past, and even in the United States—the effort has been towards forming one nation. All the empires that we have known in the past and that exist to-day are founded on the idea of assimilation, of trying to force different human material through one mould so as to form one nation. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardise the nations of the British Empire. You want to develop them into greater nationhood. These younger communities, the offspring of the Mother Country, or territories like that of my own people, which have been annexed after various vicissitudes of war—all these you want not to mould on any common pattern, but you want them to develop according to the principles of self-government and freedom and liberty. Therefore your whole basic idea is different from anything that has ever existed before, either in the empires of the past or even in the United States.

I think that this is the fundamental fact which we have to bear in mind—that the British Empire, or the British Commonwealth of nations, does not stand for unity, standardisation, or assimilation, or denationalisation ; but it stands for a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it. And even nations who have fought against you, like my own, must feel that they and their interests, their language, their religions, and all their cultural interests are as safe and as secure under the British flag as those of the children of your household and your own blood. It is only in proportion as that is realised that you will fulfil the true mission which you have undertaken. Therefore, it seems, speaking my own individual opinion, that there is only one solution, that is the solution supplied by our past traditions of freedom, self-government, and the fullest development. We are not going to force common Governments, federal or otherwise, but we are going to extend liberty, freedom, and nationhood more and more in every part of the Empire.

The question arises, how are you going to keep this world together if there is going to be all this enormous development towards a more varied and richer life among all its parts? It seems to me that you have two potent factors that you must rely on for the future. The first is your hereditary kingship. I have seen some speculations recently in the papers of this country upon the position of the kingship

of this country; speculations by people who, I am sure, have never thought of the wider issues that are at stake. You cannot make a Republic in this country. You cannot make a Republic of the British Commonwealth of nations, because if you have to elect a President not only in these islands, but all over the British Empire, who will be the ruler and representative of all these peoples? You are facing an absolutely insoluble problem. Now, you know the theory of our Constitution is that the King is not merely your King, but he is the King of all of us. He represents every part of the whole Commonwealth of nations. If his place is to be taken by anybody else, then that somebody will have to be elected by a process which, I think, will pass the wit of man to devise. Therefore let us be thankful for the mercies we have. We have a kingship here which is really not very different from a hereditary Republic, and I am sure that more and more in the future the trend will be in that direction, and I shall not be surprised to see the time when our Royal princes, instead of getting their Consorts among the princelings of Central Europe, will go to the Dominions and the outlying portions of the Empire.

I think that in the theory of the future of this great Empire it is impossible to attach too much importance to this institution which we have existing, and which can be developed, in my opinion, to the greatest uses possible for its future preservation and development. It will, of course, be necessary to go further than that. It is not only the symbol of unity which you have in the Royal ruler, but you will have to develop further common institutions.

Everyone admits that it would be necessary to devise better machinery for common consultation than we have had hitherto. So far we have relied upon the Imperial Conference which meets every four years, and which, however useful for the work it has done hitherto, has not, in my opinion, been a complete success. It will be necessary to devise better means for achieving our ends. A certain precedent has been laid down of calling the Prime Ministers and representatives from the Empire of India to the Imperial Cabinet, and we have seen the statement made by Lord Curzon that it is the intention of the government to perpetuate that practice in future. Although we have not yet the details of the scheme, and we have to wait for a complete exposition of the subject from his Majesty's Government, yet it is clear that in an institution like that you have a far better instrument of common consultation than you have in the old Imperial Conference, which was called only every four years, and which discussed a number of subjects which were not really of first-rate importance. After all, what you want is to call together the most important statesmen in the Empire from time

to time—say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary—to discuss matters which concern all parts of the Empire in common, and in order that causes of friction and misunderstanding may be removed. A common policy should be laid down to determine the true orientation of our Imperial policy.

Take foreign policy, for instance, on which the fate of the Empire may from time to time depend. I think it is highly desirable that at least once a year the most important leaders of the Empire should be called together to discuss these matters, and to determine a common policy, which would then be carried out in detail by the various executive Governments of the commonwealth nations. This Imperial Council or Cabinet will not themselves exercise executive functions, but they will lay down the policy which will be carried out by the Governments of the various parts of the Empire. A system like that, although it looks small, must in the end lead to very important results and very great changes. You cannot settle a common policy for the whole of the British Empire without changing that policy very considerably from what it has been in the past, because the policy will have to be, for one thing, far simpler. We do not understand diplomatic finesse in other parts of the Empire. We go by large principles, and things which can be easily understood by our undeveloped democracies. If your foreign policy is going to rest, not only on the basis of your Cabinet here, but finally on the whole of the British Empire, it will have to be a simpler and more intelligible policy, which will, I am sure, lead in the end to less friction, and the greater safety of the Empire.

Of course, no one will ever dispute the primacy of the Imperial Government in these matters. Whatever changes and developments come about, we shall always look upon the British Government as the senior partner in this concern. When this Council is not sitting the Imperial Government will conduct the foreign affairs of the Empire. But it will always be subject to the principles and policy which have been laid down in these common conferences from time to time, and which, I think, will be a simpler and probably, in the long run, a saner and safer policy for the Empire as a whole. Naturally, it will lead to greater publicity. There is no doubt that, after the catastrophe that has overtaken Europe, nations in future will want to know more about the way their affairs are conducted. And you can understand that, once it is no longer an affair of one Government, but of a large number of Governments who are responsible ultimately to their Parliaments for the action they have taken, you may be sure there will be a great deal more publicity and discussion of foreign affairs than there has ever been.

* I am sure that the after-effects of a change like this, although it looks a simple change, are going to be very important, not only for this community of nations, but for the world as a whole. Far too much stress is laid upon the instruments of government. People are inclined to forget that the world is getting more democratic, and that forces which find expression in public opinion are going to be far more powerful in the future than they have been in the past. You will find that you have built up a spirit of comradeship and a common feeling of patriotism, and that the instrument of government will not be the thing that matters so much as the spirit that actuates the whole system in all its parts. That seems to me to be your mission. You talk about an Imperial mission. It seems to me this British Empire has only one mission, and that is a mission for greater liberty and freedom and self-development. Yours is the only system that has ever worked in history where a large number of nations have been living in unity. Talk about the League of Nations—you are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the line that I am sketching here is correct you are going to be an even greater league of nations in the future; and if you are true to your old traditions of self-government and freedom, and to this vision of your future and your mission, who knows that you may not exercise far greater and more beneficent influence on the history of mankind than you have ever done before?

In the welter of confusion which is probably going to follow the war in Europe you will stand as the one system where liberty to work successfully has kept together divers communities. You may be sure the world such as will be surrounding you in the times that are coming will be very likely to follow your example. You may become the real nucleus for the world-government for the future. There is no doubt that is the way things will go in the future. You have made a successful start; and if you keep on the right track your Empire will be a solution of the whole problem.

I hope I have given no offence. When I look round this brilliant gathering, and see before me the most important men in the Government of the United Kingdom, I am rather anxious that we should discuss this matter, which concerns our future so very vitally—a matter which should never be forgotten even in this awful struggle in which all our energies are engaged. Memories of the past keep crowding in upon me. I think of all the difficulties which have surrounded us in the past, and I am truly filled with gratitude for the reception which you have given me, and with gratitude to Time, the great and merciful judge, which has healed many wounds, and gratitude to that Divinity which “shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will.” I think of the

difficulties that still lie ahead of us, which are going to test all the nations fighting for liberty far more than they have been tested in the past, and I hope and pray that they may all have clearness of vision and purpose, and especially that strength of soul in the coming days, which will be more necessary than strength of arm. I verily believe that we are within reach of priceless and immeasurable good, not only for this United Kingdom and group of nations to which we belong, but also for the whole world. But, of course, it will depend largely upon us whether the great prize is achieved now in the struggle, or whether the world will be doomed to long, weary waiting in the future. The prize is within our grasp, if we have strength, especially the strength of soul, which I hope we shall have, to see this thing through without getting tired of waiting, until victory crowns the efforts of our brave men in the field.

PIERRE VICTURNIEN VERGNIAUD

(1753-1793).

IDEALIST, poet, philosopher, and philanthropist, capable of all the virtues, Vergniaud, the greatest of the French Girondists, was forced by circumstances to become a revolutionary leader at a time when, on one side and the other, he was opposed by a ruthlessness of which he was incapable, manifesting itself through crimes which to him were unimaginable in advance of their commission. When the absolutism of royalty and that of the mob exerted each against the other all the enormous forces of the malevolence of centuries of injustice, he attempted to establish liberty and, through its uplifting power, to put France and the world on a higher plane of civilization. The attempt ended for him with the scaffold. But it did not end so for France, and he may rightly be classed as chief among the founders of the existing Girondist Republic.

Born at Limoges, May 31st, 1753, of a family in good circumstances, Vergniaud while still a youth wrote a poem which attracted the attention of Turgot who became his patron and promoted his education. After beginning the practice of law he was drawn into politics at the opening of the Revolution. Entering the Legislative Assembly in October 1791, he showed such power as an orator that leadership was thrust on him in spite of himself. He was at first in favour of constitutional monarchy, but the plots of the court with foreign enemies of the new order in France made him a republican. The Girondists followed him with courage and confidence, while the Jacobins eagerly took advantage of his attacks on their enemies to excuse meditated crimes which, when they became overt, he viewed with the deepest abhorrence. He was not willing, however, to trust wholly to moral and intellectual forces, and, although he voted for the death of the King with reluctance, he had done much to make it inevitable. From that vote, his own downfall dates, for the King's execution forced conditions under which the utmost Radicalism of the Girondists was attacked as "milk-and-water moderation." Opposing the atrocities of the Terrorists with a self-devoting courage which expected the inevitable end, Vergniaud and his friends were prepared for it when it came in the autumn of 1793. On the wall of the Carmelite convent where they were imprisoned, he wrote

in blood *Potius mori quam fœdari*, and on October 31st, 1793, he went to the guillotine with his friends, all singing the Marseillaise and keeping up the chant until the last man was strapped under the axe.

REPLY TO ROBESPIERRE—AGAINST TERRORISM

Delivered in the French Convention, April 10th, 1793).

ROBESPIERRE accuses us of having suddenly become "Moderates,"—monks of the order of Saint Bernard. (*Feuillants*.) Moderates,—we? I was not such, on the tenth of August, Robespierre, when thou didst hide in thy cellar. Moderates! No, I am not such a Moderate that I would extinguish the national energy. I know that liberty is ever as active as a blazing flame,—that it is irreconcilable with the inertia that is fit only for slaves! Had we tried but to feed that sacred fire which burns in my heart as ardently as in that of the men who talk incessantly about "the impetuosity" of their character, such great dissensions would never have arisen in this Assembly. I know that in revolutionary times it is as great a folly to pretend the ability to calm on the spur of the moment the effervescence of the people as it would be to command the waves of the ocean when they are beaten by the wind. Thus it behoves the lawmaker to prevent as much as he can the storm's disaster by wise counsel. But if under the pretext of revolution it became necessary, in order to be a patriot, to become the declared protector of murder and of robbery,—then I am a "Moderate!"

Since the abolition of the monarchy, I have heard much talk of revolution. I said to myself: There are but two more revolutions possible: that of property or the Agrarian law, and that which would carry us back to despotism. I have made a firm resolution to resist both the one and the other and all the indirect means that might lead us to them. If that can be construed as being a "Moderate," than we are all such; for we all have voted for the death penalty against any citizen who would propose either one of them.

I have also heard much said about insurrection,—of attempts to cause risings of the people,—and I admit I have groaned under it. Either the insurrection has a determined object, or it has not; in the latter case, it is a convulsion for the body politic which, since it cannot do it good, must necessarily do it a great deal of harm. The wish to force insurrection can find lodgment nowhere but in the heart of a bad citizen. If the insurrection has a determined object, what can it be?

To transfer the exercise of sovereignty to the Republic. The exercise of sovereignty is confided to the national representatives. Therefore, those who talk of insurrection are trying to destroy national representation; therefore they are trying to deliver the exercise of sovereignty to a small number of men, or to transfer it upon the head of a single citizen; therefore they are endeavouring to found an aristocratic government, or to re-establish royalty. In either case, they are conspiring against the Republic and liberty, and if it become necessary either to approve them in order to be a patriot, or be a "Moderate" in battling against them, then I am a Moderate!

When the statute of liberty is on the throne, insurrection can be called into being only by the friends of royalty. By continually shouting to the people that they must rise; by continuing to speak to them, not the language of the laws, but that of the passions, arms have been furnished to the aristocracy. Taking the living and the language of sansculottism, it has cried out to the Finistère department: "You are unhappy; the assignats are at a discount; you ought to rise *en masse*." In this way the exaggerations have injured the Republic. We are "Moderates!" But for whose profit have we shown this great moderation? For the profit of the *émigrés*? We have adopted against them all the measures of rigour that were imposed by justice and national interest. For the profit of inside conspirators? We have never ceased to call upon their heads the sword of the law. But I have demurred against the law that threatened to proscribe the innocent as well as the guilty. There was endless talk of terrible measures, of revolutionary measures. I also was in favour of them,—these terrible measures, but only against the enemies of the country. I did not want them to compromise the safety of good citizens, for the reason that some unprincipled wretches were interested in their undoing. I wanted punishments but not proscriptions. Some men have appeared as if their patriotism consisted in tormenting others,—in causing tears to flow! I would have wished that there should be none but happy people! The convention is the centre around which all citizens should rally! It may be that their gaze fixed upon it is not always free from fear and anxiety. I would have wished that it should be the centre of all their affections and of all their hopes. Efforts were made to accomplish the revolution by terror. I should have preferred to bring it about by love. In short, I have not thought, that like the priests and the fierce ministers of the Inquisition, who spoke of their God of Mercy only when they were surrounded by autos-da-fé and stakes, that we should speak of liberty surrounded by daggers and executioners!

You say we are "Moderates!" Ah! let thanks be offered us for this moderation of which we are accused as if it were a crime! If, when in this tribune they came to wave the brands of discord and to outrage with the most insolent audacity the majority of the representatives of the people; if, when they shouted with as much fury as folly: "No more truce! No more peace between us!" we had given way to the promptings of a just indignation; if we had accepted the counter-revolutionary challenge which was tendered to us, I declare to my accusers (and no matter what suspicions they create against us; no matter what the calumnies with which they try to tarnish us, our names still remain more esteemed than theirs) that we would have seen coming in haste from all the provinces to combat the men of the second of September, men equally formidable to anarchy and to tyrants! And our accusers and we ourselves would be already consumed by the fire of civil war. Our moderation has saved the country from this terrible scourge, and by our silence we have deserved well of the Republic!

I have not passed by, without reply, any of Robespierre's calumnies or of his ramblings. I come now to the petition denounced by Pétion; but, as this petition is connected with a general scheme of mischief, allow me to treat of the facts from a higher point of view.

On the tenth of March, a conspiracy broke out against the National Convention. I denounced it to you then. I named some of the leaders. I read to you the decrees taken in the name of the two sections, by some intriguers who had slipped into their midst. A pretence was made of throwing doubts on the facts; the existence of the decrees was considered as uncertain. Nevertheless the facts were attested even by the municipality of Paris. The existence of the decrees was confirmed by the sections who came to disavow them and to inform against the authors.

You ordered, by a decree, that the guilty parties should be prosecuted before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The crime is acknowledged. What heads have fallen? None. What accomplice has even been arrested? None. You yourselves have contributed to render your decree illusory. You have ordered Fournier to appear at the bar of your court. Fournier admitted that he was present at the first gathering that took place at the Jacobins: that from there he had gone to the Cordeliers, the place of the general meeting; that, at that meeting, there was a question of proceeding to ring the alarm-bell, to close the barriers, and to slaughter a number of the members of the convention. But because he stated that, in the scenes in which he had participated, he had not been animated by evil intentions; and,—as if to butcher a part of the convention had not been reputed as an evil,—you set him at liberty by ordering that he should be heard later on as a witness, if it was thought best, before the Revolu-

tionary Tribunal. It is as if in Rome the Senate had decreed that Lentulus might become a witness in the conspiracy of Catiline!

This inconceivable weakness rendered powerless the sword of the law and taught your enemies that you were not to be dreaded by them. At once a new plot was formed which manifested itself by the constitution of this central committee which was to correspond with all the provinces. This plot was counteracted by the patriotism of the section *du Mail*, who denounced it to you; you ordered before your bar the members of this central committee; did they obey your decree? No. Who then are you? Have you ceased to be the representatives of the people? Where are the new men whom they have endowed with their almighty power? So they insult your decree; so you are shamefully bandied about from one plot to another. Pétion has let you into the secret of still another one. In the petition of the *Halle-au-Blé*, the dissolution of the National Convention is being arranged for, by accusing the majority of corruption; opprobrium is being poured upon them from full cups; the formal design is announced of changing the form of the government, inasmuch as they have made manifest that of concentrating the exercise of sovereign authority in the small number of men therein represented as the only ones worthy of public confidence.

It is not a petition that is being submitted to your wisdom. These are supreme orders that they dare dictate to you. You are notified that it is for the last time that the truth is being told you; you are notified that you have but to choose between your expulsion, or bow to the law that is imposed on you. And on these insolent threats, on these burning insults, the order of the day or a simple disapproval is quietly proposed to you! And now then! how do you expect good citizens to stand by you, if you do not know how to sustain yourselves? Citizens! were you but simple individuals, I could say to you: "Are you cowards? Well, then; abandon yourselves to the chances of events; wait in your stupidity until your throats are cut or you are driven out." But there is here no question of your personal safety; you are the representatives of the people; the safety of the Republic is at stake; you are the depositaries of her liberty and of her glory. If you are dissolved, anarchy succeeds you, and despotism succeeds to anarchy. Any man conspiring against you is an ally of Austria. You are convinced of it, as you have decreed that he shall be punished by death. Do you wish to be consistent? Cause your decrees to be carried out, or revoke them, or order the barriers of France to be opened to the Austrians and decree that you will be the slaves of the first robber who may wish to put his chains upon you.

SIDNEY WEBB

(1859-).

SIDNEY WEBB has been variously employed, in a city office, in the War Office, as a surveyor of taxes, and in the Colonial Office, and has been called to the bar at Gray's Inn. But he is better known as a socialist and one of the chief writers in the Labour cause. He was one of the early members of the Fabian Society, contributed to "Fabian Essays" (1889), and soon made his political views known by his speeches and writings.

In 1892 he entered the London County Council as a member for Deptford, and in the successive elections of 1895, 1898, 1901 and 1904 was returned at the head of the poll. He had resigned from the Civil Service in 1891 to devote his whole time to the work of the Council and to the study of economics. He has served on many important commissions including that on Trade Union Law. It was he and his wife, too, who were responsible for the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission.

His election at the beginning of the war to the national executive of the Labour party gave him more influence in Labour circles, and the reconstruction of the party a little later was closely in accord with his views. He has since served on the Coal Industry Commission and the Committee set up under the 1919 Profiteering Act and has held the professorship of Public Administration in London University. In the last Labour Government he was President of the Board of Trade.

Mr. and Mrs. Webb have been the joint authors of many valuable books on political and social subjects. The more important are: "English Local Government: the Manor and the Borough," 1908; "The History of Trade Unionism," 1920; "A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain," 1920. He was instrumental in founding the weekly "New Statesman" in 1913 and in developing the London School of Economics and Political Science.

LABOUR'S PROGRAMME

(Delivered in London).

THERE are three dominant features of the economic life of to-day peremptorily demanding the consideration of every statesman, and challenging every political party. There is the almost complete supersession, by subtle forms of trust and monopoly, of that free competition among capitalist enterprises which used to give the consumer at least some guarantee that prices would oscillate closely around the necessary cost of production. This problem, I find, reduces the candid statesman of either of the older parties privately to despair. He sees no solution. There is in the next place, that equivocal influence, if not sinister dominance, in all important issues of government, in the newspaper press, and even in educational and social organization, of the private interests of the owners of great masses of wealth. In the form in which it exists to-day, this is a new feature. I do not find that such Liberal or Unionist members of the House of Commons as I have talked to on the subject, even when they recognize its danger, have any idea of how to prevent this illegitimate dominance. And the third of these outstanding economic problems—into which, as it seems to me, both the others enter—is that of Unemployment; not so much in its present magnitude, which is exceptional and transient, but in its persistence and universality.

It would, I suppose, be very rude of us to "butt in" at the domestic recriminations of the conferences of either section of the Liberal Party—or to intrude on those more shrouded interchanges of counsel among the influential personages of the Unionist Party—with any peremptory challenge as to the substance of their respective policies. I fear that neither Liberalism nor Unionism would abide our questioning. But I may at least put the inquiry before this Conference. What has the Liberal Party—what has the Unionist Party—to propose to the consumer by way of protection against the now continuous profiteering of the various capitalist combinations that dominate prices? How does either of these statesmen suggest that the illegitimate and almost limitless power of private wealth in the newspaper press and in public administration can be checked? Finally, does either of these parties or these statesmen believe that the British wage-earners will go on acquiescing in the common refusal to deal adequately and systematically with the tragedy of nation-wide unemployment? It is, I venture to say, in the failure of political leaders even to apply their minds to these three fundamental economic problems, still less, to permit them to appear

in their political programmes, that stands revealed to-day the bankruptcy of both Liberalism and Conservatism.

The Labour Party at least grapples with these problems in all their ramifications. Where the candid Liberal or the honest Unionist admits that he sees no way out, the inquirer who comes to the Labour Party finds that it has principles, directly applicable to the very questions about which he is puzzled. And what has become unusual in political parties, the Labour Party has not only principles but also a practical programme worked out in considerable detail ; and a programme which flows out of its principles, and is consistent with these. This consistency between party principles and party programme is indeed a luxury ! Nothing strikes me with greater astonishment than the unabashed way in which Ministers, whether Liberal or Unionist, whenever they are compelled to grapple with a pressing evil, adopt, not an individualist solution, which is what, in my innocence, I used to expect from them, but always and inevitably a Collectivist solution. The policy that they continue to profess is, of course, violently Anti-Collectivist. But whenever they have actually to do anything in their several departments it is always a Collectivist line that they follow. Naturally, because along this line they lack both faith and knowledge, they make a botch. The nation will sooner or later see the wisdom of calling in those doctors who both understand and believe in what they prescribe.

First let me insist on what our opponents habitually ignore, and indeed, what they seem intellectually incapable of understanding, namely the inevitable gradualness of our scheme of change. The very fact that Socialists have both principles and a programme appears to confuse nearly all their critics. If we state our principles, we are told " That is not practicable." When we recite our programme the objection is " That is not Socialism." But why, because we are idealists, should we be supposed to be idiots ? For the Labour Party, it must be plain, Socialism is rooted in political Democracy ; which necessarily compels us to recognize that every step towards our goal is dependent on gaining the assent and support of at least a numerical majority of the whole people. Thus, even if we aimed at revolutionizing everything at once, we should necessarily be compelled to make each particular change only at the time, and to the extent, and in the manner in which ten or fifteen million electors, in all sorts of conditions, of all sorts of temperaments, from Land's End to the Orkneys, could be brought to consent to it. How anyone can fear that the British electorate, whatever mistakes it may make or may condone, can ever go too fast or too far is incomprehensible to me. That indeed, is the supremely valuable safeguard of any effective democracy.

But the Labour Party, when in due course it comes to be entrusted with power, will naturally not even want to do everything at once. Surely it must be abundantly manifest to any instructed person that, whilst it would be easy to draft proclamations of universal change, or even enact laws in a single sitting purporting to give a new Heaven and a new Earth, the result, the next morning, would be no change at all, unless indeed, the advent of widespread confusion. I remember Mr. Bernard Shaw saying, a whole generation ago, "Don't forget that, whilst you may nationalize the railways in one afternoon, it will take a long time to transform all the third-class carriages and all the first-class carriages into second-class carriages." Once we face the necessity of putting our principles first into Bills, to be fought through committee clause by clause; and then into the appropriate administrative machinery for carrying them into execution from one end of the Kingdom to the other—and this is what the Labour Party has done with its Socialism—the inevitability of gradualness cannot fail to be appreciated. This translation of Socialism into practicable projects, to be adopted one after another, is just the task in which we have been engaged for a whole generation, with the result that, on every side, fragments of our proposals have already been put successfully into operation by town and county councils, and the national government itself, and have now become accepted as commonplaces by the average man. The whole nation has been imbibing Socialism without realising it! It is now time for the subconscious to rise into consciousness.

Let me add a word in passing about our position as a party in this matter. The Labour Party, after more than twenty years' strenuous work, has now attained the position of the Official Opposition, holding itself out to the electors as the Alternative Government, prepared to take over the whole administration of the nation as soon as it is called upon to do so. The Party must remember this position, and rise to its responsibilities. We have, from now onward, to work and speak and act, under the sense of the liability, at any moment, to be charged with putting our plans and projects in operation. This does not mean, I suggest, that we should abandon our investigations and researches whether individual or departmental, which have proved of the greatest value in putting us ahead of the other political parties, or give up refining and enlarging our ideals, or, as individuals, cease the expounding of inspiring visions of what the future might and should unfold. But it does mean, I suggest, that we should not lightly commit ourselves as a party—and we should not even seek to commit the party as a party—to new or additional projects, or to the details of reforms, if these

belong more appropriately to a stage of greater freedom and less responsibility.

This brings me to the suggestion that surely every citizen of our own land must see, in the experience of the past decade, an overwhelming demonstration of the fact that violence is, and must be, always accursed, injuring both him who does and him who suffers it, and futile to both. Violence persuades no one, convinces no one, satisfies no one. Thus, it may produce death, or the acquiescence which is the death of the mind—that is to say, violence may destroy, but it can never construct. Moreover, in our practical British way we can see that, by the very nature of the case, violence can be much more easily and effectively applied on the Conservative side—to keep things as they are, because this requires only acquiescence—than on the side of change, because every change requires the active participation of the citizen, the adoption of new methods of life and work, or at least the formation of new habits. What has happened in the United States on the one hand, and in Italy on the other, where property, in small holdings as well as great, has successfully used violence against the popular cause, are but examples of the general proposition that when it comes to the brutalities of physical force, reaction easily goes one better than the revolutionary mob. It is when the decision is arrived at by counting heads, not by breaking them, that we get the nearest approach to Government of the people, by the people, for the people. At any rate it is in this faith that the Labour Party is rooted.

Let me add that in my judgment it behoves us to weigh our words when we voice our intuitive objection to the authority of government. We must, of course, be outspoken in our denunciation of every form of governmental tyranny, whether "white," "red," "black" or any other colour, at home or abroad, in Asia and Africa as well as in Europe and America. The public opinion of the civilized world—for which in this matter the Labour Party has largely the responsibility—has a real influence, slow moving though it be, even over the most obdurate of authorities. We have need to exercise the greatest vigilance to detect and at once oppose every instance of the illegal exercise of power, to which all governments, whether democratic or monarchical, municipal or national, are perpetually prone. Even in the land of Habeas Corpus, as recent instances show, we have by no means yet recovered all the liberties that we lost during the war. The strenuous and ultimately successful fight against the Home Secretary's arbitrary Irish deportations, which was maintained by the Labour Party, in the House of Commons, in the constituencies and in the Courts of Justice, will, I hope, be repeated whenever fresh cases occur.

But whatever is done to safeguard individual liberty, and to safeguard it, also, against economic and social as well as against governmental tyranny, let us always remember that it is not against government itself that we are protesting. For government is, after all, only another word for that deliberate co-operation of citizens in a common task which lies at the root of all our proposals. The alternative to government is not freedom. It is the very anarchy of competition, unrestrained and unregulated, from which the world is still suffering; it is, in short, fighting, whether between individuals, between groups, between classes, or between nations; fighting which, even when limited to what we blandly call economic weapons, is inevitably destructive of personal liberty on a far greater scale than any governmental tyranny can be. When this fighting takes the form of war we see that it destroys civilization itself. The only alternative to the struggle expressed by the sinister maxim, "Every man for himself, and the Devil take the hindmost," is, let us remember, exactly that deliberately arranged co-operation among citizens in social tasks that we term government. To-day, I make bold to say, what the world needs is not less government but more. This need for a perpetually increasing co-operation in social functions, in place of individualist anarchy, springs inevitably from the ever-growing complexity of the social life of crowded populations, in which this very co-operation is the condition under which alone individual liberty can be maximized. We enjoy actually greater freedom on the highways because there is a Rule of the Road, than we should if everyone drove as the whim of the moment dictated. It is because we want more government internationally (and thereby a wider measure of national freedom in any real sense) that we support the League of Nations, and seek to render it both more democratic and more and more effective as an instrument of world control.

At the other end of the scale we ask perpetually for greater powers for our Town Councils, and other local authorities, and we look to their obtaining an ever-widening sphere for their beneficent administration by which the freedom of the mass of the people to live their own lives is so much increased. And even at Whitehall, though we grumble at bureaucracy, it is not a diminution but an increase that in the name of freedom the Labour Party demands in the functions exercised, for instance, in connection with mines and railways, shipping and insurance, health and housing or the conditions under which ninety per cent. of the people have to work and live. What we have always to insist on is that government should, at all points, be effectively democratized; that it should be, wherever practicable, entrusted to the local representatives of the community, rather than to the necessarily centralized

departments at Whitehall; that in every branch the widest possible sphere should be assigned to the voluntarily associated Consumers' Co-operative Movement, which, be it remembered, is, to the Socialist, an integral part of Socialism itself; and that everywhere the necessary supervision and control to be exercised by Parliament and the Central Government should be supplemented by a steadily increasing participation in management by the vocational organizations of all grades of workers concerned. How difficult it is to make the academic philosophers, not to mention Lord Chancellors, understand that vocational organization is itself an indispensable part of democratic government—that political democracy without industrial democracy is a sham! But subject to these improvements in governmental machinery—improvements which, I admit, are of the essence of the case—I repeat that, in my opinion, what the world needs to-day—what Britain needs to-day—what even the Labour Party needs to-day is, not less government but more.

Finally, let me remind you that there is a higher need even than government, whether it be the government of a city or the government of our tempers or the government of our tongues. It is not upon its plans or its programmes—not even upon its principles or its ideals—that a political party is ultimately judged. It is not upon them or any of them that its measure of success in the continuous appeal to the judgment of the average citizen finally depends. The success of the Labour Party in this country depends, more than on anything else, upon the spirit in which we hold our faith, the spirit in which we present our proposals, the spirit in which we meet our opponents in debate, the spirit in which we fulfil our own obligations, the spirit in which, with inevitable backslidings, we live our own lives. We shall not achieve much, whatever changes we can bring about, unless what we do is done in the spirit of fellowship. For we must always remember that the founder of British Socialism was not Karl Marx but Robert Owen, and that Robert Owen preached not "class war" but the ancient doctrine of human brotherhood—the hope, the faith, the living fact of human fellowship—a faith and a hope reaffirmed in the words of that other great British Socialist—William Morris—in "The Dream of John Ball." "Forsooth, brothers, fellowship is heaven, and lack of fellowship is hell; fellowship is life, and lack of fellowship is death; and the deeds that ye do upon the earth, it is for fellowship's sake that ye do them, and the life that is in it, that shall live on and on for ever, and each one of you part of it, while many a man's life upon the earth from the earth shall wane."

